People v. Wagner CA2/4

CourtListener 10849105Calctapp28.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/28/26 P. v. Wagner CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B346113

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. M0255196, A624927)
v.

ROGER WAGNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maria Cavalluzzi, Judge. Affirmed.
Margaret Manning, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Roger Wagner appeals from the trial court’s
order extending his involuntary commitment under Penal Code
section 1026.5, subdivision (b).1 He does not contest the court’s
statutorily required findings that he has a mental illness that
causes him to pose a substantial danger of physical harm to
others. Instead, he contends only that substantial evidence does
not support the additional, constitutionally required finding that
he has serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous
behavior. We disagree and affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 1983, appellant was found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI) of assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd.
(a)(1)). The trial court ordered him committed to the Department
of State Hospitals. Appellant was admitted to Patton State
Hospital on July 18, 1983, for a term not to exceed six years. The
trial court subsequently extended his commitment numerous
times under section 1026.5.
On September 20, 2024, the People filed the instant
petition to extend appellant’s commitment pursuant to section
1026.5. Appellant personally waived his right to trial by jury; his
counsel joined. The petition was tried to the court, which granted
the petition, extending appellant’s commitment through January
10, 2027. Appellant timely appealed.

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. People’s Evidence
A. Commitment Offense
In January 1983, appellant grabbed a woman on the street
and started “grinding on her” in an effort to have sexual
intercourse. After the woman pulled away, appellant ran after
her, grabbed her a second time, and pulled on either her clothing
or skin to see her vagina. The woman managed to escape.
B. Testimony of Treating Psychiatrist
Appellant’s current treating psychiatrist, Dr. Steven
Matthew Toffel, M.D., had known appellant for about nine
months. Dr. Toffel met with appellant monthly. Dr. Toffel also
met with appellant and his entire treatment team quarterly and
annually. He testified that appellant was an “active participant”
in the team meetings, but appellant “usually cut short” the
monthly conversations because he “typically doesn’t want to
discuss a lot of psychiatric-related matters.”
Dr. Toffel diagnosed appellant with schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type. He testified that appellant also had
“borderline social functioning”2 and cannabis use disorder that
was in remission due to the controlled environment at Patton.
Appellant’s active symptoms primarily “relate[d] to chronic
delusions, often religious in nature,” including that he was God or
“the Holy Jesus.” Appellant told Dr. Toffel and the rest of his
treatment team that the Bible said he did not have any mental

2 The written report filed with the petition and received into
evidence by the court states that appellant’s diagnoses included
“borderline intellectual functioning,” not “borderline social
functioning.”

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illness; he also denied ever having psychiatric symptoms. He
nevertheless complied with his psychotropic medication regimen,
telling the treatment team he wanted to follow their instructions.
Appellant spent a lot of time in his room and tended to
keep to himself. Patton staff did not document any
“inappropriate behaviors,” including violence or aggression,
during the preceding six months.
C. Testimony of Evaluating Psychologist
Dr. Mario Souza, Psy.D., testified that he was trained in
clinical and forensic psychology. His job at Patton was to
evaluate patients and prepare reports for the court. Souza had
been appellant’s evaluator since 2020. For the most recent
evaluation, Dr. Souza reviewed appellant’s current medical
records, spoke to members of appellant’s treatment team, and
met with appellant. He prepared a written report that the trial
court received into evidence and read and considered in
connection with the proceedings.
Dr. Souza testified that appellant had actively participated
in his meeting with Dr. Souza and was “very respectful.”
However, appellant exhibited “delusional thinking, lack of
insight, and some thought disorganization.” Specifically, he told
Dr. Souza he was “the Jesus Christ” and talked about being
invincible at a high school football game. Appellant “blanketly
denied” suffering from any mental illness or symptoms thereof.
Dr. Souza testified that such lack of insight into one’s mental
illness, formally known as “anosognosia,” is “a typical
presentation” in schizoaffective disorders. When Dr. Souza asked
appellant about his commitment offense, appellant acknowledged
that he had tried to have sexual intercourse with the victim but
characterized the incident as “a misunderstanding” and

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attempted to “show that the situation wasn’t as bad as people
portrayed it to be.”
Dr. Souza testified that a “fundamental” goal of treatment
at Patton is for patients to develop insight into their mental
illnesses, violence risk, and “the behavioral chain associated with
their sexual offending.” He explained that “if you don’t recognize
what you suffer from, there’s no way you can stop it from
impacting your behaviors.” Appellant’s delusional religious
behaviors were present at the time of his commitment offense,
had persisted, and “he has no insight into the presence of these
beliefs.” Dr. Souza opined that this was “severely problematic
and adds to his recidivism risk.”
Dr. Souza had spoken with appellant about sex offender
treatment available at Patton “in every single one of my
interviews with him since 2020.” Each time, appellant told Dr.
Souza he would not attend sex offender treatment because he
was not a sex offender. Dr. Souza opined that appellant’s refusal
to attend the treatment “shows a lack of cooperation with
treatment providers who are asking him to engage in a specific
form of treatment,” and “there’s no way he’s going to gain an
understanding of why he engaged in this problematic sexual
behavior, without first acknowledging it, and then receiving the
expert training and knowledge . . . to make sure this behavior
doesn’t happen again.” Dr. Souza later added that “better insight
into his severe mental illness and to everything else that follows”
would help appellant “recogniz[e] triggers of a warning sign” and
“know how to manage [him]self.”
Dr. Souza opined that, due to his schizoaffective disorder,
appellant had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous
behavior and posed a substantial danger of physical harm to

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others. He based these opinions on “risk factors that have been
shown in the scientific literature that contributes to violence
recidivism.” Specifically, Dr. Souza testified that he “put a lot of
weight on dynamic factors,” which are emphasized in the “gold
standard” HCR-20 violence risk assessment tool. In appellant’s
case, dynamic factors included appellant’s “severe lack of insight
into his violence risk” and “sexually problematic behaviors,” as
well as his lack of insight into his need for treatment and
medication. Appellant also showed “low responsivity to
treatment” despite his relatively high attendance rates at certain
groups, and a “lack of understanding of how some of these beliefs
about women and sexual consent can increase his risk for
dangerous behavior.” Dr. Souza opined that “any female he does
interact with romantically would also be potentially at risk,”
particularly since appellant had an “unrealistic appraisal of how
well he will do in the community” and lacked a “workable relapse
prevention plan.”
II. Appellant’s Evidence
Appellant did not present any expert testimony. Instead,
appellant testified as the only defense witness.
Appellant testified that he was ready to leave Patton. He
had been “locked up” for many years, despite not doing “anything
negative, like penetrate the woman and rape her thoroughly.”
Instead, he “had a misunderstanding with a young lady on the
street” when he was 22 years old, and “came here to get out
early.” When he was released, appellant planned to rent an
apartment, “have a good life, do the right thing, take my
medications, [and] try to look for a wife.” He added that he
already had a girlfriend named Tracy; he “wrote her a beautiful

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love letter” before his 1983 arrest, and believed she was waiting
for him due to his “connection with her spirits.”
Appellant testified that he would continue to take his
medications. Even though he was “not mentally ill,” he felt that
the medication was “slowing me down to keep me in commission
to making me stable in my mind,” and giving him “some kind of
structure.” While he was in Patton, he was “just asking for drugs
for a favor,” which staff gave him “because I’m a Virgo.”
Appellant also testified, however, that the staff had “been
treating me so bad in this hospital,” including writing “nasty
things in my chart, like I masturbate in their face.” Appellant
conceded he “did some things like that” in the past, but he was
currently “really feeling that I’m in step with the Lord.”
On cross-examination, appellant clarified that he did not
say sex offender treatment was not applicable to him. Rather, he
“just said it’s a bunch of nonsense. It’s a bunch of craziness, and
I don’t need that garbage in my mind.” He added that he knew
“enough about sex to be restored . . . without all of that trash
they’re saying, oh, this and that, don’t do this, don’t have sex. I
don’t want to hear all that.” Appellant later reiterated his belief
that “going to those groups is not going to help me.”
When asked about his commitment offense, appellant
testified that it was a misunderstanding. He explained that he
encountered the victim while he was on his way to his mother’s
house and started to “rap to her.” He then asked her some
questions, after which point he “grabbed her and started grinding
her.” The victim broke away and yelled that appellant was trying
to rape her, “[s]o I ran after her.” The victim went into a tire shop
where three men were present, and appellant “grabbed her”
again, and “pulled back her pants and saw her vagina.” The

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woman “broke loose” and “jumped into this car.” Appellant ran
away, “and when I got there we were smoking marijuana.”
III. Ruling
The trial court stated that it had “listened very carefully to
all of the testimony” and “found Dr. Souza to be not only
credible,” but also his “opinions to be very, very valid” and well
explained. The court further found that appellant, while “very
sincere and respectful to the court,” demonstrated a “reluctance”
to participate in sex offender treatment, which “kind of indicates
the lack of insight.” The court also found appellant lacked insight
into his commitment offense by “failing to see what it probably
was for the woman, which was a very frightening and traumatic
experience for her,” and failed to appreciate why or how “his
behavior was prompted by his own . . . mental illness.”
The court found that appellant continued to have a mental
disease, schizoaffective disorder, and “based on that mental
disease” and “the very well-articulated opinion of Dr. Souza,” that
“there remains a risk of recidivism, and he is a substantial
danger.” The court accordingly sustained the petition. It
encouraged appellant to fully participate in sex offender
treatment to perhaps become eligible for Patton’s conditional
release program (CONREP) during the next review period.

DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the People presented insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he has serious difficulty
controlling his potentially dangerous behavior. (See People v.
Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159-1165 (Zapisek).)

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I. Legal Principles
A person committed to a state hospital after being found
not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity “may not be kept in
actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment.”
(§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, the term of commitment may be
extended for two years if, after a trial in accordance with rights
guaranteed in criminal proceedings, the trier of fact finds that
the person, “by reason of mental disease, defect, or disorder
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.”
(§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (7), (8).) Proof of dangerousness also
requires proof that the person has “at the very least, serious
difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous behavior.”
(Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) This latter
requirement, while not in the text of section 1026.5, is necessary
to comport with constitutional principles of due process. (See In
re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 136; Zapisek, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1159-1165.) To satisfy it, the “People are not
required to prove the defendant ‘“is completely unable to control
his behavior.”’ [Citation.] Instead, the defendant’s ‘impairment
need only be serious, not absolute.’” (People v. Kendrid (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370 (Kendrid).)
Whether a person has serious difficulty controlling his or
her potentially dangerous behavior is a question of fact generally
resolved with the assistance of expert testimony. (See People v.
Redus (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011 (Redus).) We employ the
substantial evidence standard of review, viewing the entire
record in the light most favorable to the extension order to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have made the
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Zapisek, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011;

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People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 782, 789 (Cheatham).)
“A single psychiatric opinion that an individual is dangerous
because of a mental disorder constitutes substantial evidence to
support an extension of the defendant’s commitment under
section 1026.5.” (People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870,
878 (Bowers); accord, Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165;
Redus, supra, 54 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) However, expert medical
opinion must be based upon relevant, probative facts; it does not
constitute substantial evidence if it is based upon a guess,
surmise, or conjecture. (In re Anthony C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
1493, 1504.) Witness credibility and the truth or falsity of
historical facts are matters within the exclusive province of the
factfinder; we do not revisit them. (Ibid.)
II. Analysis
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding
Dr. Souza, a psychology expert whom the trial court
expressly found credible, personally evaluated appellant and
opined that he had “severe difficulty controlling his dangerous
behavior” due to his mental illness. Dr. Souza further testified
that this opinion was based on “supported risk factors … in the
scientific literature that contributes [sic] to violence recidivism,”
including dynamic factors assessed in the HCR-20 risk
assessment tool. He opined that appellant’s “severe lack of
insight” into his mental illness and violence risk, “lack of insight
into his need for treatment and medication,” “low responsivity to
treatment,” and lack of a “workable relapse prevention plan”
increased his risk for dangerous behavior and placed women he
may “interact with romantically” at particular risk.
This uncontroverted testimony, bolstered by appellant’s in
many respects, is grounded in relevant and probative facts and

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based on scientific literature, not conjecture or guesswork. “[A]n
NGI defendant’s lack of insight and continued delusions of the
kind he or she suffered from at the time of the commitment
offense can support a finding of continued dangerousness.”
(Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012.) Indeed, courts have
recognized that there may be considerable overlap between an
NGI defendant’s lack of understanding and his or her ability to
control behavior. (See Kendrid, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p.
1370, quoting Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, 415).)
Dr. Souza also testified that appellant’s treatment team
prescribed sex offender treatment for appellant. He further
testified that he discussed sex offender treatment with appellant
at every one of their meetings over a period of years, but
appellant denied he was a sex offender and refused to attend the
treatment. A “person’s amenability to voluntary treatment is a
factor in determining whether commitment is necessary.” (People
v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 928.) Thus, a
“defendant’s refusal to undergo treatment constitutes potent
evidence that he is not prepared to control his untreated
dangerousness by voluntary means.” (People v. Sumahit (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 347, 354.)3

3 Although appellant correctly observes that Ghilotti and
Sumahit addressed the commitment of sexually violent
predators, the Supreme Court recognized in Ghilotti that this
principle applies in “similar schemes for the civil commitment of
mentally disordered and dangerous persons.” (Ghilotti, supra, 27
Cal.4th at p. 928, citing People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d
1591, 1600 and People v. Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1476,
1482-1483.)

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A rational trier of fact could, and in this case did, properly
conclude that appellant continued to experience serious difficulty
controlling his potentially dangerous behavior.
B. Appellant’s Authorities Are Distinguishable
Appellant’s authorities are distinguishable. In Cheatham,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 786, the defendant acknowledged his
mental illness, recognized the importance of his medications, and
took proactive steps to address his substance abuse disorder.
Here, in contrast, appellant denied having a mental illness,
maintained that his commitment offense had been a mere
misunderstanding, refused to participate in sex offender
treatment, and stated that he only took medication to placate his
treatment team.
In Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1001-1002, the
defendant acknowledged his mental illness and was a “‘fragile old
man’” who “‘you could probably push . . . over with one finger,’”
such that he was physically incapable of acting violently. (Id. at
p. 1011.) In People v. Jenkins (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 142, the
defendant was likewise physically impaired; she used a
wheelchair. (See id. at pp. 147, 153.) Although appellant points
out that he is now 65 years old, there was no specific testimony
about appellant’s physical state, and Dr. Souza opined that “any
female he does interact with romantically would also be
potentially at risk,” suggesting he was more physically capable
than Redus or Jenkins.
Finally, in both Redus and People v. Johnson (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 96, the defendants did not engage in any violent or
aggressive behavior during their lengthy commitments or their
CONREP releases. Johnson was not violent or aggressive even
after discontinuing his medication for two months (Johnson,

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supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 109), and Redus recognized and
sought assistance for homicidal ideation he experienced while on
CONREP (Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012.) That
evidence undermined the expert opinions. Here, there is no
evidence that undermines the expert opinions regarding
appellant’s serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous
behavior. (See People v. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p.
353 [“The fact that defendant has not misbehaved in a strictly
controlled hospital environment does not prove he no longer
suffers from a mental disorder that poses a danger to others.”].)
C. Double Jeopardy
In light of our conclusion that sufficient evidence supported
the order extending appellant’s commitment, we need not address
appellant’s contentions regarding the double jeopardy
implications of a reversal.
DISPOSITION
The order sustaining the petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COGLIATI, J.*

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J. MORI, J.

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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