K.W. v. Superior Court CA1/5

CourtListener 10847925Calctapp24.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/24/26 K.W. v. Superior Court CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

K.W.,
Petitioner,
v. A175667
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY SAN (San Francisco County
FRANCISCO, Super. Ct. Nos. JD24-3186,
Respondent; JD24-3186A, JD24-3186B)
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

Petitioner K.W. (Mother) petitions for writ review (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.452) and requests a stay of a juvenile court order terminating
reunification services and scheduling a hearing pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother contends that the court erred in
finding that real party in interest San Francisco Human Services Agency
(Agency) provided or offered her reasonable reunification services. She
further contends that the court abused its discretion by terminating

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare

and Institutions Code, and all rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
reunification services as to her three older children while continuing to place
her youngest child with her. We disagree and deny the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Detention
In October 2024, the police responded to a report of domestic violence
involving Mother and her partner, M.V., who is the father of her youngest
child, then three-month-old T.V. Mother suffered a fractured leg and cuts
and bruises to her face.
In addition to T.V., Mother’s three other children—D.R., T.R., and A.R.
(the boys), who at the time were nine, eight, and six year-old boys,
respectively—were present in the home during the assault.2 D.R. and T.R.
witnessed the assault. At the hospital, Mother confirmed that all four of her
children were home during the assault and disclosed a prior domestic
violence incident in which M.V. punched her.
After being notified of the incident by the police, the Agency sent a
Protective Services Worker (PSW) to visit the children the day after the
incident. In a detention report, the PSW noted that D.R. and T.R., the two
older boys, appeared guarded and refused to answer questions about the
domestic violence they just witnessed. Although he was not in the room
when the attack occurred, A.R., the youngest boy, stated that “[M.V.] kicked,
punched, kicked and punched” while he made punching and kicking motions.
A.R. further stated, “Mom crying. Get a knife and stab her.”
Mother told the PSW that she did not want to press charges against
M.V. and that she “did not understand why there was a Child Endangerment
charge against [M.V.]” Although Mother admitted other domestic violence

2 At the time of this incident, the boys’ biological father was

incarcerated and unavailable. He is not a party to this writ petition.

2
incidents, she told the PSW that she accepted M.V.’s apology and “ ‘want[ed]
him home.’ ” Mother also stated that the boys had been in their biological
father’s custody until he was incarcerated, and she admitted that they had
not attended school while in her care for the past year.
The Agency detained all four children, placing the boys in foster care
and T.V. with a family member. The Agency also filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of the boys.3
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facia case
that the boys came within section 300, ordered their continued detention and
placement in foster care, and set a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
The court provided for unsupervised visits with Mother while she remained
in the hospital and supervised visits once she was discharged and after the
Agency assessed Mother’s home. The court also gave the Agency discretion to
allow monitored or unsupervised visits or to release the boys to Mother’s care
if she entered a “confidential program” and a restraining order was served on
M.V.4
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency recommended that the
allegations of the section 300 petition be sustained, that the children be
declared dependents, and that reunification services be ordered for Mother.
The report confirmed that Mother entered a confidential program after being
discharged from the hospital. Despite her injuries, Mother was “able to
transport herself to meetings with the Agency and to attend all of her visits

3 The Agency filed a separate section 300 petition on behalf of T.V.

T.V.’s petition is not at issue here.
4 After the hearing, the juvenile court issued a temporary restraining

order against M.V. protecting Mother and all four children. The court later
issued a permanent three-year restraining order.

3
with her children.” As later testified to by a PSW, the Agency transported
Mother to those visits for a period of time while she was still injured using its
vehicles and staff.
The report further revealed that “[Mother] could not recall the last time
she took the children for medical care,” explaining that she was only able to
“keep up” with T.V.’s medical care. The report detailed the family’s extensive
history with child welfare services and multiple referrals for neglect, physical
and emotional abuse, unsanitary living conditions, and lack of medical care
and supervision. It also disclosed that Mother had a history of
methamphetamine and marijuana use. According to the report, “[i]nstead of
being children, [D.R. and T.R. have] been parentified to watch out for each
other and their baby sister.” All three boys had “emotional and behavioral
health concerns that directly have a negative impact on their well-being.”
Indeed, the boys had to be separated for placement because they often fought,
and each had to change placements due to behavior problems.
Although “it [was] unclear if [Mother] truly appreciate[d] the gravity of
what happened to her and the damage this caused the children,” the report
recognized her participation in programs to reunite with her children. It
concluded that Mother “must demonstrate that not only can she provide for
[the boys’] basic needs, medical care and education (which they were
missing), [Mother] must demonstrate that she can access and learn skills and
enhanced parenting practices for when the children inevitably start talking
to her about the violence they witnessed.” The Agency identified several
services that Mother had to utilize to achieve reunification, including
therapy, a parenting class, and a survivors of domestic violence program.
A month later, the Agency filed an addendum report. Although the
addendum stated that “there [were] no longer the big outbursts of

4
aggressions” by the boys, “all of the caregivers request[ed] mental health
supports for all of the children” because they struggled to regulate their
emotions. There were no apparent concerns about Mother’s behavior at her
supervised visits with the children.
The addendum also stated that Mother had “proactively brought
herself to [La] Casa De Las Madres” to avail herself of “psychoeducational
classes regarding domestic violence” but was told she needed a referral. After
Mother obtained a referral, however, she did not attend the intake
appointment because “she was dealing with a lot of stressors.” The
addendum further stated that Mother was “reluctant” to “re-connect and
engage with her natural supports to develop a safety plan” because it was “up
to her to get her children back and that [no one] is going help her anyway.”
According to the PSW, Mother also discounted the benefit of individual
therapy but said, “she will do it if she is ‘forced’ to do so.” The PSW explained
to Mother that the Agency needed to see behavioral changes, not just the
completion of services.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the
allegations of child abuse and neglect pursuant to section 300, subdivisions
(b)(1), (b)(3), (g)(2), and (j)(1). It also found that there was a substantial
danger to the boys’ physical safety and well-being if returned home and that
the Agency had made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for removal of
the boys. Finally, the court found that Mother had made “[a]dequate”
progress toward alleviating the causes of the placement and identified July
10, 2025 as the likely date the boys would be returned home. Accordingly,
the court declared the boys dependents of the court, continued their foster
care placements, and ordered reunification services and a psychological
evaluation for Mother.

5
C. Six-Month Review
In the Agency’s six-month status report, newly assigned PSW Elizabeth
Landon noted that Mother had demonstrated that she could provide for T.V.’s
basic needs and had been reunited with T.V. following a successful 30-day
visit. Landon further stated that Mother “had demonstrated incremental
positive changes.” Mother also told Landon that she “receives WIC,
CalWORKS, and food stamps” and was “able to take advantage of programs
that provide items such as diapers, food, and toys to assist her in caregiving
for [T.V.]”
Regarding the boys, the report stated that Mother regularly attended
the visits offered to her and that those visits were generally positive.5 But
Mother struggled to manage the boys’ behavior, sometimes requiring visits to
end early. Landon concluded that Mother “appears to still need support in
gaining the skills to navigate her [boys’] high behavioral needs during visits.”
Despite this, Mother had shown a “lack of follow-through with the
majority of service referrals” and had “minimally taken advantage of” support
services available from her housing program. For example, despite multiple
referrals to La Casa De Las Madres, Mother did not complete the intake
assessment until approximately five weeks before the six-month review
hearing. Mother also did not follow through with her court-ordered
psychological evaluation due to “difficulty maintaining contact” with the
psychologist. After being “linked with an individual clinician for therapy,”
Mother only attended two sessions, claiming that she believed the service
was completed despite multiple phone calls and e-mails from the clinician.
Relatedly, a referral to SafeCare parenting classes had been closed because

5 By this time, the Agency had stopped providing Mother

transportation to visits.

6
Mother had not engaged. Later, Mother told Landon that she found a new
parenting class. But when Landon contacted the provider, she learned that
Mother “enrolled late and missed the first session . . . [and] attended session
two and three but missed the following two classes and [had] not completed
any makeups . . . .”
Landon further expressed concerns about Mother’s comments denying
that she experienced domestic violence, stating that she missed M.V. and
downplaying the negative effects domestic violence had on her children.
Mother later contradicted those comments when she told Landon, “she did
not want to resume a relationship with [M.V.] at [the] time and wanted to
focus on herself and her kids.”6
At the six-month status review hearing, the juvenile court found that
the boys could not be returned to Mother’s custody and that the Agency
provided or offered Mother reasonable reunification services. The court found
Mother’s progress on her case plan to be “[a]dequate” and ordered continued
services until the 12-month status review hearing.
D. Interim Review
Roughly two months after the six-month status review hearing, Landon
filed an interim progress report informing the juvenile court that Mother was
still minimally engaged in services and that the Agency had suspended her
visits with the boys.7 Specifically, Mother had not yet attended a class in the

6 Landon also outlined other concerns. For example, Mother refused to
enroll T.V. in daycare or use her natural support system because she did not
want “people to ‘be in her business;’ ” she returned home in the wee hours of
the morning; and she suspected she may be pregnant from an unidentified
individual. Mother also missed appointments to discuss A.R.’s educational
assessments.
7 The juvenile court originally ordered the progress report to address

lingering questions concerning the Indian Child Welfare Act.

7
SafeCare parenting program, had not re-engaged in individual therapy
despite a third referral, and had not completed the court-ordered
psychological evaluation. Mother’s visits with the boys had also grown
“sporadic” as she “missed multiple visits.”
After talking to Landon, Mother agreed to a number of conditions so
she could resume visits, including a reduced visitation schedule and early
arrivals. Landon also provided Mother with “a fast pass and transportation
check” for the next month. But two days after their discussion, Mother
texted Landon to complain about taking public transportation to the visits—
which were outside San Francisco. Mother asked the Agency to resume
transporting her door-to-door for her visits with the boys, like when she was
injured, but Landon explained the Agency could not do so. Landon further
explained the Agency’s expectation that parents travel longer distances than
children for visits. Mother replied that she would not make the next visit
and would instead seek virtual visits, resulting in the suspension of her visits
with the boys.
After the interim review hearing was continued, the Agency filed a
second progress report. The report stated that Mother was now participating
weekly in the SafeCare parenting program but had stopped participating in
domestic violence services. She also had made no progress with therapy or
her psychological evaluation. Mother’s visits remained suspended and there
were no updates concerning virtual visits.
At the interim review hearing, Mother appeared and the court
admonished her to visit the boys and to complete her services and
reunification goals.

8
E. 12-Month Review
In its 12-month status review report, the Agency recommended
termination of Mother’s reunification services for the boys. At that time,
Mother only had a month left of her transitional housing; yet, she was not
availing herself of resources to find new housing. Mother also continued to
resist using public transportation, even when subsidized by the Agency,
“unless it [was] her only option.” Instead, she relied on friends for rides to
visits and, on one occasion, paid for a taxi to get to a visit in San Francisco.
As for Mother’s progress with her case plan, the report relayed that
Mother started attending SafeCare classes and completed the court-ordered
psychological evaluation on October 23, 2025. Per the evaluation, she was
diagnosed with a mild intellectual disability (intellectual developmental
disorder), other depressive disorder, and other specified anxiety disorder. As
a result, it was recommended that she attend individual therapy, complete a
substance abuse assessment, attend domestic violence services, and “attend
an initial assessment at Golden Gate Regional Center [(GGRC)] to determine
her eligibility for services.” However, Mother never participated in individual
therapy, despite four referrals, and her participation in domestic violence
services was intermittent.
Mother’s supervised visits with the boys had resumed after the interim
review hearing. Landon arranged for the next two visits to be in San
Francisco, which Mother attended, and Mother was able to transport herself
to the next two visits outside the city. But Mother cancelled the next four
visits, again resulting in suspension of visits. Because the visits with T.R.
and A.R. were held separately from the visits with D.R., Landon was unable
to assess Mother’s parenting capacity with all children present. The report
also noted that Mother struggled to remain engaged in the boys’ educational

9
needs. The Agency recommended virtual visits to help maintain her contact
with the boys.
The Agency expressed concern about Mother’s ability to provide
stability and safety for the boys if they were returned to her custody. In view
of Mother’s lack of engagement in individual therapy and domestic violence
services, the Agency also expressed concerns about her ability to address the
children’s trauma and to protect them from further exposure to domestic
violence. The report highlighted how Mother’s reticence to use public
transportation, even within San Francisco, and her refusal to enroll T.V. in
daycare called into question her “capacity to utilize the resources available to
her should the [boys] be returned to her care . . . . ” Given Mother’s
unwillingness to rely on her natural support system, the Agency was
skeptical she could meet the basic needs of all four children when together,
especially the boys’ therapeutic and emotional needs, or that she could
control the boys’ behavior. Thus, the Agency recommended that reunification
services be terminated.
The 12-month review hearing was continued to February 2026, and the
Agency submitted an addendum report. Mother’s living situation had not yet
changed, but her exit from transitional housing was scheduled to occur
within a week. Despite this, Mother refused to live in a housing program the
Agency referred her to because she did not like the restrictive rules of the
program. Instead, she stated that she would utilize a hotel shelter program
while awaiting more permanent housing from the CalWORKS housing
support program.
Mother’s engagement with services remained spotty. After a belated
start, she had been participating in the SafeCare parenting program and only

10
had seven sessions left. But she missed several appointments for domestic
violence services provided by La Casa De Las Madres.
Meanwhile, Mother did not visit T.R. or A.R.—who were placed outside
of San Francisco—because she still refused to take public transportation,
citing her anxiety. And despite D.R.’s placement in San Francisco, Mother
refused to visit him until he was moved to a different visitation center in the
city. She told Landon that a friend drove her to those visits. After recapping
these developments, the Agency maintained its recommendation to terminate
reunification services.
The contested 12-month review hearing took place on February 6,
2026—16 months after the children’s initial detention. The juvenile court
received in evidence the Agency’s six-month status review report, 12-month
status review report, and addendum report, and heard testimony from
Landon and Mother.
Landon testified about Mother’s inconsistent participation in services,
her failure to attend individual therapy, and her lack of insight into the
effects domestic violence had on her children. According to Landon, Mother
“understood the purpose for which the services were ordered” and she would
“rephrase or re-explain or work with [Mother]” when it appeared Mother was
struggling to understand information being conveyed. When asked about the
recommendations based on Mother’s psychological evaluation, Landon
explained that she provided “the information for the intake line [at GGRC] to
[Mother] and encouraged her to call and schedule an intake for herself.”
Landon explained that she provided the information to Mother “on multiple
occasions during [their] in-person contacts.” She also asked Mother on
multiple occasions whether she “needed assistance with enrolling in various

11
services, and [Mother] indicated she did not,” including for services that had
“a self-referral process for intake.”
When asked how the Agency accommodated Mother’s visits, Landon
replied that “[t]he Agency provided financial . . . assistance” and that she
“offered and helped [by] outlin[ing] what the route for public transportation
would be like.” Landon continued: “the Agency repeatedly referred [Mother]
to individual therapy where she might explore her anxiety and how to best
handle those stressful situations on public transportation.” According to
Landon, it was the Agency’s policy that parents bear the burden of
transportation, explaining that the initial use of Agency staff to transport
Mother ended “due to the realistic need for those resources to be utilized
elsewhere, as well as the need for [Mother] to demonstrate her capacity to
utilize her own resources to meet the request of the Agency that she
demonstrate a capacity to visit with her boys.”
Landon also testified that the boys had to be taken out of school to
attend visits with Mother. She further explained that accommodating
Mother’s request that the Agency transport the boys to San Francisco for
visits would require them to miss an entire day of school, which would not
contribute to their well-being.
Mother testified about her difficulty attending visits due to her anxiety
and lack of familiarity with the public transit system. She also said that she
had trouble contacting some of the services she was required to participate in
and that she sometimes had a hard time understanding things. When asked
why she had not participated in therapy or the domestic violence program,
Mother stated that no one had contacted her. Mother claimed that she
understood that domestic violence had an impact on her children but
criticized the domestic violence program as “not a class to [her].”

12
Following closing arguments by counsel, the juvenile court took the
matter under submission. Four days later, the court delivered its ruling.
Explaining that it took a “trauma-informed approach,” the court found clear
and convincing evidence that the Agency provided reasonable services to
Mother. The court concluded that Mother was unlikely to reunify with the
boys by the 18-month review hearing and that returning the boys to her
custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to their well-being.
Accordingly, the court terminated reunification services and set a section
366.26 hearing. The court also kept T.V. with Mother and continued family
maintenance services.
Mother filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s order
(Petition).
II. DISCUSSION
After removing a child from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court must
provide reunification services to that parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) If the child
is over the age of three, the presumptive period of reunification services is 12
months. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(A).) If the child is not returned to the parent after
the 12-month review, the court has options. (See § 366.21, subd. (g).) The
court may continue reunification services for an additional six months, but
“only if it finds [(1)] that there is a substantial probability that the child will
be returned to the physical custody of their parent” and “safely maintained in
the home within the extended period of time” or (2) “that reasonable services
have not been provided to the parent . . . .” (Id., subd. (g)(1); see § 361.5,
subd. (a)(3).) Alternatively, the court may order a section 366.26 hearing only
if it finds “clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been
provided or offered to the parents . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)

13
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by denying her request to
continue reunification services because reasonable services were not
provided. Mother further contends that the court’s order terminating
reunification services with the boys was “internally inconsistent” with its
order maintaining services with T.V. and therefore constituted an abuse of
discretion. We disagree.8
A. Standard of Review
We review a finding that reasonable reunification services were
provided for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962,
971.) “[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact

8 The Agency asks this court to strike or deny the Petition on

procedural grounds because Mother failed to “ ‘provide a summary of
significant facts’ ” as required by rule 8.452(b)(1). Although the Petition does
not include a factual summary, it does cite to the record whenever it makes a
factual assertion. Because we must liberally construe the Petition, we
consider its merits notwithstanding any procedural defects.
Although the Agency did not raise the issue, it also appears that
Mother missed the deadline for filing the Petition by 3 days. Nonetheless, we
will address the merits of the Petition because Mother likely received
ineffective assistance of counsel. “[P]arents [in a dependency proceeding]
may raise an incompetent representation claim based on the untimely filing
of a notice of appeal.” (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 251.) And where, as
here, counsel missed the deadline for filing the writ petition by three days
after timely filing a notice of intent to file that petition, counsel was
necessarily ineffective. (See id. at p. 252 [counsel is ineffective when “counsel
was directed to file an appeal on behalf of a parent but failed to do so in a
timely manner”].) For this same reason, the failure to timely file the Petition
is prejudicial. (See id. at pp. 252–253 [“To ascertain prejudice, we focus on
whether the parent would have taken a timely appeal, without requiring the
parent to shoulder the further burden of demonstrating the appeal was likely
to be successful”].)

14
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996.) That record must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. (Id. at p. 996.)
Finally, we review “the juvenile court’s decisionmaking process based on
those findings for abuse of discretion.” (San Joaquin Human Services Agency
v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 223.)
B. Reasonable Services
Mother argues that the Agency failed to tailor her reunification
services to her intellectual disability and anxiety disorders or provide her
with reasonable visitation. We are not persuaded.
Reunification services should be “tailored to suit the needs of the
parents.” (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 810.) But
those services need not be perfect. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at
p. 972.) Instead, the Agency need only make a reasonable effort to identify
the problems leading to the loss of custody and to provide reasonable services
to remedy those problems. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
According to Mother, the Agency erred by using “standard referrals and
instructions that assumed average cognitive functioning” even though
Mother suffered from an intellectual development disorder. Mother contends
that “simply provid[ing] [her] with [a service provider’s] intake telephone
number and encourag[ing] her to call on her own” was inadequate. In
making this contention, Mother focused on the Agency’s efforts to arrange her
intake with GGRC. But Mother does not dispute that Landon provided the
intake information for GGRC “on multiple occasions during [their] in-person
contacts” and even offered to assist her with signing up for services.
In any event, Mother’s failure to attend an intake assessment at GGRC
is the exception that proves the rule. Mother was able to enroll in numerous

15
services on her own, including a domestic violence program at La Casa De
Las Madres and the SafeCare parenting program. She also admittedly
enrolled in nutritional aid for T.V. on her own. Mother even availed herself
of other public services, such as CalWORKS and food stamps, on her own.
And at the 12-month review hearing, Mother explained in some detail the
process for obtaining new housing, identifying the agencies she was working
with and demonstrating a more than functional level of independence.
Although Mother asserts that the “disability services system” was “more
complex,” she provides no support for this assertion. Thus, viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the order, there is more than enough
evidence to support the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
the Agency provided reasonable services. Put another way, a reasonable fact
finder could find it highly probable that Mother’s failure to obtain individual
therapy was not due to the Agency’s failure to tailor the services to her
intellectual disability.
Mother’s cases are distinguishable. In In re Victoria M. (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 1317, the mother had been diagnosed with mild mental
retardation years before her children were taken into protective custody. (Id.
at pp. 1320–1321.) Despite having access to that diagnosis “from the onset,”
the agency “failed to arrange a second evaluation” and “never considered”
services offered by a regional center. (Id. at pp. 1329–1330.) By contrast,
Mother took 10 months to complete her court-ordered psychological
evaluation. And as soon as the Agency learned of the recommendation that
Mother “attend an initial assessment at [GGRC] to determine her eligibility
for services,” it provided her with the necessary information multiple times
and offered to help her with the intake process.

16
In Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1419, the
Court of Appeal found that reasonable services had not been provided to
developmentally disabled parents, one of whom was physically disabled. The
parents’ visits with their child were positive, they “fully cooperated with the
Agency,” and they “made substantial progress with their court-ordered case
plans.” (Id. at pp. 1426–1427.) Nonetheless, the agency limited the parents’
visits because of a single incident where the child, “who was learning to walk,
fell and bumped his head.” (Id. at p. 1426.) In response, the father “picked
his son up, wiped away his tears and followed [the social worker’s] advice to
put ice on a small lump on [the child’s] head.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
found no evidence that the parents had jeopardized the child’s safety. (Id. at
p. 1427.) It also found other viable ways to alleviate the agency’s concerns
about unsupervised visitation. (Ibid.) Finally, the parents did not receive
other services the juvenile court deemed important. (Ibid.) For example, the
disabled mother was not offered services designed to address her physical
disabilities. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal therefore held that the agency had
unreasonably foreclosed family reunification on the basis of the parent’s
disabilities. (Id. at pp. 1427–1428.) There is no evidence of any remotely
analogous missteps by the Agency here.
Finally, we do not find persuasive Mother’s contention that the Agency
failed to reasonably facilitate visitation with the boys. She avers that
“reasonable services . . . required either continued transportation [by the
Agency] for a reasonable period or concrete, disability sensitive steps to
transition Mother to independent travel.” However, the record shows that
the Agency did take reasonable steps to facilitate the visits.
When Mother was recovering from her fractured leg, the Agency
transported her. But after Mother’s leg healed and she could move about

17
again, the Agency reasonably stopped transporting her itself. As Landon
explained, the Agency needed to optimize its scant resources and Mother
needed to demonstrate a capacity to utilize the resources available to her.
Nonetheless, the Agency paid for Mother to take public transportation and
even identified the routes for her to take. And recognizing that Mother was
anxious about using public transportation, “the Agency repeatedly referred
[her] to individual therapy where she might explore her anxiety and how to
best handle those stressful situations on public transportation.” But despite
four referrals, Mother only completed two intake sessions and never followed
up with the provider even though the provider “attempted multiple times to
reach out to [M]other to re-engage.” Given that Mother was able to obtain
many other services on her own, we find sufficient evidence that the Agency
took reasonable steps to help Mother attend the visits.
Mother’s reliance on In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962 is
misplaced. There, the father “had done all that was required of him under
the plan.” (Id. at p. 973.) Although the plan required that he engage in joint
counseling with his child after the child had participated in eight individual
therapy sessions, the agency “did not get around to signing [the child] up for
a long time” and “submitted no evidence of having made a good faith effort to
bring those sessions about.” (Id. at pp. 966–967, 972–973.) Here, the Agency
was not the obstacle preventing Mother from visiting her boys. Instead, it
was her reticence to take subsidized public transportation and her failure to
attend therapy designed to address her anxiety.
C. Purported Inconsistency
Finally, we reject Mother’s contention that the decision to terminate
reunification services for the boys while maintaining an in-home placement

18
for T.V. is “internally inconsistent and underscores the unreasonableness of
terminating services.” We find no abuse of discretion here.
There is nothing internally inconsistent with continuing T.V.’s in-home
placement and terminating reunification services for the boys. T.V. was only
19 months old at the time of the hearing. By contrast, the boys were eleven,
nine, and seven years old. Unlike T.V., who was not old enough to attend
school, the boys were old enough to do so. Yet, they had not attended school
for a year since being in Mother’s custody. And unlike T.V., two of the boys
had witnessed, and the third was aware of, the domestic violence that had
precipitated their out-of-home placement.
These differences between the needs and circumstances of T.V. and the
boys are more than sufficient to explain their differential treatment by the
Agency. As the Agency explained at the 12-month review hearing, Mother
had not “demonstrated the behavioral change [or] the developmental insight”
needed to take care of her three “traumatized boys.” There is substantial
evidence to support this conclusion even though Mother claimed that she
understood that the domestic violence “had an impact on [her] children.”
Indeed, the record establishes that the boys had significant emotional and
behavioral issues and that Mother’s participation in domestic violence
services was woefully deficient. There was also ample evidence Mother could
not manage all three boys at the same time during supervised visits.
T.V. did not suffer similar trauma or exhibit similar behavioral issues
as the boys. Therefore, the Agency reasonably concluded that Mother could
care for T.V. There was also evidence that Mother prioritized T.V.’s needs by,
for example, signing up for programs that supplied baby food and diapers but
did not prioritize visits with the boys. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that returning the boys to Mother’s custody

19
created a substantial risk of detriment to their well-being, while keeping T.V.
in her custody did not.
III. DISPOSITION
The Petition is denied. The request for a stay is denied as moot.

CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
BURNS, J.

A175667/ K.W. v. Superior Court

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