People v. Seward CA3

CourtListener 10846340Calctapp21.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/21/26 P. v. Seward CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE, C103243
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No.
v. STKCRFECOD20160016388)

CORNELL SEWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Cornell Seward appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The trial court concluded Seward’s admission to a
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement made him ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. Seward contends on appeal that the trial court erred because his record of
conviction did not establish that he could be convicted of attempted murder under the
current law. The People concede the record does not establish that Seward is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. We reverse the order denying Seward’s petition and remand
for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings
consistent with section 1172.6.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
BACKGROUND
In October 2016, a shooting incident between rival gangs resulted in multiple
individuals being shot and wounded. (People v. Seward (Feb. 7, 2020, C088094)
[nonpub. opn.].)2 A witness reported hearing about 40 shots being fired. From a photo
lineup, the same witness identified Seward as one of the individuals holding a handgun.
A few months later, the People charged Seward and his codefendant, Jesse Corral,
with 33 counts and numerous special allegations in connection with the incident. The 33
counts included three counts of attempted premeditated murder and several section
12022.53, subdivision (d) gun enhancements that were filed only against Seward. The
People also alleged this would be Seward’s third strike under the “Three Strikes” law.
Seward pled no contest to seven counts, including two counts of attempted “non-
premeditated” murder. The parties stipulated to the police reports as the factual basis for
the plea.
In connection with the two attempted murder counts, Seward admitted two
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancements. During the plea colloquy, the trial court
asked Seward if he admitted that “in the commission of Count 25 you intentionally and
personally discharged a firearm, a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.5.” Seward stated, “I admit.” The court corrected itself, “I’m sorry,
[section ]12022.53[, subdivision] (b). Do you admit that?” Seward responded, “Yes,
sir.”
As to count 26, the court stated, “And do you further admit that in the commission
of that charge by way of amendment you intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53[, subdivision] (b), as in
‘boy’ ….” Seward responded, “Yes sir.”

2 On the court’s own motion, we incorporate by reference our unpublished opinion in
Seward’s prior appeal, People v. Seward, supra, C088094.

2
Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Seward
to an aggregate term of 20 years in prison.
On January 23, 2023, Seward filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. Seward asserted (1) the complaint that was filed
against him allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder that included
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2) that he was
convicted of attempted murder pursuant to a plea agreement, and (3) that based on the
changes made to sections 188 and 189, he “could not presently be convicted” of
attempted murder under current law. He asked the court to appoint counsel to represent
him, which it did.
The People filed a response, arguing that Seward failed to establish a prima facie
case for relief because his record of conviction showed he was prosecuted as a “direct
perpetrator.” Specifically, Seward was charged “as the actual perpetrator … of willful,
deliberate, premeditated attempted murder with a firearm enhancement” that alleged he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury. The other
charges against him also indicate he was prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of attempted
murder. Moreover, Seward also admitted to being the actual shooter when he admitted to
“ ‘personally and intentionally’ discharging the firearm” in connection with his plea to
attempted murder.
In his reply, Seward argued the record of conviction did not exclude the possibility
that he was charged and convicted under the natural and probable consequences theory of
attempted murder. Further, his no contest plea under People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595
did not bar him from relief as a matter of law because he did not specifically admit to
attempted murder. Nor did his admission to a section 12022.53, subdivision (b)
enhancement bar him from relief. It was a “legal conclusion in the words of the statute”
that did not include any specific facts about the incident.

3
At the hearing, the People focused their arguments on Seward’s admission to the
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement for personal use of a firearm. They
argued that when he admitted to “intentionally and personally discharging a firearm” in
connection with the attempted murder of the victims, he admitted to being the actual
shooter, which rendered him ineligible as a matter of law.
Defense counsel countered that Seward did not admit to any specific facts
underlying the plea agreement. And determining whether Seward “was the actual shooter
is, in fact, fact-finding.” As for the gun enhancement, Seward had to admit the
enhancement to get the plea deal. Seward admitted “to a legal fiction in order to get the
benefit.”
In denying Seward’s petition, the trial court challenged defense counsel’s claim
that he did not admit to being the actual shooter when he admitted to personally
discharging a firearm: “[W]hen I specifically asked him if he personally discharged a
firearm and he said he did it he was lying to the Court.” The trial court continued:
“THE COURT: If he had to admit that he actually shot, and when I asked him if
he shot, he said he did.
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes, your Honor, I understand, but in order to get that --
“THE COURT: So that would be -- you’re saying he lied --
“[Defense Counsel]: He would have to do that.
“THE COURT: You’re saying he lied.
“[Defense Counsel]: I am not saying he lied, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Well, you’re saying that wasn’t truthful. So it’s either when I
asked him either you told the truth or you lied, which was it?
“[Defense Counsel]: I am saying he plead out to a legal fiction in order to get the
benefit --
“THE COURT: I’m sorry, there is no evidence of that. The Court is denying his
motion.”

4
Seward timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Seward contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition at the prima facie
stage because the record did not conclusively show he could not have been prosecuted for
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Seward further
contends that his admission to the two section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancements
does not conclusively demonstrate that he was a sole perpetrator, and, therefore,
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
The People concede the trial court erred in denying the petition because the record
of conviction did not support the court’s conclusion that Seward was ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. Specifically, in his plea colloquy, Seward did not admit facts or a
specific theory of attempted murder liability that would make him ineligible for relief.
For the reasons we explain below, we will accept the People’s concession.
A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Historically, sections 188 and 189 allowed the prosecution and conviction of a
defendant for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 335, 336.) The natural and probable
consequences doctrine, which Seward focuses on in his appeal, allowed prosecution of a
defendant for attempted murder based on a theory that the defendant aided and abetted a
crime where murder was a natural and probable consequence. (Id. at p. 336.)
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) amended sections 188 and 189 “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Under the amended law, malice cannot “ ‘be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v.
Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 227.) In addition to amending sections 188 and 189,

5
Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedural mechanism, now codified in section 1172.6 but
previously found in section 1170.95, for individuals convicted of murder under the
former versions of sections 188 and 189 to petition the trial court for resentencing.
(People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton).)
Two years later, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 775)
expanded section 1172.6 relief to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2;
People v. Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) Thus, in its current form, section
1172.6 also applies to individuals who pleaded guilty to attempted murder and would
have been subject to prosecution for attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, a defendant must make a prima facie
showing that (1) the complaint or information allowed the People to prosecute the
defendant for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine;
(2) the defendant was convicted of attempted murder or entered a plea to attempted
murder, and (3) the defendant could not presently be convicted of attempted murder
under the current versions of sections 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 558.)
The trial court’s prima facie inquiry is limited. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 971 (Lewis).) The court must accept the defendant’s allegations as true and assess
whether the defendant would be entitled to relief if the allegations were true. (Ibid.) If
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing where the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant could be convicted of attempted murder under the current versions of
section 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559.)

6
A trial court may deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage only if the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101 (Ervin).) In making its determination, the court may examine the
record of conviction. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) At this stage, the
court should not reject the factual allegations in the defendant’s petition on credibility
grounds or engage in factfinding by weighing the evidence or exercising its discretion.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) If the record of conviction contains facts that
conclusively refute allegations in the defendant’s petition, however, the court may make
credibility findings adverse to the defendant and deny the petition. (Id. at p. 971.)
At this stage of the proceedings, a trial court’s determination that a defendant is
ineligible for relief is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo. (Ervin, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
B. Analysis
In his petition, Seward asserted (1) the complaint that was filed against him
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder that included attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2) that he was convicted
of attempted murder pursuant to a plea agreement, and (3) that based on the changes
made to sections 188 and 189, he “could not presently be convicted” of attempted murder
under current law.
We conclude Seward made a prima facie showing that he was eligible for relief.
(Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
The People charged Seward with two counts of “attempted murder, non-
premeditated.” This generic attempted murder charge did not include a specific theory,
allowing the prosecution to pursue any theory of liability, including one under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 978.)

7
More importantly, in pleading no contest to the amended counts of attempted
murder, Seward did not plead to a theory of liability that would preclude section 1172.6
relief. Specifically, he did not admit malice or that he held an intent to kill any of the
victims, elements required under the current version of section 188. (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595 (Offley).)
Nor does the record of Seward’s conviction conclusively refute his allegation that
he could not be convicted of attempted murder under current law. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) When a defendant enters a plea, the record of conviction includes
the facts about the offense “ ‘the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty
plea.’ ” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211-1212, quoting People v.
Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136.)
Here, Seward’s plea colloquy does not establish that he admitted any specific facts
about the attempted murder charges that conclusively eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a theory of liability. He did not admit shooting the victims or
being the sole perpetrator of the shooting. (See, e.g., People v. Fisher (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028-1029 [the defendant’s admission to being sole perpetrator and
to shooting and killing victims rendered him ineligible for relief].)
Furthermore, the police reports to which the parties stipulated as the factual basis
do not establish that Seward was either the actual shooter or the sole perpetrator.
(People v. Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 977-978.) The reports show the October
2016 incident involved rival gangs with multiple shooters. And although a witness
identified Seward as a person holding a gun, no one reported witnessing Seward shoot
anyone or firing a gun during the incident.
Seward’s admission to the gun enhancement does not change our conclusion
because the admission to the enhancement does not establish Seward acted with the
required intent for attempted murder under the new law. (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th
at p. 598.)

8
During the plea colloquy, the trial court misstated the language of the
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement, which imposes a 10-year term and
requires an admission that Seward personally used a firearm. Instead, the court recited
the language of the 20-year enhancement in subdivision (c), which requires an admission
that Seward personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).)
Despite this misstatement, the record of conviction shows Seward admitted to, and
received, the 10-year enhancement under subdivision (b), not the 20-year enhancement
under subdivision (c). Seward’s admission to personal use of a firearm could be an
admission that he displayed or brandished the firearm during the October 2016 incident.
(People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120.) Such an admission would be consistent
with the report of one eyewitness.
As the People also acknowledge, even if we were to accept that Seward admitted
personally and intentionally discharging the firearm, that admission does not establish
that he acted with malice aforethought. (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) As
such, the admission does not exclude the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
theory of liability. (Id. at p. 599.) Therefore, it would not render Seward ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. (Ibid.)
For these reasons, we accept the People’s concession that Seward is not ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. Because neither the plea nor the record of conviction refuted
Seward’s eligibility for relief, the trial court erred in denying his petition at this stage of
the proceedings. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-972; Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th
at p. 101.)

9
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Seward’s section 1172.6 petition and
remand the matter with directions for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and
conduct further proceedings under section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d).

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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