People v. Steele CA2/6

CourtListener 10842650Calctapp14.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/14/26 P. v. Steele CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B340926
(Super. Ct. No. 24F-00050)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

MARC STEELE,

Defendant and Appellant.

Marc Steele appeals from the judgment entered after a jury
convicted him of possession of an assault weapon (count 5 – Pen.
Code, § 30605, subd. (a));1 two counts of possession of a firearm
by a felon (counts 3 and 7 – § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and two counts
of possession of ammunition by a felon (counts 4 and 6 – § 30305,
subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found true an allegation that
appellant had previously been convicted of a serious or violent
felony within the meaning of California’s “Three Strikes” law. (§§
667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant was sentenced to prison for eight years, eight
months. The sentence included a consecutive term of eight
months on each of counts 6 (possession of ammunition by a felon)
and count 7 (possession of a firearm by a felon). Appellant
contends section 654 prohibits punishing him for both of these
offenses because they involved “the same indivisible course of
conduct based on the same intent.” We disagree and affirm.
Underlying Facts and Trial Court’s Sentence
Appellant’s convictions were based on two separate
incidents. Counts 3 and 4 were based on his possession of a
firearm (count 3) and ammunition (count 4) on January 3, 2024.
The trial court sentenced appellant to three years on count 3 and
stayed execution of the sentence on count 4 pursuant to section
654. We are not concerned with these counts.
The counts at issue – 5, 6, and 7 – were based on crimes
committed on January 5, 2024. As to these counts, the
ammunition (count 6) and the firearm (counts 5 and 7) were
inside a garage that had been converted into a bedroom. In the
bedroom a detective found mail addressed to appellant and a
traffic citation issued to appellant.
Counts 5 and 7 involved the same firearm – an “AR-15
rifle” – that was “between . . . two pieces of furniture.” The
firearm’s “magazine well” contained a magazine loaded with live
“.223 rifle rounds.” Appellant was not charged for possessing the
ammunition inside the firearm. Count 6 was based on another
“loaded AR-15” magazine that was inside the pocket of a jacket
that was draped over a chair in the bedroom.
The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 8 months
on each of counts 6 and 7. It denied appellant’s request to stay
execution of the sentence on count 6 pursuant to section 654. It

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stayed execution of the sentence on count 5 because that count
and count 7 involved the same firearm.
Accordingly, the aggregate sentence was four years, four
months, which was doubled because of the prior strike.
Section 654
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “An
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” “ ‘Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act
within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and
objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one
objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such
offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5
Cal.4th 1203, 1208.)
“ ‘Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. [Citations.] We review the trial court’s determination in
the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the
existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Latten (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 574,
577.)
Appellant’s Argument
Appellant argues: “[T]here was no evidence appellant had
multiple intents or objectives in possessing the firearm and the
ammunition. Here, both items were stored in close proximity in
the same room. . . . Appellant intended to have an operational

3
firearm, and to find separate intents and objectives would be
parsing the objectives too finely.” “Appellant’s convictions . . .
were based on one continuous course of conduct not separated in
time or place.” “Because the offense of unlawful possession of
ammunition arose from the same course of conduct relied upon to
sustain a conviction for counts five, unlawful possession of an
assault weapon, and count seven, unlawful possession of a
firearm (same weapon), the sentence as to count six, felon in
possession of ammunition should have been stayed.”
Substantial Evidence Supports Trial Court’s
Finding that Section 654 Is Inapplicable
Both the People and appellant cite this court’s opinion in
People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132 (Lopez). There, the
defendant was charged with felon in possession of a firearm and
unlawful possession of ammunition. We held, “Where, as here,
all of the ammunition is loaded into the firearm, an ‘indivisible
course of conduct’ is present and section 654 precludes multiple
punishment.” (Id. at p. 138.) We concluded that the defendant’s
“obvious intent was to possess a loaded firearm.” (Ibid.)
Lopez is distinguishable. All of the ammunition here was
not loaded into the firearm. Count 6 was based on ammunition
found inside the pocket of a jacket that was draped over a chair
in the bedroom. Since the firearm contained a loaded magazine,
the trial court could have reasonably inferred that appellant
possessed extra ammunition inside the jacket’s pocket for the
purpose of reloading the firearm after the first magazine had
been emptied.
Thus, unlike the defendant in Lopez, appellant did not just
have an intent “to possess a loaded firearm.” (Lopez, supra, 119
Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) Substantial evidence supports the

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existence of multiple intents and objectives. Accordingly, section
654 does not prohibit punishment for both possession of the
loaded firearm and possession of additional ammunition inside
the jacket’s pocket.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

5
Catherine J. Swysen, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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