CourtListener 10845625•People v. Garvey CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/16/26 P. v. Garvey CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084847
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD300373)
HENRY MATTHEW GARVEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Kathrynn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Henry Matthew Garvey of assault with a deadly
weapon (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (c)1—count 1); evading an officer with
reckless driving (Veh. Code § 2800.2, subd. (a)—count 2); resisting an officer
(§ 69—count 3); hit and run driving (Veh. Code § 20002, subd. (a)— count 4);
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
and driving under the influence (Veh. Code § 23152, subd. (a)— count 5). The
trial court sentenced him to a total term of four years eight months in prison,
stayed pending successful completion of three years of probation. Garvey
asserts he cannot be punished on both counts 1 and 2, pursuant to section
654, and that the judgment should be reversed because the trial court
erroneously denied his objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a
juror, in violation of Civil Procedure section 231.7. We conclude there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the two crimes in counts 1 and
2 had separate objectives and remand the matter to the trial court with
instructions to exercise its discretion under section 654 to stay the sentence
on either count 1 or 2. We conclude further that the trial court properly
sustained the peremptory challenge and affirm the judgment in all other
respects.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
San Diego Police Officer Andrew Ozeroff was patrolling the area of
Little Italy in San Diego at approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 23, 2023,
when he observed a vehicle come close to a group of cyclists and pedestrians.
It appeared there was an argument occurring. Officer Ozeroff was driving a
marked squad car and maneuvered it closer to the vehicle to contact the
driver, later determined to be Garvey. As Officer Ozeroff approached, the
vehicle accelerated at a rapid pace.
Officer Ozeroff followed the vehicle, trying to catch up so that he could
initiate a traffic stop. As he got closer, Officer Ozeroff turned on his overhead
lights to signal to Garvey to pull over, but Garvey did not yield. Instead,
Garvey decelerated rapidly in the middle of the intersection, a maneuver that
Officer Ozeroff referred to as a “brake check.” This caused Officer Ozeroff’s
vehicle to collide with the rear end of Garvey’s vehicle. Garvey accelerated
2
again and the chase continued. Officer Ozeroff informed dispatch of the
situation, activated his siren, and continued to follow the vehicle. Garvey ran
through stop signs, traveled the wrong way down a one-way street, and brake
checked Officer Ozeroff several more times over the next few minutes.
Officer Ozeroff was able to avoid further contact, as he anticipated the
additional brake checks.
Garvey eventually stopped the vehicle, apparently because a
bystander—later determined to be Jonah Carbajal, one of the individuals on
an e-bike in the crowd at the beginning of the incident—stood in front of it,
but when another police officer approached, Garvey refused to get out of his
vehicle. Ozeroff and the other officer had to forcibly remove Garvey, and
Garvey actively resisted, kicking and pulling against the officers’ force. After
removing Garvey from the vehicle, the officers determined that he was under
the influence of alcohol. Garvey was rambling and making profane and
vulgar statements throughout the ordeal. Officer Ozeroff was wearing a body
worn camera, and the prosecution played a video of the chase for the jury at
trial.
A phlebotomist drew blood from Garvey’s arm around 1:00 a.m. on
August 24, 2023. A criminalist from the forensic chemistry unit tested the
blood sample and testified that the blood alcohol level (BAC) was 0.083 plus
or minus .004 percent. She discussed principles of absorption and indicated
that Garvey’s BAC was likely higher at the time of the incident.
Garvey testified in his own defense at trial. He was in Little Italy on
the evening of August 23 to get some dinner. Garvey recalled that one of the
individuals in the crowd, subsequently identified as Carbajal, was
approaching his vehicle on an electric bike and yelling at him. This
frightened Garvey. Garvey did not recall seeing a police officer, or a patrol
3
car, until after he was “bumped from behind going through that signal.”
Garvey had stopped, or braked, in the intersection because he was
concentrating on Carbajal, who seemed to be chasing him. Garvey felt “very
nervous.”
Garvey testified that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in
2012. He was on medication but had not taken it yet that day because he had
not eaten. Before the collision, he was experiencing symptoms including
“panic, paranoia, uncertainty, [and] fear.” After the collision, Garvey “felt
unsafe.” He was shaking, but kept going, and said to himself, “I’m not going
to pull over right here. I don’t feel safe enough. I don’t feel stable enough to
even pull over right now.” He acknowledged stopping, or brake checking,
several times and said that he was looking for his phone or his glasses and
that he continued feel “paranoid” and “strange.”
Garvey said that he was injured when the officers pulled him out of the
car, that he had been injured by police in the past, and that the pain, along
with his “extreme panic and paranoia” played a role in his reaction. He
denied drinking, but said that he did drink a kombucha earlier in the day
that might have had alcohol in it.
The jury found Garvey guilty on all five asserted counts. The trial
court sentenced him to a total term of four years eight months, including the
middle term of four years for assault with a deadly weapon on count 1, and
one-third the middle term for an additional eight months, to run consecutive
for evading an officer, on count 2. However, the trial court acknowledged
that Garvey had some mental health issues, stayed the prison term, and
placed him on probation for three years “under fairly tight conditions.”
Garvey filed a timely notice of appeal.
4
II. DISCUSSION
Garvey raises two assertions on appeal: First, he argues that the
sentence on either count 1 or 2 must be stayed under section 654, because the
assault and evasion were part of an indivisible course of conduct. Second, he
asserts the trial court erroneously denied defense counsel’s peremptory
challenge to a prospective juror based on Civil Procedure section 231.7.
A. Section 654 Precludes Punishment on Counts 1 and 2
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
A defendant may be charged with—and in some cases convicted of—
multiple crimes arising out of the same conduct but cannot receive multiple
punishments for the same act or omission. (§§ 654, 954; People v. Reed (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226−1227 (Reed).) “When section 954 permits multiple
conviction[s], but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment[s], the trial court
must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple
punishment is prohibited.” (Id. at p. 1227.)
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.”
(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) If we conclude “that the case
involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct . . . we then consider
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or
multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
“The determination of whether there was more than one objective is a
factual determination, which will not be reversed on appeal unless
5
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.” (People v. Saffle (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.) “ ‘We review the trial court’s determination in the
light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every
fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People
v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 916.)
Because the trial court sentenced Garvey on both counts 1 and 2, we
presume the trial court made an implied finding that section 654 did not
apply, and that the two crimes had separate objectives.2 (See People v. Kelly
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 904 [“When there is no ‘explicit ruling by the trial
court at sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate to
the sentence it imposed.’ ”].) For the reasons we will explain, we conclude
that implied finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
The prosecutor argued that the various brake checks that occurred
through the pursuit constituted assault with a deadly weapon on an officer,
sufficient to convict Garvey on count 1. There is no dispute that each of the
brake checks occurred during the pursuit, and that Garvey was behaving
erratically the entire time. Officer Ozeroff testified that “several times when
there was a brake check,” Garvey brought his vehicle to a complete stop. The
stops lasted long enough that Officer Ozeroff put his own vehicle into park,
believing that the pursuit had ended, only to have Garvey accelerate once
again. Officer Ozeroff testified further, “When it continued, I was cognizant
that this is an evasion tactic. This was intentional.” This testimony at least
suggests that the brake checks were incidental to Garvey’s evasion of the
2 Garvey relies on California Rules of Court, rule 4.424 to assert that the
trial court had to make a finding pursuant to section 654 before imposing a
sentence on count 2. Garvey provides no authority, nor are we aware of any,
supporting this position. Regardless, the issue is rendered moot by our
conclusion that substantial evidence does not support any such finding.
6
officer. And there was no evidence that Garvey had some different objective,
or an actual intent to cause harm to the officer or the patrol car.
To the contrary, Officer Ozeroff testified that Garvey “appeared
confused” when the police tried to extract him from his vehicle. Another
officer testified that Garvey seemed intoxicated but also that he was erratic
and some of his behavior might possibly be due to mental health. And,
although the jury was not required to accept his version of the events, Garvey
testified that he did not recall seeing the officer before he got “bumped from
behind,” that he was initially fleeing from Carbajal, and that he subsequently
felt “paranoid,” “unsafe,” and “strange once he realized the police were also
pursuing him. He acknowledged the intermittent brake checking, but
indicated it was not intentional and was, instead, part of his reaction to the
entire situation. The trial court seemed to credit at least some of Garvey’s
statements, indicating “clearly there is some mental health issues at play
here,” before ultimately staying the sentence and placing Garvey on
probation.
Garvey argues that In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37 is instructive.
There, the minor, L.J., was likewise charged with assault during an extended
flight from the police, and the court concluded, “The evidence does not
support a finding that the minor’s assaults on the officers were based on
different intents and objectives than the minor’s overall purpose of trying to
evade the police officers.” (Id. at p. 44.) The court explained that the totality
of circumstances—the minor driving towards the police at a relatively slow
speed and before attempting to “slalome[ ]” between them, causing some
incidental damage—indicated the minor was trying to get past the police, as
part of the evasion, “rather than targeting them.” (Ibid.) The same is true
here. Although Garvey was driving away from, and not slaloming through
7
the police cars, the evidence suggests the brake checking was, as Officer
Ozeroff described it, an evasion tactic, albeit a seemingly erratic one, and
thus incidental to Garvey’s singular intent and objective. (Cf. People
v. Jimenez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 409, 426 [defendant had a different intent
and objection when driving “head on” towards an officer].)
The People assert that Garvey had time to reflect after committing the
first and before committing the subsequent brake checks. We disagree. The
record indicates the chase lasted no more than about 10 minutes, and that
Garvey was acting erratically throughout. Moreover, Garvey testified that he
did not notice the police car until it bumped him from behind, suggesting that
he did not attribute the collision to his own conduct. Rather, there was ample
evidence Garvey was nervous, paranoid, and not in a state of mind to be able
to reflect on his actions.
In sum, we conclude there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that the two crimes in counts 1 and 2 had separate objectives.
Because section 654 permits the court to stay the punishment as to either
count, we must remand the matter to the trial court to allow it to exercise
that discretion. We acknowledge that the trial court did stay both sentences
pending Garvey’s successful completion of probation but, nonetheless, the
abstract of judgment should reflect a further stay based on section 654, in the
event that Garvey is not successful on probation.
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Peremptory Challenge
Garvey next asserts that the judgment must be reversed and the
matter remanded for a new trial because the trial court violated his statutory
rights under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 by failing to sustain his
objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror
No. 21 (Juror No. 21). Before turning to the details of the peremptory
challenge, we provide an overview of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a
8
provision of the Racial Justice Act (the RJA) that became effective on
January 1, 2021.
1. Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7
At its core, Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 precludes either party
from using “a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the
basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived
membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.” (Civ. Proc.
§ 231.7, subd. (a).) If a party attempts to use a peremptory challenge in a
prohibited manner, the other party or the trial court “may object to the
improper use of a peremptory challenge.” (Id., subd. (b).) “[U]pon objection to
the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party
exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory
challenge has been exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Once the objection is made, the trial court “shall evaluate the reasons
given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and
shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications
for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race,
ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a
factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be
sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the
objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.”
(Civ. Proc.§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)
In making its determination, the trial court can consider, but is not
limited to, several enumerated factors. (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)–
9
(G).) The statute acknowledges “that unconscious bias, in addition to
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential
jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).) It defines
“ ‘unconscious bias’ ” to include both “implicit and institutional biases.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(2)(C).)
Accordingly, the statute provides further that a “peremptory challenge
for any of [certain enumerated] reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the
party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing
evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as
unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity,
sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived
membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on
the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Civ. Proc.
§ 231.7, subd. (e).) The enumerated reasons include, among others:
“(1) Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law
enforcement or the criminal legal system.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)–(10).)
“The term ‘clear and convincing’ refers to the degree of certainty the
factfinder must have in determining whether the reasons given for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to the prospective juror’s
cognizable group membership, bearing in mind conscious and unconscious
bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity has been overcome, the
factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the reasons given for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or
unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (f).)
In addition, the statute provides a list of “reasons for peremptory
challenges [that] have historically been associated with improper
10
discrimination.” (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (g)(1).) This includes the juror
failing to make eye contact or “exhibit[ing] either a lack of rapport or
problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.” (Id., subd. (g)(1)(A), (B).)
Finally, the statute provides: “The denial of an objection made under
this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial
court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The
appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including
findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not
expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only
reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or
consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the
peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated
jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged
juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis
argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the
objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the
judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.” (Civ.
Proc. § 231.7, subd. (j).)
2. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defense Counsel’s
Objection Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
231.7
During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 21 disclosed that he had been
arrested in 2000, and that the contact with law enforcement was “abrasive.”
Juror No. 21 explained that believed he was being cooperative, that the first
officer he interacted with treated him appropriately, but the second officer
treated him as if he was not listening and it “did not sit well” with him.
Counsel asked if the memory still brought up a lot of emotions, and Juror No.
21 said, “It still sits back there. Once in a while it’s something that I won’t—I
11
don’t look back on it too much.” Juror No. 21 said that he believed he could
set the memory aside and judge the present case fairly and impartially.
Juror No. 21 also disclosed that he had a family member whom he was
very close to who experienced mental health issues. He continued to have
strong emotions of sadness “and how things kind of went with her.”
Later, the prosecutor returned to the subject of the Juror No. 21’s
negative interactions with law enforcement and asked, “Do you think that’s
something that you would be able to set aside and hear the evidence in this
case completely separate from those emotions?” Juror No. 21 replied, “I
would have to hear and go from there. Counsel asked if his experience would
“come into play when you were making a decision in this case,” and Juror No.
21 said, “A little bit. I think it would. A little bit, yeah.” Both counsel agreed
that Juror No. 21 was being “wishy washy,” and the trial court stated it
would follow up with him again. The trial court asked, “In this matter can
you be fair and impartial to both sides,” and Juror No. 21 said, “I believe so
as well.”
The prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 21 and
defense counsel objected under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The
trial court proceeded to sidebar with counsel, and a discussion was held in
which the court determined that Juror No. 21 was likely Asian, perhaps
Filipino, but that his race had not been definitively identified. The
prosecutor explained that “this juror when he was questioned regarding his
feelings particularly against police officers, he did say that he was biased
against police officers specifically the way that he phrased it at the end. He
said, yes, this is my experience and it would sit at back of my mind when
coming to my decision. In this case he also did express strong feelings about
12
mental health issues, and how that would also affect his ability to sit on the
case.” The trial court then clarified that the defendant “is a white male.”
The trial court stated, regarding Juror No. 21: “He was a tough call for
cause before. I did go back and ask him if he could be fair and reasonable,
which is always the bottom line, but there was certainly some underlying
factors a little bit on the mental health issues but also on the idea of whether
he could be fair and impartial to both sides, which, of course, that is the
whole purpose of voir dire is to pick people who can be fair and impartial to
both sides. I will make a finding this is not about race or any ethnic group. I
think it would be very unfair to the prosecutor to make that finding because
this is not about race or ethnic group. She is treating him as if he were
anybody else and just not the best juror for her on this particular case, which
is what voir dire is all about.”
Defense counsel asserted that one of the stated reasons, a negative
experience with an officer was presumptively invalid under Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7.3 In response, the trial court reiterated that its
finding was based on the indications that Juror No. 21 could not be fair and
impartial, and that the court was not willing to make a finding that the
prosecutor was exercising the objection for racial reasons, including implicit
bias.
We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. Juror No. 21 expressed
uncertainty as to his ability to set aside his prior negative experiences to
judge the present case fairly and impartially. The trial court considered the
fact that negative experiences with law enforcement raise a presumption of
3 The transcript indicates counsel referenced “section 231.15 (a)(1) and
(2)” but we presume counsel either intended to reference section 231.7,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) or that there may have been a transcription error.
13
invalidity under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 and the concept of
implicit bias, but made a finding that, here, the peremptory challenge was
not based on race and was, instead, based on Juror No. 21’s stated
uncertainty as to his ability to be fair and impartial. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding. Juror No. 21 stated that he had lingering
emotions about his experience after being arrested and about a close family
member who suffered from mental health issues. He stated that he was not
sure if he could completely separate his emotions from the present case and
counsel agreed that his responses were inconsistent at a minimum.
As the court explained in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1,
“While a prospective juror’s negative experience with law enforcement may
be inextricably related to that juror’s race, the focus of [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 231.7 is on race as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge. In view of his multiple uncertain and noncommittal responses
regarding impartiality, the trial court properly found it highly probable the
prosecutor’s challenge was unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and
was instead specific to [the prospective juror] and bore on his ability to be fair
and impartial. In other words, the clear and convincing standard was
satisfied.” (Gonzalez, at pp. 17–18.) For the reasons we have explained, we
conclude that the same is true here.
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III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to exercise
its discretion to stay the sentence on either count 1 or 2 pursuant to section
654. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
15
Filed 4/16/26 P. v. Garvey CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084847
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD300373)
HENRY MATTHEW GARVEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Kathrynn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Henry Matthew Garvey of assault with a deadly
weapon (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (c)1—count 1); evading an officer with
reckless driving (Veh. Code § 2800.2, subd. (a)—count 2); resisting an officer
(§ 69—count 3); hit and run driving (Veh. Code § 20002, subd. (a)— count 4);
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
and driving under the influence (Veh. Code § 23152, subd. (a)— count 5). The
trial court sentenced him to a total term of four years eight months in prison,
stayed pending successful completion of three years of probation. Garvey
asserts he cannot be punished on both counts 1 and 2, pursuant to section
654, and that the judgment should be reversed because the trial court
erroneously denied his objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a
juror, in violation of Civil Procedure section 231.7. We conclude there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the two crimes in counts 1 and
2 had separate objectives and remand the matter to the trial court with
instructions to exercise its discretion under section 654 to stay the sentence
on either count 1 or 2. We conclude further that the trial court properly
sustained the peremptory challenge and affirm the judgment in all other
respects.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
San Diego Police Officer Andrew Ozeroff was patrolling the area of
Little Italy in San Diego at approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 23, 2023,
when he observed a vehicle come close to a group of cyclists and pedestrians.
It appeared there was an argument occurring. Officer Ozeroff was driving a
marked squad car and maneuvered it closer to the vehicle to contact the
driver, later determined to be Garvey. As Officer Ozeroff approached, the
vehicle accelerated at a rapid pace.
Officer Ozeroff followed the vehicle, trying to catch up so that he could
initiate a traffic stop. As he got closer, Officer Ozeroff turned on his overhead
lights to signal to Garvey to pull over, but Garvey did not yield. Instead,
Garvey decelerated rapidly in the middle of the intersection, a maneuver that
Officer Ozeroff referred to as a “brake check.” This caused Officer Ozeroff’s
vehicle to collide with the rear end of Garvey’s vehicle. Garvey accelerated
2
again and the chase continued. Officer Ozeroff informed dispatch of the
situation, activated his siren, and continued to follow the vehicle. Garvey ran
through stop signs, traveled the wrong way down a one-way street, and brake
checked Officer Ozeroff several more times over the next few minutes.
Officer Ozeroff was able to avoid further contact, as he anticipated the
additional brake checks.
Garvey eventually stopped the vehicle, apparently because a
bystander—later determined to be Jonah Carbajal, one of the individuals on
an e-bike in the crowd at the beginning of the incident—stood in front of it,
but when another police officer approached, Garvey refused to get out of his
vehicle. Ozeroff and the other officer had to forcibly remove Garvey, and
Garvey actively resisted, kicking and pulling against the officers’ force. After
removing Garvey from the vehicle, the officers determined that he was under
the influence of alcohol. Garvey was rambling and making profane and
vulgar statements throughout the ordeal. Officer Ozeroff was wearing a body
worn camera, and the prosecution played a video of the chase for the jury at
trial.
A phlebotomist drew blood from Garvey’s arm around 1:00 a.m. on
August 24, 2023. A criminalist from the forensic chemistry unit tested the
blood sample and testified that the blood alcohol level (BAC) was 0.083 plus
or minus .004 percent. She discussed principles of absorption and indicated
that Garvey’s BAC was likely higher at the time of the incident.
Garvey testified in his own defense at trial. He was in Little Italy on
the evening of August 23 to get some dinner. Garvey recalled that one of the
individuals in the crowd, subsequently identified as Carbajal, was
approaching his vehicle on an electric bike and yelling at him. This
frightened Garvey. Garvey did not recall seeing a police officer, or a patrol
3
car, until after he was “bumped from behind going through that signal.”
Garvey had stopped, or braked, in the intersection because he was
concentrating on Carbajal, who seemed to be chasing him. Garvey felt “very
nervous.”
Garvey testified that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in
2012. He was on medication but had not taken it yet that day because he had
not eaten. Before the collision, he was experiencing symptoms including
“panic, paranoia, uncertainty, [and] fear.” After the collision, Garvey “felt
unsafe.” He was shaking, but kept going, and said to himself, “I’m not going
to pull over right here. I don’t feel safe enough. I don’t feel stable enough to
even pull over right now.” He acknowledged stopping, or brake checking,
several times and said that he was looking for his phone or his glasses and
that he continued feel “paranoid” and “strange.”
Garvey said that he was injured when the officers pulled him out of the
car, that he had been injured by police in the past, and that the pain, along
with his “extreme panic and paranoia” played a role in his reaction. He
denied drinking, but said that he did drink a kombucha earlier in the day
that might have had alcohol in it.
The jury found Garvey guilty on all five asserted counts. The trial
court sentenced him to a total term of four years eight months, including the
middle term of four years for assault with a deadly weapon on count 1, and
one-third the middle term for an additional eight months, to run consecutive
for evading an officer, on count 2. However, the trial court acknowledged
that Garvey had some mental health issues, stayed the prison term, and
placed him on probation for three years “under fairly tight conditions.”
Garvey filed a timely notice of appeal.
4
II. DISCUSSION
Garvey raises two assertions on appeal: First, he argues that the
sentence on either count 1 or 2 must be stayed under section 654, because the
assault and evasion were part of an indivisible course of conduct. Second, he
asserts the trial court erroneously denied defense counsel’s peremptory
challenge to a prospective juror based on Civil Procedure section 231.7.
A. Section 654 Precludes Punishment on Counts 1 and 2
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
A defendant may be charged with—and in some cases convicted of—
multiple crimes arising out of the same conduct but cannot receive multiple
punishments for the same act or omission. (§§ 654, 954; People v. Reed (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226−1227 (Reed).) “When section 954 permits multiple
conviction[s], but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment[s], the trial court
must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple
punishment is prohibited.” (Id. at p. 1227.)
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.”
(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) If we conclude “that the case
involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct . . . we then consider
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or
multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
“The determination of whether there was more than one objective is a
factual determination, which will not be reversed on appeal unless
5
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.” (People v. Saffle (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.) “ ‘We review the trial court’s determination in the
light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every
fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People
v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 916.)
Because the trial court sentenced Garvey on both counts 1 and 2, we
presume the trial court made an implied finding that section 654 did not
apply, and that the two crimes had separate objectives.2 (See People v. Kelly
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 904 [“When there is no ‘explicit ruling by the trial
court at sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate to
the sentence it imposed.’ ”].) For the reasons we will explain, we conclude
that implied finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
The prosecutor argued that the various brake checks that occurred
through the pursuit constituted assault with a deadly weapon on an officer,
sufficient to convict Garvey on count 1. There is no dispute that each of the
brake checks occurred during the pursuit, and that Garvey was behaving
erratically the entire time. Officer Ozeroff testified that “several times when
there was a brake check,” Garvey brought his vehicle to a complete stop. The
stops lasted long enough that Officer Ozeroff put his own vehicle into park,
believing that the pursuit had ended, only to have Garvey accelerate once
again. Officer Ozeroff testified further, “When it continued, I was cognizant
that this is an evasion tactic. This was intentional.” This testimony at least
suggests that the brake checks were incidental to Garvey’s evasion of the
2 Garvey relies on California Rules of Court, rule 4.424 to assert that the
trial court had to make a finding pursuant to section 654 before imposing a
sentence on count 2. Garvey provides no authority, nor are we aware of any,
supporting this position. Regardless, the issue is rendered moot by our
conclusion that substantial evidence does not support any such finding.
6
officer. And there was no evidence that Garvey had some different objective,
or an actual intent to cause harm to the officer or the patrol car.
To the contrary, Officer Ozeroff testified that Garvey “appeared
confused” when the police tried to extract him from his vehicle. Another
officer testified that Garvey seemed intoxicated but also that he was erratic
and some of his behavior might possibly be due to mental health. And,
although the jury was not required to accept his version of the events, Garvey
testified that he did not recall seeing the officer before he got “bumped from
behind,” that he was initially fleeing from Carbajal, and that he subsequently
felt “paranoid,” “unsafe,” and “strange once he realized the police were also
pursuing him. He acknowledged the intermittent brake checking, but
indicated it was not intentional and was, instead, part of his reaction to the
entire situation. The trial court seemed to credit at least some of Garvey’s
statements, indicating “clearly there is some mental health issues at play
here,” before ultimately staying the sentence and placing Garvey on
probation.
Garvey argues that In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37 is instructive.
There, the minor, L.J., was likewise charged with assault during an extended
flight from the police, and the court concluded, “The evidence does not
support a finding that the minor’s assaults on the officers were based on
different intents and objectives than the minor’s overall purpose of trying to
evade the police officers.” (Id. at p. 44.) The court explained that the totality
of circumstances—the minor driving towards the police at a relatively slow
speed and before attempting to “slalome[ ]” between them, causing some
incidental damage—indicated the minor was trying to get past the police, as
part of the evasion, “rather than targeting them.” (Ibid.) The same is true
here. Although Garvey was driving away from, and not slaloming through
7
the police cars, the evidence suggests the brake checking was, as Officer
Ozeroff described it, an evasion tactic, albeit a seemingly erratic one, and
thus incidental to Garvey’s singular intent and objective. (Cf. People
v. Jimenez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 409, 426 [defendant had a different intent
and objection when driving “head on” towards an officer].)
The People assert that Garvey had time to reflect after committing the
first and before committing the subsequent brake checks. We disagree. The
record indicates the chase lasted no more than about 10 minutes, and that
Garvey was acting erratically throughout. Moreover, Garvey testified that he
did not notice the police car until it bumped him from behind, suggesting that
he did not attribute the collision to his own conduct. Rather, there was ample
evidence Garvey was nervous, paranoid, and not in a state of mind to be able
to reflect on his actions.
In sum, we conclude there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that the two crimes in counts 1 and 2 had separate objectives.
Because section 654 permits the court to stay the punishment as to either
count, we must remand the matter to the trial court to allow it to exercise
that discretion. We acknowledge that the trial court did stay both sentences
pending Garvey’s successful completion of probation but, nonetheless, the
abstract of judgment should reflect a further stay based on section 654, in the
event that Garvey is not successful on probation.
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Peremptory Challenge
Garvey next asserts that the judgment must be reversed and the
matter remanded for a new trial because the trial court violated his statutory
rights under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 by failing to sustain his
objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror
No. 21 (Juror No. 21). Before turning to the details of the peremptory
challenge, we provide an overview of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, a
8
provision of the Racial Justice Act (the RJA) that became effective on
January 1, 2021.
1. Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7
At its core, Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 precludes either party
from using “a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the
basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived
membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.” (Civ. Proc.
§ 231.7, subd. (a).) If a party attempts to use a peremptory challenge in a
prohibited manner, the other party or the trial court “may object to the
improper use of a peremptory challenge.” (Id., subd. (b).) “[U]pon objection to
the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party
exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory
challenge has been exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Once the objection is made, the trial court “shall evaluate the reasons
given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the
circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and
shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications
for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race,
ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a
factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be
sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the
objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.”
(Civ. Proc.§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)
In making its determination, the trial court can consider, but is not
limited to, several enumerated factors. (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)–
9
(G).) The statute acknowledges “that unconscious bias, in addition to
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential
jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).) It defines
“ ‘unconscious bias’ ” to include both “implicit and institutional biases.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(2)(C).)
Accordingly, the statute provides further that a “peremptory challenge
for any of [certain enumerated] reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the
party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing
evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as
unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity,
sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived
membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on
the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Civ. Proc.
§ 231.7, subd. (e).) The enumerated reasons include, among others:
“(1) Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law
enforcement or the criminal legal system.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)–(10).)
“The term ‘clear and convincing’ refers to the degree of certainty the
factfinder must have in determining whether the reasons given for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to the prospective juror’s
cognizable group membership, bearing in mind conscious and unconscious
bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity has been overcome, the
factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the reasons given for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or
unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (f).)
In addition, the statute provides a list of “reasons for peremptory
challenges [that] have historically been associated with improper
10
discrimination.” (Civ. Proc. § 231.7, subd. (g)(1).) This includes the juror
failing to make eye contact or “exhibit[ing] either a lack of rapport or
problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.” (Id., subd. (g)(1)(A), (B).)
Finally, the statute provides: “The denial of an objection made under
this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial
court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The
appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including
findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not
expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only
reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or
consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the
peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated
jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged
juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis
argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the
objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the
judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.” (Civ.
Proc. § 231.7, subd. (j).)
2. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defense Counsel’s
Objection Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
231.7
During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 21 disclosed that he had been
arrested in 2000, and that the contact with law enforcement was “abrasive.”
Juror No. 21 explained that believed he was being cooperative, that the first
officer he interacted with treated him appropriately, but the second officer
treated him as if he was not listening and it “did not sit well” with him.
Counsel asked if the memory still brought up a lot of emotions, and Juror No.
21 said, “It still sits back there. Once in a while it’s something that I won’t—I
11
don’t look back on it too much.” Juror No. 21 said that he believed he could
set the memory aside and judge the present case fairly and impartially.
Juror No. 21 also disclosed that he had a family member whom he was
very close to who experienced mental health issues. He continued to have
strong emotions of sadness “and how things kind of went with her.”
Later, the prosecutor returned to the subject of the Juror No. 21’s
negative interactions with law enforcement and asked, “Do you think that’s
something that you would be able to set aside and hear the evidence in this
case completely separate from those emotions?” Juror No. 21 replied, “I
would have to hear and go from there. Counsel asked if his experience would
“come into play when you were making a decision in this case,” and Juror No.
21 said, “A little bit. I think it would. A little bit, yeah.” Both counsel agreed
that Juror No. 21 was being “wishy washy,” and the trial court stated it
would follow up with him again. The trial court asked, “In this matter can
you be fair and impartial to both sides,” and Juror No. 21 said, “I believe so
as well.”
The prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 21 and
defense counsel objected under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The
trial court proceeded to sidebar with counsel, and a discussion was held in
which the court determined that Juror No. 21 was likely Asian, perhaps
Filipino, but that his race had not been definitively identified. The
prosecutor explained that “this juror when he was questioned regarding his
feelings particularly against police officers, he did say that he was biased
against police officers specifically the way that he phrased it at the end. He
said, yes, this is my experience and it would sit at back of my mind when
coming to my decision. In this case he also did express strong feelings about
12
mental health issues, and how that would also affect his ability to sit on the
case.” The trial court then clarified that the defendant “is a white male.”
The trial court stated, regarding Juror No. 21: “He was a tough call for
cause before. I did go back and ask him if he could be fair and reasonable,
which is always the bottom line, but there was certainly some underlying
factors a little bit on the mental health issues but also on the idea of whether
he could be fair and impartial to both sides, which, of course, that is the
whole purpose of voir dire is to pick people who can be fair and impartial to
both sides. I will make a finding this is not about race or any ethnic group. I
think it would be very unfair to the prosecutor to make that finding because
this is not about race or ethnic group. She is treating him as if he were
anybody else and just not the best juror for her on this particular case, which
is what voir dire is all about.”
Defense counsel asserted that one of the stated reasons, a negative
experience with an officer was presumptively invalid under Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7.3 In response, the trial court reiterated that its
finding was based on the indications that Juror No. 21 could not be fair and
impartial, and that the court was not willing to make a finding that the
prosecutor was exercising the objection for racial reasons, including implicit
bias.
We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. Juror No. 21 expressed
uncertainty as to his ability to set aside his prior negative experiences to
judge the present case fairly and impartially. The trial court considered the
fact that negative experiences with law enforcement raise a presumption of
3 The transcript indicates counsel referenced “section 231.15 (a)(1) and
(2)” but we presume counsel either intended to reference section 231.7,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) or that there may have been a transcription error.
13
invalidity under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 and the concept of
implicit bias, but made a finding that, here, the peremptory challenge was
not based on race and was, instead, based on Juror No. 21’s stated
uncertainty as to his ability to be fair and impartial. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding. Juror No. 21 stated that he had lingering
emotions about his experience after being arrested and about a close family
member who suffered from mental health issues. He stated that he was not
sure if he could completely separate his emotions from the present case and
counsel agreed that his responses were inconsistent at a minimum.
As the court explained in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1,
“While a prospective juror’s negative experience with law enforcement may
be inextricably related to that juror’s race, the focus of [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 231.7 is on race as a factor in the use of the peremptory
challenge. In view of his multiple uncertain and noncommittal responses
regarding impartiality, the trial court properly found it highly probable the
prosecutor’s challenge was unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and
was instead specific to [the prospective juror] and bore on his ability to be fair
and impartial. In other words, the clear and convincing standard was
satisfied.” (Gonzalez, at pp. 17–18.) For the reasons we have explained, we
conclude that the same is true here.
14
III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to exercise
its discretion to stay the sentence on either count 1 or 2 pursuant to section
654. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
15
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