CourtListener 10849138•People v. Hernandez CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Hernandez CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064398
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19WF1374)
VICTOR ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Ricardo A. Nicol, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Appellant Victor Anthony Hernandez was convicted of multiple
counts of sexual crimes against a 14-year-old child. On appeal, Hernandez
raises the following claims of error: (1) the trial court improperly limited his
right to cross-examination by excluding evidence related to impeachment of
the victim’s mother; (2) the court improperly excluded evidence of the victim’s
mother’s conduct, which was relevant to demonstrate her bias; (3) the
prosecution committed misconduct by failing to correct the victim’s mother’s
alleged false testimony; (4) the court should have granted his motion for
mistrial based on the prosecution’s misconduct; (5) the court improperly
denied his request to recall various defense witnesses; and (6) the verdict
statements are misstatements of the law. We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
FACTS
A. Factual Background
1. Prosecution Evidence
In December 2018, W.O. (mother) had separated from her
husband and needed to move out of their shared home. Mother had two
children, a 14-year-old son (victim) and a 16-year-old daughter (daughter).
Hernandez, who owned a truck and trailer and had been friends with mother
for about six months, agreed to help her move. Hernandez’s friend Ernesto
also agreed to help, as did victim’s 14-year-old friend P.P. and daughter’s
boyfriend C.N.
On moving day, the group made several trips between the house
and mothers storage unit. Everyone, including the children, were drinking
champagne, although mother did not know her underage children were
drinking.
2
Mother left around 7:00 p.m. to attend a work event. Hernandez
and Ernesto agreed to stay at the house until mother returned. Hernandez
had met mother’s children once before. P.P. and C.N. stayed as well. Mother
called to check in and was assured everything was fine.
Hernandez and Ernesto drove with victim to the liquor store and
bought large amounts of alcohol. Hernandez poured alcohol into shot glasses
and gave them to victim and P.P. Hernandez, Ernesto, victim, and P.P. hung
out downstairs while daughter and C.N. stayed upstairs in her bedroom.
Victim, who had never had alcohol before, consumed approximately eight to
12 drinks and became drunk.
Later in the evening, Hernandez was talking separately with
victim in the living room. Hernandez asked victim whether he had ever
kissed or had sexual intercourse before. Hernandez repeatedly stroked
victim’s arm and hugged him. Victim was confused and uncomfortable but
did not tell anyone or try to stop it.
Hernandez and Ernesto later danced in front of victim and P.P.
in a sexually suggestive manner. Hernandez and Ernesto started talking
about penises and asked victim about the size of his penis.
Hernandez then said he was going to the bathroom and asked
victim to meet him in the office across from the bathroom. Victim followed
Hernandez down the hall, and Hernandez pushed victim into the office.
Hernandez closed and locked the door.
Hernandez then got on his knees and pulled down victim’s pants.
Victim was swaying because he was intoxicated, and Hernandez held him
steady by gripping victim’s hips. Without asking permission, Hernandez
began orally copulating victim. Victim had not agreed to engage in oral
copulation and felt confused, and that he could not leave.
3
Hernandez then stood up, faced the wall, pulled down his own
pants, and guided victim’s penis into his anus. Victim did not try to stop him,
although victim did not want to engage in sex with Hernandez and did not
feel that he could leave. Hernandez then resumed orally copulating victim
until victim ejaculated. Hernandez told victim not to tell anyone. Victim
pulled up his pants and left the office.
P.P. had noticed victim and Hernandez were missing and looked
for them upstairs. When victim returned, P.P. noticed that his behavior “was
off” and that he looked “a little shook up.” Hernandez returned to the living
room shortly after victim and was talking on the phone.
Victim told P.P. that he and Hernandez had sex and that he had
lost his virginity. Victim felt confused, nervous, and disgusted with himself.
At this point, victim was very intoxicated, experiencing dizziness,
lightheadedness, blurred vision, and difficulty walking or standing. P.P. blew
up an air mattress to lie down.
Mother returned home around 10:00 p.m. and found Hernandez
and Ernesto in the kitchen. She saw numerous empty bottles of alcohol in the
kitchen that were not there when she left. Victim and P.P. were asleep on an
air mattress downstairs. After mother woke them up to go upstairs, she was
upset because she suspected they had been drinking. Mother left with
Hernandez and Ernesto to go to her friend’s house.
Daughter woke up around the time her mother left with
Hernandez and Ernesto. Daughter saw P.P. throwing up in the upstairs
bathroom. Victim called for her, and daughter went to help him. When
daughter asked victim if he was okay, he started crying. She believed victim
was drunk because he was slurring his words and mumbling. Victim told
daughter that Hernandez did “stuff” to him and that his “butt hurt.” He kept
4
asking, “‘What’s wrong with me? What happened?’” Victim asked daughter if
this was how he lost his virginity.
Daughter called her mother, saying, “‘[Hernandez] did something
to your son, and you need to get home immediately.’” Daughter also said, “‘I
think he touched him sexually, something happened.’”
When mother confronted Hernandez, asking him what he had done to
victim, Hernandez replied, “‘Your son is on a journey,’” and “‘Your son is
curious.’” Mother was furious at Hernandez, stating, “‘He’s a child. He’s 14
years old. What did you do to my son?’” Although Hernandez did not say what
he had done to victim, he did state “[t]hat he fucked up” and that he would
take whatever was coming to him.
Mother felt that her trust was betrayed and that she had failed
her children. After mother returned home, victim told her, “‘I’m so sorry,
Mom.’” She hugged him and asked him to tell her what happened. Victim told
mother what happened while he was sobbing and curled up in a fetal
position.
Early the next morning, Hernandez sent mother the following
text: “‘I have nothing but shame, remorse, and regret for everything. I’m
sorry, [W.O.], for what went down and breaking our trust. I feel wrong inside
for everything, and I can never feel clean and I can never be okay now. This is
a stain and will haunt me. I’m really sorry and I don’t know how to proceed
from here. I guess all I can say is I’m sorry, I love you and goodbye.’”
Mother called police, who interviewed victim regarding his
interactions with Hernandez. Victim appeared scared and hesitant and cried
during the conversation. Victim said that he did not go into the office
willingly but was pushed by Hernandez.
5
Victim was examined later that day by a forensic nurse, who
collected swabs to test for DNA. Hernandez’s DNA profile matched that found
on victim’s penial and scrotal samples. The testing also revealed amylase in
both the penial and scrotal samples, indicating the presence of saliva.
2. Defense Evidence
Hernandez’s mother, sister, and friends testified that Hernandez
had a serious drinking problem and would routinely drink until he passed
out.
Hernandez testified in his own defense: He routinely bought a
gallon of hard alcohol on the weekends and drank until he passed out. He had
a sexual relationship with Ernesto, had had sex with mother, and had
engaged in a threesome with mother and his friend Tommy.
Hernandez was drunk and fell asleep in the office at mother’s
house. He woke up to find victim lying on top of him and anally penetrating
him. Hernandez decided not to tell anyone what happened because he did not
want to ruin victim’s life. He admitted sending the text message to mother
but did so to take the blame for victim. He acknowledged that sex with a
minor is illegal, he felt he was to blame, and he should not have gotten so
intoxicated.
On cross-examination, Hernandez admitted the following: he had
anal sex with victim, his DNA was on victim’s penis, he spoke with victim
about penis size, he stroked victim’s arm, and he knew victim was a teenager.
B. Procedural History
Hernandez was charged with committing a lewd act on a minor
14 years old and at least 10 years younger than the defendant (Pen. Code,1
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
6
288, subd. (c)(1); count 1), oral copulation of a minor under 16 by a person
over 21 (§ 288, subd. (b)(2); count 2), sodomy of a person under 16 by a person
over 21 (§ 286, subd. (b)(2); count 3), forcible oral copulation on a minor 14 or
older (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 4), forcible sodomy of a minor 14 or older
(§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 5), and contributing to the delinquency of a
minor (§ 272, subd. (a)(1); count 6).
The information alleged the following aggravating factors: the
victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3));
Hernandez induced others to participate in the commission of the crime (rule
4.421(a)(4)); he induced a minor to commit and assist in the commission of
the crimes (rule 4.421(a)(5)); and he took advantage of a position of trust to
commit the crimes (rule 4.421(a)(11)). The prosecution eventually dismissed
count 6 and two of the aggravating factors, i.e., that Hernandez induced
others to participate in the crime and he induced a minor to commit and to
assist in the commission of the crimes.
The jury convicted Hernandez of counts 1 through 5 and found
true the aggravating factors as to each count. The trial court sentenced
Hernandez to a total term of 17 years and eight months in prison, consisting
of the middle term of nine years on count 5, a consecutive middle term of
eight years on count 4, and a consecutive term of eight months on count 1.
The court stayed the sentence on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
I.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF VICTIM’S MOTHER
Hernandez contends the trial court improperly limited his right
to confront mother regarding a video allegedly depicting her engaged in a
threesome with Hernandez and Tommy. Hernandez argues that mother lied
7
when she denied having had sexual intercourse with him and that the
exclusion of the video gave mother a false aura of credibility. We conclude
any error was harmless given the substantial evidence of his guilt.
A. Factual Background
Defense counsel asked mother on cross-examination whether she
knew there was a video of her, Tommy, and Hernandez. After the trial court
overruled the prosecutor’s objection, defense counsel asked, “Are you aware of
a video, ma’am?” Mother replied, “No.” Later, the following colloquy occurred:
“[Defense Counsel]: You didn’t know Victor that well, correct?
“[Mother]: Correct.
“[Defense Counsel]: And I’m sorry to ask, but you knew him
sexually, correct?”
The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection on relevance grounds.
Defense counsel then requested a sidebar. The court paused
proceedings and called both parties into chambers. Defense counsel stated
that he had a video depicting Hernandez, Tommy, and mother having a
threesome sometime before the charged offenses. When the court asked how
the video was relevant, defense counsel argued that mother was
misrepresenting Tommy as Hernandez’s boyfriend for the following reasons:
“[T]hey specifically told the kids that Tommy was the boyfriend to explain
why . . . Tommy and Hernandez and [mother] would go into her bedroom, to
suggest that they are not doing anything. It’s just these two guys that are
friends, that’s why they are all in there. The idea is she was making cover for
her own tryst that she was doing. The point—so the relationships—if the
prosecutor hasn’t gotten into the relationships, because she is trying to prove
this trust, this great relationship she had with Hernandez when in fact she is
lying about the whole situation.”
8
The prosecutor objected on the ground that the video was
irrelevant and prejudicial: “The relationships, sexual relationships, if any,
between the mother of the victim, Tommy, and [Hernandez] is not relevant to
whether or not [Hernandez] sexually assaulted the minor. An adult
relationship, whether it exists or not, is not relevant to the conduct at hand,
first. And, second, a sex video of the victim’s mother is highly prejudicial, way
more prejudicial than probative.”
The trial court excluded the video as more prejudicial than
probative under Evidence Code section 352. However, the court stated it
would allow defense counsel to ask mother “whether or not she has had a
sexual relationship with Tommy.” Further, the court stated it would allow
defense counsel to impeach mother if she testified that she did not have a
sexual relationship with Tommy but not with evidence of the video.
Defense counsel asked mother whether she had a “sexual
relationship with Tommy,” to which mother replied, “No.” Defense counsel
then queried, “Are you saying you never had a [threesome] with Tommy and
my client?” Mother replied, “No.” Later, defense counsel asked, “And did you
ever tell [victim] or [daughter] that Tommy was Victor’s boyfriend to hide the
fact that you were going to have a [threesome]?” Mother replied, “I do
remember [saying] something saying, yes, that they were a couple, but that’s
it.”
After dismissing the jury, the trial court stated that questions
about Tommy and Hernandez visiting mother’s house were not relevant
because it occurred before the move and it would necessitate undue
consumption of time. The court requested defense counsel provide a copy of
the video so the court could make an informed decision if the issue arose
again.
9
Defense counsel stated he had several reasons that he wanted to
ask mother about the video, including to demonstrate that mother lied when
she denied a sexual relationship with Hernandez and denied knowledge of
the video. Also, because the prosecution had alleged mother trusted
Hernandez to be with her children, the defense wanted to demonstrate there
was no relationship between the two, only sex. Therefore, mother “d[id]n’t
have a right to say ‘I’m a great mom, look at me,’ when in fact, that was just a
bad decision” for her to leave the children with Hernandez. Additionally,
defense counsel wanted to establish that Ernesto was Hernandez’s boyfriend
to argue that Hernandez would not have had sex with victim with Ernesto
present.
Defense counsel stated he did not want to show the video to the
jury but rather wanted to impeach mother with it. The trial court responded
that it was not preventing the defense from impeaching mother but that it
was not going to allow impeachment using the video.
The video came up again after the prosecution rested its case.
Defense counsel stated he planned to call Tommy as a “habit and custom”
witness and “that also deals with that one video.” The trial court stated it had
since watched the video but that it remained “inadmissible and not an area of
inquiry.” The following exchange then occurred:
“[Defense Counsel]: So I can’t ask if the video existed?
“[Court]: I thought my ruling was clear. My ruling is clear, that is
not a topic upon which we are going to address—
“[Defense Counsel]: Yeah, I’m just defining.
“[Court]: —Period.
“[Defense Counsel]: The video—
10
“[Court]: The video, the [threesome], the pictures, anything about
that. The court has ruled on that. [¶] Is there anything unclear about the
court’s ruling in regards to that area that I can assist you with?
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
“[Court]: What is that, sir?
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, [mother] identified [Tommy] as a
boyfriend, and he’s not a boyfriend.
“[Court]: Okay. That’s how—okay. So that’s how she introduced
them. Okay.
“[Defense Counsel]: And I want to refute that, and I wanted to
establish what the true relationship is.
“[Court]: Between [Tommy] and your client, great, ask him what
relationship he has with your client.
“[Defense Counsel]: And her.
“[Court]: No. [Defense counsel], again, I don’t know how clear the
court can be on this topic. This video, [threesomes], sport sex, everything that
we have talked about ad nauseum and I have heard from both of you, the
court has ruled. So we are not getting into it.”
The trial court stated it was willing to reconsider its ruling if
defense counsel could demonstrate something had changed. Defense counsel
argued that one of the elements the prosecution had to prove was that
Hernandez took advantage of a position of trust, but that Hernandez was
never put in a position of trust because his relationship with mother only
involved casual sex. The court denied the request to reconsider its ruling.
The defense called Tommy as a witness, who testified that he
knew Mother but did not know her last name. Defense counsel did not ask
Tommy any further questions about mother.
11
Hernandez testified that Ernesto was “more than a friend.” He
also testified that he and Tommy had threesomes together. When asked
whether he could recall meeting mother in person on other occasions,
Hernandez stated, “So there was her birthday and then from her birthday,
then there was the time where we all had our sexual endeavors with—.” The
prosecution objected and the court called the parties into chambers.
The trial court brought up the subject of the video, noting it
seemed to show two different incidents and that mother, Hernandez and
Tommy appeared to be participants. The court queried whether defense
counsel was “seeking to impeach [mother] by virtue of having your client
right now say he had a sexual experience with her?” Defense counsel
answered yes and noted that this would be directly contrary to mother’s
testimony.
The trial court then modified its earlier ruling: “In light of the
testimony of [mother] denying any type of relationship and denying the
existence of a video, I’m inclined to allow counsel to ask one or two questions
along these lines because he has alluded to it already—even though the court
has stricken it—and that would be at any time prior to the date of violation,
and I think you have indicated, counsel, two months prior to the date of
violation, ‘did you engage in a sexual [threesome]’ however you want to
describe it, ‘involving you, Tommy, and [mother]?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Thank you.’ That
would go directly towards impeaching [mother] as to her testimony, but we
are still not going to get into a video.”
The prosecutor objected to any questions about mother having
sex with Hernandez or Tommy months before the alleged crimes because it
was not relevant to Hernandez’s acts involving victim. The prosecutor further
argued that any evidence regarding mother’s alleged sex acts would simply
12
confuse the issues and should therefore be excluded under Evidence Code
section 352.
The trial court allowed defense counsel to “simply ask [his] client
as to whether or not he had a prior sexual experience with [mother] and
anticipating his answer is going to be yes, [defense counsel] could ask him
when it was and [defense counsel] ha[s] indicated two months prior to this
date of violation and then we can move on.” The court denied defense
counsel’s requests to ask Hernandez whether his sexual encounters with
mother were videotaped and if there was “proof” of the sex. The court further
encouraged defense counsel to use leading questions to prevent Hernandez
from mentioning the video.
Hernandez then testified he had sexual relations with mother
and Tommy at her home approximately three months before the charged
crimes.
B. Legal Standard
The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state
Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the
prosecution’s witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) A
defendant’s right to cross-examine an adverse witness with impeachment
evidence is a vital constitutional right. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475
U.S. 673, 678–679 (Van Arsdall).) The Supreme Court has held that a
violation of the confrontation clause occurs when a defendant is barred “from
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences
relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (Id. at p. 680.)
13
However, trial courts “retain wide latitude insofar as the
[c]onfrontation [c]lause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’[s] safety, or interrogation that
is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at
p. 679.) “[N]othwithstanding the confrontation clause, a trial court may
restrict cross-examination [pertaining to the credibility] of an adverse
witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352.” (People v.
Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623.)
“Proper application of Van Arsdall requires threshold
consideration of whether the trial court exercised sound discretion under
state law evidentiary standards in limiting the scope of cross-examination.”
(People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282 (Castaneda-
Prado). Whether the court exercised its discretion to impose reasonable limits
on cross-examination under the Evidence Code is determined “under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review governing such
discretionary questions.” (Ibid.) If the court excluded “evidence of marginal
impeachment value” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545) or
“otherwise merely carried out the routine evidentiary function of controlling
the scope of permissible cross-examination, the answer to this initial evidence
question will generally be yes—the trial court was within its discretion—and
the inquiry comes to an end.” (Castenada-Prado, supra, at p. 1282.)
However, where a trial court effectively renders cross-
examination an exercise in futility, we must proceed to a second stage of
analysis. Here, we ask whether “[a] reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression” of the challenged witness’s credibility if
the proposed line of cross-examination had been permitted. (Van Arsdall,
14
supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.) This is determined by applying a de novo standard
of review. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1283.)
“‘[T]he constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s
opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other [c]onfrontation [c]lause
errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis.’ (Van Arsdall, supra,
475 U.S. at p. 684, citing Chapman v. California [(1967)] 386 U.S. 18, 24
[(Chapman)].) ‘The correct inquiry,’ [therefore,] ‘is whether, assuming that
the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a
reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1281.)
Whether a particular confrontation clause violation is harmless “‘depends
upon a host of factors,’ including ‘the importance of the witness’ testimony in
the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and . . . the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’” (Ibid.)
C. Discussion
On the record before us, it is a close call whether there was a
confrontation clause violation under Van Arsdall. On the one hand, the trial
court could reasonably have restricted the defense from pursuing the
threesome line of questioning altogether on the ground that its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would
necessitate undue consumption of time and create danger of undue prejudice
under Evidence Code section 352. On the other hand, once the court allowed
the defense to ask mother about the threesome and she denied it, the video
gained impeachment value and became more probative.
15
Nevertheless, we conclude any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under Chapman. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.)
As noted, whether a particular confrontation clause violation is harmless
depends on “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and . . .
the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Ibid.)
Here, mother was not a particularly important witness in the
prosecution’s case because she was not present at the time of the crimes and
victim himself testified that Hernandez sexually abused him. Her testimony
was cumulative of victim’s because she primarily relayed what he told her
about the sexual assault. Victim also told his sister and friend P.P. about the
sexual abuse directly after it happened, and both testified to their
conversations with victim. Additionally, the trial court allowed defense
counsel to cross-examine mother regarding whether she had sex with
Hernandez and Tommy, as well as on a variety of other matters relating to
her credibility, such as her decisions to allow her minor children to drink
alcohol and to leave them in Hernandez’s care.
Furthermore, the prosecution’s case was overwhelming: victim
testified that Hernandez sexually assaulted him and that he did not consent;
daughter and P.P. testified that victim told them about the assault almost
immediately after it occurred; Hernandez’s DNA profile matched that
recovered from victim’s genital area; and Hernandez sent mother a text
message the following morning apologizing and saying that everything was
his fault. Thus, even if the trial court had allowed cross-examination
16
regarding the video, it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been
different given the strength of the prosecution’s case.
II.
EVIDENCE OF VICTIM’S MOTHER’S ALLEGED BIAS
Hernandez also argues the trial court erred by excluding the
video because it was relevant to demonstrate mother’s bias against him based
on the fact they had a prior sexual relationship.
The Supreme Court has “‘recognized that the exposure of a
witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.’” (Van Arsdall, supra,
475 U.S. at pp. 678–679.) “Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the
jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled
to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a
witness’ testimony.” (United States v. Abel (1984) 469 U.S. 45, 52.)
Hernandez offers no explanation as to how the fact he and
mother had sexual relations would demonstrate her bias, nor offers any
citation to the record in support of this argument. “Appellate courts presume
the trial court’s judgment or order is correct and indulge all intendments and
presumptions to support the judgment or order on matters as to which the
record is silent. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564;
Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) A
logical implication of the presumption of correctness is that the appellant
bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.” (Eagle Fire & Water
Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 470.)
Even if Hernandez had explained how their past sexual
relationship demonstrated mother’s alleged bias, any error in excluding the
17
video itself or in excluding questioning regarding it was harmless for the
reasons discussed above. Accordingly, we reject Hernandez’s claim of error.
III.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Hernandez contends the prosecution committed misconduct by
failing to correct mother’s false testimony that she had not had sexual
relations with Hernandez and Tommy, citing Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360
U.S. 264 (Napue). We disagree.
A. Legal Standard
“‘“‘“A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal
Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it
infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of
due process.’”’ [Citation.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state
law only if it involves ‘“‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to
attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’”’” (People v. Ayala (2000)
23 Cal.4th 225, 283–284.)
“Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution
cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of
which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was
not intentionally submitted.” (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 647.)
This principle also applies even where the false testimony “goes only to the
credibility of the witness.” (Napue, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 269.) The elements of
a Napue claim are that “‘the testimony or evidence in question must have
been false or misleading’ and, ‘the State must have known or should have
known that it was false or misleading,’ and ‘the testimony or evidence in
question must be material.’” (In re Hill (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 804, 834.)
18
B. Discussion
Hernandez has failed to establish a violation of his right to due
process under Napue. Even if mother’s testimony that she did not have a
threesome with Hernandez and Tommy were untrue, it is not clear the
prosecutor knew or should have known this was false. The prosecutor never
saw the video of the alleged threesome; it was only viewed by the trial court
and defense counsel. Although the court concluded mother was one of the
participants after viewing the video, this only occurred after the prosecution
had already rested its case.
Moreover, the jury was made aware, through Hernandez’s
testimony, that he had a threesome with Tommy and mother, which directly
contradicted mother’s testimony. The prosecutor did not object to defense
counsel’s questioning Hernandez about the threesome and whether he had
past sexual relations with mother.
Nor did the prosecutor rely upon mother’s alleged false testimony
to obtain Hernandez’s conviction. In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged to the
jury in closing argument that mother made some poor choices as a parent,
noting “[t]his is not a trial about [mother’s] parenting and her decisions.”
And, as discussed above, mother’s testimony was not essential to the
prosecution’s case. Rather, Hernandez’s conviction was based primarily upon
victim’s testimony, the DNA evidence, and Hernandez’s inculpatory text
message. Accordingly, Hernandez has failed to demonstrate prosecutorial
misconduct.
IV.
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
When the prosecutor moved to admit evidence of Hernandez’s
prior conviction for possession of a firearm, the trial court ruled that only the
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fact of the conviction was admissible. After the prosecutor asked about the
facts underlying the conviction, defense counsel sought a mistrial, which was
denied by the court. Hernandez argues the court erred in failing to declare a
mistrial based on the prosecution’s misconduct. We conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez’s motion.
A. Factual Background
In April 2023, Hernandez was charged with assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and discharging
a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3, subd. (a)) but pled guilty to
one count of possession of a firearm in violation of a court order (§ 29825,
subd. (a)). The conviction was based upon violation of a protective order in
the instant case. Hernandez was sentenced to 120 days in jail for the offense,
which is a crime of moral turpitude.
The prosecutor moved to admit evidence of Hernandez’s felony
firearm possession conviction as impeachment evidence if he testified. The
trial court ruled the conviction was admissible as impeachment evidence, but
that Hernandez could not be asked about the underlying facts of the
conviction.
During recross examination, the prosecutor asked Hernandez,
“Sir, isn’t it true that you as recently as April 2023, have a felony conviction
for a felony possession of a firearm by a person who is prohibited by a
protective order?” Hernandez replied, “Yes.” The prosecutor did not ask any
further questions at that time.
On redirect examination, defense counsel asked Hernandez to
identify two no-contact protective court orders issued in this case, one from
2019 and the other from 2021. Hernandez noted that only the 2021 order
prohibited possession of a firearm. Defense counsel then asked, “And it was
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on the basis of that order where it said you shouldn’t possess a firearm that
you got arrested and you entered a felony guilty plea to possessing a firearm
in violation of that order?” Hernandez answered, “Yes.”
The prosecutor followed up this questioning on recross:
“[Prosecutor]: Sir, you, by court order, were not allowed to have
firearms, right? [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Hernandez]: Initially, no.
“[Prosecutor]: And in late 2022, you were arrested for discharging
that firearm?”
Defense counsel objected and the trial court overruled the
objection “as phrased.” Before Hernandez could answer, defense counsel
again objected and the court called counsel into chambers.
“[Court]: All right. [Prosecutor], by [defense counsel] marking as
two court exhibits two protective orders and, therefore, placing them into
play and opening the door, how far do you think that you want to go in now
that the door has been swung open?
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, just that he was arrested for this and
he ultimately pled guilty, sentenced. I didn’t want to go—
“[Court]: There you go, [defense counsel]. Any objection to her
following up on the fact that he pled guilty to possessing a firearm in
violation of a protective order?
“[Defense counsel]: I have no problem with that, but she just said
he was arrested for shooting or discharging a firearm.
“[Court]: Is that true?
“[Prosecutor]: That was the charge.
“[Court]: That’s the charge.
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“[Defense counsel]: That was not the charge that he got convicted
for.
“[Court]: Well, okay. [Prosecutor], you’re basing this knowledge of
discharge versus possession based on what?
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I have his rap sheet which indicated
he was arrested for negligent discharge, [section] 245[,] [subdivision] (a)(1),
as well as the possession of the firearm. A case was filed in San Bernardino.
He ultimately pled guilty to the singular charge.
“[Court]: Of possession?
“[Prosecutor]: Of possession. Three charges were filed.
“[Court]: Then let’s keep it to possession rather than discharge.
Although he may have been arrested for discharge, he pled guilty to
possession, so just be mindful of that, and I think she will do that.
“[Defense counsel]: The court specifically sanitized that to the
specific charge.
“[Court]: Yeah.
“[Defense counsel]: She just went beyond that.
“[Court]: No problem at all. Anything further, folks?”
Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, arguing, “There is a
specific court order exactly what she could get into and not. She went beyond
that to a mere arrest that was not followed up for a conviction of a charge—
well, for an arrest for a charge he was not convicted of when there is a clear
order not to get into that area, and it is extremely prejudicial to make this
mere allegation of what he was arrested for when she had no belief that that
was what the conviction was for.” The prosecutor responded, “Counsel opened
the door on his redirect. Submit on that.”
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After denying the motion for mistrial, the court asked defense
counsel if he would like the court to “admonish the jury not to consider the
question that was made?” Defense counsel asked the court “to admonish the
jury to disregard the District Attorney’s question. It has no evidentiary
value.” The court then instructed the jury, “As you have been or will be
instructed, ladies and gentlemen, nothing that the attorneys say is evidence.
Their remarks are not evidence and their questions are not evidence. Only
the witnesses’ answers are evidence.”
B. Legal Standard
Under California law, a prosecutor commits misconduct when he
or she uses “‘“‘deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade
either the court or the jury.’”’” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858.) A
prosecutor may commit misconduct by “eliciting or attempting to elicit
inadmissible evidence” in defiance of a court order. (People v. Crew (2003) 31
Cal.4th 822, 839.)
Whether to grant a mistrial “is directed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985.) “‘A mistrial
should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable
by admonition or instruction. Whether a particular incident is incurably
prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested
with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.’” (People v.
Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1068.) In reviewing a ruling on a motion for
mistrial, we apply “the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Ibid.)
C. Discussion
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Hernandez’s motion for a mistrial. First, it is not clear that the prosecutor
intentionally attempted to elicit inadmissible evidence in defiance of the
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court’s order. From the evidence before us, it appears the prosecutor believed
that Hernandez had opened the door to further questioning on the prior
conviction by testifying that only one of the two protective orders issued in
the case specifically prohibited possession of a firearm, inferring that his
conviction was the result of an honest mistake.
However, even if the prosecutor committed misconduct by
questioning Hernandez about the underlying facts of his conviction, any
possible prejudice was cured by the trial court’s instruction that the jury
could not consider anything the attorneys said as evidence. In the absence of
any contrary evidence, we must presume the jury followed the court’s
instructions. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 (Chhoun).)
Moreover, there was no prejudice because the trial court
sustained defense counsel’s objection and Hernandez was therefore not
required to answer the question regarding the facts underlying his gun
possession conviction. “A party generally is not prejudiced by a question to
which an objection has been sustained.” (People v. Johnson (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 1230, 1236; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 764 [holding
that “because the trial court sustained objections to the argumentative
element of the prosecutor’s questioning, we assume any prejudice was
abated”].)
Even if the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial,
any error was harmless. (See People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 749–750
& fn. 9 [finding any error in denying mistrial motion based on inadmissible
reference to defendant as a drug dealer was harmless under either People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 for state error, or Chapman, [supra,] 386
U.S. at p. 24 for federal constitutional error]; see also People v. Harris (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1581 [any error in denying motion for mistrial was
24
harmless where “evidence of [defendant’s] guilt was overwhelming”].) Here,
the evidence of Hernandez’s guilt, including victim’s testimony, DNA
evidence, and Hernandez’s text message to mother, was overwhelming, and
any error was therefore harmless.
V.
MOTION TO RECALL WITNESSES
Hernandez argues the trial court abused its discretion and denied
him his constitutional right to present a defense by denying his request to
recall witnesses Tommy, mother, and Officer Lamas. Hernandez contends he
should have been able to recall these witnesses because the defense had not
yet rested its case. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Hernandez’s request to recall witnesses.
A. Factual Background
After the defense called Tommy as a witness, and he was cross-
examined, the trial court inquired whether the witness could be excused and
if so, should the witness be subject to recall. Defense counsel stated there was
no need for recall and the court dismissed Tommy.
The next day, defense counsel stated he wished to recall Tommy
“because [he] forgot to ask him about what he saw that day during the event.”
The trial court replied, “[T]he process of recalling a witness is not because
you forgot to ask them something. It is not because you looked through your
notes and/or ordered transcripts and realized you forgot to do something. It is
to address items that additional subsequent evidence has brought up.
Otherwise, we are re-trying the whole case.” As an example, the court noted
it granted defense counsel’s request to recall [victim] as a witness to address
“areas that . . . Officer Lamas brought up in regards to the exchange in the
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hallway as to how [victim] got into the room, whether it was by force or
otherwise.”
Defense counsel explained that he wanted to ask Tommy what
time he arrived at mother’s house, when he left, and what he saw. The
prosecution objected on the ground that defense counsel had the opportunity
to ask Tommy those questions when he called him as a witness. The trial
court denied the request, noting what defense counsel “proffered in the offer
of proof does not warrant . . . calling him back.”
Defense counsel then sought to recall Officer Lamas to impeach
daughter’s testimony with an earlier statement she made to Officer Lamas.
Defense counsel said, “[daughter] stated on the stand that she quoted [victim]
saying, ‘Is this how I lose my virginity’ or words to that effect.” Defense
counsel explained that daughter’s trial testimony suggested victim made the
statement in a sad manner but her earlier statement to Officer Lamas was
“as-a-matter-of-fact statement.” The trial court replied, “I don’t understand
the impeachment because it sounds like it is the same statement.” The court
denied the motion to recall daughter because the proposed recall testimony
was not relevant and defense counsel could have raised this issue when he
originally examined daughter.
Defense counsel then asked whether “the court is staying with its
initial ruling on cross-examining [mother] related to her relationship with my
client, with Tommy [], and whether or not it was a sexual relationship or
casual sexual relationship versus something different.” The trial court
confirmed the request to question mother on this topic was denied.
B. Legal Standard
“A witness once examined cannot be reexamined as to the same
matter without leave of the court, but he may be reexamined as to any new
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matter upon which he has been examined by another party to the action.
Leave may be granted or withheld in the court’s discretion.” (Evid. Code,
§ 774.) “After a witness has been excused from giving further testimony in
the action, he cannot be recalled without leave of the court. Leave may be
granted or withheld in the court’s discretion.” (Evid. Code, § 778.)
We review a court’s decision declining to recall a witness for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 542.) A trial court
may permit a witness to be recalled when recall would clarify inconsistencies
in the witness’s testimony. (Ibid.) However, a trial court may refuse to allow
recall of a witness if further examination “would necessarily be cumulative
and repetitious of matters already inquired into.” (People v. Flynn (1958) 166
Cal.App.2d 501, 512.) “‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do
not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense. Courts
retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to
control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and
the avoidance of prejudice.’” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305.)
C. Discussion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
recall of Tommy, Officer Lamas, or mother. With respect to recalling Tommy
or Officer Lamas, defense counsel had the opportunity to examine these
witnesses regarding the topics he sought to raise on recall at the time they
were initially called. As the court noted, the purpose of recalling a witness is
to address additional evidence that may have arisen since the witness was
called or to examine discrepancies in a witness’s testimony, neither of which
applied here.
Moreover, the trial court acted within its discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude marginally relevant testimony which
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was likely to necessitate undue consumption of time. Defense counsel made
an offer of proof regarding what he hoped to ask Tommy and Office Lamas on
recall, and the court reasonably concluded these topics were not sufficiently
significant to justify recalling them.
In light of our conclusion the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining the proposed examinations would not have
produced relevant evidence, we further conclude that the trial court’s refusal
to allow the additional examination did not violate Hernandez’s
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. (See People v.
Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623–624) [“notwithstanding the
confrontation clause, a trial court may restrict” examination of witnesses on
the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352].)
With respect to defense counsel’s request to recall mother, even if
the trial court erred in disallowing questioning her about the alleged
threesome with Hernandez and Tommy, any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under Watson and Chapman given the substantial evidence
of guilt.
VI.
THE VERDICT FORMS CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW
Hernandez argues the verdict forms misstated the law because
they provided the jury the option of finding him either “guilty” or “not guilty,”
which had the effect of requiring the jury to find that he was factually
innocent before it could find him not guilty of the charged crimes. He
similarly claims the verdict forms for the aggravating factors also misstate
the law because they provide the jury the option of finding the factors “true”
or “not true.” He contends the verdict forms therefore violated his due process
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right not to be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt under
In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358.
We note this issue is waived because defense counsel did not
raise any objection at trial to the wording of the jury verdict forms. A
defendant’s failure to object to a verdict form when the court proposed to
submit it or when the jury returned its finding forfeits the issue on appeal.
(See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330 [defendant forfeited claim of
error related to verdict form that contained incorrect code section].)
Even if this issue were preserved on appeal, it is without merit.
Hernandez fails to cite, and we have been unable to locate, any authority
concluding that the standard verdict forms which provide the jury the option
of finding a defendant “guilty” or “not guilty” violate a defendant’s due
process right to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, any possible error was cured by the jury instructions.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and
reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 220, which
states, “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [¶] . . . [¶] Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, (he) (is) entitled to an acquittal and you must find
(him) not guilty.” Regarding the aggravating factors, the court instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 3250, “The People have the burden of proving each
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find that the allegation has not been proved.” We presume the jury
followed its instructions. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 30.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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