CourtListener 10840446•People v. Arias CA2/7
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Filed 4/9/26 P. v. Arias CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339046
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA120755)
v.
ALVARO ARIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez and Seth
P. McCutcheon, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Alvaro Arias appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of, among other crimes, robbery, willfully inflicting
corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on someone
with whom he had a dating relationship, and driving or taking a
vehicle without consent of the owner and with intent to deprive
the owner of title or possession. Arias argues that substantial
evidence did not support his conviction for unlawfully driving or
taking a vehicle, that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
request certain jury instructions, and that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to strike his prior serious or violent felony
conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Arias Assaults His Girlfriend, Takes Her Phone, and
Drives Away with Her Car
On October 9, 2022 Arias and his girlfriend Bertha Caceres
got into an argument at Caceres’s workplace. Caceres told Arias
that she did not want to date him anymore and that they should
go their separate ways because he had been hitting her. Caceres
also confronted Arias about messages she had seen earlier that
day on Arias’s phone that caused her to suspect Arias was
cheating on her. Arias responded by hitting her on the left side of
the face. Caceres hit him in the forehead with a pair of scissors,
and Arias ran away.
The next day, while Caceres and Arias were in Caceres’s
car, they continued the argument from the previous day.
2
Caceres, who was driving, told Arias that she wanted to end the
relationship. Arias reached over and turned the car’s engine off
while the car was in the middle of the street. When Caceres tried
to restart her car, Arias told her to pull into a driveway so they
could talk. After Arias agreed he would leave her alone if she
parked the car, Caceres pulled into a parking lot.
Caceres told Arias that she did not want to be around him
and that she was going to “leave the city.” Arias reacted by
“tackling” her, grabbing her around the neck, and choking her
until she was unable to breathe. Caceres felt as if her “breath
was going out.” Caceres tried to get away, but Arias grabbed her
by her hair and pulled “a lot” of it out. Arias hit Caceres three
times in the “chest area.” Caceres realized her phone had fallen
onto the floor of the car and began to look for it. She saw a gun
under Arias’s leg. At some point while Caceres was still in the
car, Arias moved the gun to his lap.
Caceres opened the door of her car to get out and saw her
phone on the seat. Arias said, “Your phone’s right there,” and
Caceres grabbed it. Caceres walked across the parking lot, and
Arias moved into the driver’s seat of Caceres’s car and followed
her. Arias got out of the car, walked to where Caceres was
standing, and told her, “Get in the fucking car.” Caceres told
Arias that she was not getting in the car and that she did not feel
safe with him. Arias grabbed Caceres around her neck, tried to
pull her into the car, and eventually threw her to the ground.
Arias told Caceres, “Give me your fucking phone.” Arias
“snatched” Caceres’s phone out of her hand and said: “Fuck you,
bitch. Watch, bitch, watch, I’m going to get your mom and your
kid.” Arias ran to Caceres’s car and drove away.
3
Caceres asked a stranger to call the police. Officer Jesse
McHenry and his partner responded to the call and interviewed
Caceres in the parking lot. Caceres described the assault and
told the officers that she wanted to “press charges” against Arias
for stealing her car, that she was afraid Arias would use his gun
on her, and that Arias had a tattoo of a professional football team
logo on the left side of his head. Caceres said that Arias “took
everything,” including her phone, identification, and house keys
(which she had left in the car) and that her mother and daughter
were in the car.1
Three days later, police officers conducted a traffic stop
while Caceres was driving her car, and Arias was sitting in the
front passenger seat. Referring to the October 10, 2022 incident,
the officer asked Caceres whether Arias, after hitting Caceres,
took her car “without permission.” Caceres said, “Yeah.”
Another officer recovered a firearm from the car, and Caceres
said it belonged to Arias. During the traffic stop one of the
officers saw Arias had a tattoo of the same football team logo on
his head and asked Arias to state his name. Arias said that his
name was David Arias, that his brother was Alvaro Arias, and
that he and his brother had the same tattoos.
1 Counsel for defendant acknowledged in his closing
argument that, after the altercation, Arias “drove to the house
with the mother and the daughter.” There is some evidence,
however, Caceres’s mother and daughter were at home at the
time of the assault. Arias does not challenge Caceres’s statement
her mother and daughter were in the car when he drove away
from the parking lot.
4
B. At Trial Caceres Recants Her Statements to the Police;
The People Impeach Caceres and Present Evidence of
Arias’s Guilt
At trial Caceres testified she and Arias got into an
argument on October 10, 2022 because she saw pictures of
another woman on Arias’s phone and confronted him about them.
Caceres denied that anything happened while she and Arias were
in the car and explained they had “just [an] argument” before she
got out of the car and walked away. When asked about her prior
statements to the police describing the assault, Caceres explained
she made up the statements “out of anger.” Caceres testified she
did not remember telling the police that she saw Arias had a gun
or that, when she got out of the car, Arias had moved the gun to
his lap. Caceres denied that Arias told her to get back in the car
and said that Arias got out of the car, walked toward her, and
then “left.” Caceres stated that she wanted to walk home because
she “didn’t want to keep on going with the argument” and that
Arias just drove away. Caceres admitted that she was crying in
the parking lot and that she asked a stranger to call the police.
Caceres said she did not recall telling the police that Arias hit her
in the face, grabbed her, tried to strangle her, pulled out some of
her hair, or took her phone from her hand.
The prosecutor played for the jury a surveillance video of
the parking lot that captured the interaction between Arias and
Caceres outside the car. Referring to a segment of the video, the
prosecutor asked Caceres, “Do you not want to tell us that he
punched you in the face twice . . . is that correct?” Caceres
replied, “Well, you’re looking at it.” When the prosecutor asked
whether Caceres told the officers that Arias had choked her,
Caceres said, “Yeah, it’s on the video.” Referring to another
5
segment, the prosecutor asked Caceres, “So he takes you to the
ground, is that correct?” Caceres replied, “Yeah.” Caceres
refused to confirm the video showed Arias holding her head down
on the ground, but she admitted the video showed her lying on
the ground of the parking lot when Arias got into her car and
drove off.
Caceres testified she told the officers that she wanted to
end the relationship with Arias because he was cheating on her.
Caceres stated that the phone Arias took from her hand was
really his phone and that she told the police it was her phone
because she was angry with him. Caceres stated that Arias
brought her car back to her house the next day, that she and
Arias “shared” the car, that he had “his own spare key,” that he
helped her with insurance payments, and that she was never
concerned Arias would not bring the car back. Caceres said that
she still loved Arias and that she did not want to see anything
bad happen to him.
Officer McHenry testified that, when he interviewed
Caceres in the parking lot on October 10, 2022, she “was highly
emotional, scared of what had just happened, and just shaken up
altogether.” The officer stated he observed “swelling and bruising
to the left side of her face.” Officer McHenry recalled Caceres
told him that Arias did not have her permission to take her car
that day. The officer testified that Caceres “consistently” referred
to the phone Arias had taken from her as “her phone” and that,
when Caceres needed to call her mother, she had to use another
officer’s phone. Officer McHenry stated that he saw “quite a few”
strands of hair on Caceres’s jacket and that Caceres told him that
Arias pulled her hair in the car.
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C. The Jury Convicts Arias, and the Trial Court
Sentences Him
The jury found Arias guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),2
willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic
condition on someone with whom he had a dating relationship
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)), driving or taking a vehicle without consent of
the owner and with intent to deprive the owner of title or
possession (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), possessing a firearm
as a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), carrying a loaded firearm on his
person or in a vehicle (§ 25850, subd. (a)), unlawfully possessing
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and falsely representing or
identifying himself as another person to a peace officer (§ 148.9,
subd. (a)). The trial court found true the allegation Arias had a
prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of
the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). Arias admitted, and the court found true,
aggravating circumstances under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3) and (b)(4). The court imposed an aggregate
prison term of 10 years eight months. Arias timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supported Arias’s Conviction
Under Vehicle Code Section 10851, Subdivision (a)
Arias argues substantial evidence did not support his
conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle because
Caceres had given him “blanket consent” to drive her car and
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
7
there was no evidence Caceres had “revoked” her consent on
October 10, 2022, when Arias drove the car away.3 There is no
merit to this argument.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] This
determination ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.’” (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821; see
People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) “‘Because the
sufficiency of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must
examine the record independently for “‘“substantial evidence.”’”
(Navarro, at p. 302.) “We do not question the credibility of a
witness’s testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently improbable,’
nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any particular item of
3 Arias also contends the evidence showed “he did not have
the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Caceres of
ownership or possession of her car,” but he does not provide any
argument or authority on this point. Therefore, he has forfeited
the argument. (See People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997,
1124, fn. 39; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People
v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 467.)
8
evidence.” (Ibid.) “We must also “‘accept logical inferences that
the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’”
(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Conviction
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), provides: “Any
person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without
the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to
permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or
her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without
intent to steal the vehicle . . . is guilty of a public offense . . . .”
(See People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135; People v. Garza
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871.) “To establish a defendant’s guilt of
violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the
prosecution is required to prove that the defendant drove or took
a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner’s
consent, and that the defendant had the specific intent to
permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or
possession.” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.)
“[N]onconsent of the owner is a necessary element of the crime of
the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle.” (People v. Lam
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301.)
Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding Arias did
not have Caceres’s consent to take her car after he beat her up
and threatened to harm her mother and daughter. Caceres told
officers on two occasions (October 10, 2022 and October 13, 2022)
Arias did not have permission to take her car. (See People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 281 [“It is well settled that ‘unless
the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
9
conviction.’”].) Aside from this direct evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer Arias did not have Caceres’s permission to drive
her car away because Arias had a gun, he physically assaulted
her before driving away in her car, and he left her in the middle
of the parking lot. And Officer McHenry found Caceres
frightened and distraught, with visible injuries on her face. (See
People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 34 [“‘“‘Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime
and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’”].)
Arias argues that he had “permission to drive [Caceres’s]
car at will” and that there was no evidence, other than her
statements to the police officers, Caceres revoked that permission
before Arias drove away in her car. But the direct evidence of
Caceres’s statements, along with circumstantial evidence, was
substantial evidence Arias did not have Caceres’s permission to
drive away in her car. Arias is essentially arguing Caceres’s
general permission to use her car meant he had an unconditional
right to take the car at any time and under any circumstances,
unless Caceres expressly told him he could no longer drive her
car. Arias does not cite any authority for this argument, thus
forfeiting it. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 335, 363; People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1061.) Arias’s argument also lacks merit. Vehicle Code section
10851, subdivision (c), states: “In any prosecution for a violation
of subdivision (a) or (b), the consent of the owner of a vehicle to
its taking or driving shall not in any case be presumed or implied
because of the owner’s consent on a previous occasion to the
taking or driving of the vehicle by the same or a different person.”
Thus, even if Caceres at some point gave Arias permission to
10
drive her car, that permission did not allow him to drive her car
after he beat her up.
Arias asserts there was no evidence he obtained Caceres’s
keys by force. Use of force, however, is not an element of a
violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The
crime of carjacking requires the defendant to take a motor vehicle
by means of force or fear; the crime of unlawfully taking a vehicle
does not. (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034; see
People v. Hudson (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 838 [“‘mere vehicle
theft becomes carjacking if the perpetrator, having gained
possession of the motor vehicle without use of force or fear,
resorts to force or fear while driving off with the vehicle’”]; People
v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 418-419 [“The
carjacking offense omits the ‘driving’ element of Vehicle Code
section 10851 and adds to it the element of securing the vehicle
from the immediate presence of the victim or the passenger by
force or fear.”].) In any event, there was evidence Arias used
force: He was armed with a firearm, struck and choked Caceres,
and threatened her and her family.
Citing Caceres’s testimony she thought of him “as family
and wanted to marry him,” Arias attempts to characterize
himself as a quasi-owner. That attempt fails. Caceres testified
the car was a gift to her and was registered in her name. That
Arias had a spare key or helped maintain the car did not make
him a co-owner. Arias lost his temper and assaulted Caceres
because she tried to break up with him in the car. The jury could
reasonably infer any permission Caceres may have given Arias to
drive her car ended when she told him she no longer wanted to be
in a relationship with him and he beat her up in the parking lot
and threatened her family.
11
B. Counsel for Arias Did Not Provide Ineffective
Assistance
Arias argues we should reverse his conviction for
unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle because his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to request an
instruction on the mistake of fact defense, as stated in CALCRIM
No. 3406.4 Arias argues we should also reverse his robbery
conviction because his counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to request CALCRIM No. 3406 for that crime and an
instruction on the defense of claim of right. None of these
arguments has merit.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance
was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
4 CALCRIM No. 3406 states: “The defendant is not guilty
of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental
state required to commit the crime because (he/she) . . . did not
know a fact or . . . mistakenly believed a fact. [¶] If the
defendant’s conduct would have been lawful under the facts as
(he/she) . . . believed them to be, (he/she) did not commit <insert
crime[s]>. [¶] If you find that the defendant actually believed
that <insert alleged mistaken facts> . . . , (he/she) did not have the
specific intent or mental state required for <insert crime[s]>. [¶]
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had
the specific intent or mental state required for <insert crime[s]>,
you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that crime/those crimes).”
(Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2025)
CALCRIM No. 3406.)
12
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.’” [Citation.] Regarding deficient
performance, ‘“Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we
shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide
range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and
inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.”’
[Citation.] When the record on direct appeal sheds no light on
why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, defendant
must show that there was “‘“no conceivable tactical purpose”’ for
counsel’s act or omission.”’” (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th
629, 679 (Aguirre); see People v. Windfield (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
496, 520.)
“To establish prejudice, a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel ‘must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (Aguirre,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 706; see People v. Windfield, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) “That probability must be sufficient to
undermine confidence in the verdicts.” (Windfield, at p. 520; see
People v. Kaihea (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 257, 268 [“‘The likelihood
of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.’”].)
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2. Counsel’s Failure To Request a Mistake-of-fact
Instruction on the Vehicle Code Section 10851,
Subdivision (a), Charge Was Not Ineffective
Assistance
The court instructed the jury on the elements of a violation
of Vehicle Code section 10851: “(1) The defendant took someone
else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent; and (2) when the
defendant took the vehicle, he intended to temporarily deprive
the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle; and (3) the
vehicle was worth more than $950.” Mistake of fact “is . . . an
assertion by the defendant that a particular factual error in his
perception of the world led him to lack the mens rea required for
the crime.” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 940; see
People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 345 [“A ‘mistake of
fact’ defense negates an element of a charged crime because it
disproves criminal intent.”].) However, the “‘defense’ of mistake
of fact requires, at a minimum, an actual belief ‘in the existence
of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act with which
the person is charged an innocent act.’” (People v. Lawson (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 108, 115; accord, People v. Zinda (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 871, 880; see People v. Watt (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1218 [“A mistake of fact must be in good
faith.”].) “The trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to give
a mistake of fact instruction.” (People v. Speck (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791.)
Arias has not shown his counsel had “no conceivable
tactical purpose” (Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 679, internal
quotation marks omitted) for not requesting a mistake-of-fact
instruction. Counsel could have rationally concluded that
substantial evidence did not support such an instruction (see
14
People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1049 [“‘“[a] trial court
need give a requested instruction concerning a defense only if
there is substantial evidence to support the defense”’”]; see also
People v. Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 791 [“where a
defendant presents substantial evidence on mistake of fact and
the instruction is legally correct,” the court is “required to give
such an instruction on request”]) and that therefore a request
would have been futile. (See People v. Wilson (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1034 [“‘Counsel does not render ineffective
assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel
reasonably determines would be futile.’”]; People v. Smith (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 298, 313, fn. 24 [because substantial evidence did
not support giving an instruction on involuntary manslaughter,
counsel was not ineffective for failing to request one].)
Caceres’s testimony did not support a reasonable inference
Arias actually believed Caceres consented to him driving off with
her car. To be sure, Caceres testified Arias regularly drove her
car. But she also admitted (after the jury saw the security
footage of the parking lot, the videos of her interviews with the
officers, and photographs of her injuries) that Arias hit her twice
in the face and threw her to the ground and that she asked a
stranger to call 911. This evidence supported the reasonable
inference that Arias knew he did not have Caceres’s permission
to drive off with her car, not that he actually but mistakenly
believed she gave him consent to take her car.
Arias also cannot show prejudice. The evidence Arias
assaulted and threatened Caceres, as she first described the
incident to the police officers, was overwhelming. Officer
McHenry described Caceres’s initial description of the attack, and
the surveillance video and the video recording of Caceres’s
15
interview corroborated his testimony. Arias has not shown it is
reasonably probable that, had his trial counsel requested an
instruction on mistake of fact (and assuming the court gave the
instruction), the jury would have found he mistakenly believed,
after the violent assault inside and outside the car, Caceres
permitted him to drive her car away. (See People v. Garcia (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 887, 900 [where “the evidence of [the] defendant’s
guilt was overwhelming,” the defendant failed to show “it is
reasonably probable she could have obtained a more favorable
determination in the absence of counsel’s alleged failings”];
People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1311 [counsel’s
failure to request pinpoint instructions did not prejudice the
defendant because the evidence against him was overwhelming].)
Arias argues that, given Caceres’s “prior permission, the
fact that she left the car and indicated to [Arias] that she did not
want to get back into the car is substantial evidence that [he] had
a good faith belief that he still had [her] consent to drive off with
the car” and that, “had the jury been properly instructed on
mistake of fact, at least one juror may not have voted to convict
[him].” It is unclear how Caceres’s unwillingness to get back in
the car with Arias (who was armed and had just beaten her up)
indicates Arias believed Caceres consented to him taking her car
at that point. Caceres’s refusal to get back into the car reflected,
if anything, her fear of being anywhere near Arias, and she told
him as much.
16
3. Counsel’s Failure To Request a Mistake-of-fact
Instruction on the Robbery Charge Was Not
Ineffective Assistance
The court instructed the jury on the elements of robbery:
“1. The defendant took property that was not his own; 2. The
property was in the possession of another person; 3. The property
was taken from the other person or her immediate presence;
4. The property was taken against the person’s will; 5. The
defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the
person from resisting; and 6. When the defendant used force, he
intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently or to
remove the property from the owner’s possession for so extended
a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major
portion of the value or enjoyment of the property.” As discussed,
an actual but mistaken belief “‘in the existence of circumstances’”
may negate the mental state element of a crime. (People v.
Lawson, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 115; see id. at p. 118 [“an
instruction on the defense of mistake of fact would have served
. . . to negate the mental state element of the crime of theft by
larceny”].)
Whether there was substantial evidence to support a
mistake-of-fact instruction on the robbery charge is a close call.
Citing the evidence that Caceres “had the phone in her
possession” and that “the dispute had arisen because she believed
that his phone contained evidence of infidelity,” Arias argues
“there was substantial evidence that [he] could have mistaken
Caceres’s phone for his own,” While that evidence may have
suggested Arias mistakenly believed he was taking back his
phone, it is unclear whether the evidence suggested he had “an
actual belief” (People v. Lawson, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at
17
p. 115) the phone was his. There was no evidence, for example,
the two phones looked alike. Indeed, Caceres testified her phone
had a cover and Arias’s phone was black, and the two phones had
different operating systems. (Cf. People v. Speck, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 791 [where the defendant testified he
believed the person from whom he borrowed the car was the
rightful owner, substantial evidence supported a mistake-of-fact
instruction]; People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430
[defendant’s testimony “he thought the motorcycle was
abandoned,” along with corroborating evidence, supported a
mistake-of-fact instruction], disapproved on another ground in
People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874, fn. 14.)
In any event, even if substantial evidence supported the
instruction, and even if Arias’s trial counsel had no tactical
reason for not requesting the instruction (see Aguirre, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 679), Arias cannot show the failure to request a
mistake-of-fact instruction prejudiced him because the evidence
Arias knowingly took Caceres’s phone was overwhelming.
Caceres told the officers several times during interview Arias
took her phone; Arias demanded that Caceres give him her phone
before he took it from her; Caceres asked a stranger to call
911 and used an officer’s phone to call her mother. There is no
reasonable probability that, had counsel requested an instruction
on mistake of fact (and had the court given such an instruction),
the jury would have found Arias mistakenly believed he was
taking his phone from Caceres. (See id. at p. 706.)
18
4. Counsel’s Failure To Request an Instruction on
Claim of Right on the Robbery Charge Was Not
Ineffective Assistance
“‘The claim-of-right defense provides that a defendant’s
good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that he has a right or
claim to property he takes from another negates the felonious
intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.”5 (People v.
Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 872; accord, People v. Tufunga
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938; see People v. Williams (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1528 [“The claim-of-right defense is based
on the sound concept that a person who acts under a good faith
belief that he is repossessing his own property lacks felonious
intent to deprive another of his or her property.”].) A “claim of
right may be based on a mistake of fact regarding the defendant’s
right to take property, as long as the belief is held in good
faith. Thus, the defenses can overlap.” (People v. Russell, supra,
144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.) The trial court does not have a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of claim of right.
(Covarrubias, at p. 874 & fn. 14.)
Here, even if counsel should have requested an instruction
on the claim-of-right defense, Arias cannot show any such failure
5 Arias does not specify the instruction or language the court
should have given on the defense of claim of right. CALCRIM
No. 1863, titled “Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right
(Pen. Code, § 511),” states: “If the defendant obtained property
under a claim of right, (he/she) did not have the intent required
for the crime of (theft/ [or] robbery). [¶] The defendant obtained
property under a claim of right if (he/she) believed in good faith
that (he/she) had a right to the specific property or a specific
amount of money, and (he/she) openly took it. [¶] In deciding
19
prejudiced him. (See Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 706.) As
discussed, the evidence that the phone belonged to Caceres and
that Arias knew the phone was Caceres’s was overwhelming. In
addition to Caceres’s statements to the police that Arias took her
phone, Arias’s comments during his assault of Caceres (as she
described it to the officers) confirmed Arias knew he was taking
Caceres’s phone. He told Caceres that her phone was on the seat
of the car before she picked it up and got out of the car and, as he
threw Caceres on the ground, he said, “Give me your fucking
phone.” Thus, even if counsel should have asked for a claim-of-
right instruction, it was not reasonably probable the jury would
have found Arias took his phone or took Caceres’s phone under a
good faith belief he had a right do so.
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining
To Strike Arias’s Prior Serious or Violent Felony
Conviction
Arias argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike his
prior serious or violent felony conviction because, according to
Arias, he was a “‘youthful offender’” when he committed the prior
whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to the
property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith,
consider all the facts known to (him/her) at the time (he/she)
obtained the property, along with all the other evidence in the
case. The defendant may hold a belief in good faith even if the
belief is mistaken or unreasonable. But if the defendant was
aware of facts that made that belief completely unreasonable, you
may conclude that the belief was not held in good faith.”
(Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2025)
CALCRIM No. 1863.)
20
felony and the court “did not appear to take into consideration
[his] age at the time he committed the strike prior.” The court
did not abuse its discretion.
1. Relevant Proceedings
The People alleged Arias was subject to sentencing under
the three strikes law because he was convicted in 2007 of
kidnapping (§ 207), a serious and violent felony. Before trial
commenced in this case, Arias’s original counsel filed a motion
under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike the prior
conviction. Arias’s original counsel stated that Arias committed
his prior felony when he was 25 years old and that “a long prison
sentence enhanced by mistakes of his youth are not what the
[three strikes] law was created for or to enhance.” At some point
after the jury convicted Arias, the court appointed new counsel
for Arias. Arias’s new attorney filed another motion under
Romero, listing four circumstances in mitigation: Arias’s prior
conviction occurred in 2007, the injuries in this case “were
minimal,” Arias had dropped out of gang life, and Caceres wanted
the court to release Arias “immediately.” The second Romero
motion (unlike the first) did not discuss Arias’s youth at the time
he committed his prior serious or violent felony.
As discussed, at the sentencing hearing the court found
that Arias had a prior serious or violent felony conviction within
the meaning of the three strikes law and found true (after Arias’s
admission) aggravating circumstances under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(3) and (b)(4). The prosecutor pointed out the
“brutality” of Arias’s crime in this case, his “lack of remorse,” and
that Arias had served 14 years in prison on a kidnapping
conviction. The prosecutor asked the court to impose an
21
aggregate prison term of 14 years eight months. Members of
Arias’s family testified and asked the court for leniency in
sentencing him. Counsel for Arias asked the court to sentence
Arias to a prison term of six years, which apparently was the
People’s pretrial offer.
The court found Arias’s conduct “was really, really serious,
especially in light of the fact that it occurred almost immediately
after he was released from prison, after being there for quite
some time.” The court did not discuss Arias’s age at the time he
committed his prior felony. The court expressed its “extreme
concern” over Arias’s “fundamental disregard for the respect of
other people in this case.” After stating that it had considered
the statements in mitigation, the court sentenced Arias to a
prison term of 10 years eight months. In particular, on Arias’s
robbery conviction, the court imposed the middle term of three
years, doubled under the three strikes law; on his conviction for
violating section 273.5, subdivision (a), the court imposed a term
of one year (one-third the middle term of three years), doubled; on
his conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a), eight months (one-third the middle term of two
years), doubled; and on the conviction for violating 29800,
subdivision (a)(1), eight months (one-third the middle term of
two years), doubled. The trial court imposed and stayed
execution of the sentences on the remaining counts under section
654.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 “a trial court may
dismiss a strike allegation or finding in the interests of justice.”
(People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089, 1097.) “‘[I]n ruling
22
whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony
conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on
its own motion, “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to . . .
[section 1385, subdivision (a),] or in reviewing such a ruling, the
court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’” (People v. Dain (2025)
18 Cal.5th 246, 256-257; see People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th
416, 428; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377
(Carmony).) “Thus, the Three Strikes law establishes a ‘strong
presumption’ in favor of a harsher sentence and requires the
court to explicitly articulate its reasoning if it is to depart from a
harsher sentence by granting the Romero motion.” (Salazar, at
p. 428; see Carmony, at p. 378.) “While a court must explain its
reasons for striking a prior [citations], no similar requirement
applies when a court declines to strike a prior [citation]. ‘The
absence of such a requirement merely reflects the legislative
presumption that a court acts properly whenever it sentences a
defendant in accordance with the three strikes law.’” (In re Large
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550; accord, In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th
524, 560; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.)
A court’s “failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374;
accord, People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093; People
v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 856.) A court “will only
23
abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction
allegation in limited circumstances,” such as “where the trial
court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss [citation],” or
“where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to
dismiss.” (Carmony, at p. 378; accord, People v. Nunez (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 362, 371.) “Where the record is silent [citation],
or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in
conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial
court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first
instance.’” (Carmony, at p. 378; accord, People v. Brugman,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The defendant’s age when he or she committed the prior
serious or violent felony “is plainly relevant to the nature and
circumstances of the strikes and could be a mitigating factor.”
(People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142.) The trial
record contained ample information about Arias’s age at the time
he committed his prior felony. The information included Arias’s
date of birth (December 2, 1981) and the date of the alleged prior
conviction (January 25, 2007), and in the Romero motion counsel
for Arias pointed out the date of Arias’s prior felony conviction.
The evidence at trial included Caceres’s statement (in 2022)
Arias would turn 41 years old later that year. From this
information and evidence the court could readily calculate Arias’s
age at the time he committed the kidnapping, for which he served
14 years in prison. The Romero motion Arias’s original trial
attorney filed asked the court to strike Arias’s prior felony
conviction in light of his relative youth when he committed that
24
felony. We presume the court considered Arias’s youth (along
with other relevant factors) in deciding not to exercise its
discretion to strike Arias’s prior felony conviction. (See Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v. Brugman, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.)
Contrary to Arias’s assertion, the trial court’s failure to
discuss Arias’s age at the time he committed his prior serious or
violent felony does not mean the court did not consider it. As the
Supreme Court stated, “‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking
the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.”’” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
Arias’s reliance on the trial court’s silence (or on the court’s
discussion of other factors) does not meet his burden to prove
error on appeal. (See People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310 [“the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on
the violence and potential violence of appellant’s crimes does not
mean that it considered only that factor”]; see also People v. Allen
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 330 [same].)
Citing People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, at page 862,
Arias argues that, despite the presumption the court “correctly
applied the law on a silent record,” “there still must be evidence
that the ‘court engaged in a reasoned exercise of judgment based
on an examination of the particular circumstances of [the] case.’”
Arias’s reliance on Crandell is misplaced. The statement Arias
quotes from the Crandell opinion has to do with the defendant’s
request for appointment of advisory counsel. (Ibid.) Arias does
25
not explain how that discussion relates to the trial court’s
exercise of discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a), or
Romero.
Citing People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, at
page 417, Arias argues we “should not assume that the trial court
implicitly considered a defendant’s youth when ‘the court did not
mention the subject in its otherwise comprehensive ruling.’” In
Pittman the defendant appealed from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. (Pittman, at
p. 403.) The court observed that “a defendant’s youth . . . is a
factor within the totality of circumstances relevant to the
requisite mental state for felony murder” and concluded that,
because the trial court did not discuss the defendant’s youth at
the time he committed second degree murder, the court in
Pittman could not “assume the trial court implicitly considered”
that factor. (Id. at p. 417.) The court directed the superior court
“to consider how, if at all, [the defendant’s] youth impacted his
ability to form the requisite mental state for second degree
murder.” (Id. at p. 418.) The task of the superior court under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), however, is to determine if the
People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant “‘is
guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by [the
Legislature’s] changes to Section 188 or 189.’” (Pittman, at
p. 413; see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)). That inquiry is very different
from the trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), whether to dismiss a defendant’s prior serious or
violent felony “in furtherance of justice.”
26
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
27
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