CourtListener 10849107•People v. Frazier CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Frazier CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B334385
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA103783)
v.
JOSHUA LAMARR FRAZIER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Joshua Lamarr
Frazier of nine felony sex offenses, including four counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14.
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses on seven of the nine
counts. He requests we reverse the convictions on those seven
counts, or alternatively, that we modify the judgment by reducing
the convictions to the lesser offenses. We find no prejudicial
instructional error, and therefore affirm the judgment of
conviction in its entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Kiara B. was born in November 2004. When Kiara was
approximately four or five years old, defendant began a
relationship with Kiara’s mother, Sakia J. Defendant began
living with Kiara and her mother, and Sakia and defendant
eventually had four children together. Kiara saw defendant as a
“father figure” and one of her primary caregivers. Defendant
started sexually abusing Kiara when she was approximately six
years old and the family was living in Las Vegas, Nevada. The
abuse continued after the family moved to Long Beach,
California. Kiara first reported the ongoing abuse to her mother
in March of 2016.
After taking Kiara to the hospital to be examined, Sakia
called the police and reported the abuse. Defendant was arrested
on or about March 16, 2016. He was 29 years old at the time—
more than 15 years older than Kiara.
Following his arrest, defendant made numerous admissions
of guilt. He said he had been having sexual contact with Kiara
since she was about four years old. The sexual relationship first
started while they were living in Las Vegas, and included oral
copulation (he was not sure how many times but it was “a lot”),
2
vaginal sex (no less than five times), and anal sex (no less than
five times). Defendant said he did not like condoms, so he
preferred engaging in anal sex to prevent the possibility of
pregnancy.
Defendant elaborated on his initial statements during a
second recorded interview with Detective Rubi Castro, a detective
in the child abuse unit of the Long Beach Police Department.
Defendant said the sexual contact began in Las Vegas when
Kiara was six years old, and not four years old as he initially
stated. He repeatedly told Detective Castro that Kiara initiated
the contact, putting her hands in his pants, coming into his room
when he was asleep and trying to lie down with him. He said it
“just kept happening like that.”
Defendant said initially he engaged in oral copulation with
Kiara and nothing else, but then it progressed to anal sex.
Defendant admitted they had sexual intercourse numerous times
and it had been “going on for a year.” According to defendant,
they did not have vaginal intercourse until Kiara’s eleventh
birthday. Defendant admitted the most recent act of vaginal
intercourse occurred when Sakia had been hospitalized in
February 2016. Defendant said he tried to tell Kiara it was
wrong for them to be having sex, but she did not care, it was
“what she wants.” Defendant claimed Kiara told him she never
wanted it to stop, and asked him to promise he would never do it
with her siblings. Defendant said he realized he was “being sex
played by a child.” He described Kiara as sometimes acting like
“a woman scorned.”
Detective Castro also interviewed Kiara. The recorded
interview took place on March 16, 2016. Several days later, a
forensic interview of Kiara was conducted by an expert in
interviewing child victims. Detective Castro was also present.
3
Kiara’s responses were substantially consistent with the
information she had already given to Detective Castro.
Kiara said she was 11 years old. She explained that
defendant started abusing her by touching her private parts
when she was just six years old. They were living in Las Vegas
at the time. When Kiara was around nine years old, they moved
to Long Beach. She knew the move took place before the start of
the new school year and she was “about to be a fourth grader.”
Once they were in Long Beach, defendant started touching Kiara
with his penis. If she was on the bed, Kiara would try to “scoot”
away, but defendant would grab her and pull her back. It seemed
like whenever her mother left the apartment, he would try to do
stuff with her. Defendant would pull his pants down and make
Kiara pull her pants down. Defendant would then put “his stuff
in [her] stuff.” He often took Kiara into the bathroom in their
apartment when he wanted to abuse her, and sometimes he
pushed her to the floor. The first time it occurred, Kiara was
nine years old.
Towards the end of the interview, Kiara recalled several
incidents of anal sex in the bathroom, as well as acts of oral
copulation. Defendant would push Kiara onto her knees, grab
her ponytail, put his penis in her mouth, and “pull [her] head
back and forth.” She said she was 10 years old when that started
to happen.
Kiara explained she was afraid of defendant, saying he
“would kind of like threaten me.” Defendant told her they would
get in trouble if she told anyone what was going on. He also said
he would hurt her mom, her mom would think it was Kiara’s
fault, and then she would also hurt her.
Defendant was charged with nine felony sex offenses: two
counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old
4
or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); 1 counts 1 & 2); two
counts of aggravated sexual assault/rape of a child under the age
of 14 while defendant was seven or more years older than the
victim (§§ 269, subd. (a)(1), 261, subd. (a)(2) & (6); counts 3 & 4);
aggravated sexual assault/sodomy of a child under the age of 14
while defendant was seven or more years older than the victim
(§§ 269, subd. (a)(3), 286, subd. (c)(2) & (3); count 5); two counts of
lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 6 & 7); oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 8); and aggravated sexual
assault/oral copulation of a child under the age of 14 while
defendant was seven or more years older than the victim (§§ 269,
subd. (a)(4), 287, subds. (c)(2) & (3) [former § 288a]; count 9).
The jury trial began in October 2023.
Sakia testified that Kiara was born in November 2004. She
explained that after she began her relationship with defendant,
they moved in together and she had four children with him.
Kiara’s four half-siblings were a girl born in March 2011, another
girl born in March 2012, a boy born in October 2013, and another
girl born in January 2015. The family lived for a period of time
in Las Vegas, and then they moved to an apartment in Long
Beach in July 2013. Defendant was often left in charge of the
children.
After Kiara confided in her that defendant was abusing
her, Sakia confronted defendant. He initially denied it.
However, defendant eventually admitted the abuse was
occurring, and he told Sakia that Kiara was not lying. Defendant
said they could “fix” it. They just needed to tell Kiara to say that
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5
she lied and he could get help or therapy. Sakia left the house
and called the police to report the abuse.
Kiara testified she was born in November 2004. She said
defendant began abusing her while they were living in Las
Vegas. It would occur when her mother would go somewhere like
the store. She recalled incidents where defendant would start
touching her private parts while they were sitting on the couch
watching cartoons.
Kiara said the family eventually moved to Long Beach.
She could not recall when they moved, saying it was all “kind of
like a blur.” But after the move, Kiara said the abuse
“progressed” with defendant starting to touch her “using his
penis.” Kiara could not say exactly when the first incident of
vaginal penetration happened, but it occurred in the bathroom of
the apartment. She tried to walk away, but he pulled her back
and pinned her hands against the wall above her head.
Defendant first used his fingers and then his penis. Afterward,
he told her not to say anything. He said that if she did, her
mother would not believe her, her siblings would be sent to a
group home, and everyone would be separated.
Kiara testified to additional acts of abuse, including vaginal
intercourse on her 11th birthday and when her mother was
hospitalized for several days, as well as multiple acts of sodomy
and oral copulation. Kiara explained that when she was first
being interviewed about what happened, sometimes she would
not explain everything that occurred because talking about the
abuse made her feel really uncomfortable.
When asked why she did not tell her mother sooner about
what was going on, Kiara said she was scared. She did not want
to “tear apart my family.” It was upsetting and scary to have a
person she thought she could trust use that power against her.
6
Kiara also felt she was too young to even be able to articulate
what was happening.
The jury convicted defendant on all nine counts. The court
sentenced defendant to a term of 95 years to life, calculated as
follows: consecutive terms of 25 years to life on each of counts 1
and 2, plus consecutive terms of 15 years to life on each of counts
3, 4 and 9. The court imposed and stayed 15 to life terms on
counts 5 and 8, and imposed concurrent six-year middle terms on
counts 6 and 7. Defendant was awarded 3,247 days of
presentence custody credits (2,823 actual, 424 conduct).
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court committed instructional
error by failing to instruct on lesser included offenses on counts 1
through 5, and counts 8 and 9. Our review is de novo. (People v.
Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 295 (Wilson).) We conclude that to
the extent there was any instructional error, it was harmless.
1. Duty to instruct on lesser included offenses
The trial court in a criminal case has a sua sponte duty to
instruct “on all lesser included offenses the evidence warrants,
even against the defense’s wishes. Such instructions are required
when, but only when, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater one.”
(People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 98; Wilson, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 295.) Instruction on a lesser included offense is
necessary “ ‘ “ ‘when the evidence raises a question as to whether
all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation],
but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than
that charged.’ ” ’ ” (Wilson, at p. 295, quoting People v. Valdez
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115.)
7
The evidence supporting instruction on a lesser included
offense must be substantial. (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th
90, 116.) Weak or purely speculative evidence does not suffice.
(Ibid.; accord, People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705–706.) In
other words, there must be substantial, credible evidence “ ‘from
which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude that
the facts underlying the particular instruction exist.’ ” (Souza, at
p. 116.)
In assessing whether the evidence is substantial enough to
warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense, we are
mindful that, in this context, we determine only the “bare legal
sufficiency” of the evidence and “not its weight.” (People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177 (Breverman).) Moreover,
doubts about whether an instruction is warranted should be
resolved in favor of the accused. (People v. Tufunga (1999)
21 Cal.4th 935, 944.)
2. Counts 3, 4, 5 and 9
Defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child under the age of 14. The aggravated
assaults in counts 3 and 4 were based on forcible rape (§§ 269,
subd. (a)(1), 261, subd. (a)(2)). In count 5, the aggravated assault
was based on an act of forcible sodomy (§§ 269, subd. (a)(3), 286,
subd. (c)(2)(A)), and in count 9, it was based on forcible oral
copulation (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [former
§ 288a]). Defendant contends the jury should have been
instructed on all four of these counts with the lesser included
nonforcible offenses of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor
under the age of 18 (§ 261.5, subd. (c)), unlawful sodomy with a
minor under the age of 18 (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)), and unlawful oral
copulation with a minor under the age of 18 (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)).
8
The People concede the nonforcible offenses are lesser
included offenses to the aggravated counts charged in counts 3, 4,
5 and 9, but argue there was no substantial evidence warranting
instruction on those lesser offenses. Alternatively, the People
contend any error was harmless.
In asserting there was substantial evidence supporting
instructions on the lesser included offenses, defendant chiefly
points to his own pretrial statements to law enforcement. While
defendant admitted he was having sexual contact with Kiara and
had been for some time, defendant repeatedly made comments to
the effect that Kiara initiated the contact and that he was not
forcing her to engage in such conduct.
We need not resolve whether the evidence is substantial
enough to have warranted instructing the jury on any nonforcible
lesser offenses. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
instructions on lesser included offenses should have been given,
we conclude any instructional error was harmless.
Prejudice arising from the failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense in a noncapital case is assessed under People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 260 (Schuller); Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 165; People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161 (Banks),
overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015)
61 Cal.4th 363, 391; see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We do not
reverse unless examination of the record demonstrates a
reasonable probability the instructional error affected the
outcome. (Breverman, at p. 165; Watson, at p. 836.)
Moreover, a finding that substantial evidence exists in the
record to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does
not resolve the separate question of whether the failure to so
instruct was prejudicial. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
9
pp. 177–178; accord, Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1161; People
v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 929 (Beames).) “[T]he two
standards of evidentiary review are distinct.” (Breverman, at
p. 177.)
As we explained above, the duty to instruct on a lesser
included offense arises whenever there is substantial evidence a
reasonable jury could conclude the lesser offense was committed.
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) But, we take “an
entirely different view of the evidence” when assessing error
under Watson. (Breverman, at p. 177.) Posttrial review under
Watson “focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what
such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error
under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate
court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence
supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the
evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively
weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which
the defendant complains affected the result.” (Breverman, at
p. 177.)
Here, the evidence supporting the jury’s verdicts on the
aggravated sexual assault charges in counts 3, 4, 5 and 9 was
overwhelming.
Aggravated assault by rape is defined in section 261,
subdivision (a)(2), as sexual penetration “accomplished against a
person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or
another.” Aggravated assault by sodomy or forcible oral
copulation contains the same definition. (§§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A),
287, subd. (c)(2)(A).)
Force in this context is simply conduct that overcomes the
will of the victim. (See, e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1015 & 1030.)
10
Sufficient force to satisfy the statute includes acts by the
defendant of grabbing, holding, or restraining the victim that
occur in conjunction with the abusive acts themselves. (People v.
Morales (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 471, 480 (Morales); People v.
Garcia (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1024 (Garcia); People v.
Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005 (Alvarez).)
Duress is defined as the use of “a direct or implied threat of
force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution.” (CALCRIM
Nos. 1000, 1015 & 1030.) Relevant considerations to a finding of
duress include “the victim’s age, her relationship to the
perpetrator, threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the
victim when the victim attempts to resist, warnings to the victim
that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the
family, and the relative physical vulnerability of the child.”
(People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1072 (Thomas).)
Kiara’s testimony demonstrated overwhelming evidence
that all four counts were committed with the requisite force
and/or duress.
The rape in count 3 occurred on the couch in the family
home on Kiara’s 11th birthday. Kiara testified they had been
sitting on the couch watching a movie. When the movie ended,
defendant put her on his lap and vaginally penetrated her with
his penis. She said it was “the most painful thing” she had
experienced. She did not recall saying anything to defendant, but
she remembered crying. Kiara said, “[N]othing was ever said,
like, during. But after he would tell me not to tell anyone.”
Kiara felt she had no choice but to go along. She tried to just not
think about anything at all and wait for it to be over. Defendant
told her that if she said anything, it would “mess up everyone’s
lives.”
11
The rape in count 4 occurred when Kiara’s mother was in
the hospital in February 2016. Defendant woke up Kiara and
took her to sleep with him. When she was lying on the bed,
defendant spread her legs apart and penetrated her. She cried
and covered her face with a sheet.
Count 5 was based on an act of sodomy that took place in
the bathroom of the apartment in Long Beach. Kiara testified
that defendant told her to bend down and touch her toes and then
he penetrated her from behind. It was painful and she cried and
asked him to stop, to no avail.
Count 9 was based on an act of forcible oral copulation that
also took place in the bathroom of the apartment. Kiara testified
she did not feel she could say no to defendant. She explained her
feelings as follows: “I just felt like I was powerless, honestly. I
never really tried to fight back because I didn’t know if he was
going to hurt me. Because whenever—like, whenever it would
happen, it was like he was a different person, you know, not like
the father figure, so I just didn’t want to, like, make him mad or
anything.” Kiara said defendant would sometimes grab and hold
onto her ponytail. She said it hurt and she did not feel like she
could get away.
In contrast to the strength of the above evidence, the
evidence suggesting a lack of force or duress was so
comparatively weak there was no reasonable probability the
claimed instructional error affected the verdict. (Beames, supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 929; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.)
Defendant relies in large part on his own pretrial
admissions asserting that Kiara was the one who initiated the
contact, even when she was just six years old. He referred to
Kiara, a young girl not yet a teenager, as “playing” him and
acting like a “scorned” woman.
12
Defendant also argues that even if Kiara’s testimony
suggested the use of force, she never said that defendant “applied
force.” The law does not require the victim to testify to a specific
application of force. Kiara’s testimony as to each count included
testimony about defendant moving, holding or positioning her
against her will, or refusing to stop when she asked him to.
Such testimony was more than sufficient. (Morales, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th at p. 480; Garcia, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1024; Alvarez, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
There was also significant testimony about the fear and
duress Kiara felt to comply with defendant’s demands.
Defendant was a father figure and a primary caregiver that
Kiara had lived with since she was four or five years old.
Defendant repeatedly told Kiara not to tell anyone and made
various threats about getting into trouble if she did, that she
would not be believed, and that it would result in her siblings and
the family being split up. Moreover, in addition to the difference
in their ages and size, there was evidence Kiara witnessed
defendant hitting and choking her mother when they argued and
therefore had reason to fear him. Thus, there was comparatively
strong evidence of duress within the meaning of the statutory
language with relatively weak evidence of rape, sodomy or oral
copulation without duress. (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1072.)
3. Counts 1, 2 and 8
Defendant was convicted of committing multiple acts of
sexual abuse of a child 10 years old or younger—acts which are
punished more severely because of the age of the victim. In count
1, defendant was convicted of sodomy (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), in count
2, sexual intercourse (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), and in count 8, oral
copulation (§ 288.7, subd. (b)).
13
Defendant contends there was conflicting testimony
concerning Kiara’s age at the times relevant to counts 1, 2, and 8.
Defendant primarily points to inconsistencies in Kiara’s pretrial
statements and trial testimony which, he says, raised a
reasonable inference she may not have been 10 years old or
younger at the times the acts in counts 1, 2 and 8 were
committed. Defendant therefore contends, based on how the
counts were alleged, the court should have instructed with
unlawful sodomy with a minor under the age of 18 (§ 286,
subd. (b)(1)), unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the
age of 18 (§ 261.5, subd. (c)), and unlawful oral copulation with a
minor under the age of 18 (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)). The People argue
there was no substantial evidence warranting instruction on
lesser included offenses, and even if there was, any error was
harmless.
Once again, even if we assume, without finding, that
instruction on lesser included offenses was warranted as to these
three counts, we conclude any error in failing to so instruct was
harmless. (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260; Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 177–178.)
There was ample evidence supporting the jury’s verdicts of
guilt on counts 1, 2 and 8, all of which were based on conduct that
occurred from July 2013 when the family moved to Long Beach,
up until Kiara’s 11th birthday in November 2015.
Both Sakia and Kiara testified that Kiara was born in
November 2004. Sakia’s testimony established the family moved
to Long Beach in July 2013, when Kiara was just nine years old.
Kiara’s statements during the pretrial forensic interview were
consistent on this point.
Kiara testified she could not recall the exact date of the
first act of sodomy that formed the basis for count 1. But, she
14
explained the basic timeframe by making reference to the ages of
two of her half-siblings, whose birthdates were established by
Sakia’s testimony. Kiara said she remembered the incident
occurred when her youngest half-sibling was a small baby
sleeping in a crib. Her youngest half-sibling was her sister born
in January 2015, almost a year before Kiara turned 11. In
addition, during her forensic interview, Kiara said this incident
occurred when her half-brother was not yet two. Kiara’s half-
brother would have turned two in October 2015, one month before
Kiara turned 11.
Admissions by defendant corroborated Kiara’s testimony
about the timeframe when the first act of sodomy occurred.
Defendant admitted in March 2016 that sexual intercourse
started out with Kiara as anal sex, that they had anal sex at least
five times, and it had been “going on for a year.” Therefore, based
on defendant’s own statements, he had been having anal sex with
Kiara for several months before she turned 11 in November 2015.
With respect to count 2, Kiara also could not recall the
exact date of when defendant pinned her against the bathroom
wall and vaginally penetrated her with his penis. But Kiara
testified that once they moved to Long Beach when she was nine
years old, the abuse “progressed” with defendant starting to
touch her “using his penis.” In both her initial interview with
Detective Castro and the followup forensic interview, Kiara said
the vaginal penetration started in the bathroom in Long Beach
when she was nine years old.
Count 8 involved an incident of oral copulation that also
took place in the bathroom of the family’s Long Beach apartment.
During the forensic interview, Kiara said she was 10 years old
when defendant began putting his penis in her mouth.
Defendant’s admissions also corroborate the timing of this
15
incident. Defendant admitted his abuse of Kiara started when
she was just six years old, and he explained that for a long time it
consisted only of oral copulation, until it progressed to anal and
vaginal sex.
In contrast, the evidence defendant relies on to argue that
Kiara may have been older than 10 when counts 1, 2 and 8 were
committed is comparatively weak.
Defendant says there were inconsistencies in Kiara’s
testimony, pointing chiefly to her testimony at the preliminary
hearing held in January 2016. When asked her age, Kiara said
she was 12, even though she would not turn 12 until November of
that year. When this testimony was pointed out to her at trial,
Kiara said she was “pretty sure” about her age, and no further
clarification was sought. Defendant also cites to Kiara’s
statement describing everything as “kind of a blur.” But Kiara
made that statement not in response to a question about her age
or birthdate, but when she was asked if she knew the date the
family moved to Long Beach. She was able to later clarify that
she remembered they moved in the summer before she started
fourth grade.
Defendant points to some additional testimony raising an
inference that the first act of vaginal penetration, relevant to
count 2, may have occurred when Kiara was at least 11 years old.
Defendant cites to his own pretrial admissions in which he
explained that he first had vaginal sex with Kiara on her 11th
birthday, and that all of their prior sexual contact had been oral
copulation or anal sex.
In addition, defendant points to the testimony of Officer
Nathan Kane. Officer Kane was a patrol officer who reported to
the hospital when Sakia took Kiara there to be examined after
she disclosed the abuse. Officer Kane testified that Kiara told
16
him defendant had been “sexually assault[ing]” her since she was
six years old, but that the first time he vaginally penetrated her
with his penis was when her mother had recently been
hospitalized. The evidence showed Sakia was hospitalized in
February 2016 when Kiara was 11. Officer Kane also testified
that Kiara was “pretty shy” and “very nervous.” Nothing in
Officer Kane’s relatively brief testimony indicated he had any
particular experience dealing with children who have been
sexually abused. Nor does his testimony show that his
conversation with Kiara was as thorough as those conducted by
Detective Castro or by the expert forensic interviewer. The
testimony was not reasonably likely to be given more credence by
a jury, considering the entire evidentiary record.
We conclude there is no reasonable probability the claimed
instructional error affected the verdict on counts 1, 2 and 8.
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
17
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