In re Bethany C. CA2/2

CourtListener 10850504Calctapp29.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/29/26 In re Bethany C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re BETHANY C. et al., Persons B350446
Coming Under Juvenile Court
Law.

PEDRO P., Los Angeles County
Petitioner, Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03654A-D

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Dash Talbot,
Commissioner. Petition denied.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc., and Law Office of
Emily Berger, Dominika Campbell and Nadia Salcedo, for
Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Children’s Law Center, Liz Lopez and Angelina Oducayen
Ongkeko, for Minor Pedro P., as Joinder on behalf of Real Party
in Interest.
Children’s Law Center, Taylor Lindsley, for Minors
Bethany C., Emily P., and Ruby P., as Joinder on behalf of Real
Party in Interest.
INTRODUCTION
Father Pedro P., through his counsel, filed in this court a
petition for extraordinary writ seeking review of the juvenile
court’s order terminating his reunification services and setting a
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing for
March 2026. We stayed that hearing pending resolution of
Father’s petition.
By the petition, Father contends substantial evidence did
not support the juvenile court’s finding that the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
provided him reasonable reunification services and that the court
abused its discretion in not continuing the section 366.26
hearing. Finding no error, we deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The minor subjects of these proceedings are Bethany
(born 2009), Emily (born 2011), Pedro (born 2015), and Ruby
(born 2019).2 Though they are United States citizens, they came
to the attention of DCFS in 2023 while they were housed at a
shelter in Mexico run by the Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo
Integral de la Familia (DIF), a Mexican public welfare agency.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2 Though their last names differ, the children share the same
parents.
2
DIF had detained the children from Father and Mother,
C.C.,3 on September 4, 2023, based on reports of neglect and
domestic violence. Even though some of the children were well
into school age, none had ever attended school. Father tested
positive for cocaine at the time of their detention.
Six weeks after the detention, the parents had not come
looking for them. The United States Consulate had no
information regarding the parents’ whereabouts and believed
they had abandoned the children. Accordingly, it asked DCFS to
repatriate the children.
A DCFS social worker retrieved the children from the
United States Consulate at the San Ysidro Border Crossing and
brought them to a foster placement in Los Angeles. The juvenile
court ordered their continued detention.
Though the children initially gave guarded statements to
DCFS about life in their parents’ care, they opened up once in
foster care. They related that the parents would spend Father’s
earnings on drugs. Mother did not work and played video games
all day. Bethany was forced to do odd jobs to earn money for food
for the family and also took on caretaking responsibilities for the
other children. At times there was no food and the children were
reduced to eating powdered milk. Father violently disciplined
them. Emily detailed an instance in which Father “hit[] [her]
until he was tired with anything he could find, with phone cable,
belt, choked her and hit her with heavy objects around the
house.” Regular punishment of each of the children included
choking them, lifting and throwing them, and slamming their
heads against the toilet.
DCFS notified Father of the juvenile court proceedings via
WhatsApp in November 2023. Later that month, DCFS
interviewed him by telephone. He reported he was living in
Rosarito, Baja California, Mexico. He did not know where Mother

3 Mother is not a party to this writ. We omit information
about her except as relevant to Father’s claims.
3
was. He requested an attorney be appointed for him. He also
expressed anger that DIF had caused the children to be sent to
the United States. According to Father, he had been working to
reunify with the children through a process in Mexico.
Father appeared at the juvenile court’s November 2023
arraignment hearing and the court appointed counsel for him.
The court also ordered DCFS to prepare a written schedule of
video and telephonic visits between Father and the children.
At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in
March 2024, the juvenile court sustained DCFS’s amended
section 300 petition as to each child. The sustained allegations
against Father were that he (1) abandoned the children at the
DIF shelter without making a plan for their care and supervision;
(2) had a history of substance abuse, including
methamphetamine, which rendered him incapable of caring for
the children; (3) had failed to provide the children with regular
educational instruction; (4) had engaged in violent altercations
with Mother in the children’s presence; and (5) had repeatedly
struck the children with a belt. The court ordered the children
removed from the parents and ordered reunification services for
Father (Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown).
Father’s court-ordered case plan consisted of a full drug
and alcohol program with aftercare; weekly random and on-
demand drug and alcohol testing; a 12-step addiction treatment
program; a developmentally appropriate parenting program; a
52-week domestic violence program for batterers; and individual
counseling, with a licensed therapist or supervised intern, to
address case issues.
Father could not visit the United States in person due to
his immigration status. Accordingly, DCFS coordinated with DIF
to offer him services. DIF offered Father parenting classes, a
drug and alcohol program and individual counseling, but could
not provide no-cost drug testing. Father did not have the
resources to pay for drug testing, and restrictions on DCFS

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funding did not allow it to pay for services outside of the country.
As of July 2024, Father provided evidence he was enrolled in the
DIF parenting program but not the other programs.
Visitation was also necessarily remote. During the initial
six-month review period, from March to September 2024, “family
time with [F]ather and children [was] sporadic and inconsistent.”
Father initially did try to contact the children but did not respect
the agreed visitation calendar. On calls, only one child, Bethany,
was willing to engage with him; the others expressed no interest.
As of August 2024, Emily affirmatively stated she did not want to
talk to Father at all.
During the calls, Father would ask Bethany about the
other children’s wellbeing and make false promises, such as that
the children would be “coming home soon.” According to the foster
parent, Father appeared to be under the influence on calls.
After a 2024 Father’s Day call, in which Mother appeared
on camera but Father refused to let her speak, Father made no
attempt to contact the children for several weeks. He apparently
had one or more visits in August 2024 but then stopped calling
again for months. In January 2025, DCFS reported Pedro
reported not wanting contact with either parent. Father had no
contact with the children between August 2024 and at least
February 26, 2025.
During this time, Father’s communication with DCFS was
also wanting. On February 14, 2025, DCFS reported Father had
not been in contact with the social worker for over five months,
despite the social worker sending him five different e-mails
during this period. It said this to the juvenile court about his
progress: “[Father] demonstrates he is[] not in compliance with
court[-]ordered[] case plan activities and is not demonstrating
change or efforts to engage with [DCFS] to pursue his family goal
to reunify with the children. [He] has not [provided] DCFS with a
mailing address. It is unknown if he has stable housing, work,
address substance abuse disorder [sic]. His lack of participation

5
in family time visits[,] in combination with his lack of compliance
with the court[-]ordered case plan, demonstrates his
unwillingness to change his behavior and or address the issues
that brought the matter before the court and to the attention of
DCFS. It is [DCFS]’s observation that there is a lack of bonding
with the children give[n] his poor efforts in complying with family
time. At this time, [F]ather seems to lack the ability to provide a
nurturing and safe home for the children.”
The same day DCFS made this report, Father e-mailed the
DCFS social worker. He explained he had been “absen[t] in the
last few months [from] video calls . . . because [he] had a peak
season opportunity of work that made the most of those few
months of work.” He declared: “I am ready to be consistent in my
calls with my children.” He also reported he had taken a drug
test that day and, though he was unable to reach his DIF social
worker while she was on vacation, “[he] was able to talk with . . .
Psychologist Exa Liliana Valderama who granted [him] an
appointment for March 6, 2025 in order to review [his] plans,
finished plans, learning review and others.”
A week later, Father provided documents to show he
participated in Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings—22 out of
the 36 DIF had recommended. He had also taken two nonrandom
drug tests in the previous eight days. Both were positive for
marijuana. They tested only for marijuana, amphetamines,
methamphetamines, cocaine, and opiates. They did not test for
alcohol. DCFS noted to the juvenile court that Father was not in
compliance with his court-ordered case plan, had not gained
insight, and failed to address the safety concerns which led to the
dependency proceedings.
A few weeks later, DIF forwarded to DCFS a letter
ostensibly from the psychologist Father mentioned in his
February 14, 2025 e-mail. It contained a statement from Father,
rather than any service provider, that he had made progress in a
variety of ways, gaining insight through counseling with a

6
psychologist named Valentina, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), NA,
and parenting classes. In the section describing the outcome of
the interview, the psychologist added that Father arrived on time
to his appointment and had completed his assigned programs.
Proof of attendance at certain programs was attached. This
included a form showing Father had participated in 14 sessions of
psychotherapy between May and August of 2024.
Notably, some of Father’s statements relayed in the letter
were demonstrably false or misleading. For example, he reported
visiting with the children three times per week. But at the time
of the letter he had just resumed seeing them once per week after
his six-month absence. Adding to the embellishment, he said this
communication—in which he claimed to have shared with the
children that he “didn’t know how to be a father” but was
“working on being a better person”—“ha[d] helped a lot,” shown
him his “children are healing,” and allowed him to view them not
“as traumatized children.”
Father further reported he and Mother were in a good place
and planned to marry. However, Mother had recently told DCFS
that she left Father and was moving back to California. He also
reported he had not used methamphetamines since 2022 and was
clean. But DIF reported Father tested positive for cocaine in 2023
and the only drug testing he underwent during the case to that
point showed he was currently using marijuana.
DCFS filed a report with the juvenile court on June 30,
2025. In the four and a half months since his declaration that he
was “ready to be consistent” in his calls with the children, Father
had had two calls, and these were with just Bethany and Ruby. It
is unclear from the report whether these calls were the
“1x weekly video chats on Sunday afternoons” Father “[r]ecently
. . . started.” What is clear is all the children reported not
wanting to talk to Father. Bethany said she did not want to make
him think she wanted to return to his home. Emily said hearing

7
his voice reminded her of the physical abuse and trauma she
suffered in his care. Pedro said he just did not feel like it.
At a section 366.22 hearing held July 14, 2025, the juvenile
court found Father had made partial progress toward addressing
the case issues. It found DCFS had complied with the case plan,
including by making reasonable efforts to return the children to a
safe home.4 The court ordered DCFS to continue providing
reunification services; provide Father a written visitation
schedule; contact Father to discuss availability for virtual
individual counseling and domestic violence classes; and contact
the children’s therapists to assess conjoint counseling with
Father.
Pursuant to this directive, DCFS inquired with the
children’s therapist who assessed them on August 5, 2025. The
therapist wrote the children “currently appear hesitant to engage
in conversations with their biological parents.” She continued:
“This may be a temporary response related to recent family
dynamics and could evolve as therapeutic work continues. The
children will continue to work on building the therapeutic
relationship, as well as working towards processing past traumas
and building healthy coping skills to manage overwhelming
feelings.”
DCFS further sent Father referrals for online classes.
Father requested referrals for domestic violence classes, family
counseling, and individual counseling. Father reported to DCFS
he was unable to register for the classes because he did not
understand how to enroll and asked DCFS to enroll him and pay
for the classes directly. DCFS responded it was unable to do so.

4 Father appealed the July 14, 2025 order. His counsel filed a
no-issue brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.
Father’s supplemental brief was due March 6, 2025. He did not
file one, and the appeal was dismissed. (See case No. B348653.)
8
DCFS also provided Father with a referral for on-demand
drug testing in the Rosarito area and sent him leads on local
online substance abuse programs.
Father completed four on-demand drug tests in
September 2025—for amphetamines, methamphetamines,
marijuana, cocaine and opiates, but not alcohol. Each came back
negative. The following month, he tested negative for both drugs
and alcohol.
Father also reported trying to find an outpatient drug
rehabilitation program through DIF but it offered only inpatient
programs. DCFS asked him to inquire with DIF about any
outpatient programs outside of DIF that he might enroll in. He
did not reply to this request.
Father did complete an online domestic violence course for
batterers. According to the certificate, he completed 52 lessons,
and “[o]ne lesson is equal to one hour or one week of class
instruction.” Records from the provider indicate he completed
24 of the lessons in the 13 days between September 15 and
September 28, 2025.
According to DCFS, Father never enrolled in individual
counseling, despite DCFS providing both Spanish and English
language referrals in July 2025.
Regarding visitation, only Ruby was willing to talk to
Father after July 2025, but she later changed her mind. Even in
the face of this reticence, DCFS insisted that the children’s
caregiver inform the children of Father’s calls and give them an
opportunity to speak to him. The caregiver responded that she
understood, had been doing so, and would continue to do so.
DCFS’s October 2025 status report listed four occasions, all
in September and October, on which Father attempted remote
visits with the children since the juvenile court’s July 2025 order.
The children refused each time. Attached to the report were
“affidavits” from each of the children stating, in their own
handwriting, that they do not want to talk to the parents, one of

9
which also specified that no one was telling them to say that. In
noting its efforts to encourage the children to participate in
parent visits, DCFS described how the children “are irritated
when asked about contact with parents.”
The juvenile court held its section 366.25 hearing over two
days in November 2025. Father appeared remotely and testified
on the first day. He described efforts to complete his case plan
and instances in which DCFS was unhelpful. In a September
2025 meeting with DCFS, for example, he said he proposed
submitting to weekly testing, but complained DCFS did not
follow up with him. After that meeting, he testified he proposed
two different substance abuse programs in Mexico but DCFS did
not validate them. He said DCFS had provided referrals only for
programs that did not satisfy its own requirements.
Despite DCFS’s assertion to the contrary, Father testified
he did undergo individual counseling. He said it was with a DIF
psychologist named Valentina Fregoso. Through that counseling,
he said he “learned . . . all the things that [he] did wrong and the
things that [he] need[ed] to improve.” He did not say how many
times he had seen, or for how long he had been seeing, this
psychologist. He also said he invited DCFS to communicate
directly with her but it never did. When his counsel asked him to
describe what he learned through this counseling, he responded:
“Well, one of the things that come[s] to mind is that . . . children
go through different stages. . . . I was treating them as if I was
treating an adult. But then I learned that you can’t educate
children in the same way that you educate an adult. And so that
is why I am learning so much now. I am making an effort to learn
all these different stages that the children go through in order to
be a better parent.”
At argument, Father’s counsel asked the juvenile court to
find DCFS had failed to provide reasonable services and to
therefore extend reunification pursuant to section 352. Counsel
argued Father had complied with the court-ordered case plan to

10
the best of his abilities and DCFS failed to give him due credit for
his efforts. For example, counsel contended Father’s meeting with
the DIF psychologist satisfied the individual counseling
component and any shortcomings relating to the drug and alcohol
components of the plan were DCFS’s fault for not providing
adequate referrals. Counsel further claimed DCFS did not do
enough to facilitate Father’s relationship with the children.
The juvenile court took the matter under advisement and
announced on the second day of the hearing its decision to
terminate Father’s reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing. It explained to Father as follows: “I know you have done
what you can in a lot of ways to complete the court[-]ordered case
plan. And there ha[ve] been some limits about what you can do
and what [DCFS] can do to assist based on you residing in Mexico
for much of this case.”
“But while you have done the 52-course domestic violence
program, you have been to A.A./N.A., you have tested, you have
done parenting, you have done some individual counseling, I
don’t think you have shown . . . any insight into why the kids
were removed or why they can’t be returned to you or what you
needed to work on during those programs. [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
“Part of it was in individual counseling you spoke to the
therapist in Mexico. But you did not inform [the therapist] really
about what the case issues were. And you did not really address
the case issues with that therapist, I think, in a meaningful way.
You provided that therapist with some incorrect information,
also, regarding why the case was open and your level of contact
with the kids and your level of cooperation with [DCFS].
“But also part of the reason is also your testimony
indicating that what you would change is you would not treat the
children as adults, if they were returned to you. And that is what
you learned in the class. But that is really not the reason why
this case is here . . . .

11
“The [children] also have shown a lack of interest or not
wanting to visit or talk to you because they indicate that when
they hear your voice . . . they are triggered. They are reminded of
the abuse they endured, the physical abuse, the domestic
violence, and a number of other issues that were going on in the
home. And because you have not addressed those issues, I don’t
find that the [children] can safely be returned to you today.”
Finally, the juvenile court declined to extend Father’s time
to reunify under section 352. It believed it lacked legal authority
to do so, but even if it had such authority, it found no
extraordinary circumstances to justify any extension and no
substantial probability of return within the next six months.
The juvenile court advised Father of his writ rights, and he
timely filed this writ. We ordered the section 366.26 hearing
stayed until its resolution. DCFS and Pedro filed answering
briefs opposing Father’s petition, and the other three children
joined in the brief by DCFS.
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonable Services
A. Law and Standard of Review
In the process of assisting a parent in reunifying with their
child, county welfare departments like DCFS are obligated to
provide or offer reasonable services to promote such reunification.
(§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
At the section 366.25 hearing in November 2025, the
juvenile court was required to “determine whether reasonable
services ha[d] been offered or provided” to Father. (§ 366.25,
subd. (a)(3).) DCFS asserts any error in this finding is harmless
because the court made reasonable services findings at prior
hearings that Father failed to effectively challenge. We disagree.
Father’s request for a continuance, the denial of which he also
challenges, was predicated on not having received reasonable
services at least during the most recent review period.
Accordingly, we will consider his challenge of the finding. (See In

12
re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060 [“an erroneous
reasonable services finding could impede the court’s ability to
fully and accurately evaluate [a section 352 continuance]
request”].)
“ ‘ “Reunification services implement ‘the law’s strong
preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all
possible.’ . . .” . . . The [county welfare] department must make a
“ ‘ “good faith effort” ’ ” to provide reasonable services responsive
to the unique needs of each family. . . . “[T]he plan must be
specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of each family . . . ,
and must be designed to eliminate those conditions which led to
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. . . .” . . . The effort must
be made to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of
difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success. . . . The
adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s efforts
to provide suitable services is judged according to the
circumstances of the particular case. . . . “[T]he record should
show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading
to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during
the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to
assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult
. . . .” ’ ” (In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323, 329–330.) The
standard is not what services would have been ideal, but what
services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re
Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
We review the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding
for substantial evidence. (In re A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1061–1062.) The parties do not address whether the absence
of a clear and convincing evidence standard in section 366.25,
subdivision (a)(3) (in contrast to other provisions in the code; see,
e.g., § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii)) affects our standard of review.
Nevertheless, because the court stated its finding under the clear
and convincing evidence standard, we will review the record for

13
substantial evidence “account[ing] for the level of confidence”
demanded by the clear and convincing evidence standard.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) Accordingly,
“the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at
p. 1011.) Our review of the record otherwise is conducted under
the familiar principles for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence
in support of a factfinder’s determination. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that DCFS offered Father reasonable services.
Father lost custody of the children for several reasons:
abandoning them at the DIF shelter; abusing narcotics; never
sending them to school; and engaging in violence against them
and against Mother in their presence. The juvenile court ordered
services targeted to address these issues.
DCFS worked to offer Father services in accordance with
the juvenile court’s order but was limited by the fact that he
resides in Mexico. Limitations on DCFS funding and familiarity
with resources in Mexico made this a challenging case but one in
which the court had a sufficient basis on which to conclude DCFS
worked reasonably to fulfill its obligations. These efforts
necessarily took a different form than they would in the typical
case. For example, DCFS had to independently research local
resources, evaluate unfamiliar programs for compliance,
coordinate with DIF, and rely, to some extent, on Father’s
preexisting relationship with DIF to facilitate services.
Unsurprisingly, the services Father undertook did not
match, to the letter, what the juvenile court initially ordered or
what DCFS advised Father he needed to undertake. However, it
is clear from the court’s analysis that it was satisfied with the
alternative programming DCFS arranged for Father and what

14
Father, at DCFS’s prompting to coordinate with DIF, arranged
for himself.
The juvenile court acknowledged Father “ha[d] done what
[he] c[ould] in a lot of ways to complete the court[-]ordered case
plan.” Even though Father did not complete an outpatient drug
and alcohol treatment with aftercare, the court credited him for
attending AA and NA and for testing for drugs and alcohol. The
court did not suggest Father had failed to make progress in his
sobriety.
The juvenile court also credited Father for completing his
52-course domestic violence program, even though it did not occur
over the course of 52 weeks. The court did not suggest Father had
failed to make progress in avoiding domestic violence.
What the juvenile court did take issue with was Father’s
lack of insight into why the children were removed from him. The
court credited Father for taking the parenting classes it ordered,
but faulted him in the area of individual counseling, which it had
ordered him to take “to address case issues.” Because the court
did not take issue with Father’s progress in other areas of his
case plan, our consideration of the adequacy of DCFS’s service
offerings is properly focused on individual counseling.
The record reflects Father met with two different
psychologists in Mexico. He met with one on 14 separate
occasions in 2024. He met with the other at least once in March
2025. What little information the record contains about this
counseling supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father
did not take full advantage of the counseling he received. The
March 2025 letter from one psychologist shows Father reported
false information to her about his circumstances and does not
address fundamental case issues. Most prominently, there is no
mention of his past violence against the children or the extreme
neglect that kept them out of school and left them unfed in his
care before he abandoned them at a DIF shelter.

15
The record further reflects that, in July 2025, DCFS offered
Father additional individual counseling. This counseling was
offered online, in both English and Spanish. Father never
enrolled in this counseling.
Father argues he was prejudiced by DCFS’s failure to offer
reasonable services because it limited his opportunities to comply
with the juvenile court’s requirements and improve his parenting
abilities. The record shows Father received extensive services
within all the general categories ordered by the court and was
offered more services that he did not undertake. This supports
the conclusion that, rather than a lack of reasonable services, it
was Father who did not avail himself of individual counseling
opportunities offered by DCFS and did not adequately engage in
the counseling he obtained through DIF. (See In re Jasmon O.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424–425 [services found reasonable where
effectiveness of services provided to the father limited by the
father’s failure to admit issue existed]; In re Nolan W. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233 [reunification services are voluntary and
cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent].)
In a similar vein, Father argues DCFS did not do enough to
facilitate visitation between him and the children. While there is
evidence DCFS’s performance in this regard was imperfect, there
is substantial evidence it was reasonable under the
circumstances. The children did not want to talk to Father and
their therapist deemed them not ready for contact with him.
DCFS did not arrange conjoint counseling, but the juvenile court
never ordered it—it merely directed DCFS to assess it. DCFS did
so and the children’s therapist’s letter indicates it was not
appropriate at the time. We cannot say conjoint counseling was a
required “reasonable service” on this record.
There was a time in the case when the children had a
greater willingness to communicate with Father, but Father
ceased communication with them for periods of up to six months.
Further, the children’s history of trauma caused by Father (the

16
same trauma he minimized in his report to his DIF psychologist)
created a substantial barrier to the children’s willingness to
communicate with him. In providing or offering reasonable
services, DCFS is held to a standard of good faith, not good
outcomes. There is evidence that, even in the face of their
understandably steadfast reticence, DCFS continued to ensure
the children had opportunities to communicate with Father. The
children simply did not want to.
II. Denial of Continuance
A. Law and Standard of Review
Section 352, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “Upon request of
counsel for the parent . . . , the court may continue any hearing
under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the
hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that a
continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest
of the minor. In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall
give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of
his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable
environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary
placements.” Subdivision (a)(2), in turn, requires a showing of
“good cause” before a continuance may be granted.
Section 352 offers an “ ‘emergency escape valve’ ” to delay a
section 366.26 permanency planning hearing in “exceptional
cases.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 634,
635, 637 (Michael G.).) Such cases include “ ‘when “inadequate
services” are offered by the child welfare agency or “an external
force over which [the parent has] no control” prevented the
parent from completing a case plan.’ [Citation.] Examples include
cases where a parent never receives reunification services or a
reunification plan over the 18-month reunification period
[citations]; the parent was hospitalized for most of the
reunification period but demonstrated an ‘impeccable record of
visitation and efforts to comply with the reunification plan’
[citations]; or the parent sought a continuance to complete a

17
program required by the reunification plan that was otherwise
impossible to finish in time.” (Id. at pp. 632–633.) Even if
exceptional circumstances are present, a continuance is
unwarranted if contrary to the child’s interests. (Id. at pp. 637–
638.)
A juvenile court’s decision on whether to grant a
continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Michael G.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 637.)
B. Analysis
Father fails to show an abuse of discretion in the juvenile
court’s decision to deny his request for a continuance. His
argument fails to address at all whether such a continuance
would be contrary to the interests of the children. This is
independently sufficient to defeat his challenge. (See § 352,
subd. (a)(1) [not contrary to child’s interests is an independent
requirement for continuance].) Critically, the children’s cases had
been pending for over two years by the time of the hearing, and
the children had been in the DIF system for a considerable
amount of time before the cases started. The children had all
made clear they were not interested in reunifying with Father.
Indeed, the juvenile court “[did] not think [it] c[ould] find that
there [was] a substantial probability of return . . . within the next
six months.” It was well within the juvenile court’s discretion to
deny the request on this basis alone.
Even if extraordinary circumstances were independently
sufficient to sustain the challenge, Father fails to show them. In
attempting to do so, he again argues DCFS’s asserted
shortcomings in supporting his services in Mexico denied him a
meaningful opportunity to reunify. But again, the record shows
he received substantial services generally satisfying his case plan
and the juvenile court credited him for “do[ing] what [he] c[ould]
in a lot of ways to complete the court[-]ordered case plan.”
Ultimately the issue was, despite receiving extensive services and
the opportunity to do more, Father failed to demonstrate insight

18
into the circumstances that brought the children under the
court’s jurisdiction. The record showed he had not honestly
confronted the issues head-on. And certainly, as Pedro notes in
his answering brief, Father’s complete disengagement from the
case for a six-month period did not help matters. These facts are
a far cry from the extraordinary circumstances described in
Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 637.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. Pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A), this opinion is final forthwith as to this
court.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.


Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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