People v. Orellano CA2/8

CourtListener 10846375Calctapp21.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Orellano CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B336507

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA442339)
v.

EDUARDO ORELLANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

**********
In December 2015, defendant and appellant Eduardo
Orellano and nine other members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang
(MS-13) were charged with numerous felonies arising from conduct
spanning two years. In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted
defendant of first degree murder, two counts of conspiracy to
commit murder, three counts of extortion, six narcotics offenses,
and found true gang and firearm allegations, as well as multiple
aggravating factors. The trial court sentenced defendant to
107 years to life, plus nine years.
Defendant challenges his conviction on numerous grounds.
First, he contends that all gang-related enhancements must be
reversed because the jury was not instructed on the organizational
nexus element of the gang enhancement under amended Penal
Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)1 as clarified in People v. Clark
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749 (Clark). Defendant also argues the court
failed to instruct the jury on attempted extortion as a lesser
included offense of extortion. In addition, defendant asserts the
court committed prejudicial evidentiary error by limiting his cross-
examination of a key prosecution witness, and by admitting gang
evidence during the trial on the substantive offenses. He also says
substantial evidence is lacking with respect to the gang
enhancements, the gang-related firearm enhancement, conspiracy
to commit murder (count 9), the extortion counts (counts 13–15),
and possession of methamphetamine for sale (count 22). Finally,
defendant says the minute order from the sentencing hearing and
the abstract of judgment must be modified to conform to the trial
court’s oral pronouncement of sentence.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
Because we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the omission of an instruction on the organizational nexus
element of the gang allegations did not contribute to the verdict
obtained, we reverse all gang enhancements under section 186.22,
subdivision (b), the gang-related firearm enhancement on count 1
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), and the gang-
related indeterminate sentence imposed on count 13 under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(C)(4). We remand for resentencing
and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm
the judgment of conviction in all other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
1. The charges
Defendant was charged with six felonies arising from events
that occurred outside a nightclub in September 2013: one count of
first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), four
counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a)(1), 664,
subd. (a); counts 2–5), and one count of shooting at an occupied
vehicle (§ 246; count 26). Count 1 concerned the fatal shooting of
Edwin Jurado outside the El Cafetal nightclub. The attempted
murder counts and shooting at an occupied vehicle count concerned
shots fired at four individuals who attempted to intervene in the
attack on Jurado.
The remaining charges against defendant arose from conduct
that took place over several months in 2015, including two counts of
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); counts 8 & 9),
attempted extortion (§ 524; count 10), conspiracy to commit
extortion (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 11), four counts of extortion
(§§ 518, 520; counts 12–15), two counts of selling/transporting
cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); counts 17 & 19),
three counts of selling/transporting methamphetamine (Health &

3
Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); counts 18, 20 & 21), and possession of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 22).
Two counts of conspiracy to commit murder included a plan to
kill a rival gang member in Lafayette Park on September 27, 2015
(count 8), and another plan to kill an 18th Street gang member
outside of a 7-Eleven store on September 28, 2015 (count 9). The
three counts of extortion and five of the narcotics offenses (counts
17–21) involved use of a confidential informant, Oscar L., making
controlled payments and drug purchases monitored by the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The remaining narcotics
offense (count 22) arose from events occurring at the time of
defendant’s arrest in December 2015. The prosecution elected not
to proceed on counts 10, 11 and 12, so we do not discuss them
further. Defendant was not named in counts 6, 7, 16, 23, 24 and 25.
The People alleged both gang and firearm use allegations.
A gang allegation was alleged as to counts 1 through 9 and 26
under section186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C)), and as to counts 10
through 15, and 17 through 22 under section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1)(A). Defendant was alleged to have personally used a firearm
in the commission of count 22 (§ 12022, subd. (c)). A principal was
alleged to have personally used and discharged a firearm during the
commission of counts 1 through 5 and 26. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)–
(e)(1).) The People also alleged seven aggravating factors. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)–(4), (a)(8) & (b)(1).)
None of defendant’s codefendants are parties to this appeal.
2. Jury trial on substantive offenses
Trial on the substantive offenses was bifurcated from the
gang-related allegations and the aggravating factors. We
summarize some of the material facts for context and detail
additional evidence, as necessary, in our discussion of the legal
issues below.

4
2.1 The events at the El Cafetal nightclub in 2013
Eduardo Serrano, a security guard at a restaurant and
nightclub called El Cafetal, described the events that occurred
shortly before closing on September 28, 2013. Serrano testified that
a fight broke out inside the club between Edwin Jurado and several
individuals he recognized as regulars at El Cafetal, including
defendant. Serrano asked the regulars to leave, and they did so.
On their way out, one of the regulars said, “they were gonna pop
him.” Serrano told Jurado to stay inside as the others left, hoping
to avoid further trouble. Jurado stayed at the El Cafetal about
45 minutes until Serrano and the rest of the staff were closing up
sometime around 2:00 a.m. Within a few minutes after Jurado left
the club, Serrano heard gunshots and went outside. Serrano saw a
commotion at the street corner and then two cars speeding away.
At that point, Serrano noticed someone lying in the street.
Four passersby in a car saw Jurado lying motionless on the
ground while being kicked and punched by multiple attackers.
They pulled over and one of the passengers, Cristian D., attempted
to intervene. However, they fled after shots were fired at them.
Cristian suffered a gunshot wound to his arm.
Dina P. and Carlos G. (aka Lil Husky) also testified to some of
the events surrounding the murder of Jurado.
In 2013, Dina was dating Luis Ramos whose gang moniker
was Pensativo. At that time, he was the shot caller for the Park
View clique of MS-13 in Los Angeles. Dina cooperated with the
police and testified about the Jurado murder in exchange for not
being charged as an accomplice. Dina feared MS-13. She had
family members who still lived in El Salvador, and Pensativo told
her those family members would face consequences if she talked
about what she knew. LAPD provided protection for Dina and
relocated her as part of her agreement to testify about the Jurado

5
murder. Carlos testified he had been a member of MS-13 in 2013
but then moved out of state and left the gang. He agreed to
cooperate with the LAPD about the Jurado murder, and eventually
pled to voluntary manslaughter in return for a 13-year sentence.
Both Dina and Carlos testified that after leaving El Cafetal,
everyone returned to an MS-13 hang-out called a “casita.” They
were angry about how things transpired at the club. Pensativo,
defendant, and other members of the gang said Jurado had
disrespected MS-13 and tried to start a fight. They suspected he
was associated with 18th Street. Defendant and the others all
insisted they had to go back to El Cafetal and teach the guy a
lesson. Defendant said something to the effect that things could not
be left that way. Defendant, Pensativo, Carlos, and another
member of the gang called Hyper went to get guns hidden in the
bathroom of the casita. Defendant grabbed one of the guns, but
Pensativo said it was Carlos’s “time to shine” and handed the gun to
Carlos, and another one to Hyper. Pensativo also took a gun for
himself.
Defendant, Pensativo, Dina, Carlos and several others drove
back to El Cafetal in multiple cars. They found Jurado alone
outside of the nightclub. Defendant and several others started
kicking and hitting Jurado, and then Pensativo and Hyper shot
him. After the shooting, they fled in their respective cars and
returned to the casita where they celebrated. Carlos testified that
everyone, including defendant, appeared happy. They were all
throwing gang signs, and saying the murder had been for “la
bestia,” meaning for the gang.
Shortly thereafter, Pensativo left Los Angeles and passed
control of the Park View clique to defendant. Carlos also left
Los Angeles after the murder because he was not comfortable with
the gang lifestyle.

6
In late 2013, Detective Carlos Camacho of the LAPD’s gang
homicide unit took over the investigation of the El Cafetal murder.
By early 2015, the El Cafetal murder remained unsolved. Detective
Camacho was contacted by Detective Frank Flores, who told him he
had a confidential informant named Oscar who was willing to work
with him regarding the MS-13 gang.
2.2 Informant Oscar L.
Oscar was a key witness for the prosecution on the extortion
and narcotics counts, as well as on the conspiracy to commit murder
charged in count 9.
Oscar grew up in El Salvador and was familiar with MS-13 as
an El Salvadoran gang. He believed they were violent and
routinely killed rivals such as members of the 18th Street gang,
which also had a presence in El Salvador. Oscar first came to the
United States in 2005 as an adult. He testified he was never a
member of any gang.
When Oscar arrived in Los Angeles, he settled in the
MacArthur Park neighborhood. He started illegally selling DVD’s
and other items on the street which led to his arrest, and brought
him into contact with Detective Flores. Oscar offered to work as an
informant for Detective Flores and did so for several years. In 2012,
Oscar went back to live in Central America for almost two years but
kept in contact with Detective Flores. He returned to the United
States in 2014.
In the fall of 2014, Oscar was approached by defendant and
another MS-13 gang member called Lil Lifer. Defendant identified
himself as Demon Killer and said he was the shot caller for the
Park View Locos. Oscar knew the Park View clique of MS-13 was
the gang that controlled his neighborhood, and he knew they were
demanding extortion payments from several of his friends.
Defendant told Oscar he had to pay money to the Park View clique

7
like his friends. Oscar did not argue and paid him the money that
day because he believed he would be killed if he did not.
Thereafter, the gang demanded $150 per week. Sometimes
defendant would call and say he was sending Lil Lifer to collect.
But most of the time defendant came to collect the money, and
usually did so in the company of another MS-13 gang member.
By March 2015, defendant was demanding $350 per week. Oscar
was scared of MS-13 and therefore always made the payments.
One time when he was late, defendant told him “I’m not going to be
talking to you anymore, you fagot [sic]. You know how things go,
you son of a bitch.”
Around this same time, defendant demanded that Oscar, who
had his own car, start driving defendant and other members of the
Park View clique around whenever they needed it. Oscar drove
defendant to meetings with other MS-13 gang members in places
like Las Vegas and Mendota in Fresno County. Oscar did not
refuse because defendant said they would kill him if he did not
agree.
In March 2015, Detective Flores put Oscar in touch with
Detective Camacho. Oscar signed an agreement with Detective
Camacho to act as his confidential informant. The contract did not
include any benefits or promise to pay Oscar. Oscar agreed to
report information about extortion payments, homicides, or other
activities of MS-13. Oscar was also required to consent to be
searched on demand and have his cell phone monitored by the
LAPD. Oscar worked with Detective Camacho until December 2015
when the arrests in this case were made.
Oscar testified that the violence in his country because of MS-
13 made him unhappy and angry, and even though he was scared
for his life, he wanted to help the LAPD in its investigation of MS-
13. He said “[i]t was a matter of principle.”

8
As part of his informant work, Oscar wore a hidden camera
and a recording device, and participated in controlled drug buys.
In June and July 2015, Oscar made multiple controlled buys of
methamphetamine and cocaine. The LAPD gave Oscar the money
for the purchases and after he completed those purchases, he
returned the drugs to the LAPD. Detective Camacho corroborated
that Oscar turned over the narcotics he purchased during the
controlled buys.
Oscar also made several extortion payments to defendant
while outfitted with the hidden camera and recording device. At
some point, the Department of Homeland Security became involved
in the investigation with the LAPD. Oscar testified he was given
money by the LAPD, and sometimes by the Department of
Homeland Security, and that he made controlled extortion
payments on July 24, 2015, August 7, 12 and 21, 2015, September
25, 2015, October 8 and 23, 2015, and November 3, 5 and 30, 2015.
In November 2015, Oscar was still receiving threats from
members of MS-13. On November 30, 2015, Oscar received the
following text: “You son of a bitch, you mother fucker, if you don’t
face us and pay the clique, this is the last time we’re going to talk to
you. Do you understand, you son of a bitch?” Oscar felt
“threatened” and “degraded.” Oscar made his last extortion
payment on December 8, 2015.
From spending time with defendant and other members of the
Park View clique, Oscar learned that a “destroyer” was “a safe place
to hide”—basically an apartment where MS-13 members could
safely hang out together. Oscar said defendant was in charge of the
destroyer on San Marino Avenue in Los Angeles. Oscar also
testified it was a “priority” of the Park View clique to kill 18th
Street gang members. He heard defendant say several times that

9
he wanted to kill rival gang members from 18th Street, Crazy
Riders, and Florencia.
Oscar also testified to the events of September 28, 2015 at a
7-Eleven store (count 9). Oscar was wearing a recording device at
the time which captured numerous statements by defendant. Video
footage from surveillance cameras also captured some of the events.
Oscar testified he had driven defendant, Jose Rodriguez (aka
El Effecaz), and Lil Daygo to a 7-Eleven store. Oscar believed they
were out looking for members of 18th Street. While they were
inside waiting to pay for some drinks, a man walked in with a
visible 18th Street tattoo on his arm. The man with the tattoo and
defendant both stared at each other in a “defiant” way, and Oscar
believed there was “going to be trouble.” Oscar said he knew he had
to “make a scene” inside the store that would cause the clerk to kick
them out and call the police, “otherwise, I was afraid they would kill
that person.”
Oscar started to verbally taunt the 18th Street gang member,
and defendant told him to calm down. Oscar understood defendant
told him to calm down because defendant did not want to do
anything inside the store in front of other people and possibly in
front of security cameras. Defendant wanted to wait to attack the
victim outside of the store where they were more likely to get away
with it. They returned to the car, and defendant and Rodriguez
retrieved weapons from the trunk. Before they could do anything,
the store clerk came outside and told them she had called the police.
While they drove away from the store, Oscar’s recording
device captured defendant scolding Oscar for making a scene inside
the 7-Eleven. Defendant could be heard telling Oscar that they did
not want to just beat up the victim, “We want to kill him. Don’t you
understand, asshole?” Oscar said defendant told him that if he had
just kept quiet inside the store, they could have killed the guy

10
outside. Oscar reported the incident to Detective Camacho a couple
of days later.
2.3 Other evidence
Officer Tomas Perez testified to his experience and knowledge
regarding the MS-13 gang in Los Angeles, their claimed territory,
and their customary gang symbols and signs, including use of devil
horns and references to “la bestia” which was a reference to the
gang. He explained the general structure of MS-13, with leadership
in Central America, and cliques in the United States, each with
their own hierarchy of control.
The Park View clique often socialized at apartments called
casitas. They referred to stash houses as “destroyers.” Carlos
corroborated this testimony, explaining that the Park View clique
used destroyers as safe places to store guns and narcotics. Carlos
also explained that the 18th Street gang was the main rival of MS-
13, but that if any rival gang member was found in MS-13 territory,
there would be “violence.” They were willing to kill over territory.
Officer Perez provided similar testimony about MS-13’s willingness
to use violence against rivals.
Detective Flores obtained authorizations to monitor various
phone numbers. The wiretap authorizations covered phones
belonging to defendant and several other MS-13 gang members.
In many of the calls, defendant discussed gang business with other
members and referred to himself by his moniker, Demon Killer.
Several of the recordings contained conversations discussing a
plan to murder a rival gang member in Lafayette Park on
September 27, 2015 (count 8). Defendant was told by a Park View
gang member known as Desconosido that a rival was trespassing in
Park View territory. Desconosido explained he was unarmed and
asked for permission to retrieve a gun (“let me borrow a piece”).
Defendant told him another gang member would meet him to give

11
him a gun. When Desconosido arrived at the meet-up location, he
saw police officers nearby and fled before collecting the gun.
Defendant was arrested in December 2015, after barricading
himself inside the clique’s destroyer located on San Marino Avenue.
Firearms, narcotics, and other items were located during the search
of the destroyer after defendant was detained.
3. Trial on the gang-related allegations and aggravating
factors
The prosecution presented certified records of conviction on
four different criminal cases as evidence of the predicate offenses by
MS-13 gang members. Detective Camacho attested to three of the
prior offenses. Case No. BA420990 involved a fatal shooting in
2013 by MS-13 gang members Edward Chevac, Wendy Villalta, and
Kelvin Velado. Velado and Chevac were convicted by a jury of first
degree murder with a gang enhancement in 2016. Villalta pled to
voluntary manslaughter. Case No. BA442339 involved an
attempted murder in June 2015 by MS-13 gang members Mauricio
Campos (aka Lil Daygo), Rodriguez (aka El Effecaz), and Miguel
Alfaro (aka Lil Bad). Campos was convicted by a jury of attempted
murder in 2023. Rodriguez and Alfaro pled to attempted murder.
The third predicate offense, case No. BA442339, involved a fatal
stabbing in September 2015 by three MS-13 gang members. One of
the three, Samantha Hernandez, was convicted of murder in 2018.
Detective Elliott Kane testified about the fourth predicate
offense, case No. BA410841. Like the first predicate offense, it also
involved Chevac, who committed an attempted murder with gang
members Jose Efrain Ruiz (aka Flash) and Moreno Ruben Alvarado
(aka Chele). All three were convicted of premeditated attempted
murder with a gang enhancement.
Officer Daniel Cardenas testified as the prosecution’s gang
expert. He summarized the gang signs, tattoos, and other symbols

12
commonly associated with MS-13, and the territory claimed by MS-
13 in Los Angeles, including MacArthur Park and Lafayette Park.
He stated his opinion that MS-13 sees all other Hispanic gangs as
rivals, but identified 18th Street and Crazy Riders as two main
rivals with nearby territory. Officer Cardenas described MS-13 as a
large organization with nationwide membership estimated at
30,000 to 50,000, with approximately 1,000 of those members in the
greater Los Angeles area. Between 2013 and 2015, the Park View
clique had approximately 30 to 50 active members. Most of the
main leaders of the gang are in Central America with cliques in the
United States generally run by shot callers. MS-13 controlled its
territory with violence. The gang’s primary activities included
murder, attempted murder, extortion, robbery, and narcotics sales.
Officer Cardenas said one of the main operational features of MS-13
was the use of violence against rivals. Officer Cardenas stated his
opinion, based on hypotheticals, that the charged crimes were
committed for MS-13’s benefit.
4. Verdict and sentencing
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder (count 1), two
counts of conspiracy to commit murder (counts 8 & 9), three counts
of extortion (counts 13–15), and six narcotics offenses (counts 17–
22). He was acquitted of the four counts of attempted murder
(counts 2–5) and shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 26).
As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that a
principal personally used and discharged a firearm within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (e)(1). As to
count 22, the jury found true the allegation that defendant
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense within
the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (c). The jury also found
true the gang allegation as to all counts. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)
& (C).) All aggravating factors were found true.

13
The court orally pronounced sentence on January 18, 2024,
sentencing defendant to 107 years to life, plus nine years,
calculated as follows: 25 years to life on count 1 (murder), plus a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)); a consecutive term of 25 years to
life on each of counts 8 and 9 (conspiracy to commit murder); a
consecutive term of seven years to life on count 13 (extortion); and a
consecutive two-year middle term on count 22 (possession for sale),
plus a consecutive three-year middle term for the gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)), and a consecutive four-year
middle term for the firearm use enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (c)).
The court stayed the gang enhancements on counts 1, 8, 9 and
13, as well as the firearm use enhancements under subdivisions (b)
and (c) of section 12022.53 on count 1. On each of counts 17
through 21, the court imposed a four-year middle term, plus a
three-year middle term for the gang enhancement. The court
ordered the terms on counts 17 through 21 to run concurrently to
count 22. In pronouncing sentence, the court did not mention
counts 14 and 15. The court awarded defendant 2,955 actual days
of presentence custody credits.
The minute order for the sentencing hearing and the abstract
of judgment reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.
However, both documents also include additional terms the court
did not orally impose: a seven-years-to-life indeterminate term on
each of counts 14 and 15 (extortion), concurrent to counts 1, 8, 9 and
13, with the gang enhancements stayed as to both counts 14 and 15.
This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION
1. The gang enhancements, the gang-related firearm
enhancement on count 1, and the gang-related
indeterminate term on count 13 must be reversed
Defendant contends the jury was not instructed on the
organizational nexus element of the gang enhancement as clarified
in Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th 743. Defendant says this instructional
error requires reversal of all the gang-related sentencing
enhancements. The People concede the jury was not instructed on
the organizational nexus element, but contend any instructional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explain,
we conclude the gang enhancements, the gang-related firearm
enhancement on count 1, and the gang-related indeterminate term
on count 13 must be reversed.
1.1 Assembly Bill No. 333
Clark acknowledged that the Legislature, in passing
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), expressed concern
that the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act (STEP Act) (§ 186.20 et seq.) had “strayed” from its original
purpose. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 760.) Assembly Bill
No. 333 therefore created various amendments to the STEP Act to
better “align with its original intent: to focus on the threats posed
by organized criminal street gangs.” (Id. at p. 761.) The
amendments to the statutory language were “made in service of the
Legislature’s broader goal of differentiating between the threat
posed by organized groups collectively engaged in criminal activity,
versus the threat posed by individual, loosely connected persons
who happen to commit crimes.” (Ibid.)
Assembly Bill No. 333 substantially narrowed the definition
of a criminal street gang and made numerous amendments to the
statutory language. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 752; People v.

15
Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738 (Cooper).) The specific
amendment relevant here concerns the definition of criminal gang
activity. Under the amended language, the prosecution must now
present evidence that the members of the gang “ ‘collectively
engage[d]’ ” in a pattern of criminal activity, as opposed to the
former language under which individual criminal action by
members was sufficient. (Clark, at p. 752; § 186.22, subd. (f).)
Clark interpreted this new language and held that collective
engagement in section 186.22 now requires evidence demonstrating
“a nexus between the individual predicate offenses and the gang as
an organized, collective enterprise. This organizational nexus
requirement is satisfied by showing a connection between the
predicate offenses and the organizational structure, primary
activities, or common goals and principles of the gang.” (Clark,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 749.) Clark emphasized that while the
evidence necessary to establish an organizational nexus might often
overlap with the evidence used to demonstrate how a predicate
offense commonly benefitted the gang, the inquiries were
nonetheless “conceptually distinct.” (Id. at p. 763.)
In response to Clark, CALCRIM No. 1401 was amended to
reflect this new element. It now includes the following language:
“As used here, members collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity when the crimes that make up the
pattern of criminal gang activity can be connected to the gang as a
whole. Collective engagement requires a connection between the
crimes and the gang’s organizational structure or manner of
governance, its primary activities, or its common goals and
principles.” (Ibid.)
1.2 Analysis
Defendant’s trial took place several months before the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Clark and before CALCRIM

16
No. 1401 was amended. The jury was therefore not instructed on
the organizational nexus element as interpreted in Clark, and the
People do not argue the pre-Clark instruction given below was
adequate.
When a jury instruction omits an element of an offense or
special allegation, it impermissibly lessens the prosecution’s burden
of proof and implicates the defendant’s federal due process rights.
(Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 742.) When such an instructional
error occurs, we assess prejudice under the federal harmless error
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (Cooper at
p. 742 [concluding Chapman applied in assessing prejudice where
instructions omitted new element of gang enhancement that
common benefit to gang must be more than reputational].)
In this context, our review under Chapman requires an
examination of the record in its totality. (People v. Mil (2012)
53 Cal.4th 400, 417.) If, at the end of that examination, we cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury verdict would have
been the same absent the error, the instructional error was not
harmless. (Ibid.) Put another way, the error was prejudicial if we
determine the “ ‘ “record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” ’ ”
(Ibid.; accord, Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743.)
Defendant argues there was limited testimony about the
predicate offenses and how they related, if at all, to MS-13 as a
criminal organization. He also contends that because he did not
have the benefit of the clarification provided by Clark at the time of
trial, he was denied the ability to tailor his defense and his cross-
examination of the prosecution witnesses on the organizational
nexus element, and to otherwise present evidence demonstrating
the nexus was absent. The People assert the instructional error
was harmless because there was strong evidence that two of the

17
predicate offenses had the requisite organizational connection since
they both concerned the killing of rivals to MS-13. They also note
the other two offenses involved attacks on individuals believed to
have some association or connection to rival gangs.
A review of the record reveals the testimony regarding the
factual underpinnings of each predicate offense was conclusory and
brief. The testimony of Detectives Camacho and Kane was focused
instead on setting forth the date of each offense, the individual
defendants involved, the date of conviction by trial or plea, and in
attesting to the certified records documenting those convictions.
The detectives were then asked just one question about the “general
circumstances” of the offense, to which they provided a one or two
sentence response.
As to case No. BA442339, Detective Camacho testified that
three MS-13 gang members were purportedly “hunting for rivals”
when they came upon the victim whom they believed was a member
of the rival 18th Street gang, and attacked him with a machete,
causing serious but nonfatal injuries. Case No. BA442339 involved
three MS-13 gang members fatally stabbing a victim, who had a
Florencia gang tattoo on his stomach, in Lafayette Park. Case
No. BA420990 involved a fatal shooting outside a known MS-13
casita. Detective Camacho explained the victim had been talking
about a cousin who was a member of the Playboys gang, and two
MS-13 gang members took the victim outside and shot him multiple
times. Detective Kane testified to the final predicate offense, case
No. BA410841. He said it also involved three MS-13 gang
members, all of whom were convicted of attempted murder, for the
nonfatal shooting of a 17-year-old female believed to associate with
members of the 18th Street gang.
The People correctly point out there was testimony, including
from Officer Cardenas, Carlos and Oscar, that attacking and even

18
killing rival gang members was one of the regular activities or goals
of MS-13, and that Clark explained such evidence may be used to
prove the requisite organizational nexus. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 762.) But Clark also explained the phrase collective
engagement “calls for an inquiry not just into how the predicate
offenses benefited the gang, but also how the gang works together
as a gang. It calls for a showing of a connection, or nexus, between
an offense committed by one or more gang members and the
organization as a whole.” (Ibid.)
Here, no other evidence was presented illuminating the
factual circumstances of the two predicate offenses against gang
rivals on which the People chiefly rely. There was no evidence any
of the predicate offenses was directed by a shot caller. Regarding
the killing in Lafayette Park, there is nothing in the record
dispelling the possibility it was undertaken on the spur of the
moment by the individual gang members involved solely due to a
personal grievance or perceived act of disrespect, as opposed to
crimes committed as part of MS-13’s collective criminal activities.
Combined with the lack of an instruction on the organizational
nexus element to focus the jury on consideration of that specific
issue, as is now required by the statutory language, we cannot
conclude the error here was harmless.
We do not suggest the scant evidence of an organizational
nexus was the result of any failings by either party. The evidence
was presented in a manner consistent with how predicate offenses
were proved up prior to Clark. Nevertheless, the lack of substantial
evidence connecting the predicate offenses to the larger structure
and activities of MS-13 as a whole is notable. Given the present
record, we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the lack of instruction on the organizational nexus element did not
contribute to the verdict obtained. Accordingly, we reverse the gang

19
enhancements and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 764.) In the event the
People choose to retry the gang allegations on remand, the People
are free to offer additional evidence in support of the gang
allegations. (Id. at pp. 764–765.)
Both the gang-related firearm enhancement imposed on
count 1 under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), and the
gang-related seven-years-to-life indeterminate term on count 13 are
contingent on a valid true finding on the gang allegations. (See
Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 746; § 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(C).) We
therefore must also reverse the firearm enhancement on count 1
and the sentence on count 13, and remand for resentencing.
2. Cross-examination of Oscar
Defendant next contends his constitutional rights to due
process and to confront the witnesses against him were violated by
the trial court’s rulings limiting his ability to cross-examine Oscar
regarding all the benefits he may have received working as an
informant, both on this case and in his previous work. Defendant
argues the trial court’s rulings were prejudicial, cloaking Oscar
with a level of credibility to which he was not due.
There is no question defendant had the right to cross-examine
Oscar about whether he had been offered inducements to testify,
expected benefits from giving his testimony, or otherwise had a
motive to lie. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455
(Pearson); see also Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f).) Exposing a
witness’s potential for bias and fabrication has long been recognized
as one of the most important functions of cross-examination.
(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678–679.)
However, it is equally true the trial court was vested with
broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on defendant’s
cross-examination without offending the constitution. (People v.

20
Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152; Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.) “ ‘ “Within the confines of the
confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in
restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial,
confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.” ’ ” (People v.
Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1292.) The Sixth Amendment
guarantees a defendant “an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, at p. 679.)
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in this context
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10 [discretion abused only where
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a “manifest miscarriage of justice”].) Moreover, as
a general rule, the application of “ ‘ “the ordinary rules of evidence
do not impermissibly infringe on [a defendant’s] right to present a
defense.” ’ ” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620.)
In order to establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion that
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, defendant
was required to affirmatively show the trial court’s order limiting or
precluding cross-examination left the jury with “ ‘a significantly
different impression’ ” of Oscar’s credibility. (Pearson, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 455, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra,
475 U.S. at p. 680.) Otherwise, “ ‘ “the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” ’ ”
(Pearson, at pp. 455–456; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2021)
12 Cal.5th 367, 406.) We conclude defendant has not shown any of
the challenged rulings constituted an abuse of discretion or a
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

21
2.1 Questions about immigration benefits
Defendant’s main contention is that he was precluded from
asking Oscar whether he was legally in the United States, and
whether he was promised or expected favorable immigration
benefits as a result of assisting the LAPD as a confidential
informant.
In response to Oscar’s denials about receiving any money or
benefits from the LAPD, defense counsel asked, “So you were
willing to risk your life to assist them in investigations for nothing?”
Oscar responded, in relevant part, that he had been “waiting for
this moment” to testify in court. “I can explain to you the benefits
that I have received as a result of this operation. May I explain
that to you, sir?”
The court interrupted and told defense counsel to ask the
questions. Counsel asked, “What benefits have you received?”
Oscar began to respond with a statement that he believed the police
in the United States knew how to properly investigate gangs.
The court told counsel to “ask another question.”
Defense counsel did not rephrase but switched to another line
of questioning focused on Oscar’s sources of income. During this
colloquy, Oscar mentioned returning to Central America for a
couple of years and then coming back to the United States. Defense
counsel asked Oscar if he was in the United States legally. The
court told counsel to move on to another subject and they would
discuss that issue at the end of the day.
Later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel
conceded that asking about a witness’s immigration status is
normally not an appropriate question but that it was appropriate in
this case, because if Oscar was able to avoid deportation by helping
the police, that would be a powerful motivation for him to lie or
fabricate his testimony. Defense counsel offered only his theory

22
that Oscar received some sort of immigration benefit for his work.
The prosecutor responded it was not an appropriate line of
questioning because there was no evidence of any agreement
regarding immigration benefits. The prosecutor pointed out the
only evidence was that Oscar had signed an agreement with the
LAPD to be an informant that promised him nothing.
The court ruled defendant could not ask about Oscar’s
immigration status. Citing Evidence Code section 352, the court
explained there was no evidence of any agreement that Oscar had
with any entity that he would not be deported if he agreed to act as
a confidential informant, and he had repeatedly denied receiving
any benefits from the LAPD for agreeing to be an informant. The
court also noted that Oscar was working for the LAPD, and it had
no authority to deport Oscar or to promise him immigration
benefits.
Defendant says the court’s ruling constituted an abuse of its
discretion, relying on People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 1260 (Castaneda-Prado). There, the defendant
sought to question a victim about whether she was “ ‘pursuing
immigration relief’ ” based on her accusations of sexual abuse. (Id.
at p. 1271.) At the preliminary hearing, the victim was asked about
a declaration she filed in support of a restraining order against the
defendant. The victim testified she was a citizen but that she filed
the declaration because she hoped it would help her mother obtain
a U visa. (Id. at pp. 1271–1272, 1286.) A U visa is a type of
temporary visa available to a narrow class of noncitizen victims of
certain qualifying crimes to enable them to assist law enforcement
in investigating or prosecuting that crime. (See generally Hyoun
Kyung Lee v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 973, 974; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i).) During her testimony at the preliminary
hearing, the victim denied she fabricated any allegations against

23
the defendant in order to help her mother obtain the visa.
(Castaneda-Prado, at p. 1272.)
In concluding the trial court abused its discretion by
precluding the defendant from cross-examining the victim on this
point, Castaneda-Prado emphasized the victim had “admitted” in
prior testimony that she provided the declaration in the hope it
would help her mother get the visa. (Castaneda-Prado, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.) “Nothing else was necessary to provide
a good faith basis to cross-examine on the issue at trial.” (Ibid.)
The court also explained that because there was no physical
evidence of abuse, the prosecution’s case turned “almost entirely” on
the victim’s credibility. (Id. at p. 1287.)
The circumstances here are not similar. Despite defendant’s
assertion to the contrary, Oscar did not fail to answer the questions
posed to him about the benefits received. The record shows that
Oscar responded several times, both on direct and during cross-
examination, that he did not receive any money or benefits from the
LAPD for being a confidential informant. This fact was
corroborated by Detective Camacho and Detective Flores. Oscar
also denied receiving any inducements or benefits from the District
Attorney’s Office for testifying in court.
Oscar admitted the one benefit he did receive was the
payment of $25,000 from the Department of Homeland Security in
early 2016 after his work was completed. He otherwise consistently
testified he did not receive any other benefits and that helping the
LAPD investigate MS-13 was a matter of principle to him. Nothing
in his testimony suggested he was hoping to receive immigration
benefits in consideration for acting as a confidential informant.
Moreover, unlike Castaneda-Prado, while Oscar was an important
witness for the prosecution on several of the counts, there was

24
substantial corroboration of his testimony and significant evidence
offered through other witnesses.
Defendant has not shown the court’s exercise of discretion on
this issue was arbitrary and capricious. However, even assuming
solely for the sake of argument that the court should have allowed
some questioning of Oscar as to whether he expected or was
promised immigration benefits for his informant work, defendant
has not shown prejudice.
Defendant argues the court’s ruling limiting his cross-
examination was prejudicial because Oscar offered purportedly
“damning” testimony that killing rivals, particularly 18th Street
gang members, was a priority for MS-13. Defendant’s argument
would be more compelling if Oscar had been the only witness who
testified about the Park View clique’s use of violence against rivals.
But Oscar’s testimony in this regard was corroborated by multiple
witnesses, including Carlos, Dina, and Officer Perez. Much of what
Oscar attested to was also captured on recording devices he wore as
a confidential informant, including defendant’s own words about
wanting to kill the 18th Street gang member at the 7-Eleven store.
In addition, defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine
Oscar on the $25,000 payment he admittedly received and to
otherwise attempt to call into question the credibility of his
testimony that he acted as an informant without the promise of any
other benefits—a point counsel developed at length during closing
argument. Oscar was also questioned about his prior conviction for
illegally selling items on the street, and defendant obtained a
stipulation from the prosecutor regarding Oscar’s complete criminal
record, including a then-pending felony case for being a felon in
possession of a firearm and domestic abuse. Given this evidence,
we are not persuaded a reasonable jury would have formed a
significantly different impression of Oscar’s credibility had

25
defendant been able to ask him questions about the possibility he
was promised immigration benefits for working as an informant.
2.2 Questions about informant work on other cases
Defendant also contends the court improperly sustained
objections to questions about Oscar’s prior informant work on other
cases with Detective Flores.
Oscar testified at some length about his work with Detective
Flores. He admitted he initiated the conversation with Detective
Flores, sometime in 2008, asking about getting a “job” as an
informant. He said his work with Detective Flores involved other
gangs and included testifying in court about a homicide. Oscar said
he was not promised or given benefits for any of this work. Oscar
further explained that after he started working with Detective
Flores, and because of the testimony he had given in court, he could
no longer be seen in MacArthur Park as it was too dangerous.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Oscar: “So you
were an informant in other cases, and people on the street were
aware of that?” The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds.
The court sustained the objection, noting the question also called for
speculation. Defense counsel’s question was poorly phrased, and we
find no error in the court’s ruling. Defense counsel did not follow up
with a rephrased question.
Instead, defense counsel moved on to a line of questions
regarding how Oscar earned his income, apparently attempting to
elicit how he was able to make the large, weekly extortion payments
if he was not receiving money from the LAPD or the Department of
Homeland Security, and he was also no longer selling things in
MacArthur Park. Oscar responded that he worked as a gardener
and a day laborer; he lived alone and did not have a family to
support. Oscar conceded that before 2012, while he was still
involved in selling false identification documents, the LAPD did not

26
arrest him for selling those documents, nor did the LAPD confiscate
any of the money he received from those sales. Other than the one
objection noted above, defendant points to no other ruling by the
trial court limiting his ability to cross-examine Oscar about these
issues.
2.3 Questions about selling drugs
Defendant concedes in his reply brief the court did not
preclude cross-examination on this subject but only sustained an
objection as to the form of one question on this topic.
3. Admission of gang evidence on substantive offenses
Defendant argues his constitutional rights were also violated
by the admission of prejudicial gang evidence during trial of the
substantive offenses. We review the trial court’s ruling on this
evidence under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
(People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 (McKinnon).)
We are not persuaded there was any abuse in the admission of this
evidence.
When trial of a gang allegation is bifurcated from the trial of
the substantive offense, the prosecution nonetheless retains the
right “to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and
activity if it is relevant to the charged offense.” (People v. Chhoun
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.) It is well-settled that evidence of a
“ ‘defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying
force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged
crime.’ ” (Ibid.)
After ordering the gang allegations bifurcated under
section 1109, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to
present gang evidence during the trial of the substantive offenses,

27
including on the issues of motive and intent. In allowing such
evidence, it was incumbent on the trial court to scrutinize the
proffered evidence before admitting it because of its tendency to be
inflammatory. (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655.) However,
it is well-settled that evidence relating to motive is generally
admissible. “ ‘ “[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for
criminal behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its
prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting
evidence of its existence.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
The trial court acted well within its discretion in admitting
the gang evidence here as it was relevant to motive for all of the
charged offenses. It was also relevant on additional grounds.
For instance, the testimony and evidence regarding gang territory,
MS-13’s use of gang symbols related to the devil and the phrase
“la bestia,” and the gang’s propensity for violence against gang
rivals was relevant to proving intent for the Jurado murder and the
two counts of conspiracy to commit murder (counts 8 & 9). The
wiretap evidence, which included phone calls between defendant
and other gang members referencing gang business and uncharged
offenses, was relevant to establish defendant’s leadership role in the
Park View clique. Defendant’s status in the gang as a shot caller
was relevant, at a minimum, to establishing his guilt under aiding
and abetting and conspiracy theories on those counts as to which he
was not the direct perpetrator. That same evidence, along with the
testimony regarding the gang’s maintenance of stash houses known
as casitas and destroyers, was relevant to establishing defendant’s
control and possession of one of the destroyers in proving count 22.
While the court allowed the prosecution to present a
significant amount of gang evidence through multiple witnesses, it
also imposed limitations and precluded some of the testimony and
evidence proffered by the prosecution as cumulative, including a

28
number of the wiretap calls discussing uncharged offenses.
Furthermore, the court instructed with CALCRIM No. 1403 which
told the jury, in relevant part, it could consider the gang evidence
only for limited purposes, including whether defendant “acted with
the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are required to prove the
crimes charged; [¶] . . . [¶] [whether defendant] had a motive to
commit the crimes charged” and to assess the credibility of
witnesses. The instruction also told the jury it “may not consider
this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from
this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that
he has a disposition to commit crime.” We presume, absent
evidence to the contrary, that jurors understand and follow the trial
court’s instructions on the law. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th
619, 662.)
Defendant briefly argues in the alternative that if we
conclude there was no abuse of discretion, then we should find his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The trial court
properly admitted the gang evidence. Defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to assert futile objections that would have
been properly overruled.
4. Failure to instruct on attempted extortion
Defendant contends the trial court committed instructional
error by failing to sua sponte instruct on attempted extortion as a
lesser included offense of extortion in counts 13, 14 and 15. Our
review is de novo. (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 295
(Wilson).) We conclude any instructional error was harmless.
The trial court in a criminal case has a sua sponte duty to
instruct “on all lesser included offenses the evidence warrants, even
against the defense’s wishes. Such instructions are required when,
but only when, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant
committed the lesser offense but not the greater one.” (People v.

29
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 98; accord, Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 295.) Instruction on a lesser included offense is necessary
“ ‘ “ ‘when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the
elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not
when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that
charged.’ ” ’ ” (Wilson, at p. 295, quoting People v. Valdez (2004)
32 Cal.4th 73, 115.) Weak or purely speculative evidence does not
suffice. (People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 116.) Put another
way, there must be credible evidence “ ‘from which a jury composed
of reasonable persons could conclude “that the lesser offense, but
not the greater, was committed.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
To prove extortion, the prosecution was required to establish
that defendant threatened to injure or use force against Oscar, with
the specific intent of obtaining Oscar’s consent to pay defendant
money, and that, as a result of defendant’s threat or use of force,
Oscar consented to and did give the money to defendant. (§ 518; see
also CALCRIM No. 1830.) Attempted extortion consists of the
specific intent to commit extortion, and a direct but ineffectual act
done toward its commission. (§ 21a.)
The People contend the evidence at trial established only
completed acts of extortion because as to each charged act, Oscar
paid the money to defendant. They say, therefore, there was no
factual basis to instruct on attempted extortion. But “ ‘[a]
defendant can be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even
though the crime, in fact, was completed.’ ” (People v. Hubbard
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 555, 568, quoting People v. Rundle (2008)
43 Cal.4th 76, 138, fn. 28, disapproved in part on another ground in
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; see also § 663 [a
“person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although
it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was
perpetrated”].)

30
Defendant does not contest the fact that Oscar paid the
money in each of the charged counts of extortion. Rather,
defendant argues there was substantial evidence Oscar made those
payments willingly and voluntarily as part of his undercover
informant work for the LAPD, and not out of any fear of defendant.
Defendant says that because there was evidence his threats to
Oscar were not the controlling reason Oscar consented to pay, the
court was required to instruct on attempted extortion.
Our supreme court has long held that in order to constitute
extortion, “the wrongful use of fear must be the operating cause
which produces the consent. . . . ‘If some other cause were the
primary and controlling one in inducing the consent, then there
would be no extortion.’ ” (People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 88,
quoting People v. Williams (1899) 127 Cal. 212; accord, People v.
Bollaert (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 699, 725; see also People v.
Goodman (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61.) Consistent with this well-
settled law, CALCRIM No. 1830 includes the following language:
“The term consent has a special meaning here. Consent for
extortion can be coerced or unwilling, as long as it is given as a
result of the wrongful use of force or fear. [¶] The [threat] must be
the controlling reason that the other person consented. If the
person consented because of some other controlling reason, the
defendant is not guilty of extortion.” (Italics added.)
Oscar testified about numerous extortion payments he made
on his own before he became a confidential informant for Detective
Camacho, and that he made those payments out of fear he would be
killed if he did not do so. However, the charged acts of extortion in
counts 13, 14 and 15 were all based on controlled payments Oscar
made after he began his work with Detective Camacho. Count 13
was based on a payment made by Oscar to defendant on July 24,
2015. Counts 14 and 15 concerned payments on November 15,

31
2015, and November 30, 2015, respectively. Oscar testified that
those three payments, as well as several others, were made while
he was wearing a recording device and being monitored by the
LAPD. The payments were made with money given to him by the
LAPD, and sometimes by the Department of Homeland Security.
There was extensive testimony that Oscar feared defendant
and members of MS-13 generally. But Oscar also testified that
while he feared for his life, he nevertheless wanted to help the
LAPD in its investigation of MS-13 “as a matter of principle.” He
explained that he grew up in El Salvador well aware of the violent
conduct engaged in by MS-13, and those experiences made him
unhappy and angry. He said several times during his testimony
that he was willing to work as an informant for the LAPD for free
because he wanted to help the LAPD, and that no one is entitled to
take the life of another.
Even if we assume instructional error, we see no prejudice.
We assess prejudice arising from the failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense in a noncapital case under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260;
accord, Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165; People v. Banks
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161 (Banks); see also Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.) We do not reverse unless examination of the record
demonstrates a reasonable probability the instructional error
affected the outcome. (Breverman, at p. 165; Watson, at p. 836.)
Moreover, “evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a
lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence
sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome
had the instruction been given.” (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
p. 1161, italics added; accord, People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th
907, 929; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) Where the
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict of guilt is so relatively strong,

32
“and the evidence supporting a different outcome [is] so
comparatively weak . . . there is no reasonable probability that the
claimed error affected the result.” (Beames, at p. 929.)
While Oscar attested to his willingness and desire to work
with the LAPD in its investigation of MS-13, he also consistently
testified to his fear of the gang, based on his experiences both in
this country and in El Salvador. He stated more than once that he
believed he was at risk of being killed if he did not comply with
defendant’s demands. When extortion payments were made, Oscar
was usually outnumbered as defendant ordinarily was accompanied
by another member of the Park View clique. Despite regularly
making payments on a weekly basis and driving the clique around
on demand, Oscar testified to still receiving regular threats from
defendant or other MS-13 gang members as late as November 30,
2015. Oscar said he felt “threatened” and “degraded” when those
threats were made. Oscar said he remained fearful of MS-13
because of his testimony and believed he was a target and could be
killed.
Considering Oscar’s testimony in its entirety, there is nothing
indicating his fear of defendant and the Park View clique waned
simply because he was willing to assist the LAPD and agreed to act
as a confidential informant. There were no questions specifically
directed to Oscar asking him whether his fear of defendant was
eclipsed by the fact he wanted to help the LAPD in its investigation
of MS-13. In the absence of testimony on that specific point, we
consider the existing record as a whole. We conclude it contains
strong, substantial evidence that Oscar feared defendant and that it
was the primary, even if not the only, motivation for him acceding
to defendant’s demands and whims. The jury was correctly
instructed with CALCRIM No. 1830 and concluded that defendant’s
threats were the controlling reason Oscar made the extortion

33
payments, notwithstanding his testimony about willingly working
as an informant. We therefore conclude that any instructional error
was harmless. Even if the attempted extortion instruction had been
given, there is no reasonable probability defendant would have
obtained a different outcome.
5. Substantial evidence
Defendant contends that substantial evidence does not
support the true findings on the gang enhancements, the gang-
related firearm enhancement, or his convictions for extortion
(counts 13–15), for conspiracy to commit murder (count 9), and for
possession of methamphetamine for sale (count 22). When asked to
assess whether substantial evidence supports a conviction, we
review the evidentiary record according to the familiar standard.
(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) In conducting our review,
we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence, whether direct
or circumstantial. (Id. at pp. 57–58.) We do not resolve evidentiary
conflicts or credibility issues. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 (Young).) Applying this standard, we reject defendant’s
substantial evidence claims.
5.1 Extortion
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that
Oscar made the extortion payments as a result of threats by
defendant. As we explained in part 4 of the Discussion above, there
was substantial evidence Oscar feared defendant and his many
threats. Oscar’s testimony was ample evidence in support of all
three counts of extortion. “The uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Romero
(2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 386; accord, Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1181.) There was nothing physically impossible or inherently

34
improbable about Oscar’s testimony. Moreover, his testimony was
corroborated in large part by Detective Camacho who attested to
the payments made by Oscar while wearing a recording device and
being monitored by the LAPD.
5.2 Conspiracy to commit murder (count 9)
Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence he harbored a
specific intent to kill, which is required for conspiracy to commit
murder. (People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1228.) Defendant
says the recording device Oscar wore during the encounter at the 7-
Eleven store on December 28, 2015, negates Oscar’s testimony that
defendant planned on killing the 18th Street gang member. We are
not persuaded.
Oscar’s testimony as to how the events at the 7-Eleven store
unfolded was largely corroborated by the video surveillance footage
and the audiotape of the recording device Oscar was wearing at the
time. Defendant told Oscar he should not have made a scene inside
the store, because he wanted the victim to come outside: “[I]f he
had come out, he would have been fucked because [¶] . . . [¶] I was
going to stab him there.” A reasonable jury could conclude that
defendant’s own words demonstrated the requisite intent to kill.
Defendant asks us to reweigh the evidence and inferences accepted
by the jury, which we decline to do. Assessing the credibility of the
witnesses and reasonable inferences from the evidence falls within
the exclusive province of the jury. (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1181.)
5.3 Possession for sale (count 22)
Defendant argues an essential element of possession for sale
is lacking. He says there is no substantial evidence he knew that
firearms and drugs were in the San Marino destroyer. We disagree.
There was testimony from multiple witnesses that in
December 2015, defendant was the shot caller of the Park View

35
clique who was in control of the San Marino “destroyer.”
Furthermore, Carlos testified that drugs and guns were hidden at
casitas and destroyers, and Oscar testified he made multiple
purchases of methamphetamine from defendant, including at least
one purchase from that destroyer. There was also testimony that
on December 15, 2015, when the LAPD arrived at the San Marino
destroyer with an arrest warrant, defendant barricaded himself
inside until the LAPD shot gas cannisters inside in an attempt to
end the standoff. Detective Camacho testified he saw defendant
flee the destroyer after the gas cannisters were deployed. Shortly
thereafter, LAPD officers searched the destroyer and discovered
several firearms, ammunition, marijuana, and methamphetamine,
in addition to other items like empty plastic baggies and a digital
scale.
This evidence constitutes substantial evidence supporting the
jury’s finding of defendant’s guilt on count 22. We uphold a
conviction against a substantial evidence challenge “ ‘unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
5.4 The gang-related allegations
Finally, in light of our decision to reverse the gang
enhancements and the gang-related firearm enhancement as
explained in part 1 of the Discussion above, we need not discuss
defendant’s substantial evidence argument as to these
enhancements.
6. Sentencing error
The record reflects the trial court failed to impose sentence on
counts 14 and 15, two of the extortion counts on which the jury
found defendant guilty. As defendant concedes in his reply brief,
the appropriate course of action in such circumstances is a remand

36
“for the purpose of pronouncement of a judgment in accordance with
the verdict.” (People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353.)
In light of the reversal of all gang enhancements, the gang-
related firearm enhancement on count 1 and the gang-related
indeterminate term on count 13, the superior court, on remand,
shall conduct a full resentencing at which it may consider all of its
sentencing choices anew.
DISPOSITION
The true findings on all of the gang allegations and the
sentence enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 186.22,
subdivision (b) are reversed. The true finding and the gang-related
firearm use enhancement imposed under Penal Code section
12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) on count 1 are reversed. The
gang-related determinate term imposed on count 13 under Penal
Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C) is reversed. On remand,
the superior court shall conduct a new sentencing hearing at which
it may reconsider all of its sentencing choices anew.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed in all other respects.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.

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