Potter v. Barenholtz CA2/4

CourtListener 10846851Calctapp22.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/22/26 Potter v. Barenholtz CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JESSE ROBERT POTTER, B338369

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV28751)
v.

BRETT BARENHOLTZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with
directions.
Shapero & Shapero and Steven J. Shapero; Bruce Adelstein for
Defendant and Appellant.
Hayes Litigation and Daniel M. Hayes for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Here we join a long line of appellate cases in holding that the litigation
privilege under Civil Code section 47 bars derivative tort claims based on
allegations of extrinsic fraud. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, asserting
both equitable and tort claims stemming from plaintiff’s eviction from a
condominium pursuant to a default judgment obtained in unlawful detainer
proceedings. In this civil action, plaintiff alleges that the default judgment
and subsequent writ of possession in the prior unlawful detainer action were
obtained through defendant’s extrinsic fraud.
In response, defendant filed a special motion to strike under our anti-
SLAPP statute, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the
litigation privilege. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)1 The trial court denied the
motion and awarded plaintiff his attorneys’ fees under section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1). Defendant now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in
concluding that plaintiff’s tort claims were not barred by the litigation
privilege. We agree and reverse the trial court’s ruling as to plaintiff’s tort
claims. As we determine that defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion had merit, we
also reverse the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff.

1 The term “SLAPP” stands for strategic lawsuit against public
participation. All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise specified.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Parties and Background
Plaintiff Jesse Potter (Jesse)2 is a developmentally disabled adult.3
Jesse lived with his mother, Rosana Potter (Rosana), in a Van Nuys
condominium. In 2006, Rosana established a revocable trust (the Potter
trust) and transferred her interest in the Van Nuys condominium to the
trust. The trust named Jesse and his sister, Annabelle Potter Krishel
(Annabelle), as beneficiaries. The trust also designated Annabelle as the
successor trustee upon Rosana’s death. Using a power of attorney she
acquired over Rosana, Annabelle subsequently designated attorney Brett
Barenholtz (Barenholtz) to act as successor trustee. Rosana died in August
2018.
Following Rosana’s death, Jesse lived alone in the Van Nuys
condominium. According to Barenholtz, the results were disastrous, and the
condominium fell into disrepair, rendering it uninhabitable. Among the
issues were extensive piles of trash littering the condominium, water damage
caused by leaks, as well as cockroaches, mold, and noxious odors.
Additionally, foreclosure notices were filed against the property stemming
from Jesse’s failure to pay the mortgage or homeowners’ association fees for
the condominium.

2 As this case involves multiple members of the Potter family who share
a last name, we refer to certain parties by first name for clarity. No
disrespect is intended.

3 The precise nature and severity of this disability has not been
established in the record before us, but it appears to be undisputed that he
was born with an autistic spectrum disorder even if no formal medical
diagnosis appears in the record.
3
II. Unlawful Detainer Action
In May 2023, Barenholtz, through his retained counsel Michael Simkin
(Simkin), filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Jesse from the
Van Nuys condominium. In the unlawful detainer complaint, Barenholtz
asserted that Jesse agreed to rent the Van Nuys condominium as an at-will
tenant. The complaint alleged Jesse breached the terms of his rental
agreement by refusing to provide Barenholtz access to the property to
perform maintenance. The complaint did not mention the Potter trust or
that Jesse suffered from a developmental disability. When Jesse did not
respond to the unlawful detainer complaint, Barenholtz obtained a default
judgment against him for possession of the condominium.
In July 2023, while he was in the process of obtaining the default
judgment against Jesse in the unlawful detainer action, Barenholtz filed a
petition in the probate division of the Los Angeles Superior Court seeking to
be appointed as Jesse’s conservator. The form petition filed by Barenholtz
checked a box indicating that Jesse had “a developmental disability as
defined in Probate Code section 1420.” Barenholtz signed the petition under
penalty of perjury.
In a supplement to his conservatorship petition, Barenholtz
represented, under penalty of perjury, that Jesse was “developmentally
disabled from birth with the autistic spectrum disorder known as Asperger’s
Syndrome, which impacts his social and societal interactions and limits his
ability to properly care for himself. He has perception and comprehension
problems. He does not fully understand the consequences of his actions and
behavior.”
In November 2023, Barenholtz had the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department execute the writ of possession he obtained through the default

4
judgment in the unlawful detainer action. Jesse was removed from the
condominium.
Shortly thereafter, Jesse obtained counsel and filed an ex parte
application to vacate the default judgment in the unlawful detainer action.
Jesse argued that Barenholtz and Simkin improperly obscured the fact that
Jesse was developmentally disabled from the unlawful detainer court. Jesse
asked the court to vacate the default judgment and restore his access to the
condominium. The court granted the application and vacated the default
judgment. However, the court determined that it could not recall the writ of
possession and restore Jesse to the condominium because it lost the
jurisdiction to do so once the writ of possession was executed by the Sheriff’s
Department.4 Jesse subsequently brought a motion in the unlawful detainer
action asking the court to restore his possession of the condominium following
the vacatur of the default judgment. On May 28, 2025, the unlawful detainer
court denied Jesse’s motion.

III. The Instant Litigation
Jesse then filed suit against Barenholtz and Simkin. Jesse’s complaint
asserted eight causes of action against them for dependent adult abuse,
trespass, conversion, trespass to chattels, negligence, accounting, quiet title,
and declaratory relief.

4 Barenholtz and Potter both appealed the order to the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court. Barenholtz challenged the unlawful detainer
court’s decision to vacate the default judgment. Potter challenged the court’s
determination that it could not recall the writ of possession and restore him
to the condominium. On February 25, 2025, the Appellate Division filed an
opinion dismissing both appeals, concluding the unlawful detainer court’s
ruling was a non-appealable interlocutory ruling.
5
Jesse’s causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief sought a
judicial determination that he was the rightful owner of the Van Nuys
condominium. The cause of action for an accounting sought an accounting of
Barenholtz’s “payment or receipt of any money for Jesse” as a trustee of the
special needs trust or through his power of attorney.
The remaining causes of action all arose from Barenholtz’s and
Simkin’s prosecution of the unlawful detainer action, Jesse’s eviction, and
Barenholtz’s refusal to voluntarily restore Jesse to the condominium
following the vacatur of the default judgment in the unlawful detainer action.
Jesse’s complaint additionally alleged that Barenholtz and Simkin failed to
return Jesse’s personal property following the vacatur of the default
judgment in the unlawful detainer action.
In response, Barenholtz filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Jesse’s
entire complaint. Barenholtz argued that all of Jesse’s causes of action
against him arose from protected activity and were barred by the litigation
privilege. In a declaration submitted in support of the motion, Barenholtz
described Jesse as “quite impaired,” lacking the “ability to live
independently,” and suffering from “severe behavioral issues regarding
interpersonal contact, food, personal hygiene, medical care and toileting.”
Barenholtz also described Jesse as a “hoarder” who kept the Van Nuys
condominium in a “horrible, unlivable, unsafe and unsanitary” condition.
Barenholtz claimed that Jesse did “not have sufficient income or assets” to
remain in the condominium, and the Potter trust did not have the assets
necessary to maintain or repair it.
Jesse opposed the motion, disputing both that his claims against
Barenholtz arose from protected activity and that the litigation privilege
applied. In particular, Jesse argued that the litigation privilege does not

6
apply to acts of extrinsic fraud. Jesse also filed a motion seeking to recover
his attorneys’ fees for opposing the motion under section 425.16, subdivision
(c), arguing that Barenholtz’s motion was frivolous.
The trial court denied the motion to strike. In its ruling, the court held
that Jesse’s sixth cause of action for accounting and eighth cause of action for
declaratory relief did not arise from Barenholtz’s protected conduct and thus
fell beyond the anti-SLAPP statute. The court determined that Jesse’s
remaining causes of action arose from the allegation that Barenholtz
procured the unlawful detainer judgment (and subsequent writ of possession)
through extrinsic fraud. The court concluded that, under California law, the
prosecution of an unlawful detainer action was “protected activity” under
section 425.16.
Turning to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, the trial court
rejected Barenholtz’s argument that Jesse’s remaining claims were barred by
the litigation privilege. The court adopted Jesse’s argument, concluding that
under Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205 (Silberg), the litigation
privilege does not protect acts of extrinsic fraud. After reviewing the parties’
respective evidentiary showings, the court determined that Jesse sufficiently
established a “likelihood of prevailing so that the Barenholtz special motion
to strike must be denied.”
The trial court granted Jesse’s request for attorneys’ fees under section
425.16, subdivision (c)(1), concluding that Barenholtz’s anti-SLAPP motion
was “frivolous” under the statute. The court concluded that Barenholtz’s
motion was “based on a false characterization of irrefutable facts about
Barenholtz’s fiduciary obligations to [Jesse] and his obligations of fair
disclosure to the courts from which he sought judicial orders.” The court
awarded Jesse $72,355 in attorneys’ fees.

7
IV. Appeal
Barenholtz timely appealed the trial court’s March 28, 2024, order
denying his anti-SLAPP motion to strike and granting Potter’s motion for
attorneys’ fees.

DISCUSSION
I. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) A “cause of action against a person
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, courts conduct a two-
step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has met its
“burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) Second,
if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold showing, the court decides if
the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

8
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
[Citation.] We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.]” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763.)

II. Scope of Appeal
In his reply brief, Barenholtz states that he is not challenging the
denial of his anti-SLAPP motion to strike Jesse’s causes of action for
accounting, quiet title, or declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of Barenholtz’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike those causes of
action. The arguments on appeal all concern Jesse’s five tort claims for
dependent adult abuse, trespass, conversion, trespass to chattels, and
negligence.

III. Prong One: Arising from Protected Activity
At the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving party must
establish both (1) that its act constituted protected activity; and (2) the
opposing party’s cause of action arose from that protected activity.” (Colyear
v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 119, 130; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) “At this stage, the
question is only whether a defendant has made out a prima facie case that
activity underlying a plaintiff’s claims is statutorily protected.” (Wilson, at p.
888.)
In determining whether a defendant has met this burden, “courts are to
‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the
defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each
challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a

9
statutorily defined category of protected activity. [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
Barenholtz argues Jesse’s remaining claims all arise from Barenholtz’s
actions of obtaining the default judgment and executing the writ of
possession in the unlawful detainer action. We agree.
The protections of section 425.16 extend to “any act” taken in
furtherance of the right to petition. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “The filing of a
lawsuit is thus an exercise of a party’s constitutional right of petition under
the anti-SLAPP law.” (Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 285,
fn. 3.) For this reason, courts have recognized that “[t]he prosecution of an
unlawful detainer action indisputably is protected activity within the
meaning of section 425.16. [Citations.]” (Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 275, 281.)
“[P]rotection for petitioning activities applies not only to the filing of
lawsuits, but extends to conduct that relates to such litigation, including
statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation.” (Kolar v.
Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537.)
Courts have also adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes
litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian).) Actions taken by an
attorney to enforce a judgment fall within the scope of section 425.16, even
where the underlying judgment was allegedly procured by fraud. (Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062–1065 (Rusheen).)
Jesse’s causes of action for dependent adult abuse, trespass, conversion,
trespass to chattels, and negligence all arise from actions Barenholtz took in
prosecuting the unlawful detainer action and enforcing the resulting default
judgment and writ of possession. Jesse attempts to avoid this conclusion by

10
arguing his tort claims do not arise from any actions taken in the unlawful
detainer action but instead are premised on Barenholtz’s refusal to return
possession of the condominium to Jesse after the trial court vacated the
default judgment. We find this argument unconvincing.
As the trial court noted, Barenholtz obtained and retained possession of
the condo through his enforcement of the writ of possession issued in the
unlawful detainer action. Even after the default judgment was vacated, the
question of whether the condominium should be restored to Jesse’s possession
was a point of dispute being actively litigated by the parties in the
subsequent appellate proceedings and motion practice in the unlawful
detainer action. Taking, as we must, an expansive view of what constitutes
“litigation-related activities” under section 425.16, we conclude that
Barenholtz’s actions obtaining and retaining possession of the condominium
arose from, and were necessarily related to, the prosecution of the unlawful
detainer action. Therefore, Barenholtz’s conduct is protected under the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908; Rusheen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062–1065.)
Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that
the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the
question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort
claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

IV. Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits
Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need
only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law
Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) To satisfy this burden,
the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient

11
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’”
(Ibid.)

A. Litigation Privilege
Barenholtz contends Jesse’s tort claims are barred by the litigation
privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).
The litigation privilege extends to any communication: (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that has
some connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
p. 212.) “The principal purpose of section 47[, subdivision (b),] is to afford
litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts
without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 213.) The privilege promotes effective judicial
proceedings by encouraging “‘open channels of communication and the
presentation of evidence’” without the external threat of liability. (Ibid.)
“To effectuate its vital purposes, the litigation privilege is held to be
absolute in nature.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215.) For this reason,
the privilege “extends to fraudulent statements, even when made to a court,
if they were made in furtherance of litigation.” (Herterich v. Peltner (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 1132, 1141 (Herterich).) As our Supreme Court has recognized,
the application of the privilege “necessarily results in some real injuries that
go uncompensated” but that is the “‘price that is paid’” to ensure free access
to the courts. (Silberg, at p. 218.)

12
B. Jesse’s Tort Claims Arise from Privileged Conduct
Jesse argues the litigation privilege does not apply because his tort
claims are based on noncommunicative conduct.
We agree that the threshold issue in determining whether the litigation
privilege applies is whether the defendant’s conduct was communicative or
noncommunicative. (Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 211; Mero v.
Sadoff (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1480.) Jesse is also correct that the
litigation privilege generally “applies only to communicative acts and does
not privilege tortious courses of conduct.” (Kupiec v. American Internat.
Adjustment Co. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1331.) But the privilege does
not stop at communicative acts.
Rusheen is instructive. In Rusheen, our California Supreme Court held
that “where the cause of action is based on a communicative act, the
litigation privilege extends to those noncommunicative actions which are
necessarily related to that communicative act.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th
at p. 1052.) Applying this rule, the Rusheen court concluded that, where the
plaintiff alleged the defendant filed false declarations of service to obtain a
default judgment against him, the litigation privilege extended to the
defendant’s post-judgment efforts to enforce the judgment, including applying
for a writ of execution and levying on the plaintiff’s property. (Id. at p. 1065
[“the enforcement of the judgment in reliance on the filing of privileged
declarations of service was itself privileged”].)
We reach the same conclusion here. The gravamen of Jesse’s tort
claims against Barenholtz all stem from the allegation that Barenholtz
fraudulently obtained the default judgment in the unlawful detainer action
and enforced that judgment through a writ of possession. Barenholtz’s
possession and retention of the condominium were actions necessarily related

13
to the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action—both before and after the
default judgment was vacated. This brings us squarely within Rusheen, and
we conclude that the litigation privilege applies to Barenholtz’s post-
judgment execution of the writ of possession.
Jesse’s reliance on Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234
(Chacon) is misplaced. In Chacon, a landlord successfully brought an
unlawful detainer action to temporarily evict his tenants under a local
ordinance to perform repairs to the property. (Id. at p. 1239.) The landlord
did not complete the repairs within the time contemplated by the temporary
eviction. When the landlord refused to allow the tenants to return to the
property, they sued for wrongful eviction and related claims. Our colleagues
in the First District held that the litigation privilege was inapplicable
because the landlord’s refusal to allow the tenants “to reoccupy the premises
after their temporary eviction was not an effort by him to ‘enforce’ the
unlawful detainer judgment” because that judgment did not award the
landlord permanent possession. (Chacon, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.)
Here, by contrast, the writ of possession issued in the unlawful
detainer action awarded permanent possession of the condominium to
Barenholtz. While the underlying default judgment in the unlawful detainer
action was vacated, the writ was not recalled, and the unlawful detainer
court did not rule that Jesse was entitled to reoccupy the condominium
following vacatur of the default judgment. On such facts, we find Chacon
unpersuasive.

C. The Extrinsic Fraud Exemption Does Not Apply
“Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to
present his claim or defense to the court; where he was kept ignorant or,

14
other than from his own negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully
participating in the proceeding. [Citation.] Examples of extrinsic fraud are:
concealment of the existence of a community property asset, failure to give
notice of the action to the other party, and convincing the other party not to
obtain counsel because the matter will not proceed (and then it does proceed).
[Citation.] The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party’s preventing the other
from having his day in court.” (City and County of San Francisco v.
Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067.)
The parties dispute whether Barenholtz engaged in any acts of
extrinsic fraud in procuring the default judgment in the unlawful detainer
action. We ultimately need not decide that question, as even assuming that
Jesse sufficiently alleged extrinsic fraud, his tort claims arising from the
purported fraud are nonetheless barred by the litigation privilege.
Jesse’s argument to the contrary is premised on a sentence of dicta in
Silberg v. Anderson. In Silberg, a former husband brought an action against
the attorney who represented his former wife in their divorce proceedings,
alleging claims for breach of contract, negligence, and “intentional tort.”
(Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 210–211.) The plaintiff alleged that, during
the divorce proceedings, the defendant attorney falsely represented the
impartiality of a jointly-retained psychologist. (Id. at p. 210.) The defendant
filed a demurrer claiming all of the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the
litigation privilege. Our California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.
In reaching this result, the Silberg court noted the litigation privilege
was “absolute in nature” and has been held to immunize defendants from tort
liability based on all theories of abuse of process except malicious
prosecution. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215.) The court also reasoned

15
that, “To allow a litigant to attack the integrity of evidence after the
proceedings have concluded, except in the most narrowly circumscribed
situations, such as extrinsic fraud, would impermissibly burden, if not
inundate, our justice system.” (Id. at p. 214.) Seizing on this language, Jesse
argues that his claims against Barenholtz arise from extrinsic fraud and are
therefore not barred by the litigation privilege.
We note the language from Silberg was dicta. The claims at issue in
Silberg did not concern extrinsic fraud. The question of whether all claims of
extrinsic fraud necessarily fall beyond the ambit of the litigation privilege
was not before the Silberg court. Cases do not stand for propositions not
considered. (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071; B.B. v. County of
Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11.)
Jesse’s interpretation of Silberg is also belied by subsequent case law.
Four years after it issued the opinion in Silberg, our Supreme Court clarified
that the “reference to ‘extrinsic fraud’ [in Silberg] apparently relates to the
narrow doctrine permitting a collateral attack on a judgment that has been
obtained by ‘extrinsic fraud.’” (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 643, fn.
5 (Moore).) Following Moore, appellate courts have limited the “extrinsic
fraud” language of Silberg as permitting equitable collateral attacks on a
judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud. However, courts have held that
this exception to the litigation privilege does not apply to derivative tort
actions based on extrinsic fraud.
For example, the plaintiff in Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 834 alleged a tort claim for fraud based on the defendant’s
alleged procurement of a stipulated judgment against the plaintiff through
extrinsic fraud. (Id. at pp. 838, 841–842.) In response, the defendant filed an
anti-SLAPP motion to strike, arguing the plaintiff’s claims were barred by

16
the litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding that even if
plaintiff could establish extrinsic fraud by the defendant, her tort claims
would nonetheless still be barred by the litigation privilege: “Moreover, even
when extrinsic fraud can be demonstrated, the aggrieved party may seek to
set aside the judgment, but none of the cases [plaintiff] cites support the
contention that a separate action for damages may be pursued. . . . [¶] . . .
Therefore, [plaintiff]’s cause of action for fraud is barred.” (Id. at p. 844.)
Other appellate courts have drawn the same distinction. (See, e.g.,
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 288, 304 [litigation
privilege does not apply to equitable actions to set aside a fraudulent
judgment but does bar tort claims]; Herterich, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p.
1147 [Silberg exception does not apply to tort claims based on extrinsic
fraud]; Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824 [holding litigation
privilege barred plaintiff’s two tort claims but not her claim for equitable
relief]; Heyman v. Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 921, 925, fn. 2 [litigation privilege bars direct action for fraud
but not equitable actions to redress extrinsic fraud]; Home Ins. Co. v. Zurich
Ins. Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 17, 26 [same]; Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1147 [“Where a civil judgment is procured by extrinsic
fraud, the normal remedy is to seek equitable relief from the judgment, not to
sue in tort”].)
It is undisputed that Jesse’s five remaining causes of action sound in
tort. We join the other appellate courts which have determined that the
litigation privilege bars such claims, even when they arise from allegations of
extrinsic fraud. Any contrary conclusion would be difficult to square with our
Supreme Court’s holding in Rusheen. The claims at issue in Rusheen arose
from the filing of perjurious proofs of service, which allegedly resulted in the

17
entry of a fraudulent default judgment against the plaintiff. (Rusheen, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 1065.) Those are allegations of extrinsic fraud. Under
Jesse’s interpretation of Silberg, the claims at issue in Rusheen were not
barred by the litigation privilege. But the Rusheen court instead concluded
the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege, while expressly
quoting the “extrinsic fraud” language from Silberg. (Id. at pp. 1064–1065.)
The two cases cited by Jesse are unpersuasive. The plaintiffs in Kimes
v. Stone sued their former attorneys under 42 United States Code section
1983. The plaintiffs, a brother and sister, alleged their attorneys conspired
with a judge to overturn a jury verdict in state court concerning the
administration of their deceased father’s estate. (Kimes v. Stone (9th Cir.
1996) 84 F.3d 1121, 1124–1125 (Kimes).) The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6), arguing the
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by California’s litigation privilege under Civil
Code section 47. The district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit
reversed, concluding the litigation privilege under California law was
preempted by federal law and therefore could not shield defendants from
liability under the federal statute. (Id. at pp. 1126–1127.) In dicta, the
Kimes court added that, even if California’s state law litigation privilege was
not preempted, “we are not entirely convinced that the Attorney Defendants
would have been entitled to immunity for their alleged conduct because such
conduct appears to constitute ‘extrinsic fraud,’ which is not covered by [Civil
Code, section 47, subdivision (b)].” (Kimes, supra, 84 F.3d at p. 1127, fn. 3,
citing Silberg.) The Kimes court offered no further analysis beyond this
citation to the dicta from Silberg.
Mula v. Mula-Stouky (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2022, No. 21-cv-04540-BLF)
[nonpub. opn.] (Mula), is an unpublished order from a district court citing the

18
Kimes footnote to establish that California’s litigation privilege did not bar
tort claims based on extrinsic fraud. As with Kimes, the Mula court provided
no further analysis on this point. Neither Kimes nor Mula acknowledged the
California Supreme Court’s clarification in Moore or the subsequent cases
from California appellate courts that distinguished between an equitable
action to attack a fraudulent judgment and a derivative tort action for
damages. For these reasons, neither case is persuasive, particularly in light
of the California authorities that have squarely confronted this issue.
We conclude that Jesse’s tort causes of action against Barenholtz are
barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47. We do not
reach this decision lightly. (People v. Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115,
1119 [“‘“Honesty in dealing with the courts is of paramount importance, and
misleading a judge is, regardless of motives, a serious offense”’”].) And in
reaching it, we do not imply that we condone Barenholtz’s actions in the
unlawful detainer action. Instead, we merely recognize that, under
California law, Barenholtz cannot be held liable in tort for his conduct in the
unlawful detainer action. As Jesse’s tort claims are barred by the litigation
privilege, he cannot establish a probability of success on those claims under
the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The trial court therefore erred
in denying Barenholtz’s motion to strike Jesse’s tort claims.

V. The Fees Award Cannot Stand
“If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to
Section 128.5.” (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “Thus, the procedure of section 128.5

19
controls the award of attorney’s fees for a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion.”
(Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. v. Xufeng (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1, 8.)
“An action or tactic is frivolous for purposes of section 128.5 if it is
‘totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an
opposing party.’” (De La Carriere v. Greene (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 270, 279,
quoting § 128.5, subd. (b)(2).) “Whether an action is frivolous is governed by
an objective standard: any reasonable attorney would agree it is totally and
completely without merit.” (Levy v. Blum (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 625, 635.)
As we have determined Barenholtz should have prevailed in striking
five of Jesse’s causes of action, we cannot conclude that his motion was
“totally and completely without merit” or filed solely to harass Jesse.
(§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2).) The statutory basis for the trial court’s fee award no
longer exists. “Therefore, it follows that the order awarding fees and costs
cannot stand.” (Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl Street, LLC (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1320.)

DISPOSITION5
The trial court’s March 28, 2024, order is affirmed in part and reversed
in part. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike Jesse’s sixth
cause of action for accounting, seventh cause of action to quiet title, and
eighth cause of action for declaratory relief. The order is reversed as to
Jesse’s remaining causes of action and the award of attorneys’ fees. On
remand, the trial court is directed to enter an order granting Barenholtz’s
anti-SLAPP motion to strike Jesse’s first through fifth causes of action and

5 Jesse’s request for judicial notice is granted.
20
denying Jesse’s motion for attorneys’ fees. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

TAMZARIAN, J.

COGLIATI, J.*

*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

21

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.