CourtListener 10832078•Choe v. City Storage Systems CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/2/26 Choe v. City Storage Systems CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JUNE CHOE et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, G064748
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-01372944)
CITY STORAGE SYSTEMS LLC OPINION
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Donald F. Gaffney. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
K&L Gates, Kevin S. Asfour and Lauren E. Elvick for Defendants
and Appellants.
Skywheel Law and Virginia Liu for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
* * *
Defendants in this case appeal the denial of their petition to
compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims related to a commercial leasing
dispute. The individual plaintiff, June Choe, is the owner of the entity
plaintiff Poke Pub Corp. (Poke Pub). Choe electronically signed two
documents: a contract formalizing Poke Pub’s obligations to one of the
defendants and Choe’s personal guaranty of those obligations.
Neither side disputes that Poke Pub’s agreement contained an
arbitration clause. But the arbitration clause was part of a separate
document that was hyperlinked in the document Choe signed. Choe’s
personal guaranty contained language alerting Choe to the presence of an
arbitration clause in Poke Pub’s agreement. Plaintiffs claim Choe was
pressured to sign the agreements without taking the time to fully read them,
and that plaintiffs were unaware they had agreed to arbitration.
The trial court found the arbitration agreement bound only Choe,
not Poke Pub, but that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable against
Choe because it was unconscionable. We disagree. Both Choe and Poke Pub,
as sophisticated parties engaging in a business transaction, must be held to
the terms to which they agreed. We reverse and remand with the instruction
that the court grant defendants’ petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Choe is, by her own admission, a “seasoned restaurateur” who
has a track record of “establish[ing] successful restaurants.” Her company,
Poke Pub, is a restaurant selling Korean barbecue. Defendant 1750 Newport
Blvd CM LLC (Newport) is a company providing shared commercial kitchen
space and virtual restaurant concepts to entrepreneurs in the food business.
Choe alleges she was approached by defendants in her Long
Beach restaurant and “persuaded to take out a large high interest loan” to
2
fund a new Korean barbecue venture. She was shown a document called
“Order Form for Kitchen Services” (order form) electronically.1 The order
form stated that it, “along with the Kitchen Services Terms and Conditions
available at” a hyperlinked location on the internet, “together form[ed] an
agreement between the Licensor and Customer.” The order form identified
Newport as the licensor and Poke Pub as the customer.
The order form proposed to give Poke Pub use of one kitchen,
designated storage racks, and common areas for a period of 12 months
beginning on August 30, 2023. In exchange, Poke Pub had to pay a monthly
license fee starting on August 30, 2023, and other expenses.
The order form ended with the following language: “By signing
below, each party confirms that it has read and hereby agrees to the terms
set forth in this Agreement (including the Terms and Conditions at
[hyperlink] . . .).” Choe signed the order form as owner of Poke Pub.
The hyperlinked Kitchen Services Terms and Conditions contains
an arbitration clause at paragraph 11, which states in pertinent part as
follows: “Arbitration. By entering into the agreement, each party is required
to use arbitration to resolve claims or disputes on an individual basis, as
further set forth in this section. Except for claims or disputes related to a
1 There appears to be a dispute in the record as to whether Choe
reviewed the document on a mobile device shown to her by Newport’s
emissary, or whether she received the document via e-mail. Defendants’
representative filed a declaration stating that Newport sent plaintiffs the
order form and personal guaranty via e-mail on May 16, and Choe executed
them the following day. However, Choe avers in her declaration that she was
shown the document on a mobile device and was not given the chance to fully
review it. This factual conflict was not resolved by the trial court, but either
way, it appears the parties agree Choe reviewed the document electronically.
3
party’s intellectual property, each party agrees that any claim or dispute
arising between the parties, including but not limited to this Agreement, or
the breach thereof, will be settled by binding arbitration before a single
arbitrator, and not in a court of law. The arbitration will be administered by
the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its Commercial
Arbitration Rules and utilizing its Expedited Procedures. . . . Per the
Commercial Arbitration Rules, the arbitrator has the authority to determine
whether a claim or counterclaim is subject to arbitration.” (Some
capitalization and boldface omitted.)
Simultaneously, Choe, in her individual capacity and on behalf of
Poke Pub, signed an Agreement of Personal Guaranty, guaranteeing
payment of the fees required by the order form.
The guaranty was “made part of the Kitchen Services
Agreement” comprising both the order form and terms and conditions.2 The
guaranty ended with the following language: “The parties (including the
guarantor) agree that any claims or disputes arising from a) this guaranty or
b) the failure to pay fees owed pursuant to the agreement, and for which
damages of $20,000 or less are sought are excluded from the arbitration
clause as set forth in section 11 of the agreement. As such, a party may, at its
own election, commence an action in small claims court in the jurisdiction
where the delivery hub is located to resolve any such claim or dispute.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.)
2 Hereinafter, we refer to the overall agreement as the “kitchen
services agreement,” which comprises the order form, hyperlinked terms and
conditions, and personal guaranty. We refer to paragraph 11 in the
hyperlinked terms and conditions as the “arbitration provision.”
4
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After Choe’s new venture experienced operational problems,
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit. Their amended complaint named City Storage
Systems, LLC dba CloudKitchens, Restaurant Technology Solutions, LLC
dba Otter, Newport (dba Costa Mesa Kitchens), and Travis Kalanick.3
Plaintiffs alleged eight causes of action, including intentional and negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, and
discrimination in business dealings pursuant to Civil Code section 51.5.
Counsel representing the corporate defendants contacted
plaintiffs’ counsel demanding that the case be submitted to arbitration.
Plaintiffs did not agree.
Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration. They argued
the controversy was covered by the arbitration provision, which was
incorporated into the kitchen services agreement between plaintiffs and
Newport. Also, because plaintiffs had alleged alter ego and agency liability
between them in the complaint, defendants argued the nonsignatory
defendants were entitled to enforce the arbitration provision as well.
Plaintiffs opposed the petition, arguing there was no valid
agreement to arbitrate because Newport hid the arbitration provision and
because the arbitration provision was unconscionable. In support, they
attached Choe’s declaration, in which she averred (1) she was never provided
with a copy of the hyperlinked terms and conditions, (2) the documents were
presented in a manner which did not allow negotiation, (3) she did not know
the terms and conditions contained an arbitration provision, and (4) she felt
3 According to defendants, Kalanick has never been served or
appeared in the case.
5
coerced into signing by representations that kitchen space was quickly filling
up.
After a hearing, the trial court denied defendants’ petition. First,
the court found there was no valid arbitration agreement between Poke Pub
and Newport because the arbitration provision was not made visible or
conspicuous. It did find an agreement to arbitrate between Choe and
Newport because the guaranty contained a reference to the arbitration
provision. Even so, it found the arbitration provision to be unconscionable.
Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is
based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
[Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’”
(Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2015)
234 Cal.App.4th 459, 467.) Because the court’s decision here rested on the
formation and enforceability of a contract, a legal question, we review its
decision de novo.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. (See Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447.)
Defendants also take issue with the court’s ruling on their evidentiary
objections. However, given that we find the court erred in denying the
petition as a matter of law, regardless of the evidentiary rulings, we need not
resolve that issue.
6
II.
THERE WAS A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEWPORT,
CHOE, AND POKE PUB COVERING THIS CONTROVERSY
“Under ‘both federal and state law, the threshold question
presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an
agreement to arbitrate.’ [Citation.]” (Cruise v. Kroger Co. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 390, 396, italics omitted.) “‘When deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts.’ [Citations.] More specifically, we look to California
law regarding contracts. ‘An arbitration agreement is subject to the same
rules of construction as any other contract.’ [Citation.] The existence of a
contract under California law requires four essential elements: parties
capable of contracting; their consent; a lawful object; and a sufficient cause or
consideration. [Citation.]” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 13, 21.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of the kitchen services
agreement. Indeed, they sue in part for the breach of said agreement. They
argue the arbitration provision alone was invalid because it was within a
hyperlinked document which they had not read. This does not invalidate the
contracts they signed.
As the California Supreme Court has said, “[a]n arbitration
clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never
actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market
Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) “If an offeree objectively
manifests assent to an agreement, the offeree cannot avoid a specific
provision of that agreement on the ground the offeree did not actually read
7
it.” (B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 943
(Blizzard); see also Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 [“‘“[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which
on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot
escape liability on the ground that he has not read it”’”].)
This fundamental principle of contract law is especially
important here, where “the disputants were sophisticated parties of
reasonably equal bargaining power.” (See Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc.
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1051 [dictum].) In contrast, the authorities
plaintiffs cite involve consumers who purportedly agreed to terms of use
while using and browsing websites. (See Sellers v. JustAnswer LLC (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 444, 465 (Sellers); Herzog v. Superior Court (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1296 (Herzog).)
In Sellers, the plaintiffs filed a class action against a website
providing expert answers to questions. The plaintiffs alleged they had
submitted only one question for what they believed to be a one-time fee but
were automatically enrolled for a more expensive monthly membership
without their knowledge. (Sellers, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) The
website tried to enforce an arbitration clause in its terms of service, arguing
the plaintiffs consented through a “‘sign-in wrap’ agreement” by clicking a
button stating “‘start my trial.’” (Id. at p. 453.) Stating “the full context of any
transaction is critical to determining whether any particular notice is
sufficient to put a consumer on inquiry notice of contractual terms contained
on a separate, hyperlinked page,” the court found simply clicking a button to
start a trial was not sufficient to put a consumer on notice of contractual
terms. (Id. at pp. 453, 480–481.)
8
Similarly, in Herzog, multiple plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of
a diabetic glucose monitor for products liability. (Herzog, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1285.) The manufacturer sought to compel arbitration
in each of the cases based on a so-called “‘clickwrap’ agreement,” in which
users of the device’s mobile app had to click a checkbox in order to launch the
app. The trial court granted the manufacturer’s motions to compel
arbitration. (Ibid.) The plaintiffs petitioned for writ of mandate to vacate the
orders compelling arbitration. (Id. at pp. 1285–1286.) The court of appeal
consolidated the cases and ultimately found the arbitration agreements were
not enforceable. (Id. at p. 1286.) The court agreed that clickwrap agreements
were “generally regarded as enforceable” because they “require[] the user to
manifest assent to a website’s terms of use” using a checkbox. (Id. at p. 1296.)
But the court found the plaintiffs had not agreed to arbitrate “[b]ecause the
process required to initially launch the . . . [a]pp neither placed prospective
app users on constructive notice of the arbitration provision nor resulted in
an unambiguous manifestation of assent to the provision.” (Id. at p. 1305.)
Though the trial court here appeared to place great weight on the
fact that the arbitration provision was “hidden in a hyperlink,” this alone
does not preclude enforcement of an arbitration clause, even in the consumer
context. In Blizzard, the arbitration provision in question was also contained
within a hyperlink. (Blizzard, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 952–953.) The
plaintiffs in Blizzard were a minor and his father. The minor played an
online video game offered by Blizzard. (Id. at p. 934.) When he and his father
sued, Blizzard moved to compel arbitration based on a clause hyperlinked in
its license agreement, which was presented to users when they created and
used online gaming accounts. (Id. at p. 937.) The entirety of the license
agreement was given in a popup notice and there was specific language in the
9
popup advising the user that the agreement contained a binding arbitration
agreement and to read it.4 (Id. at p. 939–940.) Because of this extra language
advising the user to read the arbitration agreement, the court in Blizzard
found the user had notice that he needed to click the hyperlink.
Even if the kitchen services agreement did not contain the same
advisement as the agreement in Blizzard, “‘the full context of any transaction
is critical to determining whether any particular notice is sufficient to put a
consumer on inquiry notice of contractual terms contained on a separate,
hyperlinked page.’” (Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC (2022)
87 Cal.App.5th 23, 31, italics in original (Doe).) Here, the context of the
transaction is still very different from Sellers and Herzog.
Choe and Poke Pub are not consumers or remote website users.
Choe is an experienced businesswoman who, along with her company,
engaged in an arms-length business transaction with defendants to lease
commercial kitchen space for a new venture. Choe admits she physically
encountered Newport’s representative when he entered her restaurant, and
she was shown the order form electronically. She claims she was not given a
copy of the hyperlinked terms and conditions, but neither does she establish
that she ever asked for a copy or unsuccessfully attempted to click the link.
Nor does she aver that she asked for time to review either the kitchen
services agreement as a whole, or the arbitration provision specifically
mentioned in the guaranty.
4 While the plaintiff in Blizzard had created his account before the
dispute resolution policy was hyperlinked in the agreement he had to sign,
the defendant later updated its agreement in 2017 and 2018 so that the
dispute resolution was hyperlinked. (Blizzard, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 937–940.) The updated agreements were presented in popup windows
that the user had to scroll through and accept. (Id. at pp. 938–940.)
10
“It has long been the law in California that ‘an offeree, regardless
of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous
contractual provisions of which he was unaware, contained in a document
whose contractual nature is not obvious.’ [Citation.]” (Doe, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 30–31, italics added.) The documents Choe signed on
behalf of herself and Poke Pub were clearly contracts, and she knew them to
be so. Plaintiffs cannot escape the terms of contracts they willingly entered
but failed to read. We therefore conclude Newport met its burden to show
that there was an agreement to arbitrate between it, Poke Pub, and Choe.5
III.
THE PARTIES DID NOT CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY AGREE THAT
UNCONSCIONABILITY WAS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR
The trial court concluded the arbitration provision was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Defendants initially contend
that the court did not have authority to consider the validity of the
arbitration provision because that authority had been delegated to the
arbitrator.
Parties are free to delegate to the arbitrator issues regarding
enforceability of the arbitration agreement. (See Blizzard, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 956–957.) For such a delegation to be given effect, two
elements must be present: (1) “the language of the [delegation] clause must
be clear and unmistakable,” and (2) “the delegation must not be revocable
under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”
(Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 892 (Aanderud).)
Because of this conclusion, we need not resolve whether Choe’s
5
constructive notice of the arbitration provision also bound Poke Pub.
11
“The ‘clear and unmistakable’ test reflects a ‘heightened standard of proof’
that reverses the typical presumption in favor of the arbitration of disputes.”
(Ibid.) Absent a clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator, “the
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the
court, not the arbitrator.” (United Public Employees v. City and County of
San Francisco (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1026.)
In this case, the arbitration provision in the kitchen services
agreement provides: “Per the Commercial Arbitration Rules, the arbitrator
has the authority to determine whether a claim or counterclaim is subject to
arbitration,” and includes a hyperlink to the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) website. The version of the AAA commercial arbitration
rules currently available on that website provides, in relevant part: “The
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the
arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim,
without any need to refer such matters first to a court.”
(<https://adr.org/media/qielmf0g/2025_commercialrules_web.pdf> at p. 14. [as
of March 23, 2026], archived at: <https://perma.cc/PZA9-TUTU>.)
We conclude the delegation clause is not clear and unmistakable.
Within the kitchen services agreement, the language of delegation is
permissive, and does not preclude the trial court from making the decision
regarding enforceability. The hyperlinked rules are mandatory. This alone
prevents us from determining delegation is clear and unmistakable.
12
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION
WAS UNCONSCIONABLE
Defendants also argue the trial court erred by determining the
arbitrability provision was unconscionable. We agree.
“An agreement to arbitrate is invalid if it is both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. [Citations.] The two types of
unconscionability need not be present in the same degree, and ‘the more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.’ [Citation.] The party opposing arbitration has
the burden of proving unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Aanderud, supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 894–895.) Plaintiffs fail to do so.
“A procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry
into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ [Citation.] An adhesive contract
is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with
superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ [Citations.] . . . The
pertinent question, then, is whether circumstances of the contract’s formation
created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness
is required. [Citations.]” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126.)
Ultimately, the court is to look to whether unequal bargaining power has
resulted in hidden terms or a lack of informed choice on the part of the
weaker party. (See Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 895.)
Plaintiffs have not shown that the kitchen services agreement
was presented to them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In her declaration, Choe
indicates the contract was “presented in a manner that implied acceptance
was non-negotiable.” But she does not say what about the transaction gave
13
her this impression. She claims she was pressured to “sign the Order Form
hastily and without due diligence,” because the “form was presented to [her]
on a mobile device, creating a scenario where thorough review was practically
impossible.” Choe does not say she asked for time to review the document or
sought to negotiate its terms and was refused. As we noted ante, defendants
attest that they e-mailed Choe the document the day before she signed it,
thus adding another layer of uncertainty to her characterization of events.
We also see no imbalance in bargaining power. Choe is
experienced in the restaurant industry. Plaintiffs point to no evidence they
were being forced to enter a new business venture with or to lease space from
Newport. Choe states in her declaration that Newport created an aura of
urgency by making her feel that she needed to “act swiftly under the threat of
lost opportunity” based on the scarcity of kitchen spaces. But this is best
characterized as salesmanship and not as the groundwork for an adhesive
contract. We conclude the kitchen services agreement was not a contract of
adhesion and the arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable.
Plaintiffs also fail to show the arbitration provision was
substantively unconscionable. The substantive unconscionability analysis
focuses on whether the agreement is overly harsh or one-sided. (See
Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at 895.)
The trial court pointed to several aspects of the kitchen services
agreement which it concluded benefited defendants more than plaintiffs:
(1) the exclusion of intellectual property claims from arbitration, (2) a
limitation of Newport’s aggregate liability to the amount of monthly license
fees paid in the 12 months preceding a claim by plaintiffs, and (3) the
exclusion in the personal guaranty of small claims for unpaid fees from
14
arbitration. We disagree that these elements render the arbitration provision
one-sided.
Regarding intellectual property, the trial court observed that
defendants “operate a cloud kitchen system that uses the Otter platform,
which presumably includes intellectual property that Defendants would like
to protect.” But, as plaintiffs’ counsel admitted at the hearing on the petition,
plaintiffs also have intellectual property they would potentially want to
protect, such as their recipes. Thus, the carve out for intellectual property
could benefit both parties.
We also agree with defendants that the presence of a limitation of
liability provision in the kitchen services agreement does not render the
arbitration provision unconscionable. Such clauses are enforceable in
California unless they are “the improper result of unequal bargaining power
or contrary to public policy.” (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems
USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126.) “Generally, ‘a limitation of
liability clause is intended to protect the wrongdoer defendant from unlimited
liability.’” (Ibid.) As we have already found, there was no unequal bargaining
power here.
The exclusion of small claims for unpaid fees would presumably
only impact defendants’ claims, in that defendants would be the only ones
suing for unpaid fees. But we do not see why the defendants’ ability to pursue
such claims in small claims court is unconscionable. And even if this
exception were suspect, as defendants point out, the trial court could easily
sever it from the rest of the kitchen services agreement.
In analyzing unconscionability, we must invoke “‘“a sliding
scale . . . which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the
contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater
15
harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.”
[Citations.] In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract
term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to
the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ [Citation.]”
(Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910.) Here, the
level of substantive unconscionability, if any, is insufficient to tip the analysis
in plaintiffs’ favor.
The arbitration provision is thus valid and enforceable.6
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ petition to compel arbitration is
reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter an order
6As defendants argue, the arbitration provision may be enforced
by nonsignatories who are alleged by the plaintiffs to be agents of the
signatory party. (See Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614.)
Here, the complaint alleges that all defendants acted as agents of one
another. As such, all defendants are entitled to enforce the agreement.
16
granting the petition, staying the action, and ordering all parties currently
appearing to arbitration. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
BANCROFT, J.*
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17
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