CourtListener 10843483•People v. Lopez CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/15/26 P. v. Lopez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101201
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CF04168)
v.
RICHARD ISSAC STEELE LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
The trial court sentenced defendant Richard Issac Steele Lopez to an aggregate
term of eight years eight months in prison after a jury convicted him on three counts of
commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459).1 Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First,
he contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it found the aggravating factors true
and sentenced him to the upper term without first obtaining an express waiver of his right
to a jury trial or a stipulation to the aggravating factors. He also contends that his right to
due process was violated when the People failed to plead the aggravating factors the court
used to impose the upper term in the information. We agree the trial court violated
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
defendant’s right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors and that the error was not
harmless under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). Therefore, we
vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for a jury trial on the aggravating factors.
BACKGROUND
A detailed recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s convictions is
unnecessary for the issues raised on appeal. Briefly, in October 2023, officers responded
to a burglary at a shopping center in Oroville, California, where they found the door to an
ice cream shop kicked in, and multiple windows in the center shattered. Defendant was
identified as a person of interest. When officers found him, he had dried blood on his
hand and was covered in small pieces of glass. Defendant’s clothing matched that of the
person seen on surveillance video, and the GPS data recovered from his ankle monitor
placed him at the scene.
An amended information charged defendant with three counts of commercial
burglary (§ 459; counts 1-3). The information also alleged two prior strike convictions
for first degree burglary. (§§ 459, 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subds. (d), (b)-(j).) A jury
convicted defendant on all three counts. In bifurcated proceedings, defendant agreed to a
bench trial on the prior strike conviction allegations. The trial court found the two prior
strike allegations true.
At sentencing, the trial court reviewed the probation officer’s report and a prior
section 1368 evaluation. One section of the probation report referenced nine felony
convictions for defendant; however, another section included a table showing five felony
convictions and one misdemeanor conviction. The People explained that the discrepancy
arose because the first page of the table was missing from the report.
In pronouncing defendant’s sentence, the trial court acknowledged that defendant
“did not stipulate to the possible existence of aggravating factors nor did a jury find the
aggravating factors to be true.” The court took “judicial notice of its own case files” and
determined from those records that defendant had an “extensive prior criminal history
2
consisting of numerous prior felony convictions.” The court also found that defendant
was on Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) when he committed the current
offenses. Based on these findings, the court imposed the upper term of six years on count
1 and consecutive terms of 16 months on counts 2 and 3 for an aggregate prison term of
eight years eight months. The court also terminated defendant’s PRCS as unsuccessful
and imposed a sanction of 180 days to be served in prison, to run concurrent to
defendant’s current sentence. The court imposed the mandatory minimum restitution fine
of $300 and imposed and stayed a parole revocation fine in the same amount. It reserved
jurisdiction for victim restitution and imposed other fines and assessments.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury determine the aggravating factors that exposed him to
the upper term when it made findings on those factors without an express waiver of his
right to a jury trial. Defendant also contends the error requires reversal under Chapman
because the record does not establish that a jury would have found all the factors the
court relied on to impose the upper term true beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to his second claim, defendant contends that his right to due process was
violated when the trial court made findings on aggravating factors that were not alleged
in the information, and the error was not harmless. He asks this court to strike the
aggravating circumstances and remand for resentencing to the middle term or, in the
alternative, remand with instructions for the People to provide notice on the specific
aggravating factors it intends to rely on to urge the trial court to impose the upper term.
The People concede the trial court erred when it failed to obtain defendant’s
waiver of his right to a jury trial or a stipulation as to the aggravating factors it used to
impose the upper term. The People argue, however, that the error was harmless beyond a
3
reasonable doubt because a jury would have found all the aggravating factors the court
relied on to impose the upper term true beyond a reasonable doubt. As to defendant’s
second claim, the People argue there is no due process or statutory right to have the
aggravating factors pled in the information.
A. Right to a Jury Trial
We review questions about whether a defendant’s constitutional rights were
violated de novo. (People v. Palmer (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280.) If we determine
that a defendant’s right to a jury trial has been violated, we apply the harmless error
standard in Chapman. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768 (Lynch).) Under the
Chapman standard, we must reverse and remand a sentence imposed under section 1170,
subdivision (b), unless we conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper
term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
current statutory requirements.” (Lynch, at p. 768, italics added.)
1. Omission of Right to Jury Trial
It has long been established that under the Sixth Amendment, “any fact that
exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge,
and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.) In 2022, the
Legislature amended section 1170, subdivision (b), to limit a court’s discretion to impose
the upper term of a sentencing triad. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 757, 773.) Under
the current version of section 1170, subdivision (b), trial courts may impose a sentence
that exceeds the middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
4
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); see People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078
(Wiley).)
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), provides that, “Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” This provision is considered the state counterpart to the exception
the United States Supreme Court recognized in Almendarez-Torres v. United States
(1998) 523 U.S. 224 for findings regarding a defendant’s prior convictions. (Wiley,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1085-1086.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court clarified
in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger) that the Almendarez-Torres
exception to the jury trial requirement permits a judge to make findings regarding the fact
of a defendant’s prior conviction and the elements of the offense alone, nothing else. (Id.
at p. 837.)
In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court held that a jury was required to
determine whether a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions.
(Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838.) “[D]eciding whether those past offenses occurred
on three or more different occasions is a fact-laden task. . . . [¶] Judges may not assume
the jury’s factfinding function for themselves.” (Id. at p. 834.) The United States
Supreme Court confirmed that a trial court may “do no more, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.” (Id. at p. 838.) Any determination beyond the bare fact of a defendant’s
prior conviction and its elements must be made by a jury. (Ibid.)
Following Erlinger, our Supreme Court confirmed that “ “[v]irtually any fact” that
increases ‘a defendant’s exposure to punishment . . . must “be submitted to a jury” and
found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 761-762.) “This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is
‘ “ ‘straightforward.’ ” ’ ” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1084, quoting Erlinger, supra,
5
602 U.S. at p. 842.) Therefore, unless a defendant waives the right to a jury trial or
stipulates that the aggravating factors are true, under section 1170, subdivision (b), the
People must prove to a jury the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Wiley, at p. 1086.)
In Wiley, our Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the state counterpart to
the Almendarez-Torres exception codified in section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). (Wiley,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1085.) Our Supreme Court held that an inquiry into whether
defendant’s convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether his performance on
probation was poor involved “something more than a narrow factual finding that the
convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them.” (Id. at
pp. 1082-1083, 1085.) The defendant “was entitled to have a jury determine whether his
prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed
unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to
find justification for an upper term sentence.” (Id. at p. 1085.)
In holding that a jury was required to make these findings, our Supreme Court
noted that “expansive readings of the Almendarez-Torres exception,” like the one in
People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, “[did] not survive the high court’s more recent
pronouncements in Erlinger.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1085.) Specifically,
whether a defendant’s prior convictions are “of increasing seriousness” must be
determined by a jury. (Id. at pp. 1082-1083.) What the California Supreme Court
expressly did not decide is whether a defendant is entitled to have a jury determine if his
convictions are numerous. (Id. at p. 1085, fn. 9.) Even so, the California Supreme
Court’s reasoning and holding suggest that it is exactly the kind of issue that must be
determined by a jury—one that goes beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction. (Id. at
pp. 1084-1086.) For the same reason, the California’s Supreme Court’s analysis suggests
that a jury is required to determine whether defendant committed the offense while on
PRCS. (Ibid.)
6
For these reasons, we accept the People’s concession that, absent a waiver of his
right to a jury trial or an admission, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on these
aggravating factors. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086.)
2. Prejudice
The trial court failed to afford defendant his right to a jury trial, so we must now
determine whether defendant was prejudiced by that error using the Chapman standard.
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Under
Chapman, a sentence must be reversed “ ‘unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of
the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was
justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current
statute.’ ” (Wiley, at p. 1087, italics added.) “Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under
Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’
with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Ibid., quoting Neder v. United States
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19.)
In Wiley, our Supreme Court determined that the trial court’s omission of a jury
trial on the increasing seriousness of the defendant’s convictions and his unsatisfactory
performance on probation was prejudicial. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1087-1091.)
Because the inquiry into these factors is a “comparative and qualitative one,” it is
“ ‘ “ ‘difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been
submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as the
trial court. ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1089-1090.) The court could not conclude, therefore, that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
7
We reach a similar conclusion here. After taking judicial notice of its case files in
four of defendant’s cases,2 and noting the probation report’s reference to nine felonies,
the trial court found that defendant had an “extensive prior criminal history, consisting of
numerous prior felony convictions.” Beyond stating that defendant had numerous felony
convictions, the trial court did not describe any of the particulars of defendant’s criminal
history—the nature of the felonies or the temporal proximity of the felony convictions to
each other—that led it to conclude defendant’s prior criminal history was extensive.
Like the inquiry into the aggravating factors at issue in Wiley, the inquiry into
whether defendant’s prior convictions were extensive or numerous is a “comparative and
qualitative one.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) A jury reviewing the same
information the trial court did could conclude that having multiple felony convictions that
are in close temporal proximity, and that do not span decades, does not establish an
extensive prior criminal history or numerous prior felony convictions. A jury could also
conclude that a criminal history that includes convictions for misdemeanor trespass and
failure to appear, and which does not include offenses involving actual violence, does not
qualify as an extensive prior criminal history. The qualitative and comparative nature of
the inquiry, which could allow a jury to focus on different aspects of defendant’s history
than the trial court did, makes it “ ‘ “ ‘difficult . . . to conclude with confidence
that[] . . . the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial
court.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In concluding that a jury could have reached the opposite finding, “[w]e do not
suggest that one conclusion is more reasonable or more likely than the other.” (Wiley,
2 We note that section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), requires the use of certified records
of a defendant’s prior conviction. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1085.) The trial court’s
case files are not certified records of defendant’s convictions. (See Evid. Code, § 1530,
subd. (a); see also Evid. Code, § 452.5.) Therefore, the trial court’s reliance on its case
files was also erroneous.
8
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1089.) Only that it is possible that a rational jury viewing this
evidence “could conclude” the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had an extensive prior criminal history consisting of numerous felony
convictions. (Ibid.) Because it is possible a jury could reach a contrary finding on this
aggravating factor, we cannot conclude the deprivation of defendant’s right to a jury trial
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 1087, 1091.)
B. Pleading Notice of Aggravating Factors
Defendant contends that “California law and the constitutional principles
underlying [section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),] required the People to “plead and prove
any circumstances in aggravation.” Defendant’s argument that he had a right to notice of
the aggravating factors turns on language in section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), that a
defendant has a right to request a bifurcated trial on “circumstances in aggravation
alleged in the indictment or information” and language in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466 that any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
“ ‘ “charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. ” ’ ”
Because we are reversing on the ground that defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
were violated, we need not reach defendant’s pleading notice and due process claims.
9
DISPOSITION
We affirm defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a jury trial
on the aggravating sentencing factors.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Mauro, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Feinberg, J.
10
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.