CourtListener 10839935•Durack v. Givens CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/9/26 Durack v. Givens CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ALEXSEI DURACK et al., B333043
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV20402)
DERMOT GIVENS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Christie Gaumer and Christie Gaumer for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
Plaintiffs and appellants Alexsei Durack (Durack) and
Colin Fulford (Fulford) appeal from a judgment entered after a
bench trial concerning a land sale installment contract. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
We summarize the trial court’s factual findings, which are
unchallenged on appeal. (See Dominguez v. Financial Indemnity
Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 392; City of Merced v. American
Motorists Ins. Co. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1322).
In 1988, Durack and Fulford purchased a unit in a
condominium complex located on North Formosa Avenue in
Los Angeles (unit). They moved out in 1995.
Dermot Givens (Givens) owned another unit in the same
condominium complex. On April 30, 2012, the parties signed a
land sale installment contract (contract) drafted by Durack.
Givens agreed to buy the unit from Durack and Fulford for
$425,000, paying $50,000 as a down payment and paying $2,495
per month for 30 years. The monthly payments were amortized
to include interest. Givens agreed to complete repairs in the unit
and to pay property taxes and homeowners association fees.
From May 2012 through May 2019, Givens made the
monthly $2,495 payments to Durack and Fulford. Givens also
spent almost $54,000 to remodel the unit.
On May 9, 2019, Givens sent an e-mail to Fulford asking
for a buyout price for the unit. On May 12, 2019, Fulford
responded that Givens had breached the contract, owed $2,745 in
late fees, and was occupying the unit as a renter. Durack and
Fulford demanded that Givens pay them $16,259 within three
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days or they would not provide Givens the opportunity to
purchase the unit and would instead forward him a rental
agreement.
Givens filed a lawsuit on May 14, 2019, alleging contract
and fraud claims against Fulford and seeking specific
performance of the contract.
On June 3, 2019, Durack and Fulford made a final offer to
sell the unit to Givens for $423,842, which was $79,039 more
than the remaining loan balance.
Givens made no further payments to Durack and Fulford
after May 2019 yet remained in the unit.
II. Procedural History
In June 2022, Durack and Fulford filed the complaint in
this action, asserting causes of action against Givens for breach
of contract, rescission of contract, judicial foreclosure, quiet title,
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED), and elder abuse. In May 2023, the
trial court held a bench trial.
In its statement of final decision issued on August 4, 2023,
the trial court found that Givens had breached the contract by
May 2019 by failing to reimburse Durack and Fulford for
property taxes, homeowners association fees, and nonsufficient
funds fees. The court found that Durack and Fulford had also
breached the contract by “purporting to terminate Givens’[s]
rights as an equitable vendee, by purporting to forfeit (to
themselves) his investment in the property and by refusing his
request for a payoff demand.” Although it did not “excuse[]”
Givens’s failure to make payments under the contract after
May 2019, the court concluded “that the wrongfulness of [Durack
and Fulford’s] own conduct must be considered in evaluating the
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wrongfulness of Givens’[s] reaction[] to [Durack and Fulford’s]
conduct.”
The trial court rejected Durack and Fulford’s claim that
Givens had become a renter under the contract, instead
concluding that Givens held equitable title to the unit “as an
equitable vendee in possession after substantially performing the
contract over a seven-year period (May 2012 to May 2019) . . . .”
Givens was entitled to “a reasonable opportunity to complete the
purchase by paying the entire remaining balance plus damages
before [Durack and Fulford] c[ould] commence an action to
terminate his possession.” (See Petersen v. Hartell (1985)
40 Cal.3d 102, 114.) The trial court assessed $170,660.43 in
damages against Givens based on his failure to pay amounts due
under the contract since May 2019, including $127,245 for unpaid
monthly payments. These damages would continue to accrue
until the completion of the sale.
The trial court found against Durack and Fulford on their
tort causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, IIED,
and elder abuse. The court noted the lack of evidence that
Givens did not intend to perform his obligations under the
contract when he signed it in April 2012. Durack and Fulford
had failed to “prove that Givens intended to cause their
distress[,] . . . that his conduct was a substantial factor in causing
their distress [or] that his conduct was outrageous.” The court
found “no evidence that Givens acted to financially injure”
Durack and Fulford “given their actions against him.”
On August 7, 2023, the trial court issued its judgment, in
which it retained equitable jurisdiction “to structure a reasonable
opportunity for Givens to complete the purchase” of the unit. If
Givens did not complete the purchase, the court would “oversee
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the termination of the . . . contract, . . . decide the parties[’]
offsetting claims for damages and . . . entertain [Durack and
Fulford’s] motion to eject Givens from the [unit] after their
payment of any restitutionary damages owed to Givens.” The
court denied any recovery to Durack and Fulford on their tort
causes of action.
Durack and Fulford filed a timely notice of appeal from the
August 7, 2023, judgment.
The trial court, having retained its jurisdiction, terminated
the contract in June 2024 and terminated Givens’s interest in the
unit as an equitable vendee. In October 2024, the court ordered
Givens ejected from the unit. We do not consider these
postjudgment developments in resolving this appeal. (See
Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 [“It is
an elementary rule of appellate procedure that, when reviewing
the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will
consider only matters which were part of the record at the time
the judgment was entered”].)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Durack and Fulford do not challenge the trial
court’s factual findings or its retention of jurisdiction to oversee
the completion of the sale. They argue that the court erred in
finding against them on the fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
IIED, and elder abuse causes of action. Our review is de novo.
(Guardianship of Saul H. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 827, 847 [“ ‘the
application of law to undisputed facts ordinarily presents a legal
question that is reviewed de novo[]’ ”].)
I. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Durack and Fulford contend that the judgment against
them on their causes of action for fraud and negligent
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misrepresentation should be reversed because the trial court
“fail[ed] to address” their allegations that Givens did not pay
dues, that Givens “represented [Durack and Fulford’s] attorney
in litigation without their permission,” and that Givens falsely
represented that he “would buy the property per contract[.]”
We disagree. In its detailed, 20-page statement of final
decision, the trial court adequately discussed these allegations. If
Durack and Fulford believed the court should have made more
explicit findings in the context of their fraud and negligent
misrepresentation causes of action, they were required to “bring
any ambiguities and omissions in the statement of decision to
the . . . court’s attention.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors
Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 632, 634.) Durack and Fulford failed to do so despite filing
extensive objections to other aspects of the tentative and final
statements of decision.
Durack and Fulford have not demonstrated that the trial
court committed any error with respect to the fraud and negligent
misrepresentation causes of action. (See Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘error must be affirmatively
shown’ ”].)
II. IIED and Elder Abuse
Durack and Fulford contend that the trial court should
have reserved judgment on their IIED and elder abuse causes of
action to assess damages on those claims if Givens did not
complete the sale. By failing to provide cogent legal argument or
citations to relevant authority, Durack and Fulford have forfeited
the argument. (See In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 244, 255 [“ ‘The absence of cogent legal argument
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or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions
as’ forfeited”].)
Forfeiture aside, the argument is meritless. The trial court
found against Durack and Fulford on their IIED and elder abuse
causes of action. Accordingly, they are entitled to no damages
pertaining to those claims. The court had no reason to retain
jurisdiction on those causes of action, which were fully resolved
by the judgment.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their
own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GILBERT, J.*
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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