Robert D. v. County of Contra Costa CA1/1

CourtListener 10849305Calctapp28.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/28/26 Robert D. v. County of Contra Costa CA1/1
Reposting correct version
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT D.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, A170109
v.
(Contra Costa County
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, Super Ct. No. C22-01370)
Defendant and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Robert D. brought negligence claims against Contra Costa County (the
County) alleging that when he was approximately 15 years old, the County
placed him in a group foster home facility where a staff member sexually
abused him. In 2022, Robert D. sued the County for negligence, citing the
Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 905 et seq.), which was amended three
years earlier by Assembly Bill No. 218 (Stats. 2019 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
ch. 861) to add subdivision (m), exempting certain claims for childhood-

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
Although not requested to do so, we observe personal privacy interests by
referring to the plaintiff as Robert D. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
sexual-assault damages from the usual presentation requirements for claims
against public entities. The County filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing subdivision (m)’s retroactive elimination of the claim-
presentation requirement violates the gift clause of the California
Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6 [prohibiting the Legislature from
making any gift of public funds].) The superior court granted that motion on
February 5, 2024—approximately five months before Division Five of this
court held that subdivision (m)’s waiver of the claim-presentation
requirement is not a gift of public funds. (West Contra Costa Unified School
Dist. v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243, 1257 (West Contra
Costa).)
In this appeal, Robert D. contends the superior court erred in granting
the motion for judgment on the pleadings. In light of West Contra Costa,
whose reasoning is not in any way disturbed by the County’s arguments on
appeal, our de novo review agrees with Robert D. We will therefore reverse
the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Under the gift clause, “which forbids the legislature from making any
gift of public money or other thing of value to any person, the legislature has
no power to create a liability against the state for any such past act of
negligence upon the part of its officers.” (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal.
690, 693 (Chapman).) As the County concedes, West Contra Costa and at
least two other appellate court opinions have held that subdivision (m) does
not run afoul of that principle.2 This is because the rule in “Chapman
focused on whether the underlying conduct for which the Legislature

2 See O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th

930, 942 and R.L. v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 89, 116,
each holding Assembly Bill No. 218’s elimination of the presentation
requirement does not violate the gift clause.

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provided a right to sue was conduct for which the state was liable at the time
it occurred.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259.) Thus, if
a public entity’s substantive liability for sexual-assault damages resulting
from negligence existed at the time the alleged wrongful conduct occurred,
later changes to the presentation requirements for such a claim do not create
a liability in the relevant sense, and in turn, are not violations of the gift
clause. (Id. at p. 1261.)
In its brief, the County argues that these opinions rest on a
“misreading” of Chapman. According to the County, the “relevant import of
the Chapman decision is that creating a new negligence liability (a new right)
violates the gift clause, but providing a new contract cause of action (a new
remedy for preexisting liability) does not.” This, in itself, is a misreading of
Chapman, which was not so categorical with respect to negligence liability.
Chapman dealt with a shipment of some one hundred and thirty tons of coal
that were received at a public wharf in San Francisco. (Chapman, supra,
104 Cal. at p. 692.) According to the complaint, the coal sank into the San
Francisco Bay when “a large portion of the wharf . . . broke and gave way ‘by
reason of the negligence, omission, and carelessness of’ ” the defendant public
entity and “ ‘its officers, and agents, . . . in failing and neglecting to keep said
wharf in good and sound condition and repair.’ ” (Ibid.)
The “ ‘state board of examiners’ ” rejected “a claim for the damages so
sustained,” but after the events underlying the complaint, the Legislature
enacted a statute providing that “ ‘[a]ll persons who have, or shall hereafter
have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state, not allowed by
the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and
conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of
the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to

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final judgment.’ ” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 692–693.) With respect to
the damages suffered on the wharf, our Supreme Court opined that the gift
clause would preclude an action “arising out of the negligence of the officers
of the state in the discharge of a strictly governmental duty . . . .” (Id. at
p. 694.) But this was not because the gift clause categorically precludes such
claims; rather, it was because it was “well settled that, in the absence of a
statute voluntarily assuming such liability, the state is not liable in damages
for the negligent acts of its officers while engaged in discharging ordinary
official duties pertaining to the administration of the government of the
state.” (Id. at p. 693.) In other words, at the time the coal sank into the bay,
well-settled law precluded the state from being liable for such damages.3 By
contrast, there is no suggestion here that the state was similarly immunized
from liability for sexual-abuse damages at the time Robert D. allegedly
suffered sexual abuse.
For those reasons, we see no ground for departure from West Contra
Costa and the cases appropriately following its persuasive analysis.

3 Although the gift clause prevented the plaintiff in Chapman from

suing for negligence, our Supreme Court recognized that the alleged
negligent conduct also constituted a breach of contract, and because the state
had always been liable upon its contracts, the newly enacted law’s
authorization of a breach-of-contract action did not violate the gift clause.
This is because the law did not create a new liability or cause of action, but
“merely gave an additional remedy for the enforcement” of a preexisting
liability. (Chapman, at p. 696; R.L. v. Merced City School Dist., supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) Following West Contra Costa, we too view these
circumstances as “perfectly analogous to the claim presentation requirement
at issue in the present case,” and reject the County’s arguments to the
contrary. (West Contra Costa, supra, at p. 1259–1264.) In light of that
conclusion, we need not reach issues regarding the “public purpose” exception
to the gift clause prohibition.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.

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_________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

Robert D. v. County of Contra Costa / (A170109)

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