CourtListener 10847819•Potts v. Kern Allergy Medical Clinic CA5
Potts v. Kern Allergy Medical Clinic CA5
CourtListener 10847819Calctapp24.04.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/24/26 Potts v. Kern Allergy Medical Clinic CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JASMINE POTTS,
F089210
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101925)
v.
KERN ALLERGY MEDICAL CLINIC, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
Pulskamp and Bernard C. Barmann, Jr., Judges.
Jasmine Potts, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of LeBeau • Thelen and Alan J. Mish for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff and appellant Jasmine Potts, who was self-represented below and is self-
represented on appeal, filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic, among other defendants. The trial court sustained Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic’s demurrer to the FAC, without leave to amend. Subsequently, Potts moved to
disqualify the judge who sustained the demurrer, and the judge recused himself in
response. The case was thereafter reassigned to a different judge. Potts then filed a
motion to vacate the prior order sustaining the demurrer.
Potts challenges on appeal the original judge’s denial of leave to amend, upon
sustaining the demurrer to the FAC. Potts also challenges the ruling by the judge to
whom the case was reassigned, denying her motion to vacate the prior order sustaining
the demurrer. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Operative Complaint
On June 11, 2024, Potts filed a civil complaint in the Kern County Superior Court.
The complaint named Kern Medical Center and its outpatient clinics, Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic, and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings as defendants. On July
3, 2024, Potts filed the FAC, which is the operative complaint in this matter. The FAC
named as defendants, Kern Medical Center and its outpatient clinics; Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic; Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; and WestPac, Labs, Inc.
The FAC alleged that starting in March 2024, Potts sought medical care for herself
and her children because “she was sick, as were her children, and [she] suspected it was
due to mold in her apartment.” Initially, Potts obtained medical care for herself and her
children at Kern Medical Center and its associated clinics. Eventually, Potts sought and
obtained specialized allergy care at the Delano office of Kern Allergy Medical Clinic for
herself and all four of her children “for suspected mold exposure.”
As to Potts’s own treatment, the FAC merely states: “On April 3, 2024, Jasmine
Potts was seen by Amber Piercy FNP at Kern Allergy. She ordered skin testing and a
breathing test. [Potts] expressed confusion about the nut allergy results. Piercy stated,
‘When you’re sick, the test can read false positives,’ and advised against another allergy
panel when [Potts] inquired about a retest.”
With regard to Potts’s children, the FAC alleges the children saw care providers at
Kern Allergy Medical Clinic on April 10 and April 12, 2024. The providers ordered
allergy tests or “blood allergy panels” for all four children; “a breathing test” was also
2.
ordered for one child. The blood panel tests were performed at an unrelated lab. Potts
and the child for whom a breathing test was ordered, both underwent breathing tests.
At follow-up appointments with Kern Allergy Medical Clinic providers on
May 17 and May 24, 2024, the children received printouts of the results of their
respective blood panel tests. However, a few pages were missing from the test results
provided to each child.1 The May 24, 2024 appointment was with Dr. Tonny Tanus, who
also provided the results of the breathing tests taken by Potts and one of her children. In
this regard, the FAC alleges: “On May 24, 2024, Jasmine Potts and [P.G.] were seen by
[Dr. Tanus], who provided results for the breathing test.… Dr. Tanus indicated it was
safe to say [that] mold was the cause of [Potts’s] sickness and we could assume the same
for the children[,] but that he could not provide direct confirmation because they did not
do skin testing.”
Potts requested a “letter on formal letterhead” regarding her exposure to mold and
picked it up on May 29, 2024. According to the FAC, Potts was not satisfied with the
letter Dr. Tanus provided and requested a more definitive letter. The FAC alleges that
Potts received a response through Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s patient portal on May
31, 2024, as follows: “ ‘Hello, Jasmine, we received your message through the portal,
unfortunately we can’t provide you with that letter you are requesting. Mold is not the
only cause of your symptoms as you are very allergic to other things.’ ” In response to a
further communication from Potts, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic repeated on June 3,
2024: “[Dr. Tanus] is saying it is not just the molds as you are really allergic to many
other things.”
1 The FAC alleges that on April 29, 2024, Potts had received the complete blood
panel test results for all the children by email from WestPac Labs, Inc., the entity that
conducted the blood panel tests for her children. As noted, WestPac Labs, Inc., is also a
defendant in this matter.
3.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2024, Potts filed the complaint against Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic and the other defendants, initiating the instant matter, followed by
the FAC on July 3, 2024. The FAC asserted seven causes of action; however, it did not
specify to which defendant or defendants each cause of action pertained. The causes of
action alleged violations of, respectively: (1) Health and Safety Code sections 123100 to
123149.5 (full chapter: patient access to health records); (2) Business and Professions
Code section 2266 (requiring preservation of medical records by physicians and surgeons
for seven years); (3) Civil Code section 56 (entire Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act (CMIA)); (4) Business and Professions Code section 810 (prescribing disciplinary
action for false or fraudulent claims by healthcare professionals); (5) Civil Code section
1710 (deceit); (6) Penal Code section 471.5 (codifying misdemeanor offense of falsifying
medical records with fraudulent intent); and (7) California Code of Regulations, title 22,
section 70707 (requiring hospitals to adopt and publicly post list of patients’ rights).
The FAC’s prayer for relief requested, inter alia, “compensatory damages in an
amount to be determined at trial”; “punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish
Defendant [sic] for their wrongful conduct and deter future misconduct”; and “injunctive
relief requiring Defendant [sic] to comply with all applicable laws and regulations
governing medical records and patient rights.”
Potts’s Unsuccessful Attempts to Take Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s Default
On November 21, 2024, Potts filed a proof of service showing the summons and
original June 11, 2024 complaint were served on Kern Allergy Medical Clinic on
September 17, 2024. On the same day she filed the above proof of service, Potts filed an
application for entry of default and court judgment as to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic.
Subsequently, on December 3, 2024, Potts filed a proof service showing the original
summons and FAC were served on Kern Allergy Medical Clinic on September 17, 2024.
However, on December 5, 2024, Potts’s application for entry of default was
denied by the trial court clerk because (1) the application requested default on the original
4.
June 11, 2024 complaint, not the FAC; (2) a statement of damages had not been served on
Kern Allergy Medical Clinic; (3) specified parts of the application for entry of default
had not been completed; (4) a required declaration attesting that a copy of the application
had been mailed to defendant’s attorney of record, or, if none, to defendant’s last known
address was unsigned; (5) the application did not provide requisite particulars as to the
requested judgment; and (6) the application was served on a nonparty to the action.2
On December 13, 2024, Potts filed an application for entry of default on the FAC.
The trial court clerk denied this application for entry of default on grounds it was
“incomplete for service,” as the application was only served on Dr. Tonny Tanus, a
nonparty to the action.
Kern Allergy Medical Clinic Appears in Action by Filing Demurrer to FAC
On December 18, 2024, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic filed a demurrer to the FAC.
Potts filed an opposition to the demurrer on December 20, 2024. Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic filed a reply on January 13, 2025. The trial court, Judge Gregory Pulskamp, heard
argument on the demurrer on January 21, 2025. The court issued, the same day, its ruling
in a minute order: “Defendant Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s Demurrer to [Potts’s FAC]
is sustained without leave to amend. The Court finds that each ground raised is
meritorious and controlling. [Potts] lacks standing to sue on her children’s behalf and the
facts alleged do not give rise to any claim against this Defendant.”
Potts’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Gregory A. Pulskamp
On January 27, 2025, Potts moved to disqualify Judge Pulskamp from the case
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A). On January 30,
2025, Judge Pulskamp recused himself from the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
2 Potts’s application for entry of default and request for court judgment reflects it
was served on Dr. Tonny Tanus, among others.
5.
section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i), in the “interests of justice.” The case was
thereafter reassigned to Judge Bernard C. Barmann, Jr.
Potts’s Ex Parte Application to Vacate Order Sustaining Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s
Demurrer to FAC
On February 4, 2025, Potts filed an “ex parte application to vacate order sustaining
[Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s] demurrer.” (Capitalization omitted.) On February 5,
2025, Pott filed a “revised ex parte application to vacate order sustaining [Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic’s] demurrer.” (Capitalization omitted.) In her revised ex parte
application, Potts stated: “Plaintiff JASMINE POTTS … does apply to this Court ex
parte for an order vacating the Court’s ruling sustaining Defendant’s Demurrer on the
following grounds: [¶] 1. The ruling was issued by a judge who later recused himself
under CCP § 170.6, rendering the ruling voidable. A ruling by a judge who is later
disqualified is subject to being set aside, as the judge lacked authority to issue a binding
decision. [¶] 2. Defendant was in default when it filed the Demurrer, making the ruling
improper under CCP § 585 and CRC Rule 3.110(g). Under California law, a defendant in
default is barred from filing any responsive pleading unless relief from default is granted.
No such relief was sought or granted in this case.”
On February 20, 2025, Potts filed a “notice of errata regarding plaintiff’s revised
ex parte application to vacate order sustaining defendant’s demurrer.” (Capitalization
omitted.) In her notice of errata, Potts clarified: “Plaintiff inadvertently cited California
Code of Civil Procedure [section] 170.6 instead of the correct provision, California
Code of Civil Procedure [section] 170.1[, subdivision] (a)(6)(A)(i), in the …
application.” (Boldface in original.)
On February 7, 2025, Judge Barmann held a hearing on Potts’s ex parte
application. Potts appeared at the hearing, as did counsel for Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic. Judge Barmann construed the ex parte application as an ex parte application for
an order shortening time and motion to vacate Judge Pulskamp’s order granting Kern
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Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer to the FAC. As reflected in a minute order issued
after the hearing, Judge Barmann granted Potts’s ex parte application for an order
shortening time and set a hearing on the motion to vacate order sustaining demurrer for
February 27, 2025. Judge Barmann ordered Kern Allergy Medical Clinic to file and
serve its opposition to the motion by February 14, 2025. He further ordered Potts to file
and serve her reply by February 20, 2025.
On February 25, 2025, the court continued, on its own motion, the hearing on
Potts’s motion or request to vacate order sustaining demurrer from February 27, 2025, to
March 5, 2025, “[d]ue to unavailability of a court reporter.”
On March 5, 2025, Judge Barmann held a hearing on Potts’s motion to vacate
order sustaining demurrer. After the matter was submitted, Judge Barmann ruled, as
reflected in a minute order: “Plaintiff’s motion to vacate order sustaining defendant’s
demurrer is denied.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Judge Barmann’s ruling in full,
reads as follows:
“Whether the Judgement is Voidable
“Plaintiff contends the Court must vacate the order due to judicial
disqualification (CCP 170.6, CCP 170.3). Defendant cites to CCP
170.3(b)(4) arguing that the code section on its face says the ruling made by
Judge Pulskamp on the [d]emurrer is valid. It is not voidable. Plaintiff
cites no authority other than the code section itself that because Judge
Pulskamp later disqualified himself that his ruling on the [d]emurrer is void
or voidable.
“CCP 170.3(b)(4) states,
“(4) If grounds for disqualification are first learned of or
arise after the judge has made one or more rulings in a
proceeding, but before the judge has completed judicial action
in a proceeding, the judge shall, unless the disqualification be
waived, disqualify himself or herself, but in the absence of
good cause the rulings he or she has made up to that time
shall not be set aside by the judge who replaces the
disqualified judge.
7.
“In the instant case, Plaintiff does not allege a bias and suggests that
because Judge Pulskamp recuses himself[,] the judgement is void.
However, Plaintiff has not argued any reasons for good cause that the order
should be set aside. There is no basis to set aside the order sustaining the
demurrer based on Judge Pulskamp’s recusal.
“Whether Defendant was in Default when the Demurrer was filed
“Plaintiff contends Defendant Kern Allergy was in default when it
filed the demurrer making the ruling improper under CCP 585 and CRC
Rule 3.110(g). Plaintiff contends her Request for Entry of Default was
repeatedly submitted with necessary corrections and wrongfully refused
processing by the court clerk, despite Plaintiff’s compliance with statutory
requirements.
“It appears Plaintiff attempted to file a default as to Kern Allergy on
November 21, 2024, December 13, 2024, and January 10, 2025.[3] Default
was not entered due to errors with Plaintiff’s forms. It is apparent that
Plaintiff attempted to file defaults, but she was unsuccessful before
Defendant Kern Allergy filed a demurrer on December 18, 2024.
Plaintiff’s argument in the reply suggests that Defendant was automatically
in default when they failed to [timely file] a response. However, default is
not automatic. Here, the Court was with[in] its authority to rule on the
demurrer even if it was filed outside of the 30-day period [to respond to the
FAC], as there was no default [entered]. To Plaintiff’s argument that the
defaults were wrongfully refused, the Court sees no obvious errors.”
(Italics added.)
Judge Barmann further ordered, in light of the underlying order sustaining Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer without leave to amend, that “[j]udgment be entered
in favor of Defendant Kern Allergy Medical Clinic [and] against Plaintiff Jasmine Potts.”
This appeal followed.
3 The record on appeal does not contain an application for entry of default filed by
Potts on January 10, 2025. However, the register of actions shows that on January 10,
2025, a request by Potts for entry of default was denied because, among other things,
Kern Allergy Medical Clinic had already appeared in the case by filing, on December 18,
2024, a demurrer to the FAC.
8.
DISCUSSION
I. TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED KERN ALLERGY MEDICAL
CLINIC’S DEMURRER TO FAC BECAUSE NO DEFAULT HAD BEEN
ENTERED WHEN IT WAS FILED
Potts contends the trial court erred in considering Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s
demurrer to the FAC. We disagree.
Potts argues: “Under Code of Civil Procedure section 585[, subdivision] (a), a
defendant who fails to timely respond is in default and loses the right to file further
pleadings, including a demurrer. Respondent Kern Allergy Medical Clinic was served on
September 17, 2024, and its deadline to respond expired on October 17, 2024. [Citation.]
Appellant filed a Request for Entry of Default on November 21, 2024 [citation], and
again on December 13, 2024, after correcting clerical errors identified by the court.
[Citation.] [Kern Allergy Medical Clinic] did not file a motion for relief from default
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, yet was permitted to file a demurrer on
December 18, 2024. [Citation.] The trial court erred in allowing that filing to proceed.”
Here, the record is clear that Potts’s attempts to take Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic’s default were unsuccessful because of deficiencies in her forms, as well as
improper service or lack of service of both her November 21, 2024 application for entry
of default and her December 13, 2024 application for entry of default.
Code of Civil Procedure section 587 provides: “An application by a plaintiff for
entry of default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 585 … shall include an
affidavit stating that a copy of the application has been mailed to the defendant’s attorney
of record or, if none, to the defendant at his or her last known address and the date on
which the copy was mailed.” Code of Civil Procedure section 587 further provides: “No
default under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 585 … shall be entered, unless the
affidavit is filed.”
9.
“[Code of Civil Procedure section 587] was enacted ‘to prevent the taking of
default against an unwary litigant.’ ” (Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 89, 106; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (7th ed. 2026) Proceedings Without
Trial, § 201 [“The application [for entry of default] must be accompanied by an affidavit
of notice to the defendant.”].) “Furthermore, a party applying for a default judgment is
required to use a form document that includes a declaration that the completed form has
been mailed to the defendant’s counsel of record.” (Bae, at p. 106; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1800(a); Judicial Council form No. CIV-100; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (7th ed.
2026) Proceedings Without Trial, § 201.)
With regard to the application for entry of default filed by Potts on November 21,
2024, while Potts used Judicial Council form No. CIV-100, she did not sign the requisite
declaration attesting that the completed form was mailed to defendant’s attorney of
record, or, if none, to defendant’s last known address. The record reflects that Potts was
aware, at least by November 26, 2024, that Kern Allergy Medical Clinic was represented
by attorney Alan Mish, as on that date Mish informed her, by email and letter, that he had
been retained to represent Kern Allergy Medical Clinic. Subsequently, on December 9,
2024, Potts called Mish on the phone to discuss the case as well. Yet, when Potts filed
her second application for entry of default on December 13, 2024, she did not mail a copy
of the application to Mish, nor even to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic, as required by Code
of Civil Procedure section 587; rather, Potts mailed a copy of the application to Dr.
Tonny Tanus, a nonparty to the action. Given the deficiencies in Potts’s successive
applications for entry of default, the trial court clerk properly declined to enter default as
to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic.
On December 18, 2024, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic responded to the FAC by
filing a demurrer. Since default had not been entered, Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s
demurrer was appropriately accepted for filing and the trial court could properly consider
it. (See Goddard v. Pollock (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 137, 141 [“[I]t is now well established
10.
by the case law that where a pleading is belatedly filed, but at a time when a default has
not yet been taken, the plaintiff has, in effect, granted the defendant additional time
within which to plead and he is not strictly in default.”]; Jackson v. Doe (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 742, 749 [“[T]he trial court had discretion to consider [the] defendant’s
untimely demurrer.”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1) [“The court may, in
furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper … enlarge the time for answer
or demurrer.”].)
II. POTTS HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT JUDGE PULSKAMP’S ORDER
SUSTAINING KERN ALLERGY MEDICAL CLINIC’S DEMURRER
MUST BE SET ASIDE
Potts next contends that Judge Pulskamp’s order sustaining Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic’s demurrer to the FAC must be set aside. We are not persuaded.
Potts argues: “The trial court’s January 21, 2025 order sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend was issued by Judge Gregory Pulskamp. [Citation.] On
January 27, 2025, Appellant timely filed a [p]eremptory [c]hallenge under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6, which was granted. [Citation.] Judge Pulskamp recused
himself, and the matter was reassigned to Judge Bernard C. Barmann. [Citation.]
Despite the disqualification, the prior ruling was never vacated. Because rulings made by
a judge who has been properly disqualified under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.6
are voidable, the failure to nullify the order constitutes reversible error.”
Here, Judge Pulskamp sustained Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer without
leave to amend on January 21, 2025. Thereafter, on January 27, 2025, Potts moved to
disqualify Judge Pulskamp from the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A). On January 30, 2025, Judge Pulskamp recused himself
from the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i),
in the “interests of justice.” The case was thereafter reassigned to Judge Bernard
Barmann, Jr.
11.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (b)(4) provides: “If grounds
for disqualification are first learned of or arise after the judge has made one or more
rulings in a proceeding, but before the judge has completed judicial action in a
proceeding, the judge shall, unless the disqualification be waived, disqualify himself or
herself, but in the absence of good cause the rulings he or she has made up to that time
shall not be set aside by the judge who replaces the disqualified judge.” (Italics added.)
In extremely brief fashion, Potts simply asserts that Judge Pulskamp’s ruling must
be set aside. She does not even argue there was good cause to set aside Judge
Pulskamp’s ruling, let alone make a showing of good cause to do so. Nor does she
supply any other developed argument or relevant authorities to support her bare assertion
that Judge Pulskamp’s ruling must be set aside. Potts has not met her burden to
affirmatively show error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [it is
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396,
408 [“conclusory claims of error will fail”].) Furthermore, here the final order and
judgment entered on March 5, 2025, in favor of Kern Allergy Medical Clinic and against
Jasmine Potts, based on sustainment of the underlying demurrer without leave to amend,
was signed by Judge Barmann, not Judge Pulskamp.
We conclude Potts has not established that Judge Pulskamp’s order sustaining
Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer must be set aside. (See Hernandez v. Vitamin
Shoppe Industries Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450 [judge’s ruling at hearing was
valid even though comments that led to prospective disqualification for appearance of
bias were made at that hearing].)
III. TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSTRUING POTTS’S EX PARTE
APPLICATION TO VACATE RULING ON DEMURRER AS A REQUEST
FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME AND MOTION TO VACATE
RULING
Potts contends Judge Barmann erred in construing her ex parte application to
vacate the ruling on Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer to the FAC as a request for
12.
an order shortening time and motion to vacate ruling on demurrer, rather than
immediately ruling on the application’s merits. Potts has not shown error, let alone
prejudicial error.
Potts argues: “Following Judge Pulskamp’s disqualification, Appellant filed an Ex
Parte Application on February 4, 2025, requesting that the January 21, 2025 ruling be
vacated. [Citation.] The application was not opposed by Respondent. However, rather
than rule on the request, the trial court erred and issued an Order Shortening Time and
directed [Kern Allergy Medical Clinic] to file an opposition. [Citation.] The court’s
minutes falsely attributed the OST request to Appellant, when no such request was
made.” Potts contends the court’s actions “constitute serious procedural irregularities.”
Potts filed her “revised ex parte application to vacate order sustaining [Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic’s] demurrer” on February 5, 2025. (Capitalization omitted.)
Judge Barmann held a hearing on the ex parte filing on February 7, 2025. Potts and Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic’s counsel appeared at the hearing. The court construed Potts’s ex
parte filing as a request for an order shortening time and motion to vacate the prior order
sustaining Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer. The court granted the request for an
order shortening time and set a briefing schedule for an opposition to the motion and
reply. Subsequently, on March 5, 2025, the court held a hearing on the motion to vacate
ruling on demurrer and denied it.
We find nothing improper about the trial court’s course of action with respect to
Potts’s ex parte filing. Potts has not established that the court was required to rule on her
application on an ex parte basis. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1200–3.1207.) Nor do
we see any abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to construe the ex parte filing as a
request for an order shortening time and a motion to vacate the ruling on demurrer.
Furthermore, Potts has not provided a reporter’s transcript of the February 7, 2025
hearing. Without the reporter’s transcript of the hearing, we are left with an inadequate
13.
record as to the matter. (See Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435
[appellant failed to secure a hearing transcript, resulting in an inadequate record].)
We conclude Potts has not established error as to the trial court’s decision to
construe her ex parte application to vacate the order sustaining Kern Allergy Medical
Clinic’s demurrer as a request for an order shortening time and motion.
IV. POTTS LACKS STANDING TO BRING CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF HER
CHILDREN
As a general matter, Potts does not have standing to bring claims on behalf of her
children. “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367; Cloud v. Northrop
Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004 [same].) The real party in interest is
“ ‘the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.’ ”
(Ventura County Ry. Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 878, 880;
Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 671, 691 [“Generally speaking, a
party lacks standing to assert a claim that belongs to another person.”]; see Fam. Code,
§ 6601 [“A minor may enforce the minor’s rights by civil action or other legal
proceedings in the same manner as an adult, except that a guardian must conduct the
action or proceedings.”].) “Without standing, there is no actual or justiciable
controversy, and courts will not entertain such cases.” (Clifford S. v. Superior Court
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 751; Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 119, 128 [“Standing goes to the existence of a cause
of action.”].)
Nor can Potts, who is not a lawyer, represent her children in a lawsuit, in propria
persona. (J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 969 [“We conclude that the
mother may not be permitted to act in propria persona as guardian ad litem for her ward
in the court proceedings she seeks to institute.”].)
14.
Potts, however, asserts that she can properly bring a claim against Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic under Health and Safety Code sections 123120 and 123110, to the extent
the clinic blocked her access to her children’s medical records. Potts argues: “Health
and Safety Code section 123110[, subdivision ](a) provides that ‘any patient or patient’s
representative shall be entitled to inspect patient records.’ [Health and Safety Code]
[s]ection 123105[, subdivision ](e)(1) defines ‘representative’ to include ‘a parent or legal
guardian of a minor patient.’ Appellant, as the natural mother and custodial parent, had
both statutory and constitutional authority to request, inspect, and pursue claims arising
from violations of her children’s medical privacy and access rights.”
Health and Safety Code section 123120 states that a patient or patient’s
representative may “bring an action against the health care provider to enforce the
obligations prescribed by [Health and Safety Code] [s]ection 123110.” Health and Safety
Code section 123110 provides for a patient, or a patient’s representative, to inspect and
copy the patient’s medical records upon request to the relevant health care provider.
Specifically, Health and Safety Code section 123110, subdivision (a), cited by
Potts, provides: “[A]ny adult patient of a health care provider, any minor patient
authorized by law to consent to medical treatment, and any patient’s personal
representative shall be entitled to inspect patient records upon presenting to the health
care provider a request for those records and upon payment of reasonable costs .… A
health care provider shall permit this inspection during business hours within five working
days after receipt of the request. The inspection shall be conducted by the patient or
patient’s personal representative requesting the inspection.” (Italics added.)
Potts appears to suggest that she is her children’s representative for purposes of
bringing a claim pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 123120. (See Health & Saf.
Code, § 123105, subd. (e)(1).) Potts further suggests that she has standing to bring a
claim under Health and Safety Code 123120 based on a violation by Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic of Health and Safety Code section 123110, subdivision (a), in relation to
15.
her own medical records or those of her children. However, the FAC does not allege that
Potts submitted a request to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic to inspect her medical records
or those of her children and that Kern Allergy Medical Clinic denied her request to
inspect the records. Accordingly, regardless of Potts’s potential standing to bring the
claim, the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Health and
Safety Code sections 123110, subdivision (a) and 123120.
V. TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED POTTS’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER
Potts contends she submitted an opposition to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s
demurrer, but the trial court appeared to not have considered it. We are not persuaded.
Potts argues: “In [her] opposition [to Kern Allergy Medical Clinic’s demurrer,]
Appellant raised objections that the demurrer was improperly filed by a party in default,
that [Kern Allergy Medical Clinic] had failed to seek or obtain relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, and that the demurrer was unsupported by evidence and
mischaracterized the allegations in the complaint.” Potts contends: “The trial court …
erred [in] its refusal to address or rule on Appellant’s opposition.”
As discussed above, despite repeated attempts, Potts had not actually taken Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic’s default when the latter filed its demurrer. Thus, Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic’s demurrer was properly accepted for filing. Moreover, since Kern
Allergy Medical Clinic was not in default, it had no need to seek relief from default under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473 prior to filing its demurrer.
As for Potts’s complaint that the demurrer was unsupported by evidence, it is
unavailing because a demurrer is directed to the face of the complaint. (See, e.g., Harden
v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 630, 636 [“A demurrer reaches only matters
appearing on the face of the pleading to which it is directed.”]; Bocanegra v. Jakubowski
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 856 [“A demurrer is directed to the face of a complaint …
and it raises only questions of law.”].) In short, Potts’s contentions lack merit.
16.
VI. POTTS HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND WHEN IT GRANTED
KERN ALLERGY MEDICAL CLINIC’S DEMURRER
In an extremely short and conclusory argument, Potts argues “the trial court
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.” Potts has not established an abuse of
discretion on the court’s part.
It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sustain a demurrer without leave to
amend “if there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege
any cause of action.” (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711 (Smith); see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1074, 1081.) “To prove such abuse of discretion, however, the plaintiff must
demonstrate how the complaint can be amended. [Citation.] While such a showing can
be made for the first time to the reviewing court [citation], it must be made.” (Smith, at
p. 711.) “To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff ‘must show in what manner he can
amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.’ ” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
While amendments are generally liberally permitted, “[n]othing in this policy of liberal
allowance … requires an appellate court to hold that the trial judge has abused his
discretion if on appeal the plaintiffs can suggest no legal theory or state of facts which
they wish to add by way of amendment.” (HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d
508, 513, fn. 3 [“ ‘[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion.’ ”].)
Here, Potts makes only general, vague, and conclusory assertions as to how she
could potentially cure the deficiencies in the FAC. For example, Potts states that had the
trial court granted leave to amend, she “could have clarified the specific causes of action
asserted against Kern Allergy Medical Clinic and expanded the factual basis for each
claim.” Potts has not met her burden on appeal to show that the deficiencies in the FAC
can be cured by amendment. In turn, we conclude Potts has not established that the court
17.
below abused its discretion in denying leave to amend when it sustained Kern Allergy
Medical Clinic’s demurrer to the FAC.
VII. POTTS’S CLAIM REGARDING AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT
DEFENDANT IS UNAVAILING
Finally, Potts contends the trial court’s sustainment of the demurrer of another
defendant, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, “was issued under similarly
prejudicial circumstances, with the court disregarding meritorious opposition from Potts]
and cutting off her ability to amend.” Potts appears to be making a “cumulative error”
argument. However, such an argument is misplaced and Potts’s reliance on the court’s
rulings as to an unrelated defendant is unavailing.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.5 Kern Allergy Medical Clinic is awarded its costs on
appeal.
DESANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
4 To the extent Potts raises new arguments for the first time in her reply brief, we
decline to consider them. (See Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 583, 591, fn. 3 [“ ‘Normally, a contention may not be raised for the first
time in a reply brief.’ ”].)
5 Potts filed her notice of appeal in this matter on January 22, 2025. Judgment in
favor of Kern Allergy Medical Clinic was entered on March 5, 2025. We have construed
Potts’s notice of appeal as applying to the judgment entered on March 5, 2025.
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