People v. Ricohuiltron CA1/1

CourtListener 10845603Calctapp17.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/17/26 P. v. Ricohuiltron CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A171370
v.
(Alameda County
ANTHONY RICOHUILTRON, Super Ct. No. 24CR003107)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Anthony Ricohuiltron pleaded no contest to assault with force likely to
cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement that contemplated a two-year term of probation.
(§ 1203.1, subd. (a).) But at Ricohuiltron’s sentencing hearing, the court
imposed a three-year term of probation under section 1203.097, subdivision
(a)(1), which establishes a “minimum period of probation of 36 months” for
crimes of domestic violence.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
In this appeal, Ricohuiltron argues he never admitted to having any
kind of romantic relationship with the victim, and therefore the three-year
probation term for domestic violence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi) [requiring any fact, other than the fact of a
prior conviction, “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum” to be admitted by the defendant, established by the
defendant’s guilty plea, or submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt]. We disagree with the suggestion that Apprendi is
applicable, and we will affirm the judgment accordingly.
In his opening brief, Ricohuiltron contends Apprendi was violated by
“the imposition of the” three-year probation term “mandated by section
1203.097[,]” which “increased appellant’s probationary term—and therefore
his punishment—for a non-domestic violence offense based on a factual
finding: that” the victim was a victim of “Domestic violence” as defined by
Family Code section 6211. In response, the Attorney General argues that
Apprendi is inapplicable because, “[a]s an act of grace or clemency,” an order
of probation is not a penalty at all. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398,
402.) Thus, according to the Attorney General, the factual finding that
increased Ricohuiltron’s probation term did not increase “the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” (Apprendi, supra, 530
U.S. at p. 490, italics added.)
But we need not decide whether probation is a penalty, because there is
an even simpler reason why Apprendi does not apply: A two-year probation
term is not “the prescribed statutory maximum” for the crime of which
Ricohuiltron was convicted. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury may be punished “by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.” (§ 245,

2
subd. (a)(4).) And probation is a mercy “an offender has no right or privilege
to be granted.” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 402.) When compared
to even two years’ imprisonment in the state prison, then, three years’
probation can hardly be construed as an increased penalty, even if it might
arguably be construed as a penalty in some limited sense. For that reason,
we reject Ricohuiltron’s claim.
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

3
_________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
BANKE, J.

People v. Ricohuiltron / (A171370)

4

Filed 4/17/26 P. v. Ricohuiltron CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A171370
v.
(Alameda County
ANTHONY RICOHUILTRON, Super Ct. No. 24CR003107)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Anthony Ricohuiltron pleaded no contest to assault with force likely to
cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement that contemplated a two-year term of probation.
(§ 1203.1, subd. (a).) But at Ricohuiltron’s sentencing hearing, the court
imposed a three-year term of probation under section 1203.097, subdivision
(a)(1), which establishes a “minimum period of probation of 36 months” for
crimes of domestic violence.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
In this appeal, Ricohuiltron argues he never admitted to having any
kind of romantic relationship with the victim, and therefore the three-year
probation term for domestic violence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi) [requiring any fact, other than the fact of a
prior conviction, “that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum” to be admitted by the defendant, established by the
defendant’s guilty plea, or submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt]. We disagree with the suggestion that Apprendi is
applicable, and we will affirm the judgment accordingly.
In his opening brief, Ricohuiltron contends Apprendi was violated by
“the imposition of the” three-year probation term “mandated by section
1203.097[,]” which “increased appellant’s probationary term—and therefore
his punishment—for a non-domestic violence offense based on a factual
finding: that” the victim was a victim of “Domestic violence” as defined by
Family Code section 6211. In response, the Attorney General argues that
Apprendi is inapplicable because, “[a]s an act of grace or clemency,” an order
of probation is not a penalty at all. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398,
402.) Thus, according to the Attorney General, the factual finding that
increased Ricohuiltron’s probation term did not increase “the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” (Apprendi, supra, 530
U.S. at p. 490, italics added.)
But we need not decide whether probation is a penalty, because there is
an even simpler reason why Apprendi does not apply: A two-year probation
term is not “the prescribed statutory maximum” for the crime of which
Ricohuiltron was convicted. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Assault
with force likely to produce great bodily injury may be punished “by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.” (§ 245,

2
subd. (a)(4).) And probation is a mercy “an offender has no right or privilege
to be granted.” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 402.) When compared
to even two years’ imprisonment in the state prison, then, three years’
probation can hardly be construed as an increased penalty, even if it might
arguably be construed as a penalty in some limited sense. For that reason,
we reject Ricohuiltron’s claim.
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

3
_________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
BANKE, J.

People v. Ricohuiltron / (A171370)

4

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