Smith v. Superior Court CA2/3

CourtListener 10846850Calctapp22.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/22/26 Smith v. Superior Court CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CANDICE SMITH et al., B349974

Petitioners, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC639197)
v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA OF
LOS ANGELES et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate, William F.
Highberger, Judge. Petition granted in part and denied in part.
Capstone Law, Ryan H. Wu, Melissa Grant, Bevin Allen
Pike for Petitioners.
David Lee, Court Counsel, for Respondent.
Wolflick, Khachaturian & Bouayad, Gregory D. Wolflick
and Theodore S. Khachaturian for Real Party in Interest
Volunteers of America of Los Angeles.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2016, plaintiffs and petitioners Candice Smith and
Elizabeth Grundy filed a class action against their former
employer, defendant and real party in interest Volunteers of
America of Los Angeles (VOALA), asserting meal and rest period
violations and other wage-and-hour claims. Plaintiffs sought
certification of five subclasses. The trial court certified two
subclasses after limiting their scope and denied certification of
the three remaining subclasses, all of which related to meal
period violations. The trial court concluded the meal period
subclasses lacked commonality because VOALA’s affirmative
defense of waiver would require individualized proof.
Plaintiffs seek a preemptive writ of mandate. They contend
the trial court’s ruling was inconsistent with Donohue v. AMN
Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 (Donohue). Plaintiffs also
assert that the trial court erred in limiting the scope of one of the
subclasses.
We grant plaintiffs’ petition in part. We agree that the
trial court made an erroneous legal assumption in determining
that the mere pleading of waiver as an affirmative defense was

2
sufficient to show individual issues would predominate as to the
meal period subclasses. We deny plaintiffs’ petition with respect
to the Children’s Services Subclass, as substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s conclusion that certification was
proper only as to the locations where the class representatives
worked.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
VOALA
VOALA “provides services to homeless individuals,
veterans, and young adults.” Through its Children’s Services
division, VOALA also runs Head Start preschool programs and
provides other services to families. From 2012 to 2023, VOALA
employed over 5,800 hourly workers in California.
Before new employees report to their specific program sites,
VOALA’s human resources department informs them about the
company’s policies in the employee handbook, including meal and
rest break policies. At all times relevant to these proceedings,
the handbook instructed hourly employees to “take an unpaid,
30-minute” off-duty meal period for every shift “of more than five
hours.” Payroll associate Terry Ng, designated one of VOALA’s
persons most qualified, testified that VOALA paid a premium if
an employee “clocked out late after six hours for lunch, and if
they missed a lunch, and if the meal break is less than 29
minutes.”
Until 2015, hourly employees at VOALA recorded their
hours by writing their clock-in and clock-out times on paper
timesheets. Some paper timesheets included a box labeled
“Lunch” where employees could report the total hours for which

3
VOALA owed them meal premiums for short, late, or missed
meal periods.1 Other versions of the timesheet did not include a
“Lunch” category. All paper timesheets required the employee to
sign and certify that the recorded hours “fully and accurately
report all hours . . . worked during the covered period” and that
the employee received all meal periods that he or she “was legally
entitled to unless otherwise specified on this form.”
In 2015, VOALA switched to the electronic timekeeping
system NOVAtime, which allowed employees to clock in and out
using their fingerprints. NOVAtime generated timecards with
columns listing clock-in and clock-out times. Ng testified that an
entry in the “Meal” column showed when an employee was owed
a meal premium. He also testified that NOVAtime automatically
indicated a meal premium was to be paid if an employee’s meal
period was “less than 29 minutes after the six-hour [mark] or no
meal” was taken.
Complaint and Motion for Class Certification
Smith worked at VOALA from 2012 to 2016. In October
2016, she filed a class action complaint against VOALA and two
related entities. The operative complaint asserted causes of
action for unpaid overtime (Lab. Code, §§ 510, 1198);2 unpaid
minimum wages (§§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198); failure to
provide meal periods (§§ 226.7, 512, subd. (a), 1198); failure to

1 This section of the form also had boxes for overtime, jury
duty, and training.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Labor Code.

4
provide rest periods (§§ 226, subd. (a), 1198); non-compliant wage
statements and failure to maintain payroll records (§§ 226,
subd. (a), 1174, subd. (d), 1198); failure to timely pay wages upon
termination (§§ 201–203); unreimbursed business expenses
(§ 2802); and unlawful business practices under California’s
Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). An
amended complaint added Elizabeth Grundy as a named
plaintiff. Grundy is a former VOALA employee who worked as a
Head Start teacher from 2012 to 2016.
In July 2024, plaintiffs moved for class certification. They
sought “to represent one class and five subclasses of nearly 6,000
non-exempt, hourly employees” who worked for VOALA any time
from October 2012 to the date of certification and who were
subject to, among other things, “the underpayment of wages,”
“failure to provide meal breaks,” and “failure to pay meal break
premiums when due.” Plaintiffs proposed the following
subclasses “predicated on VOALA’s companywide, uniform
policies and practices”:

“• Underpayment Theory (Underpayment
Subclass): from May 1, 2015 to July 1, 2019,
Defendant underpaid its employees by calculating
employee pay using clock-in and clock-out times other
than an employee[’s] actual time punches;

“• Meal Break Policy Theory (Meal Break Policy
Subclass): Throughout the Class Period, Defendant
failed to provide employees with first meal periods
before the end of the fifth hour of work as a result of
its facially invalid meal period policies and practices;

5
“• Meal Break Electronic Timesheet Premium
Theory (Meal Break Electronic Timekeeping
Premium Subclass): From June 2015 to the
present, Defendant failed to pay meal break
premiums when required because its electronic
timekeeping system is programmed to trigger the
payment of a meal period premium when a meal
period is less than 29 minutes, missed, or taken later
than the fifth hour of work;

“• Meal Break Handwritten Timesheet Premium
Theory (Meal Break Handwritten Timekeeping
Premium Subclass): From October 31, 2012
through May 2015, Defendant failed to pay meal
break premiums when required when it used
handwritten timesheets either because employees
were not instructed on how to indicate on the
timesheet that a premium is due, or there was no
place on the timesheet to do so;

“• Failure to Provide Proper Coverage Theory
(Children’s Services Subclass): Throughout the
Class Period, Defendant failed to provide teachers
working in the Children’s Services division coverage
to release them from the employer’s control during
meal and rest breaks[.]”

Plaintiffs also sought to certify subclasses under section 203 for
waiting time penalties and section 226 for failure to provide
accurate wage statements.
Plaintiffs argued each subclass presented common
questions of law or fact that would predominate in the litigation.
With respect to the Meal Break Policy Subclass, plaintiffs argued
that VOALA’s meal period policy was facially invalid and liability

6
could therefore be established with common proof. Plaintiffs
alleged the policy unlawfully failed to “inform employees of when
to take a meal break, i.e., that it must be taken by the end of the
fifth hour of work.”
Plaintiffs asserted that employees felt “pressured” to take
late meal periods. In declarations and deposition testimony,
several former VOALA employees stated that they took short or
late meal breaks, or skipped them entirely, because they could
not otherwise complete their work or because management urged
them to complete their assignments without incurring overtime.
All declarants stated that VOALA did not pay them premiums for
noncompliant meal breaks.
Plaintiffs also contended that common questions existed as
to the Meal Break Electronic and Handwritten Timekeeping
Premium subclasses. Plaintiffs argued that NOVAtime caused
meal period violations because, per Ng’s testimony, the system
was set up to trigger the payment of premiums only “if an
employee ‘clocked out late after six hours for lunch, and if they
missed a lunch, and if the meal break is less than 29 minutes,’ ”
therefore failing to pay a premium for meal periods that were
between 29 and 30 minutes long. Plaintiffs argued that the
handwritten timesheets did not ensure employees were paid
premiums because VOALA did not include a category for
employees to report noncompliant meal periods on those
timesheets, or because VOALA included the “Lunch” category
without explaining its purpose.
Citing Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th 58, plaintiffs argued that
VOALA’s time records created a rebuttable presumption of meal

7
period violations that supported certification of the class.
Plaintiffs provided evidence that between approximately 23 and
26 percent of shifts reported in handwritten or electronic
timesheets reflected noncompliant meal periods, but premiums
were paid less than 11 percent of the time. A certified public
accountant analyzed time and payroll records that VOALA
produced during discovery. The accountant examined over
22,800 shifts worked by 63 employees between 2012 and 2018.
He found that, assuming no meal break waivers were in place,
over 5,700 shifts included noncompliant breaks. Assuming valid
waivers were in place, over 5,200 shifts still included
noncompliant meal breaks. According to the expert, payroll
records indicated VOALA only made 560 premium payments to
those employees in the same period.
The record also includes handwritten and electronic
timesheets and timecards reflecting meal period violations. Most
of the time records are from Smith and one other class declarant.
They reflect numerous shifts where the employees did not log
meal periods or reported late or short meal periods, with no
indication on the timesheet that a meal premium was due. The
record does not contain corresponding pay statements showing
that VOALA paid a premium for those noncompliant meal
periods.
Plaintiffs also contended that the Children’s Services
Subclass presented common questions. Specifically, plaintiffs
argued that VOALA did not ensure teachers could take compliant
meal or rest breaks without violating state regulations requiring
that more than one employee with supervisory responsibility over

8
the children be present in every classroom. Several former
employees in teaching positions submitted declarations stating
that they could not take fully compliant meal periods and rest
breaks because there were not enough staff to provide coverage
for their classrooms, particularly when parents picked their
children up late after the morning or afternoon sessions.
Plaintiffs also argued that the testimony of Felix Cruz, the
director of the Children’s Services division, established that no
location had enough staff authorized to supervise children to
ensure teachers could take their breaks.
In opposition to certification, VOALA contended the meal
period policy stated in its handbook fully complied with the law.
It further argued that its time records did not trigger a
rebuttable presumption under Donohue because wage statements
showed employees were automatically compensated for
noncompliant meal periods. VOALA also argued that the meal
period subclasses were not susceptible to common proof. It
produced wage statements reflecting that meal premiums were
paid to some of plaintiffs’ declarants at various times during their
employment. Some of the former employees who had submitted
declarations conceded in deposition testimony that they were not
pressured to take noncompliant breaks, or admitted they were
not aware that a code on their paychecks indicated VOALA had
paid them a premium for noncompliant breaks. Several
supervisors provided declarations directly disputing some
declarants’ claims that they were unable to take meal breaks.
With respect to the Meal Break Handwritten Timekeeping
Premium Subclass, VOALA noted that plaintiffs and declarants

9
had certified on their timesheets that they received timely, full
meal periods each shift. VOALA also contended the timesheets
allowed plaintiffs to report that a premium was due “by
accurately writing the correct clock-in and clock-out times on the
time sheets.” VOALA maintained that proving liability would
require individualized inquiries as to why employees did not take
their meal periods and why they did not report them on the
timesheets. VOALA submitted declarations from 24 current
employees stating they knew the meal period policy and were
never pressured to work during meal breaks or forgo them.
VOALA argued that the purported “common question” for
the Meal Break Electronic Timekeeping Premium Subclass—that
NOVAtime did not pay premiums for meal periods between 29
and 30 minutes—was based “on a deliberate twisting” of Ng’s
testimony. In a supporting declaration, Ng clarified he meant to
testify that VOALA paid meal premiums if the meal period “is 29
minutes or less,” which included any meal periods under 30
minutes.
Finally, VOALA argued that plaintiffs failed to proffer
evidence showing there was insufficient coverage causing meal or
rest break violations for teachers and teaching assistants in the
Children’s Services Subclass. VOALA contended Cruz’s
testimony showed that there were enough staff to relieve
employees in teaching positions for their breaks. VOALA also
submitted declarations from six current teachers attesting that
they take fully compliant meal and rest breaks during their
shifts.

10
Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court partially granted plaintiffs’ motion. First,
the court found that numerosity and ascertainability were
“assumed to exist” and it would not address the adequacy of the
class representatives because VOALA did not contest these
elements.
The court found commonality existed for the
Underpayment Subclass for only those non-exempt employees
whose records reflected rounding to their detriment. The court
redefined the subclass accordingly. For the Children’s Services
Subclass, the trial court found the staffing in each of VOALA’s 48
school locations was not “subject to generalized proof,” but there
was sufficient commonality as to those locations where the class
representatives worked. As to these redefined and limited
subclasses, the court found the claims of the class representatives
satisfied the typicality requirement, and the claims were
amenable to class treatment. The trial court also certified the
Wage Statement Subclass and the Waiting Time Subclass as
derivative of the redefined Underpayment Subclass and limited
Children’s Services Subclass.
The court found plaintiffs had not established commonality
for the other proposed subclasses. As to the Meal Break Policy
Subclass, the trial court explained:

“Merits are not the issue. The question is how much
individualized inquiry is needed to know if a given
class member suffered harm caused by the alleged
illegal policy, and, if so, how much harm. The policy,
standing alone, is not sufficient proof that harm was
suffered, i.e., that there is any basis for legal liability.

11
This analysis of liability on a class-wide basis for this
theory will require an individualized inquiry into why
each class member had . . . one or more meal breaks
taken late or for less than 30 uninterrupted minutes.
For this reason, commonality is lacking. (Brinker
Restaurant Co. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1004 [(Brinker)].) That a defendant in Allison v.
Dignity Health . . . , made a sufficient showing to
obtain decertification of a previously certified meal
and rest claims does not mean that this Defendant
needs to make exactly the same showing to defeat
class certification on the first pass, as here.[3]
Defendant did protect the right to raise an
affirmative defense with its Fifth Affirmative Defense
of waiver and estoppel. That it did not make an
affirmative showing with its factual submission that
some of its declarants knowingly took short or late
lunches as a voluntary act does not mean it would not
become part of the disputed proof if certification of
this subclass was allowed. The existence of
presumptions of violation flowing from short and
lunch punches on time cards does not foreclose a
defendant from defending a class claim with such an

3 During the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel distinguished
VOALA’s showing from that made by a defendant in Allison v.
Dignity Health, in which the First District concluded
decertification of a class was proper where the defendant
established that its defense against the plaintiffs’ meal period
violation claims would require too many individualized inquiries
to be amenable to class treatment. The California Supreme
Court has since depublished the decision. (Allison v. Dignity
Health (June 2, 2025) A169225, review den. and opn. ordered
nonpub. Oct. 15, 2025.)

12
individualized showing. As already noted, the cases
are now rather uniform in recognizing that the
particulars of why meal and lunch periods are missed
is more often than not a matter of individualized
proof.”

The trial court concluded that the Meal Break Electronic
Timekeeping Premium Subclass was “conceptually derivative of
the Meal Break Policy Subclass”; therefore, “the same lack of
commonality that prevents certification of the Meal Break Policy
Subclass prevents certification here.” The court found
commonality was lacking as to the Meal Break Handwritten
Timekeeping Premium Subclass for the same reasons. However,
the court additionally concluded that determining liability for the
subclass “would take [an] individualized inquiry into why an
employee who had taken a late or short meal break did not
[choose] to use the available space on the handwritten form to
seek the premium payment (a slightly different question from
whether the late or short meal break was due to the employee’s
own conscious choice).”
Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of mandate. This court
issued an alternative writ directing the trial court to vacate its
order and reconsider class certification in light of Donohue or to
show cause why a writ should not issue. The trial court declined
to vacate its order, and we issued an order to show cause.
VOALA timely filed a return to the petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class actions
“when the question is one of a common or general interest, of

13
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . .” A party
seeking class certification must show “[1] the existence of an
ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, [2] a well-defined
community of interest, and [3] substantial benefits from
certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the
alternatives.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) A
“community of interest” requires “ ‘ “(1) predominant common
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or
defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who
can adequately represent the class.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The certification question is “essentially a procedural one
that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually
meritorious.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 1023.) Courts instead assess whether common issues of law or
fact are likely to predominate in the determination of liability,
making the matter amenable to class treatment. (Id. at
pp. 1021–1022; Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004)
34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (Sav-On).) Additionally, “[i]n considering
whether a class action is a superior device for resolving a
controversy, the manageability of individual issues is just as
important as the existence of common questions uniting the
proposed class.” (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59
Cal.4th 1, 29 (Duran).) “[A] defense in which liability itself is
predicated on factual questions specific to individual claimants”
may make a class action unmanageable. (Id. at p. 30.)
Therefore, courts must also consider whether “litigation of

14
individual issues, including those arising from affirmative
defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently.” (Id. at p. 29.)
The question at the certification stage is “whether the
operative legal principles, as applied to the facts of the case,
render the claims susceptible of resolution on a common basis.”
(Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522,
530; Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1025.) “A trial court
is generally afforded great latitude in granting or denying class
certification, and we normally review a ruling on certification for
an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We do not apply this
deferential standard of review if the trial court has evaluated
class certification using improper criteria or an incorrect legal
analysis: ‘[A] trial court ruling supported by substantial evidence
generally will not be disturbed “unless (1) improper criteria were
used [citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made
. . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1286, 1297.)
“An appeal from an order denying class certification
presents an exception to customary appellate practice by which
we review only the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. If the
trial court failed to conduct the correct legal analysis in deciding
not to certify a class action, ‘ “an appellate court is required to
reverse an order denying class certification . . ., ‘even though
there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.’ ” ’
[Citation.] In short, we must ‘ “consider only the reasons cited by
the trial court for the denial, and ignore other reasons that might
support denial.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Alberts v. Aurora
Behavior Health Care (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 388, 399.)

15
II. The Trial Court Erred In Concluding VOALA’s Mere
Pleading of An Affirmative Defense Precluded A
Finding of Commonality
A. Employer’s meal period obligation
California law prohibits an employer from requiring non-
exempt employees to work “more than five hours per day without
providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30
minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the
employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be
waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee.”
(§ 512, subd. (a); Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage
order No. 4-2001, subd. (11)(A).) “[A]bsent waiver, section 512
requires a first meal period no later than the end of an
employee’s fifth hour of work . . . .” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 1041.)
“[A]n employer discharges its duty to provide an off-duty
break ‘if it relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control
over their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity
to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not impede
or discourage them from doing so.’ (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 1040.) When the employer does so, its knowledge that an
employee is working through a meal break establishes no
violation of the duty to pay premium wages, though the employer
must still compensate the employee for the time worked. (Id.
fn. 19.) In contrast, if the employer knows that meal breaks are
missed, shortened, or unduly delayed because the employer has
instructed the employee to work, or has otherwise impeded the
taking of breaks, that duty is contravened, absent a suitable

16
waiver or agreement by the employee.” (Safeway, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1155 (Safeway); see also
Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93,
106–107, 117 (Naranjo).)
“[T]he remedy for a violation of the statutory obligation to
provide IWC-mandated meal . . . periods is ‘one additional hour of
pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work
day that the meal . . . period is not provided.’ ” (Kirby v. Immoos
Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1256; § 226.7,
subd. (c).) “[E]ven a minor infringement of the meal period
triggers the premium pay obligation.” (Donohue, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 68.) “[T]he employee is ‘immediately’ entitled to
the premium wage, without any demand or claim to the
employer, in a manner ‘akin to an employee’s immediate
entitlement to payment of wages or for overtime.’ ” (Safeway,
supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155, quoting Murphy v. Kenneth
Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.) An
employer that fails to pay meal period premiums may incur
waiting time penalties and penalties for failing to provide
accurate itemized wage statements. (Naranjo, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 121; §§ 203, 226.)
B. Brinker and Donohue
“In the wage and hour context, a class may establish
commonality by showing a uniform policy or practice that causes
members to miss or take late meal breaks.” (Estrada v. Royalty
Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 721(Estrada),
review granted June 22, 2022, S274340, affd. on another ground
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 582.) Employers are required to record that

17
they provided timely, 30-minute meal periods to employees.
(IWC wage order No. 4-2001, subd. (7)(A)(3).) Our high court has
explained how courts should evaluate these records when
considering certification of a meal period claim.
In Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004, the court reviewed a
challenge to a trial court’s certification of a meal period subclass.
Although the trial court granted class certification, the Court of
Appeal issued writ relief and ordered decertification. (Id. at
p. 1017.) The high court reversed the Court of Appeal and
remanded for the trial court to reconsider its meal period
subclass certification based on the high court’s clarification of the
substantive law. (Id. at pp. 1034–1051.) As relevant here, while
the Brinker court concluded that an employer has an obligation to
provide duty-free 30-minute meal breaks, it also explained that
“the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure
no work thereafter is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and
the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations,
and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not
thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and
create liability for premium pay . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1040–1041.)
In a concurrence providing guidance on remand, Justice
Werdegar clarified that the court was not holding that “the
question why a meal period was missed renders meal period
claims categorically uncertifiable.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 1052 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Instead, Justice Werdegar
explained:

“If an employer’s records show no meal period for a
given shift over five hours, a rebuttable presumption

18
arises that the employee was not relieved of duty and
no meal period was provided. This is consistent with
the policy underlying the meal period recording
requirement, which was inserted in the IWC’s
various wage orders to permit enforcement.
[Citation.] An employer’s assertion that it did relieve
the employee of duty, but the employee waived the
opportunity to have a work-free break, is not an
element that a plaintiff must disprove as part of the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Rather, as the Court of
Appeal properly recognized, the assertion is an
affirmative defense, and thus the burden is on the
employer, as the party asserting waiver, to plead and
prove it.”

(Id. at p. 1053.) Justice Werdegar further explained that
individual issues arising from an affirmative defense do not
create a per se bar to certification, and “whether in a given case
affirmative defenses should lead a court to approve or reject
certification will hinge on the manageability of any individual
issues.” (Id. at p. 1054.)
Justice Werdegar further distinguished a defense to
liability involving “consideration of numerous intricately detailed
factual questions” from a defense to damages that “raises only
one or a few questions and that operates not to extinguish the
defendant’s liability but only to diminish the amount of a given
plaintiff’s recovery. We have long settled that individual
damages questions will rarely if ever stand as a bar to
certification.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1054 (conc. opn. of
Werdegar, J.).) Further, “[r]epresentative testimony, surveys,
and statistical analysis all are available as tools to render
manageable determinations of the extent of liability.” (Ibid.) In

19
light of those “settled principles,” Justice Werdegar concluded the
defendant had “not shown the defense it raises, waiver, would
render a certified class categorically unmanageable.” (Id. at
p. 1055.)
In Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th 58, the court adopted the
analysis set forth in Justice Werdegar’s Brinker concurrence. In
Donohue, the trial court certified a class of nurse recruiters who
sued their employer for wage-and-hour violations resulting from
improper rounding practices. (Id. at p. 63.) Both parties moved
for summary adjudication. (Id. at pp. 63–64.) The trial court
granted the employer’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s motion
after concluding there was insufficient evidence of meal period
violations. (Id. at pp. 64–65.) In affirming, the Court of Appeal
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that, at the summary
adjudication stage, time records showing noncompliant meal
periods gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of meal period
violations. (Id. at p. 65.)
The California Supreme Court reversed. After determining
that the employer’s rounding policy for meal periods was
unlawful, the court further concluded that the employer’s time
records showing missed, short, or delayed meal periods raised a
rebuttable presumption of liability. (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 74; see also id. at p. 76.) Adopting Justice Werdegar’s
concurrence “in full,” the court held that an employer’s assertion
that employees had voluntarily waived their meal periods is an
affirmative defense the employer has the burden to plead and
prove at the summary adjudication stage, “not just at the class
certification stage.” (Id. at pp. 75, 76.) The court explained:

20
“The rationale underlying the rebuttable
presumption supports these conclusions. The
presumption derives from an employer’s duty to
maintain accurate records of meal periods.
[Citations.] It is important that employers keep
accurate records so that enforcement agencies can
‘ “adequately investigate and enforce” a wage order’s
meal period provisions.’ [Citation.] Because time
records are required to be accurate, it makes sense to
apply a rebuttable presumption of liability when
records show noncompliant meal periods. If the
records are accurate, then the records reflect an
employer’s true liability; applying the presumption
would not adversely affect an employer that has
complied with meal period requirements and has
maintained accurate records. If the records are
incomplete or inaccurate—for example, the records do
not clearly indicate whether the employee chose to
work during meal periods despite bona fide relief
from duty—then the employer can offer evidence to
rebut the presumption. It is appropriate to place the
burden on the employer to plead and prove, as an
affirmative defense, that it genuinely relieved
employees from duty during meal periods.”

(Id. at p. 76, citing & quoting Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 1053 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)
The Donohue court remanded the matter to allow the
parties to present evidence as to whether there were records of
short or delayed meal periods for which no premium wages were
paid. (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 79.) The high court
explained that the introduction of such records would give rise to
a presumption of meal period violations, which the employer

21
could rebut “by presenting evidence that employees were
compensated for noncompliant meal periods or that they had in
fact been provided compliant meal periods during which they
chose to work.” (Id. at p. 77.) Although class certification was
not at issue in Donohue, the court further quoted the Brinker
concurrence’s analysis: “ ‘Representative testimony, surveys, and
statistical analysis,’ along with other types of evidence, ‘are
available as tools to render manageable determinations of the
extent of liability.’ (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1054 (conc.
opn. of Werdegar, J.).)” (Ibid.)
C. The trial court failed to consider the Donohue
burden-shifting framework
The trial court here acknowledged Donohue, but we agree
with plaintiffs that the court improperly failed to consider the
burden-shifting framework in assessing whether certification of
the meal break subclasses was appropriate. Plaintiffs argued
several uniform policies and practices caused VOALA to violate
the law regarding meal periods. They supported their
certification motion with evidence of those policies and practices.
The record contains time records reflecting short, late, or missed
meal periods, with no indication of premium pay. The trial court
appeared to accept that these theories and records were sufficient
to show the predominance of common questions and issues
susceptible of common proof. Yet, the court nevertheless
reasoned “[t]he policy, standing alone, is not sufficient proof . . .
that there is any basis for legal liability. This analysis of liability
on a class-wide basis for this theory will require an individualized
inquiry into why each class member had a [sic] one or more meal

22
breaks taken late or for less than 30 uninterrupted minutes. For
this reason, commonality is lacking.”
This reasoning was in direct conflict with our high court’s
guidance rejecting the proposition that “the question why a meal
period was missed renders meal period claims categorically
uncertifiable.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1052 (conc. opn.
of Werdegar, J.); Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 75.) Further,
“ ‘[a]n employer’s assertion that it did relieve the employee of
duty, but the employee waived the opportunity to have a work-
free break, is not an element that a plaintiff must disprove as
part of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.’ ” (Donohue, at p. 74.)
Notably, the trial court did not reject plaintiffs’ evidentiary
showing that VOALA’s time records showed late, missed, or short
meal periods, consistent with plaintiffs’ theories of uniform
unlawful meal period policies and practices. As such, under
Donohue, plaintiffs made at least a threshold showing that they
would be able to rely on a rebuttable presumption of liability.
VOALA would have the burden to prove waiver and, accordingly,
VOALA had the burden to demonstrate that proving that
affirmative defense would cause individual issues to predominate
in the litigation and would render class treatment
unmanageable. (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 723–724
[trial court erred in failing to apply Donohue presumption in
decertification proceedings; since plaintiffs presented time record
evidence, burden would have shifted to defendant to establish
waiver and “[i]t then follows that the burden would have been on
[defendant], not plaintiffs, to show individual issues
predominated”].)

23
The trial court did not assess whether VOALA had
established that its defense would require individualized proof or
to what extent any individual questions would predominate or
render a class proceeding unmanageable. Instead, the court
concluded that VOALA’s act of pleading waiver and estoppel in
its answer was enough. Indeed, the court expressly noted that
VOALA did “not make an affirmative showing with its factual
submission that some of its declarants knowingly took short or
late lunches as a voluntary act,” but reasoned that the failure to
make that showing “does not mean it would not become part of
the disputed proof if certification of this subclass was allowed.”
We disagree that pleading the affirmative defense without any
supporting evidentiary showing was enough to demonstrate a
lack of commonality or manageability.
The trial court correctly noted that the presumption did not
prevent VOALA from raising waiver as an affirmative defense.
(Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 38 [defendants must have
opportunity to present proof of affirmative defenses].) But the
pleading of the affirmative defense alone did not establish that
individual issues rendered class treatment inappropriate. As our
high court noted in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024)
15 Cal.5th 582, “class action defendants do ‘not have an
unfettered right to present individualized evidence in support of
a defense’ ” and “courts may exercise discretion regarding how to
adjudicate [affirmative] defenses, so long as the defendant is
permitted ‘to introduce its own evidence, both to challenge the
plaintiffs’ showing and to reduce overall damages.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 616.) The trial court was required to evaluate whether

24
VOALA had demonstrated its affirmative defense of waiver
presented individual questions that could not be fairly and
effectively managed as a class action. (Donohue, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 76; Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1055 (conc. opn.
of Werdegar, J.); see also Santillan v. Verizon Connect, Inc.
(S.D.Cal., June 13, 2022, No. 3:21-CV-1257-H-KSC) 2022 WL
4596574, p. *13 [defendant’s evidence in support of waiver was
common to class and did not raise individualized issues].)
By focusing only on VOALA’s bare pleading of a waiver
defense, without requiring any evidentiary support or specific
argument to support that defense, the trial court failed to
consider the Donohue court’s “explicit direction on issues of proof
in such cases.” (Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 362, 383 [trial court erred in accepting defense
argument on outside salesperson exemption in contravention of
guidance in Sav-On]; see, e.g., Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 338 [rejecting defense argument requiring certification
proponent in overtime cases to prove entire class is non-exempt
whenever defendant raises affirmative defense of exemption].)
We cannot determine with any reasonable certainty what
the trial court’s conclusion would have been had it conducted the
required analysis. Plaintiffs’ complaint, theories alleged,
declarations, and deposition testimony suggested their claims
would be amenable, in large part, to common proof, and that
common questions would predominate. VOALA’s evidence was
primarily intended to establish that its policies and practices
were lawful and that it uniformly made premium payments for
missed, late, or delayed meal breaks. This did not present

25
individual questions. The trial court did not find that VOALA’s
evidence established individual issues would predominate. And
the trial court suggested that VOALA did not offer any evidence
to support a defense that individual employees were provided
compliant meal breaks but they chose to work instead. There
were no declarations submitted to that effect. The pleading of
waiver as an affirmative defense alone is not substantial evidence
that there is no community of interest among class members.
To the extent VOALA argues Donohue should be
interpreted more narrowly to apply only to rounded time entries
reflected in electronic records, and not to claims of a facially
invalid meal period policy or time recorded in handwritten
records, we disagree. Nothing in the Donohue decision limited
the presumption in the manner VOALA suggests. Instead, it
described the presumption as “ ‘consistent with the policy
underlying the meal period recording requirement, which was
inserted in the IWC’s various wage orders to permit
enforcement.’ ” (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 74.) This
underlying policy applies irrespective of the reason why an
employer has failed to record or provide required meal periods.
VOALA further urges that we should not disturb the trial
court’s order denying certification of the Meal Break Electronic
Timekeeping Premium Subclass. It contends that plaintiffs
cannot present common proof that NOVAtime failed to pay a
premium for meal periods between 29:01 and 29:59 in duration
because NOVAtime records do not “track time down to the very
second.” VOALA misconstrues plaintiffs’ theory of liability.
Plaintiffs’ theory is that NOVAtime was programmed to

26
automatically pay premiums for meal periods less than 29
minutes, instead of less than 30 minutes. Records need not show
times recorded to the second to support this theory. Moreover,
the theory does not involve individual questions, but instead
concerns the operation of VOALA’s timekeeping system,
independent of individual behavior. Plaintiffs’ theory concerns
an unlawful policy, not questions of liability that would vary on
an individual basis.
In sum, on remand, the trial court must assess whether
any or all of the meal break subclasses are amenable to class
treatment, taking into consideration Donohue on the issue of
commonality. As the court has already appeared to conclude that
plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing established VOALA’s records
reflect meal breaks on a class-wide basis that were short, late, or
missed without premiums being paid, triggering the Donohue
presumption, the trial court must evaluate whether VOALA has
demonstrated through evidence and legal argument—and not
simply asserted—that the litigation of its affirmative defenses
will cause individual issues to predominate and would render a
class action unmanageable.
III. Substantial Evidence Supported The Trial Court’s
Ruling Limiting The Children’s Services Subclass To
Locations Where The Class Representatives Worked
The trial court certified a limited Children’s Services
Subclass that included only the locations where the putative class
representatives worked in teaching positions. The court
concluded that the theory alleging that understaffing at each of
VOALA’s 48 locations resulted in meal and rest period violations

27
was “not subject to generalized proof.” Plaintiffs argue the trial
court erred because Cruz’s deposition testimony was “common
proof” that staffing levels were insufficient to ensure that
teachers were afforded meal and rest periods at all VOALA sites.
We disagree.4
“Plaintiffs’ burden on moving for class certification . . . is
not merely to show that some common issues exist, but, rather, to
place substantial evidence in the record that common issues
predominate. . . . ‘[T]his means “each member must not be
required to individually litigate numerous and substantial
questions to determine his [or her] right to recover following the
class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, when
compared with those requiring separate adjudication, must be
sufficiently numerous and substantial to make the class action
advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.” ’
[Citation.]” (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29
Cal.4th 1096, 1108 (Lockheed).)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion
that plaintiffs’ understaffing theory could not be established with
common proof as to all VOALA locations. (Soderstedt v. CBIZ
Southern California, LLC (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 133, 144.) Cruz
testified that the number of classrooms, the number of

4 Plaintiffs’ proposed Children’s Services Subclass involved
meal and rest break claims. Plaintiffs do not contend that the
Donohue presumption of liability applies to claims regarding rest
breaks, which, unlike meal periods, employers have no obligation
to record. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. (7)(A)(3)
[“authorized rest periods need not be recorded”].)

28
supervisory staff, and the type of programming varied at each
site. For example, during the class period, the Children’s
Services program operated anywhere from 40 to 51 sites. Sites
had between one and six classrooms. VOALA policy required
more than one adult with supervisory responsibility over the
children to be present in each classroom at all times. Cruz
testified that to ensure they maintained mandatory staffing
ratios, other staff members with supervisory responsibility
provided coverage for teachers on breaks. Breaks were
“staggered” to ensure teachers received breaks and supervisory
ratios were met. Cruz identified over 20 positions that could
provide coverage for teachers, including supervisors, family
advocates, coaches, and aides. He testified that the program
currently employs 13 “education coordinators” and six “education
managers” for 48 locations, but he did not identify the total
number of employees in any other positions. Cruz also testified
that the specifics of each program—full-day with nap time or a
“double session” in which the children go home after lunch—
allowed for a lower staffing ratio and for breaks.
According to Cruz’s testimony, the Children’s Services
handbook stated that the workday was eight hours long and
employees would take a meal break and “an afternoon break.”
The human resources department trained Children’s Services
personnel “to ensure meal breaks and rest breaks are being met.”
Human resources notified the program if they noticed problems
with scheduling. Cruz testified that the corporate office oversaw
the human resources department. He had no oversight as the
program director.

29
Plaintiffs contend Cruz’s testimony established that
VOALA failed to hire sufficient staff to ensure teachers were
given the opportunity to take compliant meal and rest breaks.
Relying on the numbers Cruz provided, plaintiffs calculate that
“at a minimum there were 140 teachers” who needed “a total of
420” meal and rest breaks and only “150 other employees who
may or [may] not be on site and who have their own job duties
and responsibilities.” They assert that these numbers alone
demonstrate that VOALA could not have staffed each site
sufficiently to provide compliant meal and rest periods. This
argument, however, requires that the staffing numbers be
aggregated and applied across the 48 sites equally. The evidence
before the trial court was inconsistent with that approach.
Plaintiffs provided no evidence about how VOALA assigned
personnel among all locations, how many employees with
supervisory authority were present at any given location, or how
the program handled hiring or scheduling. Further, to the extent
that staffing led to meal and rest break violations, plaintiffs
offered no evidence that the violations were the result of uniform
policies or procedures. Cruz indicated that the availability of
staff varied widely between sites; not all supervisory staff were
continuously present at the school sites; and staff who created
the schedules were trained on meal and rest break requirements
by human resources. There was no showing that each site was
staffed, or understaffed, in the same manner or during the same
relevant periods. In the absence of evidence that “points to a
uniform, companywide policy,” VOALA’s liability for all 48 sites
would require highly individualized proof establishing where and

30
when each putative class member worked, what other staff
members with supervisory authority were present at the site at
the time the class members were working, how breaks were
staggered between them, and the type of program session in
effect during their shifts. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1052.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that
plaintiffs cannot prove their theory of liability for teachers’ meal
and rest break violations as to all 48 sites with common proof and
common questions would not predominate. (Lockheed, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 1108.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying only a limited subclass.

31
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part.
Respondent Los Angeles Superior Court is directed to vacate its
order denying certification as to the Meal Break Policy Subclass,
the Meal Break Electronic Timekeeping Premium Subclass, the
Meal Break Handwritten Timekeeping Premium Subclass, and
the derivative penalty subclasses. The trial court is further
directed to reconsider plaintiffs’ class certification motion as to
these subclasses, consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion. In all other respects, the petition is denied. Petitioners
are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, Acting P. J.

We concur:

HANASONO, J.

MORI, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

32

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.