CourtListener 10847930•Cal Poly Humboldt v. Ahmed CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/24/26 Cal Poly Humboldt v. Ahmed CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
CAL POLY HUMBOLDT,
A171713
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CV2300486)
FAREED ATIQ AHMED,
Defendant and Appellant.
Fareed Atiq Ahmed (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order
granting the petition of respondent Cal Poly Humboldt (Cal Poly) for a
workplace violence restraining order against Appellant (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 527.8).1 We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In early 2020, Appellant was a student at Cal Poly. He filed an
administrative complaint alleging certain individuals were harassing and
discriminating against him on multiple protected grounds, including religion
and ethnicity. The complaint was assigned to Cal Poly’s Title IX coordinator,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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David H. David investigated the complaint and, in May, sent Appellant an
email informing him that the facts as alleged did not establish harassment or
discrimination based on a protected category. A few hours later, Appellant
responded with a lengthy email disagreeing with David’s conclusion. The
following day, David replied and reiterated his position.
After this May 2020 email exchange, David did not hear from Appellant
until October 2022. At that time, Appellant sent David an email attaching a
nearly 200-page document authored by Appellant and titled, “Tome Of
Knowledge: Non-Violent Communication 101 - Decoding Covert Passive-
Aggressive Communication Tactics.” The trial court described the document
in its ruling as “an exhaustive, 199-page recounting of how [Appellant]
believes he has been ignored and wronged by members of the student body
(known and unknown) and by the University in the investigation and
conclusions reached related to his complaints. He details how, when he
received the email in May of 2020 from [David], [Appellant] states: ‘felt like
my life was in great and imminent danger and felt highly threatened; so
much so that I felt the need to kill them before they killed me.’ And how he
was out of options. He goes on to write that he called his therapist and that
helped him not feel that way anymore. Nonetheless, he continues to stand
firm in his belief that [David] is part of a satanic cult and the cult’s direct
harm on not only [Appellant] but the community at large.”
In the document, Appellant’s description of his reaction to receiving
David’s 2020 email also includes the following: “I felt a lot of violence and
hostility in the atmosphere. I felt murderous energy around me and trying to
flow into me to kill me and make me kill others. I felt like I needed to do
something to make sure the situation is still being handled properly and I
take a course of action that is serving the mutual interests of all.” Appellant
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claimed, “I feel very certain that David H[.] is actually one of the leaders of
the Secret Satanic Cults in this region and is at the center of this
Investigation,” and “I feel very certain that . . . David H[.] is a serial killer
rapist.”
In February and March of 2023, Appellant sent lengthy emails to other
Cal Poly employees which included numerous references to David, including
that Appellant was subject to “discrimination and retaliation . . . by faculty
members . . . under the command and direction of David” and that David and
other Cal Poly officials were “attempting to provoke aggressive responses
from me to violently retaliate against the members of the population who
were targeted [sic] me.”
In March 2023, Cal Poly filed a petition seeking a workplace violence
restraining order to protect David. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. After multiple attempts, Cal Poly served Appellant in
October. In November, Appellant sent an email to Cal Poly employees
stating that David “is a dangerous predator to the CSU community” who “has
been trained by the Department of Defense Intelligence Agency to utilize
weaponized systems of communication” and who “has been preying upon the
vulnerability of the weakest members of the population through deadly use of
his military-grade weaponized communication systems.”
At the July 2024 trial, the witnesses were David and Appellant. The
court subsequently issued a written order granting the petition. The order
found, “[Appellant’s] writings make it clear that he sees [David] as an
ongoing threat to him . . . . [Appellant] repeatedly expresses how the
language used by [David] made him feel victimized by the University, [David]
in particular. He goes on to describe his firmly held and current belief that
[David] is a ‘serial killer rapist’ and part of a conspiracy against him, and is a
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leader in a ‘secret satanic cult.’ While the writings espouse to be a ‘draft
textbook’ on nonviolent communication, [Appellant] continues to feel wronged
and discriminated against by the University community. [Appellant] equates
[David] to a psychopath. All the while writing that he hopes to find a
peaceful resolution to the dispute. [¶] The Court has reviewed the exhibits
and the testimony and does hereby conclude that there is . . . clear and
convincing evidence that a reasonable person would fear for their safety if
provided with the communications. [Appellant] communicated roughly 2.5[
years] after the last communication with [David] to express that he has
ruminated on those communications for years and when he received them, he
felt murderous. In his dissection of the email sent by [David], he concludes
that [David] is being hostile and aggressive towards him. That he feared for
his life as a result of the communication; felt he had to kill or be killed, and
he currently holds beliefs that [David] is a dangerous person. It’s reasonable
to conclude that a person would have an ongoing fear for their own safety
after receiving the communication.” This appeal followed.2
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence
Appellant argues no substantial evidence supports the order. We reject
the challenge.
The statute in effect at the time of the appealed-from order provided
that a restraining order may be sought by an employer “whose employee has
2 The original restraining order expired in September 2025. On our
own motion, we take judicial notice of a postjudgment order extending the
restraining order through October 2027. (See In re A.S. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1332, 1339 [“While postjudgment evidence is generally not
admissible on appeal [citation], it may be considered to determine whether it
renders an issue moot on appeal”].)
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suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual
. . . .” (Former § 527.8, subd. (a); see also County of Los Angeles v. Niblett
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 458, fn. 2 [“Although the Legislature made
changes to section 527.8 after the trial court issued the [workplace violence
restraining order] . . . the version of the statute that was effective on the date
of the order’s issuance governs our appellate review”].) The statute defined
credible threat of violence as “a knowing and willful statement or course of
conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety . . . and
that serves no legitimate purpose,” and further defined course of conduct as
“a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose . . . .” (Former § 527.8,
subd. (b)(1)–(2).)
“ ‘[W]e review an injunction issued under section 527.8 to determine
whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] Accordingly, we resolve all factual conflicts and
questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party, and draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s findings.’ ” (CSV
Hospitality Management, LLC v. Lucas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 117, 123.)
“In every appeal, the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of
the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. [Citations.] ‘Further,
the burden to provide a fair summary of the evidence “grows with the
complexity of the record. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] To meet its burden on
appeal to show a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence,
appellants cannot recite only evidence in their favor, but must ‘ “set forth in
their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely their own
evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed to be waived.” ’ ” (Slone v.
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El Centro Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173
(Slone).)
Appellant’s briefs include no statement of facts and fail to discuss all
the evidence supporting the court’s finding of a credible threat. The trial
transcript is 200 pages long and there are nearly 300 pages of trial exhibits.
“ ‘A reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for
appellant’s failure to carry his burden.’ ” (Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1174.) Appellant’s substantial evidence challenge is forfeited.
II. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Appellant argues the trial court erred in compelling him to testify after
he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. We affirm.
Cal Poly called Appellant as a witness. Before being sworn in,
Appellant informed the court, “I’m not comfortable with testifying against
myself. That’s a violation of my Fifth Amendment rights.” During the
subsequent discussion, Appellant explained that he was willing to testify
when called as a witness by his attorney, but objected to being called as a
witness by Cal Poly: “I’m not refusing to testify. [Cal Poly’s attorney] will
have his opportunity to cross-examine me when I testify on my own behalf.
Now, I don’t understand what [Cal Poly’s attorney’s] issue is with having me
testify on my own behalf rather than against me. He can ask me all of the
questions he has lined up to ask me when I come on the witness stand as my
own witness.” The trial court ruled Appellant could not refuse to testify when
called by Cal Poly.
“Both the federal and California Constitutions guarantee the privilege
against self-incrimination. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
Two distinct and separate testimonial privileges are covered by these
guarantees: (1) in criminal cases, an absolute right not to be called or to
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testify as a witness, and (2) in both civil and criminal cases, the right not to
answer questions which might tend to incriminate the witness in criminal
activity.” (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1079 (Clark).)
This was a civil, not a criminal, proceeding and Appellant therefore had
no absolute right not to testify. (Clark, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079.)
Appellant asserts that a workplace violence restraining order proceeding is
criminal in nature. The authority relied on by Appellant holds that, for
purposes of the absolute right not to testify as a witness, “[a] civil contempt
proceeding is criminal in nature because of the penalties that may be
imposed.” (In re Witherspoon (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1001.) No
criminal penalties may be imposed in a section 527.8 proceeding, and
Appellant has therefore not established that it is criminal in nature.
To the extent Appellant contends that he also invoked his right not to
answer questions which might tend to incriminate him, we reject the claim.
“ ‘[A] blanket refusal to testify is unacceptable; a person claiming the Fifth
Amendment privilege must do so with specific reference to particular
questions asked or other evidence sought. . . . [O]nce this is done, the trial
court must undertake a particularized inquiry with respect to each specific
claim of privilege to determine whether the claimant has . . . establish[ed]
that the testimony or other evidence sought might tend to incriminate him.’
[Citations.] ‘[T]he burden is on the party or witness [invoking the privilege]
to show that the testimony or other evidence could tend to incriminate him or
her.’ ” (In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1151–1152, fn.
omitted.) Appellant’s blanket refusal was insufficient to invoke this privilege
as to any particular testimony. Indeed, Appellant did not even purport to be
unwilling to answer any specific question; to the contrary, he expressly stated
he would answer Cal Poly’s questions as long as they were asked in cross-
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examination during Appellant’s presentation of evidence. Appellant has not
established error.
For the first time in his reply brief, Appellant argues his refusal to
testify when called by Cal Poly should have been granted as an
accommodation for his disabilities. The contention is both raised too late and
lacks any supporting authority, and is thereby forfeited. (Tellez v. Rich Voss
Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“ ‘ “[p]oints raised for the
first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered” ’ ”]; ibid. [“When
an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited”].)
III. Due Process
Appellant argues the trial court violated his due process rights by
excluding a defense witness. We reject the claim.
Appellant sought to call his mother as a witness. His attorney made
the following offer of proof: “[Appellant] testified that he sent a copy of the
document that is [the] basis for the restraining order to her, [for] her notes
before sending it off to David H[]. She reviewed it, went over [her] concerns,
and then she discussed the concerns with [Appellant]. After [Appellant’s]
notes, she went back and re-read it, approved it. She can talk about why she
approved it, what is in it, and then also her role in assisting [Appellant] with
communication.” After Cal Poly objected, arguing evidence of “the mother’s
subjective interpretation of a document written by her son” is “not legally
relevant,” the trial court ruled Appellant could not call his mother.
Appellant asserts that the evidentiary ruling violated his due process
rights.3 He does not claim he raised this objection below, and cites no
3 Appellant does not contend the ruling was in error under state
evidence law.
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authority for his argument other than the constitutional provisions
themselves. Even if the claim were preserved and properly raised on appeal,
it would fail. “The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant
evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court.”
(Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.) The issue
at trial was whether Appellant had made “a knowing and willful statement or
course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety
. . . and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Former § 527.8, subds. (a),
(b)(2).) Appellant’s mother’s editing of and opinions about the document
Appellant sent to David was not of significant probative value to this issue.4
To the extent Appellant also argues the trial court violated his due
process rights in denying his request to testify only during his own case
rather than be called by Cal Poly, we reject the claim. He fails to establish
any error in this ruling, and his attorney had ample opportunity to question
him while he was on the stand.
Finally, Appellant asserts his substantive due process rights were
violated because, “[a]s a result of the Workplace Restraining Order
proceedings, [Appellant] was first temporarily barred from continuing his
studies as a student at Cal-Poly Humboldt, and during the trial, lost his
student status entirely.” Even assuming this claim were both preserved and
a basis for reversing the appealed-from order, the record citations provided do
not support the assertion that any change in Appellant’s student status was a
result of the trial court proceedings.
4 Appellant complains that his mother was excluded from the
courtroom because she had been identified as a potential witness. He does
not claim this ruling was in error or articulate any legal argument supporting
such a claim.
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IV. First Amendment Rights
Appellant argues his writings were constitutionally protected speech
and therefore cannot be the basis for the restraining order. Appellant does
not claim that he raised this argument below, much less provide supporting
record citations so establishing. He has therefore forfeited the claim and we
decline to consider it. (San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 550, 579 [“Because the record does not demonstrate that any
First Amendment issue was raised below, we conclude that it was forfeited.
In both criminal and civil cases, a constitutional claim is generally forfeited
by the failure to assert it in the trial court.”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Cal Poly is awarded its costs on appeal.
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A171713)
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