People v. Peraza CA2/8

CourtListener 10843527Calctapp15.04.2026

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Filed 4/15/26 P. v. Peraza CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B338966

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA086587)
v.

JESUS ALBERTO PERAZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a jury convicted defendant Jesus Alberto Peraza of
first degree murder, premeditated attempted murder, and
aggravated mayhem. Although the trial court instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury found true
allegations that Peraza personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing the murder victim’s death and inflicting great
bodily injury on the attempted murder and aggravated mayhem
victim. The jury also found true allegations that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the
same injuries.
Peraza later petitioned the trial court for resentencing of
his murder and attempted murder convictions under Penal Code
section 1172.6. 1 The court initially found that Peraza made a
prima facie showing of eligibility for relief and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, however, the court found
that Peraza was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
The court nevertheless conducted the evidentiary hearing and
found that Peraza was the direct perpetrator of the murder and
attempted murder.
On appeal, Peraza argues that the trial court erred when it
found that he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
Peraza also contends that even though the court ultimately held
an evidentiary hearing, it applied the incorrect standard of proof
at that hearing, deferring to the jury’s findings and refusing to
make any factual findings of its own.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
We conclude any error was harmless. It was undisputed at
trial that the perpetrator of the murder and attempted murder
shot both victims. The People tried Peraza under a theory that
there was only one shooter, and Peraza conceded at the
evidentiary hearing on his resentencing petition that there was
only one shooter. Thus, by finding Peraza personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm killing the murder victim and
injuring the attempted murder victim, the jury necessarily found
Peraza was the only shooter and direct perpetrator of the murder
and attempted murder. In other words, the jury made all the
necessary findings to establish Peraza is guilty under currently
valid theories of murder and attempted murder. Accordingly,
we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
1. The shooting
Late one evening in September 2006, Daniele S. and her
boyfriend, Ruben Martinez, were sitting inside Martinez’s truck,
which was parked outside Alex G.’s home. Alex and his brother
were outside, talking to Daniele and Martinez when three cars
stopped in the middle of the street in front of Martinez’s truck.
One of the cars’ passengers, later identified as Peraza, got
out and asked Alex and his brother “where you fools from?” Alex
responded that he was “from Maywood, but he didn’t gangbang
anymore.” Peraza told Alex to “get on the floor.”
Peraza then turned towards Martinez’s truck and shot
Martinez several times. As Peraza walked back towards the
group of cars, Daniele tried to start the ignition to Martinez’s

2 We grant Peraza’s request for judicial notice of the record
from his direct appeal.

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truck. Peraza then walked back towards Martinez’s truck and
fired several shots at Daniele. At least one of the shots struck
Daniele in her back, paralyzing her. Martinez later died from his
injuries.
2. The investigation
When first interviewed by the police, Alex initially denied
being able to identify the shooter because he feared retaliation
against himself and his family. Alex later identified Peraza as
the shooter from a photographic lineup. Alex recognized Peraza
because they went to high school together several years before
the shooting.
Alex saw at least two men carrying guns, one of whom was
Peraza, got out of the group of cars that stopped in front of
Martinez’s truck. Although Alex believed it was possible that
another person fired a gun, he only saw Peraza shoot at Martinez
and Daniele.
Daniele could not identify the shooter. Although she picked
two men out of a photographic lineup who she thought resembled
the shooter, she could not confirm whether either man was
Peraza.
The police recovered nine expended nine-millimeter shell
casings and six bullet fragments from the scene of the shooting.
Although the shell casings were not all made by the same
manufacturer, a firearms expert who examined them determined
that they were all fired from the same gun. The expert also
determined that five of the six bullet fragments were consistent
with being part of nine-millimeter bullets. The expert could not
determine whether the sixth fragment was also part of a nine-
millimeter bullet because the fragment was too small to test.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The original trial court proceedings
In June 2007, the People filed an amended information
charging Peraza with murder (count 1), premeditated attempted
murder (count 2), and aggravated mayhem (count 3). As to
count 1, the People alleged three personal-use firearm
enhancements, including that Peraza personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death to Martinez (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). The People
alleged the same firearm enhancements as to counts 2 and 3,
including that Peraza personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury to Daniele (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(d)). As to all three counts, the People alleged that a
principal used and discharged a firearm (principal-use firearm
enhancements) (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)). The People also alleged
various gang and prior conviction enhancements.
At trial, the prosecution’s primary theory was that Peraza
was the only shooter and direct perpetrator of the murder and
attempted murder. Alternatively, the prosecutor argued to the
jury that it could convict Peraza as an aider and abettor. The
prosecutor stated, “if for some reason you were to find or believe
that [Peraza] was one of the armed gun men, but maybe wasn’t
the one who actually pulled the trigger, and, again, I don’t know
how you get to that point[, but] if you were to find that, [Peraza]
is still guilty of murder.” The prosecutor later argued, “Again, I
don’t know how you get to that point, and I think the only way
you get to the point of him being aider and abettor is if you were
to believe that [Alex] is correct, that [Peraza’s] one of the people
out there with a gun, but he wasn’t the one that fired those fatal
shots, or the shots that injured, then he would be aider and

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abettor, and not the actual perpetrator.” The prosecutor
explained to the jury that it could convict Peraza as an aider and
abettor under the natural and probable consequences theory, if it
found that he intended to aid and abet an assault with a deadly
weapon, the natural and probable consequence of which was one
of the charged offenses.
Peraza’s defense at trial was that the People failed to prove
he was involved in the shooting. Peraza’s closing argument
focused primarily on attacking the credibility of Alex’s
identification of Peraza as the shooter and arguing that the
People otherwise failed to present evidence connecting him to the
shooting.
The trial court instructed the jury on, among other things,
the principles of first and second degree murder, generic and
premeditated attempted murder, aiding and abetting generally,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, assault with a
firearm as the target offense for the natural and probable
consequences theory, personal and intentional discharge of a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death, and a principal’s
intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death.
The jury convicted Peraza of first degree murder,
premeditated attempted murder, and aggravated mayhem.
The jury found true all the personal-use firearm enhancements,
including that Peraza personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury to Daniele and great bodily
injury and death to Martinez. The jury also found true all the
principal-use firearm enhancements. The jury found true the
gang enhancements, and, in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial

6
court found true the prior conviction allegations. The court
sentenced Peraza to 130 years to life in prison.
A different panel of this division affirmed Peraza’s
convictions on direct appeal in 2010.
2. Section 1172.6 proceedings
In June 2023, Peraza filed a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6. The trial court found Peraza made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for resentencing and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing.
In June 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), at which the parties did
not present any new evidence. At the hearing, defense counsel
conceded that it was “clear it’s one shooter,” “[w]e are not
disputing that there was one shooter.” Instead, defense counsel
argued that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Peraza was the shooter because Daniele never confidently
identified him as such and Alex’s identification lacked credibility.
After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court
explained that it issued an order to show cause and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing because section 1172.6 “has evolved to where
now it is almost automatic. The appellate courts have provided
guidance to the trial courts and it does not take a lot to make a
prima facie showing so that’s been done.” The court went on,
“[m]y approach to this is as the appellate courts have kind of
dictated. I almost always [make] a prima facie finding . . . .”
Nevertheless, the trial court found that Peraza was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law “because a jury has
returned a verdict and has clearly indicated . . . that [Peraza] was
the shooter.” The court explained that the jury found Peraza
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great

7
bodily injury and death to Martinez and great bodily injury to
Daniele, “even though [the jury] had the ability to make a ruling
on the accomplice charges regarding [section] 12022.53[,
subdivisions] (b), (c), and (d).”
The trial court also stated that it “look[ed] at the evidence
in the case” and found that Peraza was ineligible for resentencing
“in the event that an appellate court would disagree with [the
court] and deem [Peraza] eligible.” The court explained that it
was “not going to try to put itself in the position of the jury
without all these factors that a jury is told to consider in the
instructions such as demeanor and a reason why a witness may
forget or the credibility of the witness, how they can judge the
credibility of a witness using several factors that were given that
jury. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [B]ased on the fact that [Daniele] was never
able to affirmatively identify . . . Mr. Peraza whether it was trial,
prelim or her initial statements, the court looks at that she did
identify two people and one was [Peraza] in a six-pack. And from
day one she basically was saying that those two could be or
appeared to be similar to the suspect she described or the
shooter. And in my experience again the jury is in the best
position 17, 18 years ago to listen to her testimony, watch her
demeanor versus me from a transcript 17, 18 years later. [¶] But
ultimately that in my opinion even looking at the transcript does
somewhat corroborate [Alex] because there may be many reasons
and obviously the jury heard those reasons why [Alex] based on
his background and experience may be reluctant to identify
somebody.”
The court concluded, “So what we have is based on the
jury’s findings is Mr. Peraza is ineligible as a matter of law. And
then taking the next step as if an appellate court would disagree

8
with the court’s finding in that, I think it’s clear from the
evidence that was presented to that jury and consistent with the
jury’s findings that that jury made a determination that
Mr. Peraza was the shooter. He personally had a firearm.
He discharged it, ultimately not only killing Mr. Martinez but
injuring and paralyzing [Daniele] and then also doing as far as
count 3, the mayhem on [Daniele]. So for those reasons I am not
going to disturb that jury finding and the motion to resentence
under [section] 1172.6 is denied.”
Peraza appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to eliminate the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of the
felony murder rule. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–
449 (Curiel).) Except in cases of felony murder, a principal must
act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and
malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 created a new procedure allowing
defendants convicted of murder under a now-invalid theory to
petition the sentencing court for retroactive relief under
section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
The Legislature later enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) to extend this retroactive relief to defendants
convicted of attempted murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory. (People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
860, 864.)

9
If the defendant files a facially sufficient petition under
section 1172.6, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c).) If the
defendant makes a prima facie showing, the court must hold an
evidentiary hearing. (Id., subd. (d).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of murder or attempted murder under a currently valid
theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “A finding that there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (Ibid.) Rather, the “trial court’s role in a section
1172.6 [evidentiary hearing] is to act as an independent fact
finder and determine, in the first instance, whether the petitioner
committed murder [or attempted murder] under the law as
amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Trent (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 251, 258.) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its
burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We independently review the trial court’s prima facie
finding under section 1172.6. (People v. Estrada (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337.) We review the trial court’s factual
findings following a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary
hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)

10
2. Any error in denying Peraza’s resentencing petition
was harmless
Peraza contends the trial court erred in finding he was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Peraza also
contends that the court applied the wrong standard of proof at
the evidentiary hearing because it deferred to the jury’s findings
and refused to make its own findings as to whether Peraza was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under currently valid theories
of murder and attempted murder. As we explain, we need not
determine whether the trial court erred in denying Peraza’s
resentencing petition because any error was harmless.
We apply the harmless error standard established in People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 to evaluate whether a defendant
was prejudiced by a trial court’s error in denying a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 973–974.) We apply the same standard to
determine whether a defendant was prejudiced by the trial
court’s application of the wrong standard of proof at the
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
(People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 716.) Under the
Watson standard, Peraza has the burden of showing it is
reasonably probable that he would have obtained a more
favorable result but for the trial court’s error in denying his
resentencing petition. (Lewis, at p. 974.)
Here, the jury found Peraza guilty of first degree murder
and premeditated attempted murder. The trial court instructed
the jury, however, that it could convict Peraza of either crime as
an aider and abettor under a natural and probable consequences
theory. Thus, the jury’s findings of guilt as to the murder and
attempted murder charges do not, on their own, establish Peraza

11
was convicted of murder and attempted murder under currently
valid theories of those offenses. (See People v. Morales (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1131 (Morales).)
But the jury also found true the firearm allegations under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), as to the murder and attempted
murder charges. Here, as reflected on the verdict form for the
murder charge, the jury found that Peraza “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, . . . which proximately caused
great bodily injury and death to Ruben Martinez.” As to the
attempted murder charge, the jury found that Peraza “personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm, . . . which proximately
caused great bodily injury” to Daniele.
While the jury’s true findings under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) do not, on their own, establish that Peraza acted
with malice aforethought or the intent to kill (see People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598–599), they do establish that
Peraza was Martinez’s actual killer and that he was a shooter in
Daniele’s attempted murder. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 460, 470 [the jury’s factual findings should be given
preclusive effect in resentencing proceedings under section
1172.6].) As we explain, under the circumstances of this case,
those findings establish that Peraza was the only shooter and the
direct perpetrator of both Martinez’s murder and Daniele’s
attempted murder.
At trial, it was undisputed that the perpetrator of both
crimes shot and killed Martinez and shot and injured Daniele
using the same gun. The People proceeded under a theory that
there was only one shooter. Their primary theory was that
Peraza was the shooter who killed Martinez and injured Daniele,
while their alternative theory was that Peraza was guilty as the

12
shooter’s aider and abettor. Although Peraza argued that the
People failed to prove that he was involved in the shooting, he did
not dispute that there was only one shooter. Indeed, at the
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing, Peraza’s
counsel conceded, “We are not disputing that there was one
shooter. [¶] . . . [¶] It’s clear it’s one shooter.”
The evidence presented at trial was consistent with a
theory that there was only one shooter. Alex testified that he
saw Peraza shoot Martinez and Daniele. Although he saw other
people carrying guns, Alex testified that Peraza was the only
person he saw fire shots. Daniele described only one shooter
when she testified about the shooting. The firearm expert
testified that all the shell casings recovered from the scene of the
shooting were fired from the same gun, and five of the six bullet
fragments were of the same caliber. The sixth bullet fragment
was too small to test. There was no evidence that multiple
shooters were involved in Martinez’s murder and Daniele’s
attempted murder.
By finding that Peraza personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing Martinez’s death and inflicting
great bodily injury on Daniele, the jury found that Peraza was
the only shooter and the direct perpetrator of the murder and the
attempted murder. (See Morales, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1132–1133.) Thus, the jury’s findings under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), show that the jury did not rely on an imputed
malice theory, including a natural and probable consequences
theory, in convicting Peraza of murder and attempted murder.
(Morales, at pp. 1132–1133.) The jury’s findings, therefore,
establish that Peraza was convicted under currently valid
theories of murder and attempted murder. (Ibid.)

13
Peraza points to the jury’s true findings sustaining the
principal-use firearm enhancement allegations to argue that the
jury may have relied on a natural and probable consequences
theory to convict him of murder and attempted murder.
According to Peraza, those findings support a theory that the jury
found only a principal, and not necessarily Peraza, shot and
killed Martinez and shot and injured Daniele. Under such a
theory, Peraza argues, the jury could have imputed malice to him
when it found him guilty of murder and attempted murder.
We disagree.
As the People point out, Peraza’s argument would have
merit if the jury did not also find that Peraza personally and
intentionally shot and killed Martinez and shot and injured
Daniele under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Those findings
are not negated by the jury’s findings sustaining the principal-
use firearm allegations under section 12022.53, subdivision (e).
In addition, the jury was never instructed that to sustain
the principal-use firearm enhancement allegations, it needed to
find someone other than Peraza was a principal in the murder
and the attempted murder. Nor was the jury otherwise
instructed that it could only sustain the principal-use firearm
allegations if it found Peraza aided and abetted the murder and
the attempted murder. Indeed, the court instructed the jury that
“principals” include both those who “aid and abet a crime and
those who directly perpetrate the crime.” (Italics added.)
Since the parties proceeded under a theory that there was
only one shooter, and because Peraza conceded at the evidentiary
hearing that there was only one shooter, the jury’s findings under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), establish that the jury found
that Peraza was the only shooter and direct perpetrator of both

14
Martinez’s murder and Daniele’s attempted murder. The jury’s
findings sustaining the principal-use firearm enhancement
allegations are entirely consistent with, and do not negate or
otherwise contradict, those findings.
In short, because the jury’s findings sustaining the
personal-use firearm enhancement allegations under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), establish that Peraza was
convicted under currently valid theories of murder and attempted
murder, the trial court was ultimately correct that Peraza was
not eligible to be resentenced. As a result, it is not reasonably
probable that Peraza would have received a more favorable result
but for any error in the trial court’s denial of his resentencing
petition during the evidentiary hearing. In other words, any
error in the trial court’s denial of Peraza’s petition was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Peraza’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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