CourtListener 10851333•People v. McCraney CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. McCraney CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
THE PEOPLE, C100905
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23F2544)
v.
DAVID LEE MCCRANEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant David Lee McCraney fired a gun at multiple people. As a result, the
jury found him guilty of several offenses and found true enhancements and aggravating
circumstances, including that defendant’s conduct demonstrated a danger to society. The
trial court found defendant had been previously convicted of four strike convictions that
also constituted serious felony convictions—three from a case in Shasta County and one
from a case in Trinity County. After striking the prior conviction from Trinity County for
all purposes, the trial court sentenced defendant to 122 years to life plus 59 years, which
included the imposition of multiple prior conviction enhancements based on each of the
Shasta County convictions.
On appeal, defendant contends the jury’s aggravating circumstance findings must
be reversed because the rule of court defining aggravating circumstances is vague. He
also argues the jury’s danger to society aggravating circumstance finding specifically
1
must be reversed because the instruction misstated the law and was argumentative. We
disagree.
Defendant further raises several sentencing error claims in his opening and
supplemental briefs, including that the trial court improperly imposed multiple prior
serious felony enhancements based on the three Shasta County convictions because they
all arise from the same case. The People agree on this point, as do we. Accordingly, we
remand defendant’s case for a full resentencing when he may raise his other sentencing
claims for consideration by the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Randy H. allowed multiple people, including defendant, to live on his property in
trailers and tents. After defendant had decided to move away from Randy’s property,
Randy decided to help defendant move faster. Consequently, Randy took all of
defendant’s personal property and put it into defendant’s trailer. In the process, Randy
took gold-plated money belonging to defendant. When defendant returned to his trailer,
he saw that Randy had taken his personal property. Defendant became angry, loaded a
revolver he had on his person, and made threats to kill Randy.
Defendant then went over to Randy’s trailer, banged on it, and asked Randy where
defendant’s money was. Randy saw that defendant was armed but came out of the trailer
anyway and admitted to taking defendant’s things. Randy went to his shop to turn on
lights. While Randy was in the shop, defendant became more agitated. Another person
living on Randy’s property walked over with a machete to help Randy, and defendant
fired his gun at him. Defendant then fired his gun at Randy’s girlfriend, who had come
out of Randy’s trailer after hearing the first gunshot, and then defendant shot and hit
Randy.
The jury found defendant guilty of one count of premeditated attempted murder
and three counts of assault with a firearm. The jury also found true a firearm
enhancement as to each of these convictions and a great bodily injury enhancement as to
2
one. The jury further found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person and discharge of a firearm with gross negligence. As to each count, the jury found
true two aggravating circumstances: Defendant’s crimes involved great violence and
defendant demonstrated a serious danger to society. As to the attempted murder, the jury
additionally found true the aggravating circumstance defendant used a weapon. In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had been previously convicted of
four strikes that constituted four prior serious felony convictions—three from Shasta
County in 2018 and one from Trinity County in 2003.
At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior
conviction from Trinity County, with the agreement of the parties, because of the prior
conviction’s age and defendant’s plea form from that case asserting the conviction would
not be used for enhancement purposes in the future. The trial court also declined to
dismiss any enhancements under Penal Code1 section 1385, subdivision (c). The trial
court then sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 122 years to life plus 59 years.
The sentence was comprised of both upper terms and middle terms of imprisonment and
imposed pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law. When imposing upper terms, the trial court
pointed to the jury’s findings defendant acted with great violence and defendant was a
danger to society. Relevant to defendant’s appeal, the trial court calculated the base term
of the attempted murder conviction and one assault with a deadly weapon conviction
under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A)(iii), which considers applicable
enhancements. In this case, the trial court applied the three Shasta County prior
conviction enhancements to this calculation. It also added the three Shasta County prior
conviction enhancements to each of defendant’s indeterminate terms.
Defendant appeals.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
DISCUSSION
I
California Rules Of Court, Rule 4.421 Is Not Vague
Defendant contends California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (rule 4.421), which
addresses aggravating circumstances, is void for vagueness “because [the rule] contains
no meaningful standards, and requires lay jurors to perform a factual analysis based on
abstract and imagined scenarios.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) Defendant
acknowledges that the First Appellate District, Division Four, rejected this argument in
Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 86-92 (Chavez Zepeda), but
argues that decision was wrongly decided. We disagree with defendant and conclude
rule 4.421 is not vague.
Rule 4.421 lists aggravating circumstances trial courts consider when sentencing
defendants under a triad of options. (§ 1170, subd. (a)(3); Chavez Zepeda, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 76-77.) After the passage of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.), section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) “now provides that a court may impose the upper
term only if ‘there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ ”
(Chavez Zepeda, at p. 74.) As relevant here, among the list of aggravating circumstances
are that the defendant’s crime involved great violence, the defendant was armed with or
used a weapon during the commission of the crime, and the defendant has engaged in
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society. (Rule 4.421(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1).) When
making a finding regarding these aggravating circumstances, the fact finder is required to
determine “whether the manner of the crime’s commission was distinctively worse ‘when
compared to other ways in which such a crime could be committed.’ ” (Chavez Zepeda,
at p. 89.)
4
Defendant takes issue with the requirement a fact finder find his crime was
committed in a distinctively worse way compared to other ways to commit the crime,
especially when made by jurors instead of judges, who defendant contends do not possess
the insight to determine where a particular defendant’s conduct lands among the typical
commissions of a particular crime. The Chavez Zepeda court rejected this argument.
(Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86-92.) The court first found that
rule 4.421 was not subject to the same vagueness standards applicable to elements of a
crime because the “[circumstances] do not attempt to define specific criminal offenses,
and the sentencing judge’s ultimate discretion [to not impose an enhanced sentence]
remains a meaningful safeguard.” (Chavez Zepeda, at pp. 86-87.) It next held that,
contrary to defendant’s assumption here, courts and juries applying this comparative
standard, “have not imagined an abstract, ‘ordinary case’ to determine whether a finding
of an aggravating circumstance[] is warranted by the facts of the case [before them].”
(Id. at p. 89.) Instead, “they have considered whether the manner of the crime’s
commission was distinctively worse ‘when compared to other ways in which such a
crime could be committed.’ ” (Ibid.) Given these safeguards, the Chavez Zepeda court
held the enumerated aggravating circumstances contained in rule 4.421 were not vague.
(Chavez Zepeda, at pp. 90-92.) We agree with the Chavez Zepeda court’s reasoning and
apply it here to reject defendant’s vagueness argument.
Defendant’s reliance on Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. 591 is
misplaced. Johnson involved construction of a residual clause in a federal criminal
statute under “the ‘categorical approach’ ” to whether a crime satisfies a particular
definition, which requires a court to “disregard how the defendant actually committed
[the] crime” and instead “imagine the idealized ‘ “ordinary case” ’ of the defendant’s
crime.” (United States v. Davis (2019) 588 U.S. 445, 451-452; see Chavez Zepeda,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 87-89.) Johnson does not suggest the aggravating factors at
issue here are unconstitutionally vague merely because they include qualitative standards.
5
As the Johnson court explained, in general the application of qualitative standards to
“real-world conduct” does not raise a constitutional concern. (Johnson, at pp. 603-604.)
Moreover, in this context, unlike in Johnson, a judge has discretion not to impose a
greater sentence based on the jury’s findings, “offer[ing] some protection against ‘ “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the defendant’s liberty] interest” ’ [citation] that
might attend an imprecise definition of an aggravating factor.” (Chavez Zepeda, at p. 86;
see Johnson, at p. 593.)
Accordingly, rule 4.421 is not unconstitutionally vague.
II
Modified CALCRIM No. 3234 Correctly
Stated The Law And Was Not Argumentative
The jury was instructed with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 3234, which
provided: “If you find the defendant guilty of [certain] crimes charged … , you must
then decide whether the [prosecution] ha[s] proved the additional allegation that
[defendant] has engaged in violent conduct, to wit: using a firearm to assault and injure
other individuals, which indicates he is a serious danger to society. [¶] To prove this
allegation, the [prosecution] must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant has engaged in
violent conduct; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The violent conduct, considered in light of all the
evidence presented, shows that the defendant is a serious danger to society.” (Italics
added.) The instruction then specified, “You may not find the allegation true unless all of
you agree that the [prosecution] ha[s] proved that the defendant’s violent conduct was
distinctively worse than that posed by an ordinary commission of the underlying crime
and that the violent conduct, considered in light of all the evidence presented, shows that
the defendant is a serious danger to society.” (Italics added.)
Defendant contends this instruction misstates an element of the danger to society
aggravating circumstance because the instruction does not explain that the distinctively
6
worse than ordinary standard requires a defendant’s conduct be worse than other ways in
which the crime could be committed. We disagree.
We review a claim of instructional error de novo to ascertain whether the
instruction accurately states the applicable law. (People v. Ramirez (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 175, 218.) In doing so, we consider the challenged instruction in the
context of all the instructions given to the jury and the trial record. (People v. Rivera
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326; People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 815-816.) “ ‘ “A
defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the
jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in
the way asserted by the defendant.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.)
We presume that jurors are capable of understanding and correlating the court’s
instructions and we further presume those instructions were followed by the jury. (Ibid.)
Even assuming defendant is correct in viewing the distinctively worse standard as
an independent element of the danger to society aggravating circumstance under the Sixth
Amendment, the given instructions adequately conveyed that requirement. As defendant
acknowledges, the distinctively worse standard has been described in case law just as
CALCRIM No. 3234 described it to defendant’s jury—distinctively worse than an
ordinary commission of the underlying crime. (People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d
103, 110.) The standard has also been described as the Chavez Zepeda court described
it—“wrongfulness beyond that inherent in the commission of the offense.” (Chavez
Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 91.) Both statements have been endorsed by case
law and we read them as requiring the same standard—something worse than the simple
commission of the elements of the crime. The instructions given communicated this
concept to the jury.
Defendant’s reliance on the concurrence in Lovelace v. Superior Court (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1105 (conc. opn. of Goldman, J.) is misplaced. According to
defendant, the concurrence urges the adoption of a jury instruction stating the
7
distinctively worse standard as beyond that inherent in the commission of the crime. (Id.
at pp. 1120-1122 (conc. opn. of Goldman, J.).) This is not what the concurrence stated.
The concurrence uses the phrase “ ‘distinctively worse than the ordinary’ ”
interchangeably with “ ‘distinctively worse “when compared to other ways in which such
a crime could be committed.” ’ ” (Ibid. (conc. opn. of Goldman, J.).) Regardless of the
phrase used, the concurrence merely provides that a jury instruction defining
unenumerated aggravating circumstances include the concept that defendant’s crime be
distinctively worse. (Id. at pp. 1121-1122 (conc. opn. of Goldman, J.).) This concept
was undisputedly included in the modified version of CALCRIM No. 3234 given here.
Thus, defendant’s contention that CALCRIM No. 3234 improperly states the law is
meritless. Properly construed, defendant’s argument is an argument that the instruction
was incomplete or that he wished it to be further clarified. (See People v. Buenrostro
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428.) This argument required defendant to object or request a
pinpoint instruction from the trial court, which he did not, resulting in forfeiture. (Ibid.)
Defendant also contends CALCRIM No. 3234 is argumentative because it
specified the dangerous conduct was that defendant shot a group of people. We disagree.
“An instruction is argumentative when it recites facts drawn from the evidence in such a
manner as to constitute argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law.”
(People v. Campos (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1244.) “ ‘An instruction should
contain a principle of law applicable to the case, expressed in plain language, indicating
no opinion of the court as to any fact in issue.’ ” (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d
1126, 1135.)
Here, the instruction told the jury it had to determine whether certain facts alleged
by the prosecution demonstrated defendant was a danger to society. The pattern
CALCRIM No. 3234 instruction required the insertion of alleged facts, which defendant
took part in selecting by objecting to proposed language and approving of the language
given. Ultimately, the instruction did not imply to the jury the alleged facts constituted a
8
danger to society and instead charged the jury to decide for itself. Accordingly, the
instruction was not argumentative.
Because the trial court did not misstate the law or deliver an argumentative
instruction when charging the jury with the modified version of CALCRIM No. 3234, we
must also reject defendant’s cumulative error argument related to the wording of
CALCRIM No. 3234.
III
Two Of Defendant’s Prior Serious Felony
Conviction Enhancements Must Be Stricken
Defendant contends the trial court erred by using two of his three prior convictions
from the Shasta County case to impose prior serious felony conviction enhancements
under section 667, subdivision (a). The People agree and also point out the trial court
improperly calculated the base term for two of defendant’s indeterminate Three Strike
sentences on the three prior convictions. We agree with the parties.
Section 667, subdivision (a) provides for a separate five-year sentence
enhancement for every prior serious felony conviction “on charges brought and tried
separately.” Where two charges were not brought separately, but were made in a single
complaint, the court can only impose a single five-year enhancement for the two charges.
(In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136-137; People v. Jones (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
1411, 1415.) “ ‘The question whether prior convictions were brought and tried separately
is for the court to decide, not the jury.’ ” (Jones, at pp. 1415-1416.)
Here, defendant had four prior serious felony convictions—three from one case in
Shasta County and one from another case in Trinity County. The trial court struck the
prior conviction from Trinity County and imposed an enhancement for each prior
conviction from Shasta County on each indeterminate term. The parties agree, as do we,
that the convictions from Shasta County were brought together in a single case.
Consequently, the court erred by imposing a prior conviction enhancement for each of
9
defendant’s prior convictions from Shasta County. (See In re Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at
pp. 136-137.)
The parties agree remand for a full resentencing is appropriate, as do we. The trial
court exercised multiple discretionary choices, including the imposition of middle terms
for the attempted murder conviction and some of the firearm enhancements, under the
assumption it had imposed multiple prior conviction enhancements for each
indeterminate term. Given that the court rested its sentencing decisions on a mistaken
understanding of the law, defendant is entitled to a full resentencing. (People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for
resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances’ ”].) Because
defendant is entitled to a full resentencing, there is no need for us to address his
remaining sentencing claims in his opening and supplemental briefs. Defendant may
raise these arguments to the trial court on remand.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded for a full
resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
10
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.