CourtListener 10847331•People v. Trujillo CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/23/26 P. v. Trujillo CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B339070
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YA088947)
MICHAEL FRANK TRUJILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kelly Michelle Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2016, defendant and appellant Michael Frank Trujillo
(Trujillo) pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,
§ 192, subd. (a))1 and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)). He was
sentenced to serve 20 years 8 months in prison. In 2024,
pursuant to section 1172.75, the trial court struck four, one-year
prior prison term enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and
resentenced Trujillo to 16 years 8 months.
Trujillo appeals from his resentencing. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Trujillo was originally charged in 2014 with one count of
murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) In 2016, the information was
amended by interlineation to include counts for voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)),
and Trujillo pled no contest to those counts. As to the voluntary
manslaughter, he admitted that a principal was armed with a
firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) As to the kidnapping, he
admitted that he inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a).) Trujillo also admitted four prior prison terms.
(Former § 667.5, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced Trujillo to serve an aggregate
term of 20 years 8 months in prison. The sentence consisted of
the upper term of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter, plus
one year for the firearm enhancement and four years for the
former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancements. For the kidnapping, Trujillo received 20 months
(one-third the middle term), plus three years for the great bodily
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
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injury enhancement as specifically agreed. The court dismissed
the murder charge.
In November 2023, Trujillo filed a motion for resentencing
under section 1172.75. Trujillo asked the trial court to strike the
prior prison term enhancements; resentence him to the low term
on the voluntary manslaughter pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6); and strike the great bodily injury enhancement
as to the kidnapping. Trujillo argued that his sentence should be
reduced because of trauma he suffered due to his mother’s
alcoholism and the sexual assault of his sister, his history of
substance abuse, and his positive programming while
incarcerated.
In December 2023, the trial court granted the motion for
resentencing in part by striking the four, one-year prior prison
term enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). On May 20, 2024,
the trial court conducted a full resentencing. The court declined
to reduce Trujillo’s sentence beyond striking the prior prison term
enhancements. The court explained that it had considered
section 1170 and, having reviewed Trujillo’s certified RAP sheet,
found “that his prior convictions are both numerous and of
increasing seriousness as contemplated in California Rule[s] of
Court[, rule] 4.421(b)(2)[.]” While commending Trujillo for taking
classes and working toward his rehabilitation, the court
“believe[d] that the high-term [wa]s appropriate in this case”
based on “Trujillo’s prior criminal history[.]” The court
resentenced Trujillo to 16 years 8 months.
Trujillo filed a timely notice of appeal from his
resentencing. The record does not contain a certificate of
probable cause.
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DISCUSSION
I. Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances Under
Section 1385
Trujillo contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by reimposing sentencing enhancements without considering or
affording great weight to mitigating circumstances enumerated
in section 1385.
A. Section 1172.75
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) added section 1172.75, which renders “legally invalid”
any former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term
enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020, except for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A
defendant who qualifies for the recall of sentence under
section 1172.75 is entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the
trial court may reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions.
(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe).)
The statute provides “specific instructions” for the trial
court to exercise broad resentencing authority. (People v. Carter
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.) Among other things,
section 1172.75 requires the trial court to “apply any . . . changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so
as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity
of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) The court “may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
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that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
B. Section 1385
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c). (People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723 (Coleman).) Under
the amended statute, “the court shall dismiss an enhancement if
it is in the furtherance of justice to do so[.]” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
“In exercising its discretion” to dismiss an enhancement, “the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove” the presence of nine enumerated
“mitigating circumstances . . . . Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) Mitigating factors include, as relevant here, that
“[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(B).)
C. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss or strike an
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (Nazir
v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490 (Nazir).) “A
trial court may abuse its discretion where ‘its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it,’ ‘where the trial court was not “aware of its discretion”’ to
dismiss a sentencing allegation under section 1385, or ‘where the
court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.’
[Citations.]” (Nazir, supra, at p. 490.)
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D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
As required by section 1172.75, the trial court struck
Trujillo’s four former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison
term enhancements. The court also, as required by
section 1172.75, conducted a full resentencing (see Monroe,
supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402), during which it declined to
reduce Trujillo’s sentence further.
Trujillo argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
reimposing sentencing enhancements without considering or
affording great weight to the presence of the multiple
enhancement mitigating circumstance set forth in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B). Although Trujillo forfeited this contention
by failing to raise it below (see Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 724), we consider the merits to forestall his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim (see People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th
701, 759–760; Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 400).
Trujillo has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376 [“‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary”’”].) That the court did not expressly discuss its
discretion under section 1385 does not affirmatively establish
that it was unaware of the scope of that discretion or failed to
exercise it. (See Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 725
[“Defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his
burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion”]; People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [“‘The trial court is not
required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion
under section 1385’”].)
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Because “all intendments and presumptions are indulged
in favor of [the] correctness” of the trial court’s order (In re
Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133), we presume
that the court was aware of the applicable law, gave great weight
to any relevant mitigating circumstance, and declined to dismiss
the other enhancements due to countervailing factors. (See
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker) [at
resentencing, a trial court may reimpose a challenged
enhancement upon “find[ing] substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that . . . ‘neutralize . . . the great weight of
the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the
enhancement is not in furtherance of justice’”].) Credible
evidence of such countervailing factors can be found in Trujillo’s
criminal record, which includes convictions for burglary (§ 459),
inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)), manufacturing or possessing a dangerous weapon
(former § 12020, subd. (a)(1)), carrying a concealed dirk or dagger
(§ 21310), and hit and run with property damage (Veh. Code,
§ 20002).
Trujillo speculates that the trial court would have exercised
its discretion differently if it had the benefit of Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th 1024, which was decided a few months after the
resentencing hearing. We disagree that a new hearing is
required. Before Walker was decided, sentencing courts were still
required to afford great weight to mitigating factors. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) Trujillo has not demonstrated that the court in this
case exercised its discretion in a manner inconsistent with
Walker. Indeed, Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 1029
confirmed that the existence of one or more of the mitigating
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factors listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), does not mandate
dismissal of an enhancement.
II. Sentence for Great Bodily Injury Enhancement
When a defendant is convicted of more than one felony and
a consecutive prison term is imposed, “[t]he subordinate term for
each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle
term of imprisonment . . . , and shall include one-third of the
term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to those
subordinate offenses.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)
Trujillo contends that both the original sentencing court
and the resentencing court violated section 1170.1,
subdivision (a), by imposing a consecutive, three-year sentence
for the great bodily injury enhancement attached to the
kidnapping count instead of one year (one-third of the three-year
enhancement). Trujillo’s argument goes to the validity of his
negotiated plea agreement. Because Trujillo did not obtain a
certificate of probable cause, we may not address this claim.
“Under section 1237.5, a defendant generally may not
appeal from a judgment of conviction following a guilty or no
contest plea, unless he files with the trial court a statement
‘showing reasonable, constitutional, jurisdictional, or other
grounds going to the legality of the proceedings’ (§ 1237.5,
subd. (a)), and the trial court executes and files ‘a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court’
(§ 1237.5, subd. (b)). [Citations.]” (People v. Mashburn (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) “Even when a defendant purports to
challenge only the sentence imposed, a certificate of probable
cause is required if the challenge goes to an aspect of the
sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a
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plea agreement. [Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2009)
47 Cal.4th 668, 678 (Johnson).)
In 2016, the trial court clarified that Trujillo’s agreed-upon
plea bargain included the imposition of a full, three-year great
bodily injury enhancement (rather than one year) and then
imposed that term. At the 2024 resentencing, the court
reimposed the same three-year enhancement. The three-year
enhancement was “an integral part of a plea agreement.”
(Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 678.) Trujillo’s challenge to that
aspect of his sentence “is in substance a challenge to the validity
of the plea, thus rendering the appeal subject to the requirements
of section 1237.5. [Citation.]” (People v. Panizzon (1996)
13 Cal.4th 68, 76.) Because Trujillo failed to obtain a certificate
of probable cause, we lack jurisdiction to review the issue. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3) [in the absence of a
certificate of probable cause, “the appeal will be limited to issues
that do not require a certificate of probable cause”].)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s May 20, 2024, order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
GILBERT*
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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