CourtListener 10851336•Kathleen C. v. Choi CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 Kathleen C. v. Choi CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
KATHLEEN C., B345551
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 25STRO00281)
JINHONG CHOI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melanie Ochoa, Judge. Affirmed.
Jinhong Choi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen C., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Appellant Jinhong Choi (Choi) appeals from a civil
harassment restraining order (restraining order) issued against
him protecting respondent Kathleen C. (Kathleen).1 Choi
contends that he did not receive sufficient notice; Kathleen’s
allegations and evidence fail to satisfy the legal standard for
harassment under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.62; the
restraining order contains contradictory terms that make
compliance impossible; and an error in the minute order reflects
fundamental errors that cast doubt on the reliability of the
proceedings. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
Choi and Kathleen are neighbors and former friends. In
August 2023, Choi and Kathleen had a dispute over their shared
fence. Choi then removed and stole Kathleen’s locked gate, which
allowed him to access her property. Choi repeatedly trespassed
onto Kathleen’s property and destroyed approximately $3,000
worth of her possessions, including pots, gardening supplies,
plants, tools, and garden furniture. After each incident, Choi
1 In accordance with California Rules of Court rule
8.90(b)(5), we initially refer to the person protected in this civil
harassment proceeding by her first name and last initial, and
thereafter by her first name. No disrespect is intended.
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3 We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 780, 787.) Because Choi elected to proceed without a
transcript of the hearing, we rely on the sworn allegations in
Kathleen’s request for a civil harassment restraining order.
2
would leave notes admitting that he trespassed onto her property
and destroyed her possessions. The final incident occurred on
December 25, 2024.
Choi mounted security cameras on the side of his house for
the purpose of surveilling Kathleen. Choi also idled his
motorcycle in the evenings making loud, unnecessary noise and
polluting the air around his neighbors’ residences. Kathleen
alleged that Choi was “in a rage” and that she feared for her
safety.
On January 14, 2025, Kathleen filed a request for a
restraining order under section 527.6. Kathleen filed a proof of
service on January 30, 2025.
The trial court held a hearing on February 4, 2025. Both
Choi and Kathleen appeared and testified. Following the
hearing, the court granted Kathleen’s request for a restraining
order for a period of one year. The restraining order requires
Choi to stay five feet away from Kathleen when “entering,
exiting, or residing” at his residence. Choi must also stay 100
yards away from Kathleen and her home. The restraining order
expired on February 4, 2026.4
4 We exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this
arguably moot appeal because “[a]pplying a strict standard of
mootness . . . would effectively deprive persons affected by
injunctions of limited duration from obtaining any judicial
review.” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 719, 728; see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].)
3
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Law
Section 527.6 “provid[es] expedited injunctive relief to
victims of harassment. [Citation.]” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) A person who has suffered harassment
may seek a temporary restraining order and may obtain an order
prohibiting the harassment if, after a hearing, a trial court finds
clear and convincing evidence of unlawful harassment. (§ 527.6,
subds. (a)(1), (i).) “The ‘ “ ‘[c]lear and convincing’ ” ’ standard
‘ “requires a finding of high probability” ’ of unlawful harassment.
[Citation.]” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698 (E.G.).)
The statutory definition of “[h]arassment” includes “a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and
that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “An
injunction is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts
are likely to recur.” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
399, 402.) A single act of unlawful violence may justify the
issuance of a restraining order if the trial court finds evidence of
a future threat of harassment. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499; Russell v. Douvan, supra, at p. 404.)
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s factual findings (express and
implied) in granting a civil harassment restraining order for
substantial evidence. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–
699.) Because the trial court must make its finding of unlawful
harassment under the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof (§ 527.6, subd. (i)), “the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
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probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
“When conducting our review, we must ‘not reweigh the
evidence itself’ [citation], but must instead ‘view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.]
Whether the facts, supported by substantial evidence and
construed most favorably in the petitioner’s favor, are legally
sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6 is a
‘ “question[] of law subject to de novo review.” ’ [Citations.]”
(E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)
III. Choi Received Sufficient Notice
“[U]pon the filing of a petition under [section 527.6], the
respondent shall be personally served with a copy of the petition,
temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing of the
petition . . . at least five days before the hearing.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (m)(1).) Choi admits that he received five days’ notice.
Choi argues that due process requires a longer notice
period because he is “a recent immigrant with limited English
proficiency.” Choi argues that the five-day notice period was
insufficient to secure translation services, obtain legal counsel,
prepare an adequate defense, and identify and prepare witnesses.
Choi identifies no legal authority that entitles him to more
than five days’ notice under these circumstances. Nor does the
record reflect that Choi requested a continuance on these
grounds. In his reply brief, Choi seems to admit that he did not
request a continuance. A party who opposes a motion on the
merits without requesting a continuance or identifying resulting
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prejudice waives any defect in notice. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 690, 697.)
Choi argues that Kathleen engaged in “a strategic attempt
to ambush [him] with insufficient notice” because she filed the
request on January 14, 2025, and did not serve him until
January 30, 2025. Conversely, Kathleen attaches an exhibit to
her opposition brief demonstrating that the Sheriff’s Department
attempted to serve Choi on three prior occasions. We need not
consider Choi’s argument or Kathleen’s extra-record evidence
because Choi received proper notice under section 527.6 and
waived any argument to the contrary.
IV. Kathleen’s Allegations and Evidence Are Sufficient to
Establish Harassment
Next, Choi argues that Kathleen’s allegations fail to satisfy
the legal standard for harassment under section 527.6. We
disagree. A complaint need only contain “[a] statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise
language.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) Here, Kathleen alleged that
Choi repeatedly trespassed onto her property and destroyed her
possessions; Choi removed and stole her locked gate; Choi
mounted security cameras on the side of his house to surveil her;
Choi idled his motorcycle in the evenings making loud and
unnecessary noise; and Choi was “in a rage.” These allegations
demonstrate “conduct directed at a specific person that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Choi seems to argue that Kathleen’s evidence is insufficient
to support issuance of the restraining order. For example, Choi
argues that the evidence demonstrates that this was a property
dispute, not harassment, and that his notes were “protected
6
property rights communications.” Choi argues that his security
cameras served a legitimate purpose. Choi also argues that
Kathleen, not he, violated the Penal Code. Because Choi elected
to proceed without a transcript of the hearing, we cannot
evaluate these claims on appeal. (See Estate of Fain (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 973, 992 [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been
provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing
appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed
correct as to all evidentiary matters.”].)
V. The Restraining Order Does Not Violate Due Process
Choi argues that the restraining order contained
contradictory terms, because the court simultaneously ordered
Choi to stay 100 yards away from Kathleen and her home while
ordering Choi to stay only five feet away from Kathleen and her
home when “entering, exiting, or residing at” his home. Choi
argues that these contradictory distance requirements make
compliance impossible, in violation of due process. We disagree
with Choi’s interpretation of the trial court’s order. Clearly, the
court intended to create an exception to the 100-yard
requirement when Choi was entering, exiting, or residing at his
home, so there is no due process violation. Regardless, the order
expired on February 4, 2026.
Finally, Choi argues that the minute order contains “a
significant clerical error” demonstrating that “the trial court
proceedings were fundamentally flawed.” Specifically, the
minute order incorrectly states that Kathleen, not Choi, was
assisted by two Korean language interpreters. This clerical error,
presumably by the trial court’s judicial assistant, does not
warrant reversal. (Cummings v. Columbia Pictures Corp. of
California (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 244, 250.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent Kathleen C. is entitled
to her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.*
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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