CourtListener 10851205•In re Jay.S. CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 In re Jay.S. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Jay.S., a Person Coming B348398
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (c/w B349237)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 24CCJP03582A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Jo.S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jo.S.
Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant L.G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendants and appellants Jo.S. (father) and L.G. (mother)
appeal from the juvenile court’s August 20, 2025, order
terminating their parental rights to Jay.S. (minor, born
July 2023). Father and mother’s sole contention is that the court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) failed to fulfill their duties of initial inquiry as
required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law.
Because the juvenile court’s ICWA findings are supported
by substantial evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2024, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300 petition1 seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of
dependency jurisdiction over minor and his twin sister, Jaz.S.
(born July 2023). The petition alleged that Jaz.S. sustained life-
threatening injuries consistent with non-accidental trauma and
ongoing physical abuse. A form attached to the petition indicated
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.
2
that mother and father were questioned on November 10, 2024,
and the inquiry provided “no reason to believe [minor] is or may
be an Indian child.”
In the detention report filed on November 13, 2024, DCFS
reported that mother, father, the maternal grandmother, a great
maternal cousin, and a paternal aunt all denied Indian ancestry.
Inquiries were also made of five medical providers attending to
Jaz.S. or minor, and all denied having knowledge or information
that the family had Indian ancestry. A detective investigating
Jaz.S.’s injuries also denied having such knowledge.
Mother and father each filed a parental notification of
Indian status form, reporting no known indicators of Indian
status. On November 14, 2024, the juvenile court acknowledged
receipt of father’s form and asked father directly if he had any
Indian ancestry. Father denied it. When questioned by the
court, the paternal grandmother, a paternal great-aunt, and two
paternal cousins also denied Indian ancestry. The court found no
reason to know or believe that minor and Jaz.S. were Indian
children.
Jaz.S. died on November 15, 2024, and the juvenile court
subsequently dismissed the dependency petition as it pertained
to her.
On November 20, 2024, the juvenile court asked mother
whether minor had Indian ancestry. Mother responded, “Not
that I’m sure of[.]”
In the jurisdiction/disposition report filed on January 7,
2025, DCFS reported that mother, father, the maternal and
paternal grandmothers, a paternal great-aunt, a maternal cousin,
and a paternal cousin all denied Indian ancestry. Two other
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detectives also denied knowledge of the family having Indian
ancestry.
DCFS filed an amended petition on January 8, 2025,
adding a count pursuant to section 300, subdivision (f), alleging
that mother and father caused Jaz.S.’s death through severe
abuse or neglect and had been criminally charged with murder.
On January 9, 2025, the juvenile court inquired of the
maternal grandmother and a maternal great-aunt, who both
denied Indian ancestry. The court found that DCFS had satisfied
its duty of ICWA inquiry.
On February 6, 2025, the juvenile court further amended
the dependency petition by interlineation and sustained counts
under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1)
(failure to protect), (f) (death of another child through abuse or
neglect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The court also asked two
maternal aunts and a paternal cousin who were present at the
hearing if they were aware of any Indian ancestry, which they
denied.
A DCFS social worker spoke with the paternal grandfather
on March 4, 2025, regarding possible placement of minor. The
record does not reflect that the paternal grandfather was asked
about Indian ancestry. The social worker called the paternal
grandfather again on March 18, 2025, but there was no answer
and a voice message could not be left. The social worker called
again on April 3, 2025, and was still unable to leave a message.
On April 17, 2025, the social worker was able to leave a voice
message asking for a return call. The record does not reflect that
the call was ever returned.
On April 23, 2025, two paternal uncles denied Indian
ancestry when asked by the juvenile court.
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At the section 366.26 hearing on August 20, 2025, the
juvenile court renewed its finding that there was no reason to
know that minor was an Indian child. The court terminated
father and mother’s parental rights to minor. Both appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father and mother contend that the order terminating
their parental rights must be conditionally reversed because, by
failing to ask the paternal grandfather about possible Indian
ancestry, DCFS conducted an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry.
We disagree.
“ICWA was enacted ‘out of concern that “an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies,” ’ and ‘aims to keep Indian children
connected to Indian families.’ [Citation.]” (In re Bella L. (2026)
117 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1289 (Bella L.).) To that end, “ICWA
establishes minimum standards for state courts to follow before
removing Indian children from their families and placing them in
foster care or adoptive homes and does not prohibit states from
establishing higher standards. [Citations.]” (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129.)
Under California law enacted to implement ICWA, the
juvenile court and DCFS “have duties aimed at assessing
whether a child in a dependency action is an ‘Indian child’—that
is, a child who (1) is ‘a member of an Indian tribe,’ or (2) ‘is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.’ [Citations.]” (Bella L.,
supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1289–1290.) Under its initial duty
of inquiry, DCFS “has an ongoing and affirmative duty ‘to inquire
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whether [a] child is an Indian child,’ which includes the duty to
ask ‘extended family members’ ‘whether th[e] child is or may be
an Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).)” (Bella L., supra, at
p. 1290.) Discharge of this duty “does not require interviewing
‘every’ extended family member; rather, where the juvenile
court’s finding that [DCFS] conducted an adequate inquiry and
that ICWA does not apply is ‘supported by sufficient evidence,’
conditional reversal [of an order terminating parental rights] is
not required ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who
has an interest in the child.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply
“ ‘ “implies that . . . social workers had fulfilled their duty of
inquiry.” [Citations.]’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
388, 401.) We review that finding for substantial evidence. (See
Bella L., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286; In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 800.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that there was no evidence that minor was an Indian child and,
therefore, ICWA did not apply. The record discloses that the
court and DCFS were aware of and made diligent efforts to
comply with their duties of initial ICWA inquiry. Father, mother,
the paternal and maternal grandmothers, paternal and maternal
great-aunts and aunts, paternal uncles, paternal and maternal
cousins, medical providers, and detectives were asked—some
repeatedly—about minor’s possible Indian ancestry, and all
denied having such knowledge.
Although the record does not indicate that DCFS asked the
paternal grandfather about Indian ancestry during its single
successful attempt to contact him, “this failure does not render
[its] otherwise diligent and well-documented efforts unreliable or
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the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply unworthy of
our deference. [Citations.]” (Bella L., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1290; see also id. at p. 1286 [substantial evidence supported
finding that initial ICWA inquiry was adequate where “the
agency inquire[d] of the parents and seven extended family
members on the child’s paternal side but fail[ed] to inquire of the
paternal grandfather”].) Nothing from the information provided
by the numerous relatives questioned suggested that minor had
Indian ancestry or that the paternal grandfather would have
disclosed anything different. “ ‘The juvenile court has discretion
to determine when enough is enough.’ [Citation.]” (In re K.G.
(2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 385.)
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GILBERT, J.*
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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