In re S.G. CA2/7

CourtListener 10838310Calctapp06.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/6/26 In re S.G. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re S.G., a Person Coming Under B335255, B339878
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02840A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.G.,

Defendant and Appellant,

J.B.,

Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. B335255 dismissed
as moot; B339878 is affirmed.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
California Appellate Project, Jennifer Peabody and Kristie
A. Lutz, for Respondent.
No appearance for Plaintiff.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

This case involves overlapping orders from the juvenile
court and the family court relating to minor S.G. (born 2023).
Father P.G. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s December 2023
and February 2024 orders regarding visitation and custody of his
son S.G., which the court tried to align with restraining orders
issued by the family court. He also appeals from the juvenile
court’s July 2024 orders terminating jurisdiction and issuing
custody and visitation orders.
In the first appeal, case number B335255, Father contends
temporary and permanent domestic violence restraining orders
(DVROs) against him issued by the family court were purportedly
void because the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction during
the family’s dependency proceedings. He argues the juvenile
court’s orders aligning with the family court’s restraining orders
were erroneous and prejudicial. In the second appeal, case
number B339878, Father argues the juvenile court’s exit order
inappropriately relied on the family court’s restraining order, and
the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering joint legal and

2
physical custody with equal parenting time, but with primary
physical residence designation to Mother.
Mother J.B. (Mother), as respondent, contends Father’s
first appeal is moot because the parents now share joint custody
of S.G.1 Mother also argues it was not an abuse of discretion for
the juvenile court to designate primary residence to Mother in its
exit order.
We agree Father’s appeal from the December 2023 and
February 2024 orders is moot and dismiss the first appeal. We
affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction and its
exit order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Petition and Family Court Restraining
Orders
On August 23, 2023, the Los Angeles Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a juvenile court
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),2 alleging S.G. was at risk of serious
physical harm due to a history of “violent altercations” and
mutual domestic violence between his parents, who were living
together at the time in Glendale. S.G. remained released to both
parents.

1 The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family
Services filed letter briefs in both appeals stating it took no
position on Father’s appeals.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

3
The petition was preceded by domestic violence incidents in
which each parent alleged the other was the primary aggressor
and called law enforcement. Father obtained an emergency
protective order against Mother as a result of an incident in July
2023. Mother was arrested in June 2023 and again on
September 9, 2023, after altercations between the parents.
On September 27, 2023, while the dependency petition was
pending, Mother filed in family court a request for a DVRO
protecting her and S.G. from Father and requiring Father to
move out. The family court granted Mother a temporary
restraining order the same day and ordered Father to move out of
the family apartment, but crossed out S.G. as a protected party.
The family court attached a child custody and visitation order
ordering sole legal and physical custody to Mother, with
monitored visitation for Father. On October 1, Father moved to
Georgia to live with relatives.
On October 18, the family court held a hearing and granted
Mother a permanent DVRO against Father, which included S.G.
as a protected party, effective through October 2026. Father
attended the permanent restraining order hearing. The family
court attached a child custody and visitation order ordering sole
legal and physical custody to Mother, with no visitation for
Father until further order of the court.

B. Dependency Proceedings October 2023 to February 2024
On October 25, 2023, the juvenile court held the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court and counsel noted
the existence of the family court permanent restraining order.
S.G.’s counsel requested release to Mother, with monitored
visitation for Father. Mother’s counsel requested release to

4
Mother and for Father’s visitation to happen “through a third
party” and to “abide by the current restraining order.” The
Department argued S.G. should be detained from Father and
released to Mother, noting there was now a permanent
restraining order against Father, but stated “[o]f course, this
court is its own trier of fact and independent” with regard to
custody and the restraining order.
Father’s counsel agreed “this family needs to be separated,”
but requested S.G. be released to both parents, “with appropriate
measures of parents living apart and unannounced home visits,
family preservation, and abiding by all appropriate restraining
orders.” Father’s counsel stated Father would “abide by all
appropriate restraining orders,” but argued the juvenile court
“actually . . . has jurisdiction.” Father’s counsel noted the initial
temporary restraining order crossed out S.G. as a protected
party, and argued that because the permanent restraining order
had no requirement of monitored visits, the court could release
S.G. to Father.
The juvenile court sustained the petition as to both parents
and ordered S.G. released to both parents. The court stated: “It’s
clear to me that this is a toxic relationship just as pled in the
petition. It sounds like a couple that doesn’t need to be together,
at least at this stage of their lives. There’s lots of domestic
violence and just toxicity between the two of them, and I can’t tell
who is the aggressor.” The court ordered the Department “to
make a written custody schedule that is aligned with the
protective order that is currently in place,” “[t]hat doesn’t limit
Father’s ability to make his visitation or custody clear for the

5
record,” and “that makes sense for all parties in light of the home
of parents order.”3
On December 20, 2023, Father moved ex parte in the
juvenile court to modify the permanent restraining order to
remove S.G. On December 21, Mother’s attorney argued the
request to change the order was improper because the juvenile
court had already ordered compliance with the restraining order.
Father’s counsel argued, “this is a legal inconsistency that needs
to be fixed. ¶ The home of parents order is conflicting with the
family law restraining order that Mother filed during this case
when family law court does not have jurisdiction. She should
have filed it through this court. Regardless, there’s no carveout
for visitation in the family law order; so Father reasonably
cannot see the child under the current circumstances; so we are
asking to file a JV-457 in order to fix that inconsistency and
remove the minor off of the restraining order.” S.G.’s attorney
agreed that having no carveout for visitation is “obviously a
problem. It needs to be modified.” The Department’s counsel
noted that the Department’s recommendation had been release to
Mother, and “the court released [to] parents over the
Department’s objection,” but that “[i]f there is an inconsistency,
meaning there is no carveout, I would agree that it needs to be
addressed so that it can comport with the court order . . .” The
court continued the hearing so Mother could be present.

3 Mother appealed from the jurisdiction and disposition
orders made on October 25, 2023, in case number B332836.
Appointed counsel for Mother filed an opening brief under In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, stating counsel was unable to
identify any arguable issues. Mother did not file a supplemental
brief, and this Court dismissed the appeal on August 7, 2024.

6
On December 27, 2023, the juvenile court held the
continued hearing after an off-the-record discussion with counsel
and ordered Father to have monitored visitation in California
three times a week for up to three hours per visit, with discretion
to the Department to liberalize. The juvenile court reiterated it
had directed the Department “to make a schedule for custody and
visitation to comport with the protective order,” and stated the
court believed monitored visitation was “in line with the
protective order as was originally contemplated.”
On February 14, 2024, the juvenile court held a progress
report hearing on Mother’s intended move to Florida, at which
the parties revisited the issue of the restraining order. The
juvenile court stated it understood monitored visitation “doesn’t
square necessarily with the court’s home of parents’ order, which
suggested Father should not have any restrictions placed upon
. . . his visitation.” Father’s counsel argued the juvenile court had
exclusive jurisdiction over custody and visitation under section
213.5 and “should have taken over this restraining order” earlier,
and the court’s order of monitored visitation for a custodial
parent was unlawful under the circumstances. Father’s counsel
argued that instead of ordering monitored visitation, the
“permanent restraining order should have been modified, which
this court can do since we have exclusive jurisdiction.”
Father’s counsel asked again for the court to modify the
permanent restraining order, stating: “That’s all we’re
requesting. We’re just asking that the child be removed from this
PRO in order to comply with the court’s home of parents[] order
that was made on dispo on 10-25.” Father’s counsel explained: “I
think the issue is, your Honor, the court made a home of
parents[] order. That’s custody to Mother and Father. They have

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equal custody rights. . . . A parent who has custody can’t have
monitored visits. That’s removing custody from the parent.
Those orders [are] in conflict.” Counsel continued, “You just can’t
limit a parent in that way who has custody. That is essentially a
removal.” Father’s counsel stated that “it makes sense for mom
to have primary physical residence” and that Father was just
trying to get the law right and work out a custody schedule.
The juvenile court stated it did not have a copy of the
permanent restraining order before it and was “still uncertain as
to whether the child was ever included” on the final order,
because the temporary restraining order had S.G. crossed out as
a protected party. The court stated “[i]f there is an error, it is
mine,” but concluded, “I don’t think my home of parents[] order
was unlawful. I don’t think my monitored visits, in light of the
restraining order, was unlawful. I was still trying to keep father
with the ability to visit with his children, but in light of the fact
that there was the restraining order that included the child—I
was all for upholding that order, and I would have made the
same order if it were in front of me. That’s why I don’t believe it
is unlawful.”
The juvenile court concluded, “I’m going to leave the order
intact. I’m not going to modify anything today. Maybe the
appellate court will make me do that later.” The court authorized
Mother to move to Florida and ordered the parents to mediation
“to address a custody schedule that is consistent with the existing
Permanent Restraining Order.”
On February 14, 2024, Father appealed from the juvenile
court’s orders made on December 27, 2023, and February 14,
2024, specifically stating he appealed the “court’s denial to
remove child from the restraining order.”

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C. Modification of Restraining Order and Visitation,
Termination of Jurisdiction and Exit Order
On February 21, 2024, while Father’s first appeal was
pending, Father filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile
court to remove S.G. from the restraining order and to vacate the
December 27, 2023 “monitored visitation” order.4 The petition
argued the juvenile court made multiple errors of law in violation
of the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction over custody and
restraining orders, including failing to move the restraining order
action to the juvenile court, making custody orders subject to the
family court restraining order even though the juvenile court
orders take precedence, and declining to modify the restraining
order to remove S.G.
On March 26, 2024, the juvenile court granted Father’s
petition and removed S.G. from the DVRO “to comport with [the]
Court’s Home of Parent-Parents order.” The juvenile court also
vacated its December 27, 2023 “monitored visitation” order, and
it ordered the Department to create a written parenting schedule
“in accordance with the modified restraining order.”
In April 2024, the juvenile court ordered the parents to
alternate one month on, one month off custody periods with S.G.
In June 2024, the parties agreed to close the case, and each
parent argued for primary custody.

4 In his first appeal, Father requests that this court take
judicial notice of various records relating to the post-appeal
proceedings. Because these items are included in the record on
his second appeal, which this court has determined may be heard
together, we deny Father’s request for judicial notice as
unnecessary.

9
In July 2024, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
with a custody and visitation order (commonly known as an “exit
order”) granting Mother and Father joint legal and physical
custody of S.G., with primary residence designation to Mother.
Custody of S.G. was ordered to remain on an equal “one-month
on/off schedule,” alternating between each parent for a month at
a time.
Father timely appealed from the termination of jurisdiction
and exit order.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over custody
and visitation for a dependent child until the dependency petition
is dismissed or dependency jurisdiction terminated. (In re
Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 876; see § 304; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.620(a).)5 Section 304 provides in relevant part:
“After a petition has been filed . . . , and until the time that the
petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated, no other
division of any superior court may hear proceedings [under] the
Family Code regarding the custody of the child . . . . While the
child is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court all issues
regarding his or her custody shall be heard by the juvenile court.”
Similarly, rule 5.620(a) provides: “Once a petition has been filed
[in juvenile court] alleging that a child is described by [a
subsection of] section 300, and until the petition is dismissed or

5 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

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dependency is terminated, the juvenile court has [sole and]
exclusive jurisdiction [over matters] relating to the custody of the
child and visitation with the child . . . .” Los Angeles County
Superior Court, Local Rules (Local Rules), rule former 8.34(b)(3)
accordingly requires the juvenile court to notify family or probate
courts with overlapping cases that “all issues regarding custody,
including visitation, must be heard by the juvenile court” until
the dependency petition has been dismissed or jurisdiction
terminated.
The juvenile court also has exclusive jurisdiction to issue ex
parte civil restraining orders and DVROs to protect a dependent
child or to “exclude[] a person from the dwelling of the person
who has care, custody, and control of the child.” (§ 213.5,
subd. (a); see rule 5.630(a)(1) [“The juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction under section 213.5 to issue [] restraining order[s] to
protect the child who is the subject of a petition under
section 300 . . .”].) The juvenile court has additional discretion to
issue ex parte civil restraining orders and DVROs to protect “any
parent, legal guardian, or current caretaker of the child.”
(§ 213.5, subds. (a) & (b) [juvenile court “may issue” such orders];
see § 304 [“The juvenile court, on its own motion, may issue an
order as provided for in Section 213.5, or as described in Section
6218 of the Family Code”]; rule 5.630(a)(2); see also In re
Lilianna C. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 638, 643-644 [“Under section
213.5, and as pertinent here, a juvenile court has the authority to
issue a restraining order lasting up to three years that protects a
dependent ‘child,’ ‘any other child in the household,’ as well as
‘any parent, legal guardian, or current caretaker of the child’ ”].)
Former Local Rule 8.34(c)(1) further required that “When a
family, dependency, or probate court issues a temporary or

11
permanent restraining order and the restrained person or the
protected person is known to have another dependency, family
law, or probate guardianship case involving the same children, a
copy of the restraining order must be sent to the court with the
overlapping case. ¶ When a family law court issues a temporary
restraining order for parties known to have an active dependency
case, the hearing on the permanent order must be set in the
dependency courtroom to which that case is assigned.” And, the
juvenile court has the authority to modify or terminate a
restraining order while the dependency case is open.
(Rule 5.630(j).)
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child. [Citations.]
These exit orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by
a subsequent order of the superior court.” (In re J.M. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112; see § 362.4, subds. (a) & (b); see also
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.) In making an exit order, “the
court’s ‘ “focus and primary consideration must always be the
best interests of the child.” ’ [Citation.] The juvenile court is not
restrained by any preferences or presumptions that ordinarily
apply in family court.” (In re Reyna R. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
486, 492-493 (Reyna R.).)
We review the juvenile court’s exit order for abuse of
discretion. (Reyna R., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 493; In re
M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) We will not disturb an exit
order “ ‘unless the court “ ‘ “exceeded the limits of legal discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th

12
1090, 1094 (In re N.M.); accord, Bridget A. v. Superior Court
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.)

B. Father’s First Appeal Is Moot
In his first appeal, Father argues that because the juvenile
court had exclusive jurisdiction over custody, visitation, and
restraining orders, (1) the juvenile court erred by deferring to and
conforming its custody and visitation orders to the family court
permanent restraining order without making its own findings,
and (2) the permanent restraining order hearing should have
been moved to the juvenile court. Father argues he was
prejudiced by the court’s erroneous orders. Mother concedes the
juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction and that the family
court’s orders were not legally binding on the juvenile court. But
she argues Father’s first appeal is moot because the parents now
share joint custody of S.G. and no harm is ongoing or redressable.
An appeal “becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (In re D.P.); accord, In re Gael C.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In
re D.P., at p. 276.) “ ‘As a general rule, an order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous
order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However,
dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic,
but “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” ’ ” (In re T.R.
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 214; accord, In re C.C. (2009)

13
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488; accord, In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163 (Rashad D.).)
Even if a dependency case is moot, “courts may exercise
their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (In
re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) “[C]ourts will generally
exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination.’ ” (See id. at pp. 282, 285-286 [identifying
additional relevant factors].)
In his reply brief, “Father concedes that there is no remedy
available in that the juvenile court ordered that which he
requests on appeal. However, the effects of the initial erroneous
error continue to harm him.” We conclude that Father’s first
appeal is moot because in March 2024, while this appeal was
pending, the juvenile court modified the restraining order to
remove S.G. and vacated its order directing monitored visitation
for Father. In doing so, the juvenile court resolved any conflict
between the restraining order and the court’s disposition order,
directing shared custody and release to both parents.
Additionally, the juvenile court’s July 2024 exit order, giving both
parents legal and physical custody of S.G., superseded any
interim custody and visitation orders. (See Heidi S. v. David H.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [juvenile court’s “exit order
‘determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child’ ” is “ ‘a
final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile
court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’ ”]; § 302, subd. (d) [“Any
custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at the
time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction . . . shall be a

14
final judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction is
terminated”]; see also § 362.4, subd. (b) [custody and visitation
orders “continue until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order of the superior court”].) Now that dependency jurisdiction
is terminated, S.G.’s custody is pursuant to the court’s exit order
(which we address in the next section), not its interim orders.
This court can no longer provide relief from the juvenile
court’s decision to order monitored visitation or from its decision
to deny modification of the restraining order during earlier stages
of the dependency proceedings because those orders are no longer
operative and have been superseded by the exit order. “[R]elief is
effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status,’ ” requiring “some effect on the
[appellant’s] legal status that is capable of being redressed by a
favorable court decision.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 277.) Since we cannot provide effective relief to Father from
orders that have been vacated or are no longer in effect, Father’s
first appeal is moot.
Father raises several arguments why the first appeal is not
moot. First, he contends the juvenile court’s initial errors
continue to harm him since the exit order’s primary residence
designation was based on a restricted custody and visitation
history. (See In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488 [“ ‘An
issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of
subsequent proceedings’ ”].) He reasons that but for the juvenile
court’s error, the court might not have issued a restraining order
on its own, he would have had a clear joint custody order when he
moved out of state, and thus he might otherwise have been given
primary residence in the exit order. But the juvenile court
expressly said that it “would have made the same order” as the

15
family court if the restraining order “were in front of me,” and
Father does not explain why the same consequences he identifies
would not have followed.
Second, Father argues a DVRO on Father’s record could be
used against him in future family court proceedings. But
“speculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid mootness, as are
mere complaints of stigma. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 278.) Only “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal” is a
case moot. (Id. at p. 283.) And “stigma must be paired with some
effect on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being
redressed by a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) The
impact of the DVRO on future dependency proceedings is
speculative and uncertain on this record because Father does not
challenge the underlying jurisdiction findings. As stated, the
juvenile court sustained allegations of domestic violence by both
parents. Father may explain to the court in any future
proceedings that the record in this case includes findings of
mutual domestic violence, that Father received an emergency
protective order against Mother, and that Mother was arrested
twice for spousal battery. Further, the mere existence of a DVRO
as to Mother and which does not include S.G. is not “particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.)
Third, Father urges us to exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of his first appeal even if we find the issue moot, as an
injury capable of repetition yet evading review. “Courts also have
discretion to resolve appeals that are technically moot if they
present important questions affecting the public interest that are
capable of repetition yet evade review.” (In re Damian L. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369; see In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at

16
p. 282 [“As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion
to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a
material question remains for the court’s determination’ ”].)
Here, Father does not identify any public interest, and we
conclude this case presents a “highly fact-specific question” that
has been resolved, rather than an issue of broad public
importance. (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) It is
also unlikely this controversy will recur as between these parties,
given the juvenile court’s March 2024 modification of the
restraining order and visitation order.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in B335255 as moot.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Designating Mother’s Residence as S.G.’s Primary
Residence in the Exit Order
We now examine Father’s appeal of the exit order, which
granted Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of
S.G. and primary residence designation to Mother, with an equal
“one-month on/off schedule,” alternating between each parent.
Father does not challenge the termination of jurisdiction or the
custody and visitation schedule. His sole argument is that the
juvenile court’s initial deference to the family court restraining
order prejudiced him when it issued its exit order because the
court designated Mother’s residence as S.G.’s primary residence.
But by the time the court issued its exit order in July 2024,
the juvenile court had already modified (at Father’s request) its
December 27, 2023 visitation order and the permanent
restraining order, and these orders were not the basis for the

17
court’s exit order. As stated, in March 2024, the juvenile court
removed S.G. from the restraining order and vacated the
December 27 order that required monitored visitation for Father.
Accordingly, when the dependency court terminated
jurisdiction, Father had the benefit of joint custody for several
months, without visitation restrictions or a restraining order
involving S.G. And, since April 2024, Father had a court-ordered
equal time custody schedule, with S.G. alternating monthly
between Father in Georgia and Mother in Florida. The exit order
was thus based on the custody orders and schedule in effect since
April 2024, not on the prior interim orders.
Father argues the juvenile court’s order of primary
residence designation to Mother may prevent him from accessing
S.G., due to his repeated difficulties coordinating his parenting
time with Mother. But based on the record before us, we cannot
say the court’s decision to designate primary residence to Mother
was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. At the time of the
exit order, Department reports showed both parents had a lack of
progress in their case plans but Mother had engaged in more
court-ordered services than Father (including seven anger
management classes and some individual counseling). Father
had attended one domestic violence batterer’s intervention class
in March 2024. Mother also was seeking to enroll S.G. in school.
“ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case,’ ”
(In re N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094) and “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ” ’ ”

18
(Ibid.) Father has not shown the decision was arbitrary or
capricious.
Although we affirm the juvenile court’s exit order, we note
that Father is not without a remedy. Under section 302,
subdivision (d), he may seek modification of the exit order in
family court if he can “demonstrate ‘there has been a significant
change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order
and modification of the order is in the best interests of the
child.’ ” (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)

DISPOSITION

Father’s appeal from the juvenile court’s orders on
December 27, 2023, and February 14, 2024, is dismissed as moot.
The exit orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.

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