CM Laundry v. Valadez CA2/8

CourtListener 10832079Calctapp02.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/2/26 CM Laundry v. Valadez CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CM LAUNDRY, LLC, B342304

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19GDCP00341)
v.

ANTONIO VALADEZ et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William A. Crowfoot, Judge. Affirmed.
Ross, Peter W. Ross and Charles Avrith for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Defendants
and Respondents.
Law Offices of Henry N. Jannol and Rebecca D. Wester for
Defendant and Respondent Antonio Valadez.
Law Offices of Tracey P. Hom and Tracey P. Hom for
Defendant and Respondent Hermelinda Rendon.
CM Laundry, LLC, sought to add Antonio Valadez and
Hermelinda Rendon as judgment debtors to a default judgment it
had obtained against Classic Laundry and Finishing, Inc. CM
Laundry alleged Valadez was liable as Classic Laundry’s alter
ego and that Rendon was liable as Valadez’s economic partner.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Valadez and
Rendon’s favor. It declined to pierce Classic Laundry’s corporate
veil and found Rendon had no involvement with Classic Laundry
and no business relationship with Valadez.
On appeal, CM Laundry challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying the trial court’s alter ego findings. It also
seeks reversal because the court failed to apply Evidence Code
sections 412 and 413 to draw negative inferences from Valadez’s
failure to produce certain Classic Laundry records, and because
the court misallocated to CM Laundry the burden of proof on the
alter ego issue. Further, CM Laundry maintains Rendon is liable
on the default judgment as Valadez’s economic partner. We
reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Valadez formed Classic Laundry in 2008. He owned 100
percent of Classic Laundry’s shares and served as the company’s
sole officer, director, and agent for service of process. From 2010
to 2012, Classic Laundry operated an industrial laundry out of a
facility in Maywood, California, owned by Valadez and his
romantic partner, Rendon.1
Classic Laundry ceased operations in September 2012.
Later that month, Valadez leased the Maywood property to

1 We discuss additional evidence of Classic Laundry’s
formation and operation in part I.B of the Discussion, post.

2
Ernesto Munoz, a former CM Laundry officer and shareholder.
Since October 2012, Munoz and, later, his daughter have used
the property to operate an industrial laundry.
Since 2007, CM Laundry has operated an industrial
laundry in Gardena, California. In October 2013, CM Laundry
discovered Luis Rodriguez — one of its founding shareholders
and its one-time president — had been embezzling funds by
facilitating the company’s payment of fraudulent invoices his
three co-conspirators submitted.
I. CM Laundry obtains a default judgment against
Classic Laundry.
In 2014, a CM Laundry employee sued the company for
alleged wage-and-hour law violations. In that action, CM
Laundry filed a cross-complaint alleging several of its employees
had conspired with Munoz and Rodriguez to steal its assets and
equipment to develop Classic Laundry as a competitor to CM
Laundry. The pleading did not mention Valadez and instead
alleged Munoz to be a Classic Laundry “officer and shareholder”
who was “primarily responsible for its day-to-day operations.”
Based on these allegations, CM Laundry asserted against Classic
Laundry causes of action for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, intentional interference with
contractual relations, and violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17200.
In April 2014, Valadez was served with the cross-complaint
as Classic Laundry’s agent for service of process. At the time, he
believed the cross-complaint had mistakenly named Classic
Laundry as a defendant, as the company had ceased operations
in 2012 and he had no links to the other parties. For this reason,
and because it did not name him individually as defendant,

3
Valadez did not pursue Classic Laundry’s defense of the cross-
complaint.
In June 2016, CM Laundry obtained a default judgment
against Classic Laundry for $2,480,143.71.
II. The trial court declines to add Valadez and Rendon
as judgment debtors to the default judgment.
Three years later, in August 2019, CM Laundry filed the
action giving rise to this appeal. Its operative first amended
complaint alleges Valadez created Classic Laundry for the “sole
purpose of aiding and abetting” Rodriguez’s embezzlement “and
setting up a competing, industrial laundry” with machinery and
assets stolen from CM Laundry. CM Laundry also alleges
Classic Laundry failed to follow corporate formalities, and
Valadez and Rendon used Classic Laundry funds to pay their
personal expenses. Based on these allegations, CM Laundry
alleges Valadez and Rendon were Classic Laundry’s alter egos
and, therefore, (1) sought to amend the judgment under Code of
Civil Procedure section 187 by replacing Classic Laundry with
Valadez and Rendon as judgment debtors; (2) asserted an
independent action under Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010
to hold Valadez and Rendon jointly and severally liable on the
default judgment; and (3) sought a declaratory judgment holding
Valadez and Rendon jointly and severally liable on the default
judgment.
After a bench trial, the trial court issued a thorough
statement of decision in Valadez and Rendon’s favor. It
determined Valadez was not liable because he “was not and is not
the alter ego of Classic Laundry.” On this point, the court found
Valadez did not control the 2014 lawsuit, that Valadez and
Classic Laundry had separate personalities and did not share a

4
unity of interest, and that recognizing Classic Laundry’s
corporate form would not sanction a fraud or promote injustice
against CM Laundry.
As to Rendon, the trial court concluded “there was no
evidence upon which to find that Rendon should be a judgment
creditor . . . in lieu of, or in addition to, Classic Laundry.
According to the court, the evidence showed that while Rendon
and Valadez collectively managed household affairs, Rendon was
not involved with Classic Laundry’s ownership, operations, or the
like. Accordingly, the court rejected CM Laundry’s assertion that
Valadez and Rendon were “akin to joint venturers” both liable as
alter egos of Classic Laundry.
CM Laundry timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Valadez was not Classic Laundry’s alter ego.
A. Forfeiture
Valadez and Rendon assert CM Laundry forfeited its
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial
court’s alter ego findings by failing to fairly present in its opening
brief the evidence supportive of those findings.
This argument does not persuade. It is true that
appellants who cite and discuss only the evidence favorable to
their position forfeit their challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supportive of the judgment. (Rayii v. Gatica (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) But that is not the case here.
While the opening brief’s background section certainly casts the
facts in CM Laundry’s favor, it does acknowledge some of the
evidence on which the trial court relied. Similarly, the brief’s
discussion section identifies the evidence supportive of the court’s

5
findings and asserts why, in CM Laundry’s view, that evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, having reviewed CM Laundry’s opening brief,
we note that it repeatedly failed to support its evidentiary
references with record citations, particularly in its discussion
section, as required by California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); see L.O. v. Kilrain (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620.) Record citations in a brief’s
statement of facts do not cure the lack thereof in its discussion.
(See City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211,
1239, fn. 16.) “Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) is intended to enable the
reviewing court to locate relevant portions of the record ‘without
thumbing through and rereading earlier portions of a brief.’
[Citation.] To provide record citations for alleged facts at some
points in a brief, but not at others,” as CM Laundry did here,
“frustrates the purpose of that rule . . . .” (Alki Partners, LP v.
DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8.)
Notwithstanding the omissions in CM Laundry’s brief,
which made the court’s review more difficult, we address CM
Laundry’s challenges to the trial court’s alter ego findings on the
merits.
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
alter ego findings.
“Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity,
separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors,
with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations.” (Sonora
Diamond Corp v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538
(Sonora).) But under the alter ego doctrine, “[a] corporate
identity may be disregarded — the ‘corporate veil’ pierced —
where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the

6
equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the
corporation.” (Id. at p. 538.) The doctrine “is an extreme remedy,
sparingly used.” (Id. at p. 539.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 authorizes courts “to
amend a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment
debtor, and thereby make the additional judgment debtor liable
on the judgment. [Citation.] Amending a judgment to add an
alter ego of an original judgment debtor ‘ “is an equitable
procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the
judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the
correct name of the real defendant.” ’ ” (Highland Springs
Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280 (Highland Springs).)
A judgment creditor may seek to add a judgment debtor as
the alter ego of an original defendant by filing a motion under
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 or by filing an independent
action on the judgment. (Highland Springs, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 280, 288.) Regardless of the procedural
vehicle, the judgment creditor must first demonstrate the new
party is the original defendant’s alter ego by showing: (1) there is
a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its
equitable owner such that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist; and (2) an
inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the
entity alone. (Triplett v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421 (Triplett); Sonora, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th
at p. 539.) Upon making this “threshold” showing of alter ego,
the judgment creditor must then establish “the new party had
controlled the litigation, thereby having had the opportunity to
litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns.” (Triplett, at p.

7
1421.) The decision to add a judgment debtor as an alter ego “lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court [citation] and will
not be disturbed on appeal if there is a legal basis for the decision
and substantial evidence supports it.” (Highland Springs, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)
On substantial evidence review, we simply determine
“ ‘whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citation.]
In so doing, we accept all evidence that supports the judgment,
disregard contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences
to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘It is not our role to reweigh
the evidence, redetermine the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
conflicts in the testimony . . . .’ ” (Slone v. El Centro Regional
Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173 (Slone).)
Thus, we “will uphold a judgment that is supported by
substantial evidence even if substantial evidence to the contrary
also exists.” (DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 371, 382 (DeNike).) “The testimony of a single
witness may constitute substantial evidence as long as it is not
physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (Id. at p. 381.)
Applying these principles, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings that Valadez and Classic
Laundry did not share a unity of interest, and that no inequity
would arise from recognizing Classic Laundry’s corporate form.
Absent these “threshold” alter ego showings, we need not address
whether Valadez controlled the 2014 litigation giving rise to the
default judgment. (Triplett, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421
[amendment of a judgment to add an alter ego defendant
“requires both (1) that the new party be the alter ego of the old
party and (2) that the new party had controlled the litigation”].)

8
1. Unity of Interest
“[M]any factors” bear upon whether a shareholder and a
corporation share a unity of interest. (Highland Springs, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 281; see also Associated Vendors, Inc. v.
Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 838–840 [listing
factors].) Those factors include one individual’s ownership of all
stock in a corporation; commingling of the individual’s and
corporation’s funds and other assets; an individual holding out
that he is personally liable for the corporation’s debts; disregard
of corporate formalities; failure to maintain adequate corporate
records; absence of corporate assets and inadequate
capitalization; and the use of the corporation as the mere shell,
instrumentality, or conduit for the individual’s personal affairs.
(Misik v. D’Arco (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1073.) These
factors are not exhaustive. (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 799, 812.) “ ‘ “No single factor is determinative,
and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to
determine whether to apply the [alter ego] doctrine.” ’ ” (Misik v.
D’Arco, at p. 1073.)
After considering the presence and absence of these factors,
the trial court found “Valadez and Classic Laundry had separate
personalities and there was no unity of interest” between them.
Substantial evidence supports this finding, and we disagree with
CM Laundry’s position that “there is undisputed evidence that
every single factor in favor of finding a unity of interest and
ownership is present here.”
Valadez created Classic Laundry with the help of his
accountant, Ed Chermisqui. Chermisqui testified he prepared
and filed Classic Laundry’s articles of incorporation and

9
statement of information with the Secretary of State, both of
which were admitted into evidence at trial. He also obtained a
book including corporate documents and places for recording
minutes and stock transfers.
Subsequently, Valadez testified, he opened a checking
account for Classic Laundry at Bank of America with an initial
deposit of $200. He then contributed $79,000 in capital to the
company from his personal funds, of which $35,000 to $40,000
was used to purchase washers and dryers.
According to Valadez, Classic Laundry had two Bank of
America accounts during its years of operation. One account was
a general account, and the other was for payroll. Valadez
testified he used a payroll company to pay his employees. The
trial court admitted into evidence copies of W-2 forms prepared
by Chermisqui and issued to Classic Laundry’s employees for the
2011 and 2012 tax years.
Valadez testified Classic Laundry customers made
payments out to the company, not to him personally. Valadez
deposited those payments into Classic Laundry’s bank account.
He stated he never deposited checks from Classic Laundry
customers into his personal checking account at Chase, a
different bank. Nor did he use Classic Laundry funds to pay his
personal bills. In addition, Valadez never collected a salary from
Classic Laundry, as the company lacked sufficient funds to pay
him.
Valadez testified Classic Laundry filed tax returns for the
2010, 2011, and 2012 tax years. According to Valadez, Classic
Laundry did not operate in 2009 and, therefore, did not file a tax
return for that year. Chermisqui prepared Classic Laundry’s tax
returns, and Valadez received K-1 forms from the company.

10
The trial court admitted into evidence copies of Classic
Laundry’s tax returns for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 tax years. In
2010, Classic Laundry reported $1,176,270 in gross revenue,
$84,478 in taxable income, and payment of $458,191 in salaries
and wages. That year, the company yielded $24,060 in profits.
Valadez testified he did not withdraw any of Classic Laundry’s
profits, and instead left the funds in the company for payment of
future bills.
In 2011, Classic Laundry lost an important customer.
Consequently, its tax return for that year reported $417,475 in
gross revenue and a loss of $53,516. Then, in 2012, Classic
Laundry’s tax return reported $405,028 in gross revenue and a
loss of $49,152.
Valadez testified that based on Classic Laundry’s poor
financial performance, he decided to close its business in 2012.
He informed his customers and employees of Classic Laundry’s
closure, and he closed the company’s bank accounts. He took no
funds from Classic Laundry upon its closure, as the company had
none left. Valadez did not know how to close a corporation with
the Secretary of State and, consequently, took no formal steps to
do so. He assumed that once Classic Laundry ceased its business
operations, the company would close automatically. He believed
Classic Laundry no longer existed after 2012.
The evidence above shows Classic Laundry was adequately
capitalized and observed corporate formalities. It shows the
company operated a legitimate industrial laundry business and
was not a mere shell or conduit for Valadez to conduct his
personal affairs. Although he was Classic Laundry’s sole
shareholder, officer, and director, Valadez took care to segregate
his assets, finances, and liabilities from Classic Laundry’s. He

11
occasionally infused Classic Laundry with additional capital and
never used company funds or assets for his own purposes.
In arguing for reversal, CM Laundry asserts the trial court
should have placed greater weight on the evidence suggesting
Classic Laundry failed to observe corporate formalities, and
should have inferred from the evidence that the company was
undercapitalized. These arguments fail because they
misunderstand our role on substantial evidence review. (See
Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173; see also DeNike, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.)
CM Laundry further contends reversal is required based on
“uncontradicted evidence that Valadez diverted all [of Classic
Laundry’s] assets to himself.” (Italics omitted.) Specifically, it
asserts Valadez appropriated lease payments due to Classic
Laundry on the Maywood property, benefits related to the
company’s wastewater discharge rights, the company’s
laundering equipment, and its customer list.
For several reasons, we disagree. First, substantial
evidence demonstrates Valadez and Rendon, rather than Classic
Laundry, owned the Maywood property. Therefore, Valadez
properly collected and kept Munoz’s rent for Rendon and himself.
Valadez testified he purchased the property in 2007, before
Classic Laundry was formed, using his personal funds, a cash
disbursement from his other corporation, APS Finishing, Inc., a
loan from a bank, and an SBA loan. The escrow company’s final
statement for the property’s purchase confirms Valadez’s
testimony. Likewise consistent with his testimony are the grant
deed by which Valadez and Rendon obtained title to the property,
and the deed of trust securing their bank loan. Those documents

12
reflect that although unmarried, Valadez and Rendon took title
as “husband and wife as joint tenants.”
Valadez testified, and the trial court specifically agreed,
Munoz’s lease mistakenly lists Classic Laundry as the lessor.
Both he and Munoz understood Valadez to be the owner of the
property, not Classic Laundry. For this reason, Munoz paid rent
to Valadez personally.
Next, the trial court appropriately found the record lacked
credible evidence showing Classic Laundry, after ceasing
operations, owned transferable water discharge rights of
substantial value that Valadez looted.
Contrary to CM Laundry’s argument, the trial court was
not required to accept and find dispositive the testimony of Gary
Freedman. Freedman is a director and managing member for
CM Laundry’s parent company, Citizens of Humanity. He
testified industrial laundries purchase wastewater discharge
rights by the unit based on prices set by the marketplace. Each
unit permits the laundry to discharge a set amount of wastewater
into the sewage system. CM Laundry originally purchased 660
units for $1.2 million, and when trying to sell some of its units
three to four years prior to trial, Freedman was quoted a price of
$3,000 per unit.
So long as it does not act arbitrarily, “a trier of fact may
reject the evidence of a witness, including an expert, even though
that evidence is uncontradicted.” (Beck Development Co. v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160,
1206, fn. 27.) Here, the trial court rationally found Freedman’s
testimony unpersuasive as to the existence, ownership, value, or
transferability of water discharge rights related to Classic
Laundry based on his lacking “personal knowledge of Classic

13
Laundry’s process” and inability to testify to “the current market
cost for water discharge rights . . . .” Instead, the court credited
Valadez’s testimony that the water rights cost him a sum certain
that he never recouped.
Nor was the trial court required to find the water discharge
rights of significant value based on Munoz’s payment of $9,000 in
monthly rent for the Maywood property or Classic Laundry’s
stipulation in 2011 and 2012 to judgments in favor of County
Sanitation Districts Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, totaling nearly
$140,000 for wastewater treatment and conveyance fees due
because of the company’s status as an industrial discharger. CM
Laundry cites no evidence tying the value of Munoz’s rent or that
of the stipulated judgments to Classic Laundry’s ownership of
high-value, transferable wastewater discharge rights, let alone to
any looting of assets by Valadez. And the court did not have to
accept CM Laundry’s speculations regarding such a connection.
(California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 1, 45.)
Finally, substantial evidence supports that Valadez did not
steal Classic Laundry’s customer list or its laundry equipment.
As to the former, Valadez testified that by 2012, Classic Laundry
only had four or five customers, with whom he did no further
business after the company ceased operations. As to the latter,
Munoz testified that when he leased the Maywood property in
2012, the washers and dryers purchased by Valadez were old and
“almost fall[ing] into pieces.” Munoz uninstalled those machines
and bought new ones to replace them. Valadez disposed of the
old machines at the junkyard, for which he received
approximately $200 to $300.

14
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Valadez and Classic Laundry had separate
personalities and shared no unity of interest.
2. Inequity
Arguing recognition of Classic Laundry’s corporate form
would result in injustice, CM Laundry reiterates its contentions
that Valadez stole Classic Laundry’s assets and that Classic
Laundry was undercapitalized. We have already addressed and
rejected those arguments in part I.B.1, ante.
CM Laundry additionally argues that acknowledging
Classic Laundry’s corporate existence would unfairly preclude it
from “recover[ing] the funds stolen from it that ended up at
Classic Laundry . . . .” In support, CM Laundry asserts that by
entering the default judgment in its favor, the trial court found
true its allegation that Classic Laundry was built on funds
embezzled from CM Laundry. This finding, CM Laundry
contends, “cannot now be contested” under res judicata principles
and, thus, should have justified the alter ego doctrine’s
application here.
CM Laundry’s argument appears to invoke issue
preclusion. Historically known as collateral estoppel, “[i]ssue
preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided
in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes
of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
824, italics omitted (DKN).) The doctrine “applies (1) after final
adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and
necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one
who was a party in the first suit or in privity with that party.”
(Id. at p. 825.) The fourth requirement limits issue preclusion’s
reach “[i]n accordance with due process.” (Id. at p. 824.) “The

15
party asserting [issue preclusion] bears the burden of
establishing these [threshold] requirements.” (Lucido v. Superior
Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (Lucido).)
Even where issue preclusion’s threshold requirements are
met, “policy considerations may limit its use where the limitation
on relitigation underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by
other factors.” (Jackson v. City of Sacramento (1981)
117 Cal.App.3d 596, 603; see also Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at
p. 343 [“the public policies underlying [issue preclusion] —
preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of
judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by
vexatious litigation — strongly influence whether its application
in a particular circumstance would be fair to the parties and
constitutes sound judicial policy”].) That is, issue preclusion “is
not an inflexible, universally applicable principle.” (Jackson v.
City of Sacramento, at p. 603.) In determining whether “fairness
concerns” militate against issue preclusion’s application, courts
“ ‘ “balance the need to limit litigation against the right of a fair
adversary proceeding in which a party may fully present his
case.” ’ ” (Thompson v. Crestbook Insurance Company (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 115, 129.)
CM Laundry does not couch its res judicata arguments
within this well-settled analytical framework. Instead, CM
Laundry cites Fitzgerald v. Herzer (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 127
(Fitzgerald) for the proposition that a default judgment “is res
judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint” such that
the “defendant is estopped from denying in a subsequent action
any allegations contained in the former complaint.” (Id. at p.
132.) This invocation of Fitzgerald does not adequately address
the threshold requirements of issue preclusion or the equitable

16
concerns regarding whether it should apply here and how. CM
Laundry, therefore, has forfeited this point. (Picerne
Construction Corp. v. Castellino Villas (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
1201, 1211 [“the appellant must support claims of error with
meaningful argument”].)
Moreover, Fitzgerald is distinguishable. There, the
appellate court considered whether a defendant’s discharge in
bankruptcy released him from a default judgment entered in a
personal injury action where the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from
the defendant’s grossly careless and reckless conduct.
(Fitzgerald, supra, 78 Cal.App.2d at pp. 128–129.) Answering the
question in the negative, the court then addressed the default
judgment’s effect on the plaintiff’s subsequent, post-bankruptcy
action seeking a new judgment against the same defendant in the
amount of the default judgment, with interest. (Id. at pp. 130–
131.) Here, unlike the defendant in Fitzgerald, Valadez was not
a party to the action giving rise to the default judgment. After
all, CM Laundry brings this very proceeding to add Valadez as a
party.
Substantial evidence otherwise supports the trial court’s
finding. As noted above, Valadez testified he bought the
Maywood property using personal funds, funds from APS
Finishing, and two loans. From his personal funds, he infused
Classic Laundry with capital to purchase the washers and dryers
used in the company’s operative years. When served with the
cross-complaint in 2014, Valadez was unfamiliar with CM
Laundry and, other than Munoz, whom he knew as his tenant
and nothing more, he recognized none of the parties named in the
pleading. Valadez denied meeting Rodriguez and stated neither
he nor Classic Laundry received any money, equipment, or other

17
assets from Rodriguez, Munoz, CM Laundry, or anyone affiliated
with CM Laundry.
In sum, the trial court appropriately concluded recognition
of Classic Laundry as an entity separate from Valadez would not
sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
II. Evidence Code sections 412 and 413 did not require
the trial court to draw inferences adverse to Valadez.
Its substantial evidence arguments aside, CM Laundry
asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing to draw,
under Evidence Code sections 412 and 413, negative inferences
from Valadez’s inability to produce certain Classic Laundry
records, such as its bank statements and customer invoices, to
corroborate his testimony. These statutes, CM Laundry argued,
required the court to infer the missing documents “were
unfavorable to” Valadez.
Evidence Code sections 412 and 413 do not apply here. And
even if they did, these statutes were permissive, as they imposed
no mandatory obligation on the trial court.
Evidence Code section 412 provides: “If weaker and less
satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of
the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the
evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.” (Ibid.) This
statute, then, “ ‘only applies when it can be shown that a party is
in fact in possession of or has access to better and stronger
evidence than was presented.’ [Citations.] It does not apply to
evidence that does not exist.” (Orange County Water Dist. v.
Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 362.)
CM Laundry identifies no evidence requiring a finding that
Valadez possessed or had access to the records he failed to
produce. On the contrary, by asserting “virtually all of Classic

18
Laundry’s records were gone by the time” of discovery in the
present case, CM Laundry essentially concedes those documents
do not exist. Evidence Code section 412, therefore, does not
apply.
Evidence Code section 413, in turn, punishes and deters the
intentional spoliation of evidence by permitting the finder of fact
to infer “evidence which one party has destroyed or rendered
unavailable was unfavorable to that party.” (Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
Specifically, section 413 states: “In determining what inferences
to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a party, the
trier of fact may consider, among other things, the party’s failure
to explain or to deny by his testimony such evidence or facts in
the case against him, or his willful suppression of evidence
relating thereto, if such be the case.” (Ibid.)
In arguing the trial court should have invoked Evidence
Code section 413, CM Laundry essentially challenges its finding
that the Classic Laundry documents at issue were innocently lost
due to the passage of time and “Valadez’s poor record-keeping.”
As substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual finding
(see Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173), CM Laundry’s
argument falters.
As discussed above, Valadez testified he believed Classic
Laundry did not exist after it ceased operations and closed its
bank accounts in 2012. Classic Laundry owed no debts to CM
Laundry. It never did business with CM Laundry. Valadez
heard of CM Laundry for the first time when he was served with
the cross-complaint in 2017, five years after Classic Laundry’s
closure.

19
Immediately after winding Classic Laundry down, Valadez
testified, he kept the company’s records in a box stored at the
APS Finishing office. By the time of trial, he no longer knew
where the documents were, as “it’s been a long time.” Valadez
acknowledged he had been asked to look for Classic Laundry
documents “many times” for purposes of this case but was unable
to find them. He stated: “I was asked all the time to look here, to
look there, to look for all the evidence, to focus myself. I look[ed]
everywhere. Why would I want to hide anything? I would like to
have . . . the documents to turn them in, but I didn’t find them.”
Further, Valadez testified that in 2018, he called the bank and
asked for Classic Laundry’s records. Unable to fulfill his request,
the bank explained to Valadez that it no longer had the records
“because it had been a long time.”
On this record, the trial court reasonably inferred Valadez
did not willfully destroy Classic Laundry’s records to avoid
liability to CM Laundry, and that they had instead been
misplaced or lost due to the passage of time. Accordingly,
Evidence Code section 413 does not apply.
In any event, even assuming Evidence Code sections 412
and 413 did apply, neither statute required the trial court to
draw adverse inferences from Valadez’s inability to produce the
Classic Laundry records at issue. The statutes permit the trier of
fact to view and interpret the evidence through a certain lens
under specific circumstances. (See Evid. Code, §§ 412 [“the
evidence offered should be viewed with distrust” (italics added)],
413 [“the trier of fact may consider . . . the party’s willful
suppression of evidence” (italics added)].) The court, therefore,
retained discretion as the trier of fact “to decide whether an
inference should be drawn and the weight to be accorded the

20
inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 374.)
CM Laundry has shown no abuse of that discretion here.
In sum, the trial court did not commit reversible error by
declining to infer Classic Laundry’s missing records would have
worked against Valadez’s favor.
III. Reversal is unwarranted based on the trial court’s
allocation of the burden of proof.
According to CM Laundry, the trial court prejudicially
erred by allocating to it, the party seeking court action, the
burden of proving Valadez was Classic Laundry’s alter ego.
Specifically, relying on public policy and the fact Valadez alone
possessed the evidence bearing upon the alter ego factors, CM
Laundry argues reversal is required because the trial court
should have shifted the burden of proof to Valadez on the alter
ego issue.
We disagree. Even assuming the trial court misallocated
the burden of proof to Valadez — an assumption that does not
reflect our inclination towards CM Laundry’s position — any
such error was harmless.
In a bench trial, “misallocation of the burden of proof is not
‘reversible error per se,’ [and] does not vitiate the substantial
evidence rule . . . .” (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 712, 736.) For nearly a century, the rule has
been where substantial evidence supports the findings on which
the court’s decision rests, its “misallocation of the burden of proof
[is] harmless because there [is no] reasonable probability the
court’s decision would have been different in absence of the
error.” (Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. v. Moorefield Construction,
Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1288; Merrill v. Normandie Corp.
(1930) 110 Cal.App. 621, 623 [in a bench trial, “the question of

21
upon whom rests the burden of proof become[s] purely academic
when the trial court has found upon substantial evidence that the
essential facts have been proved”].)
As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s express findings that Valadez and Classic Laundry shared
no unity of interest, and that recognition of Classic Laundry’s
corporate form would not sanction a fraud or result in inequity.
(See Discussion part I.B, ante.) Under these circumstances, even
if the trial court had misallocated the burden of proof on the alter
ego issue, its error was not prejudicial. Reversal is not required.
IV. Rendon is not liable for the default judgment.
Lastly, CM Laundry seeks reversal of the judgment as to
Rendon because “she was Valadez’s business partner” and, thus,
“under basic principles of partnership law, Rendon is liable to the
same extent as Valadez.”
CM Laundry’s contention fails for two reasons. First, it
incorrectly assumes Valadez is liable on the default judgment as
Classic Laundry’s alter ego. (See Discussion, parts I and II,
ante.)
Second, substantial evidence demonstrates — as the trial
court found — Rendon and Valadez did not create a partnership
or joint venture to co-operate an industrial laundry business
through Classic Laundry. (See Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 442, 445 [existence of partnership is a factual finding
reviewed for substantial evidence].)
“ ‘A joint venture exists where there is an “agreement
between the parties under which they have . . . a joint interest[ ]
in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the
sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control.”
[Citations.] An essential element of a partnership or joint

22
venture is the right of joint participation in the management and
control of the business. [Citation.] Absent such right, the mere
fact that one party is to receive benefits in consideration of
services rendered or for capital contribution does not, as a matter
of law, make him a partner or joint venturer.’ ” (Kaljian v.
Menezes (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 573, 586.) As discussed above,
Valadez testified — and Classic Laundry’s statement of
information confirms — he was Classic Laundry’s sole
shareholder, officer, and director. Rendon testified she had no
ownership in Classic Laundry and has never worked for the
company. She did not have signing authority for Classic
Laundry. Nor did she have access to the company’s checking
accounts. She received no funds from Classic Laundry, and
Classic Laundry has never paid for her expenses.
Accordingly, substantial evidence demonstrates Rendon
had no right to participate in Classic Laundry’s management or
control and did not receive a share of the company’s profits. For
this reason, the trial court correctly declined to hold her liable on
the default judgment as Valadez’s partner or joint venturer.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

SCHERB. J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.

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