In re M.C. CA4/1

CourtListener 10832499Calctapp03.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/3/26 In re M.C. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re M.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DEIGO COUNTY HEALTH D086270
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. EJ4770)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants;

J.M.,

Intervener and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Jack McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant E.C.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant D.M.
Mansi H. Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Intervener and Appellant J.M.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief
Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha Edwards, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

E.C. (Mother), D.M. (Father), and J.M. (Paternal Grandmother)
appeal an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their
son, M.C., now nearly four years old, and selecting a permanent plan of
adoption for him pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section

366.26.1 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in its consideration of
the evidence regarding whether the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception applied to preclude the termination of her parental rights and
selection of adoption as M.C.’s permanent plan. (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) Father and Paternal Grandmother join in Mother’s argument
and do not separately raise any additional claims. Based on our reasoning
below, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In spring 2022, M.C. was born to Mother and Father. Less than one
month after he was born, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) filed a section 300, subdivision (b) petition
alleging there was a substantial risk that M.C. would suffer serious
physical harm or illness as a result of his parents’ inability to supervise or
protect him adequately because of an incident of domestic violence by
Father against Mother and a maternal great-grandfather. At the

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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detention hearing, the court found that the Agency had made a prima facie
case on its petition, detained M.C. in out-of-home placement, and granted
supervised visits for Mother and Father.
At a pretrial status conference in summer 2022, the Agency
recommended that the court make a true finding on the petition’s
allegations, declare M.C. a dependent of the court, place him in the care of
Mother in the home of maternal great-grandmother on the condition
Father was not to reside in the home, grant Mother maintenance services,
and grant Father enhancement services and supervised visits. The court
sustained the petition, declared M.C. a dependent of the court, placed him
in the care of Mother in the home of maternal great-grandmother on the
condition Father was not to reside in the home and Mother was to abide by
the restraining order against Father, granted maintenance services to
Mother and Father, and granted supervised visitation to Father.
Four months later, the Agency filed a supplemental petition under
section 387 seeking modification of the court’s order, alleging Mother could
not provide adequate care and supervision for M.C. because Mother had
engaged in violent altercations with a boyfriend in the presence of the
child, threatened to harm herself and the child, and had violated terms of
the court’s prior order. The Agency recommended that the court make a
true finding on the petition’s allegations, M.C. be continued as a dependent
of the court, M.C. be removed from Mother’s care and detained in out-of-
home foster care, and Mother and Father be granted reunifications
services and separate supervised visitation. At the detention hearing, the
court found that the Agency had made a prima facie case on its petition,
continued M.C. as a dependent of the court, detained M.C. in out-of-home
foster care, and granted supervised visits for Mother and Father.

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At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in early 2023,
the Agency recommended the court order that M.C. remain a dependent of
the court, continue his placement in out-of-home foster care, and grant
Mother and Father six months of reunification services and supervised
visits. The court made a true finding on the petition, ordered that M.C.
remain a dependent of the court, placed him in confidential foster care,
ordered the Agency to provide Mother and Father with reunification
services consistent with their case plans, ordered Mother and Father to
comply with their case plans, and granted Mother and Father supervised
visitation. The Court informed Mother and Father that, because M.C. was
under three years old when removed from their custody, they had six
months to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-
ordered treatment programs or to cooperate with services provided in their
case plans; that failure to do so may result in termination of reunification
efforts after six months; and that, after the termination of reunification
efforts, parental rights could be terminated and the court could select a
permanent plan for M.C. under section 366.26.
At the contested six-month review hearing in fall 2023, the court
found that both Mother and Father had made adequate progress toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating M.C.’s placement out of
the home. The court granted Mother and Father continued reunification
services and supervised visitation.
After the six-month review hearing, the court granted Mother
unsupervised visitation.
At the contested 12-month review hearing in spring 2024, the Agency
recommended that Father’s reunifications services be terminated due to
his continued demonstrated risk to M.C. and that he be granted supervised

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visitation. The court adopted the Agency’s recommendations, terminated
Father’s reunification services, granted Father supervised visitation, and
granted Mother continued unsupervised visitation.
At the 18-month review hearing, pursuant to the Agency’s
recommendation, the court ordered that Mother be returned to supervised
visitation due to her being under the influence of marijuana while
parenting M.C. and having paraphernalia and marijuana accessible to
him.
At a modification hearing in summer 2024, the Agency recommended
that Mother’s reunifications services be terminated due to her lack of
progress and “the parent’s lives . . . becoming more violent,” Mother and
Father be granted supervised visitation, and the court set a section 366.26
hearing to determine a permanent plan for M.C. The court terminated
Mother’s reunification services, granted Mother and Father supervised
visitation, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In late 2024, Mother filed a section 388 change of circumstance
petition, requesting that the court place M.C. back in her care in light of
her recent progress.
In its initial section 366.26 reports in early 2025, the Agency
recommended that the court deny Mother’s 388 petition, terminate the
parental rights of Mother and Father, and order a permanent plan of
adoption. The Agency recognized that Mother had consistently and
regularly visited M.C. and that those visits were positive and she had
made some late progress, but the Agency continued to be concerned about
the relationship between Mother and Father. The Agency stated that M.C.
had adjusted to his placement home, experienced sleep and emotional
regulation struggles related to parental visitation, easily separated from

5
Mother at the end of visitation, and did not ask about Mother between
visits. The Agency concluded there was no evidence it would be
detrimental to M.C.’s emotional health to terminate Mother’s parental
rights and order a permanent plan of adoption. As to Father, the Agency
noted visitation was sporadic and inconsistent, M.C. did not recognize
Father as his father figure, and M.C. did not appear to have a strong
parent-child relationship that would outweigh the benefits of adoption.
The Agency stated that M.C. was specifically and generally adoptable and
his current caregivers wished to adopt him. The Agency explained that, at
M.C.’s young and vulnerable age, he required and deserved stability and
permanency.
In an addendum report in spring 2025, the Agency changed its
recommendation to a permanent plan of legal guardianship. The Agency
noted that Mother continued to progress and maintained consistent
positive visitation. During visitation with Mother, M.C. sought her out to
meet his various needs and identified her as his mother. The Agency noted
“a healthy attachment” between M.C. and Mother, although it noted M.C.
does not display emotional disturbances at the end of visits and the Agency
remained worried about the dynamics between Mother and Father. The
Agency reported that Mother completed a bonding study, the report of
which “indicate[d] that [M.C.] engages in healthy attachment behaviors
toward the mother” and “a substantial, positive relationship exists between
[M.C.] and [Mother].” The Agency concluded that “a parent-child bond
exists between [M.C.] and [Mother], which would make the termination of
parental rights detrimental to him.” The Agency stated M.C. was reluctant
to engage Father in physical contact and stated he was “ ‘ready to go’ ” at
the end of visitation.

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In spring 2025, following M.C.’s third birthday, the court held a two-
day hearing on both Mother’s 388 petition and the issue of a permanent
plan under section 366.26, at which Mother represented herself. The court
heard Mother’s testimony and admitted into evidence the Agency’s reports
and Mother’s exhibits, including the bonding study report. Mother sought
to have M.C. placed in her care or, in the alternative, in the care of
Paternal Grandmother, who was present at the hearing.
The court issued its order following the hearing. It found there had
not been changed circumstances and it was not in M.C.’s best interest to

return M.C. to Mother and thus denied Mother’s 388 petition.2 As to a
permanent plan under section 366.26, the court found that M.C. was
specifically and generally adoptable and that it was likely he would be
adopted if parental rights were terminated. It found that none of the
exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied to preclude
the termination of parental rights, including the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. The court found that adoption was in M.C.’s best
interest and therefore terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
and selected adoption as M.C.’s permanent plan.
After the court’s order at the section 366.26 hearing, Paternal
Grandmother filed a section 388 petition, requesting the court place M.C.
in her care under a permanent plan of legal guardianship or adoption. The
court denied the petition upon a finding it could not be granted as a matter

of law.3

2 None of the appellants challenge this ruling on appeal.

3 None of the appellants challenge this ruling on appeal.

7
Mother, Father, and Paternal Grandmother timely filed notices of
appeal, challenging the court’s order for a permanent plan of adoption

under section 366.26.4
DISCUSSION
I.
Relevant Legal Principles
“If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a parent’s
custody within statutory time limits, the court must set a hearing under
section 366.26.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).)
“[W]hen the court orders the section 366.26 hearing, reunification services
have been terminated, and the assumption is that the problems that led to
the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved.” (Ibid.) The purpose
of a section 366.26 hearing is to determine and implement the appropriate
permanent plan for a dependent child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th
295, 309.) The juvenile court can choose among three permanent plans:
adoption, legal guardianship, and long-term foster care. (§ 366.26,
subd. (b).) When a child is adoptable, adoption is the preferred permanent
plan unless there are countervailing circumstances or adoption is not in
the child’s best interest. (In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535, 546;
In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574 (Autumn H.).)

4 Respondent argues Paternal Grandmother does not have standing to
challenge the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights and order for a permanent plan under section 366.26. We
do not address this argument because, even assuming Paternal
Grandmother has standing here, as we shall explain, we reject the single
claim raised by appellants.

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At a section 366.26 hearing, it is the parent’s burden to show an
exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Fernando M. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
One exception is when the juvenile court finds “a compelling reason” for
determining that termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to
the child because the “parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The California Supreme Court
has clarified that the “compelling reason” language does not impose on the
parent any burden beyond the requirement to show termination of the
beneficial relationship would be “detrimental” to the child. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 635.)
Caden C. stated that under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a
parent has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three
things: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child”; (2) “the child has
a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental
to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
II.
Additional Background
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother offered a bonding study report
authored by Dr. Elizabeth Stanton, which identified Dr. Stanton only as a
clinical psychologist with no other information regarding her area of
practice or expertise. In her report, Dr. Stanton noted she observed
Mother and M.C. for a total of three and a half hours during two separate

9
visits. Dr. Stanton reported that M.C. “engages in healthy attachment
behaviors toward Mother” and Mother responds to M.C. supportively and
appropriately. Dr. Stanton concluded “the interactions between [M.C.] and
his Mother indicate that a substantial, positive relationship exists between
them, and severing contact could be detrimental,” and that “[e]ven if it is
not immediately destabilizing, there may be challenges related to
negotiating the ambiguous loss that a child may endure when a significant
parent-child relationship is permanently terminated.” Dr. Stanton
recommended that the court “consider the substantial, positive,
interpersonal interactions observed between [M.C.] and his mother when
making any determinations regarding the future of their relationship.”
M.C.’s counsel objected to the admission of the bonding study report
absent Dr. Stanton being called as a witness. In response, Mother stated
she could call Dr. Stanton to testify the following day, but that Dr. Stanton
would testify consistently with the contents of her report. Given Mother’s
representation of Dr. Stanton’s potential testimony, M.C.’s counsel
withdrew her objection to the admission of the report. No party requested
that the trial court designate Dr. Stanton an expert.
In considering a permanent plan under section 366.26, the court
found that no exceptions to the statutory preference of adoption applied,
including the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and
acknowledged the bonding study report as it related to the second and
third prongs of that exception. As to the second prong of the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception—whether M.C. has a beneficial
attachment to Mother—the court explained it “d[id] not assign much
weight to this bonding study” because the court did not “have any
qualifications as to Dr. Stanton as an expert” and the report was not

10
“supported by any explanation as to who she even is.” The court further
noted Dr. Stanton was not available for cross-examination about her
findings, and she only observed M.C. for three and a half hours and “it’s
hard to find that to be a substantial amount of time to assess the entirety
of a relationship . . . .” As to the third prong of the exception—whether the
detriment of terminating the attachment outweighs the benefit of
adoption—the court explained that Dr. Stanton’s report “says that there
‘could be detriment’ ” but that the court “ha[d] to find that it’s more likely
than not detrimental.”
III.
The Juvenile Court Properly Considered Dr. Stanton’s Report
Appellants challenge the juvenile court’s consideration of
Dr. Stanton’s bonding study report, seemingly arguing both that the court
erred by finding Dr. Stanton was unqualified to offer an expert opinion and
that the court erred by affording Dr. Stanton’s expert report limited
weight.
To the extent appellants argue that the trial court erred by finding
Dr. Stanton was not qualified to offer an expert opinion, we are
unpersuaded. The issue of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an
expert is different from the weight the trier of fact might afford that
testimony given the expert’s degree of knowledge on a particular subject.
(See People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 97 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “Where a witness has
disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to
the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the
weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.” ’ ” ’ ”]; People v. Dowl
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 1079, 1089 (Dowl) [“A trial court’s determination that a
witness is qualified to testify ‘is binding on’ the jury, although jurors may

11
consider any evidence of the witness’s qualifications in determining the
weight to give the testimony.”].) Here, the court did not find Dr. Stanton
unqualified to offer an expert opinion, as appellants suggest. In fact, no
party requested that the court designate Dr. Stanton an expert and
appellants suggest here that the parties “effectively . . . stipulat[ed] that
Dr. Stanton was qualified to render an expert opinion . . . .” Thus, the
court had no occasion to make such a ruling. Rather, it admitted
Dr. Stanton’s report and then afforded it limited weight, in part, because
the court had no evidence before it showing that Dr. Stanton had any

degree of knowledge relevant to the parent-child relationship exception.5
To the extent appellants’ argument is that the trial court abused its
discretion in affording limited weight to Dr. Stanton’s report, we remain
unpersuaded. As appellants acknowledge, the weight to afford a bonding
study report lies within the discretion of the juvenile court. (In re M.V.
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 508–512.) “ ‘An abuse of discretion will be
“established by ‘a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an

5 The court also provided two other reasons for affording the report
little weight, i.e., Dr. Stanton was not presented for cross-examination at
the section 366.26 hearing and she spent just three and a half hours
observing M.C. and Mother. Even if we could find that the juvenile court
erred by deeming Dr. Stanton unqualified to render an expert opinion, any
error was harmless. As we shall discuss, the three reasons the court
offered for affording Dr. Stanton’s report limited weight were legally valid
and supported by the record, even accepting the premise that the report
constituted an expert opinion. Thus, appellants cannot show they would
have enjoyed a more favorable result absent any alleged error regarding
Dr. Stanton’s qualification as an expert witness. (In re R.F. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 459, 474 [“[A] judgment in a dependency case should not be
set aside unless it is reasonably probable the result would have been more
favorable to the appealing party but for the error.”].)

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arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 509.)
As stated, the trial court afforded limited weight to Dr. Stanton’s
report because the report did not disclose any information regarding her
degree of knowledge on the relevant issues, she was not subject to cross-
examination regarding her findings, and she spent just three and a half
hours observing M.C.’s relationship with Mother. These reasons are
supported by the record and provided valid bases for affording less weight
to Dr. Stanton’s report. (Dowl, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1089 [“[J]urors may
consider any evidence of the witness’s qualifications in determining the
weight to give the testimony.”]; see People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
665, 675 [a trier of fact “is free to reject the expert’s opinion . . . as
unsound, based on faulty reasoning or analysis, or based on information
the jury finds unreliable”]; cf. Evid. Code § 721 [expert witness is subject to
cross-examination as to her qualifications, the subject to which her
testimony relates, and the basis and reasoning for her opinion].) Thus, the
court’s reliance on these factors in finding Dr. Stanton’s report was entitled
to limited evidentiary weight was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently

absurd as to amount to an abuse of discretion.6

6 We note appellants’ argument that, “even assuming the juvenile
court could reasonably find an insufficient basis to recognize Dr. Stanton
as an expert witness, it should have ruled the bonding study inadmissible”
so that Mother or the Agency could have “cure[d] the evidentiary problem.”
But the trial court was not permitted to guide the parties as to how to
present their case. (See Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 866, 907–908 [it is a violation of the canons of judicial
ethics for a judge to help litigants prepare their cases].) This is so even
though Mother was not represented by counsel at the hearing. (Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [a self-represented party “ ‘is to be
13
For these reasons, appellants have not shown the trial court
disqualified Dr. Stanton as an expert or abused its discretion in affording
her report limited evidentiary weight.
IV.
The Court Did Not Err by Finding the Beneficial Parent-Child
Relationship Exception Did Not Apply in This Case
Lastly, to the extent appellants’ argument can be interpreted as
challenging the juvenile court’s finding that Mother did not carry her
burden to show the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied
to preclude the termination of her parental rights and selection of adoption
as M.C.’s permanent plan, we are unpersuaded.
In making the determination of whether the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception applies, the juvenile court “balances the strength
and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement
against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.
If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of
a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be
greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural
parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at
p. 575.) Because interaction between a child and his or her parent will
generally confer some incidental benefit to the child, the parent must prove
the child will benefit to such a degree as to overcome the preference for
adoption. (Ibid.) The beneficial parent-child relationship exception is not
established simply by a showing of a parent’s frequent and loving contact

treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].)

14
and relationship with their child. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503,
529.)
On appeal, we apply a hybrid standard in reviewing a juvenile
court’s determination whether the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–641; In re J.C.,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530–531.) We apply the substantial evidence
standard of review to the factual issues of maintenance of regular contact
and visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship,
and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there
is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to
the child. (Caden C., at pp. 639–641; In re J.C., at pp. 530–531.) Under
the substantial evidence standard of review, we consider the evidence, and
make all reasonable inferences therefrom, favorably to support the court’s
order and disregard contrary evidence as not accepted by the court as
having sufficient veracity or persuasiveness. (Caden C., at p. 640; In re
S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297–298.) Under the abuse of discretion
standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile court’s decision
exceeded the bounds of reason, and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our
view for that of the juvenile court. (Caden C., at p. 641; In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
Appellants do not call into question the court’s analysis as to the first
prong of the three-prong Caden C. test for the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception when it found Mother had maintained regular
visitation and contact with M.C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
And on the second prong, whether M.C. would benefit from continuing his
relationship with Mother (ibid.), the court conceded the parties could
“disagree with each other,” although the court ultimately found the second

15
prong was not met. Regardless, because, as we shall explain, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion as to the third prong of the Caden C.
test—that the benefits to M.C. of adoption outweigh the detriment to him
resulting from the termination of his relationship with Mother—appellants
cannot show the trial court erred in finding the parent-child relationship
exception inapplicable here to bar a permanent plan of adoption for M.C.
The court weighed the benefits to M.C. of adoption (e.g., stability)
against the detriment to him of terminating his relationship with Mother.
In so doing, the court acknowledged that M.C. would likely feel some loss
during his life because of the termination of his relationship with Mother,
as every child who loses a biological parent feels loss. Furthermore, the
court considered the evidence that Mother maintained a consistent positive
relationship with M.C. but highlighted the lack of evidence to show
severing this relationship would be sufficiently detrimental to M.C. as to
outweigh the benefits of adoption. The court explained that the only
evidence as to this third prong of the parent-child relationship exception
was the Agency’s conclusory statement that “a termination of parental
rights [would be] detrimental,” which was supported by nothing more than
the equivocal opinion of Dr. Stanton that severing M.C.’s relationship with
Mother “could” be detrimental. The court was “troubl[ed]” by “the Agency’s
lack of analysis of the third prong at all.” The court concluded “there is
nothing in the evidence to support the [third prong of the] exception,
unfortunately.”
Based on the record in this case, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion by concluding the benefits to M.C. of adoption
outweighed the detriment to him from the termination of his relationship
with Mother and therefore finding that Mother had not met the third

16
prong of the Caden C. test. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; cf.
Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The juvenile court properly
applied the third prong of the Caden C. factors and its conclusion that no
evidence supported a finding that the detriment of severing M.C.’s
relationship with Mother outweighed the benefits of adoption is supported
by the record. Specifically, Dr. Stanton concluded only that “severing
contact [between M.C. and Mother] could be detrimental,” (italics added)
and that “[e]ven if it is not immediately destabilizing, there may be
challenges related to negotiating the ambiguous loss that a child may
endure when a significant parent-child relationship is permanently
terminated.” (Italics added.) And, strikingly, before Dr. Stanton’s report,
the Agency recommended a permanent plan of adoption, concluding there
was no evidence it would be detrimental to M.C.’s emotional health to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. Then, seemingly based only upon the
equivocal opinion of Dr. Stanton, the Agency changed its recommendation
to that of legal guardianship. Even then, however, the Agency merely
made a conclusory assessment that “a parent-child bond exists between
[M.C.] and [Mother], which would make the termination of parental rights
detrimental to him.”
Thus, we conclude that the court properly found the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception did not apply to preclude the
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and selection of
adoption as M.C.’s permanent plan. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

RUBIN, J.

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