In re Katherine D. CA2/6

CourtListener 10832075Calctapp02.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 4/2/26 In re Katherine D. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re KATHERINE D. et al., B347820
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP01229A-D)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIO D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Reversed and
remanded.
Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan P. Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
In this juvenile dependency case, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction, orally announced an unlawful
qualification for a forthcoming “exit order,” and subsequently
issued a written order that reflects several errors and
inconsistently describes the noncustodial parent’s visitation
rights. We accordingly vacate the exit order and remand for the
juvenile court to clarify its ruling and correct the errors.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Julieta A. (mother) and Mario D. (father) have been
married since 2008 and have four children together—Katherine
D. (born August 2009), Diana D. (born July 2010), Brisa D. (born
October 2013), and Julian D. (born June 2023) (collectively, “the
children”).
B. Mother obtains a three-year civil restraining
order
On October 18, 2024, mother requested a domestic violence
restraining order protecting her and the children from father
based on father’s drug use and escalating verbal and physical
abuse of mother. Following a hearing, the trial court on
November 12, 2024 entered a restraining order (the civil

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restraining order) that (1) granted mother sole legal and physical
custody of the children, (2) prohibited father from coming within
100 yards of the family home, mother’s workplace or vehicle, and
the children’s schools, and (3) prohibited father from having any
contact with mother. The order contained an exception allowing
contact for purposes of court-order monitored visitation. The
order had a three-year duration, set to expire on November 12,
2027.
C. Father repeatedly violates the civil restraining
order
In January and February 2025, father violated the
restraining order “almost daily” by knocking on mother’s window
in the middle of the night or lurking in or around the apartment
building where mother and the children lived. On one occasion,
father broke into the home while mother and the children were
away, left salt on the floor in what mother described as a
“ritualistic” pattern, and stole mother’s underwear, money, and
jewelry. Approximately a week later, father appeared on the
patio outside the apartment. He gestured at mother by moving
his finger left to right across his neck, signaling cutting one’s
throat.
D. Diana and Katherine disclose sexual abuse by
father
In the early months of 2025, Diana told mother that father
had sexually abused both her and Katherine. Mother reported
the abuse to law enforcement; during forensic interviews, Diana
disclosed that father inappropriately touched her when she was 8
or 9 years old, and Katherine disclosed that father raped her
when she was 11 years old.

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E. Criminal charges are filed and the trial court
issues a criminal protective order
In response to father’s conduct, the People charged father
with (1) two counts of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422,
subd. (a)), (2) stalking (id., § 646.9, subds. (a) & (f)), (3) eight
counts of willfully violating a restraining order (id., § 166, subd.
(c)(1)), (4) one count of trespassing (id., § 602, subd. (m)), and (5)
one count of making obscene, threatening, harassing, or annoying
telephone calls (id., § 653m, subd. (a)). Father pled not guilty to
these charges, and the court presiding over the criminal charges
entered a criminal restraining order on February 25, 2025 that,
as pertinent here, (1) prohibited father from coming within 100
yards of the family home, mother’s workplace or vehicle, and the
children’s schools, and (2) prohibited father from having any
contact with mother or the children. The criminal protective
order has no exception allowing contact for purposes of visitation,
and is to “remain[] in effect until further court order.”
II. Procedural Background
A. The petition
On April 28, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to assert dependency jurisdiction over
the children based on (1) father’s domestic violence against
mother (pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1)1), (2) father’s abuse of alcohol and
methamphetamine (pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1)),
and (3) father’s sexual abuse of Katherine and Diana (pursuant
to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j)).

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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B. Jurisdiction and disposition
The juvenile court held a combined jurisdictional and
dispositional hearing on July 21, 2025. The court sustained the
allegations and stated its intent to terminate jurisdiction and
issue an exit order granting mother sole legal and physical
custody of the children.
1. Oral ruling
At the hearing, the court indicated that the exit order was
to have a “rider . . . to provide that before this family law order
[that is, the exit order] can be modified[: Father] is to complete,
in full, 52 sex offender classes for adults, 52 domestic violence
classes for batterers, parenting class, individual counseling, a
substance abuse program, and submit to six clean tests.”
2. Written orders
The court asked mother’s counsel to prepare a written exit
order, which counsel submitted and the court signed the day after
the hearing. The exit order awarded mother full legal and
physical custody of the children. With regard to visitation by
father, the exit order provided that:
-- Visitation was permitted as set forth in an attached
JV-205 form. The JV-205 form stated that a criminal protective
order was “in place until November 12, 2027[2] that does not allow
for visits,” but further indicated that “[s]hould th[at order] be
modified, [father] is to have monitored visits only.”
-- “No visitation is ordered” for the reasons set forth in
an attached JV-206 form. The JV-206 form stated that the court
was ordering “no visitation” because father “has not completed” a
“[s]exual abuse treatment or awareness program for offenders,” a
“[d]rug abuse treatment program with random testing,” an

2 As explained below, this expiration date is incorrect.

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“[a]lcohol abuse treatment program with random testing,” a
“[d]omestic violence treatment program for offenders,”
“[p]arenting classes,” or “[i]ndividual counseling,” but also stated
that father “is also to submit 6 consecutive negative drug tests
[and] needs to complete a 52 week DV program and a 52 week
sexual abuse treatment program for offenders.”
C. Appeal
Father filed a notice of appeal on the day of the hearing,
which was the day before the exit order was signed. The notice
stated that father was appealing the “orders of the court . . .
sustaining [the] petition against father and [c]losing the case
giving mother sole physical and legal custody of the children on
7/21/25 & 7/22/25.”
DISCUSSION
On appeal, father argues that the exit order must be
vacated so the juvenile court can clarify father’s visitation rights.
The Department responds that father’s appeal is not properly
before us, and that the order is sufficiently clear. We address the
threshold jurisdictional issue first.
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, the Department argues we must
dismiss father’s appeal due to deficiencies in his notice of
appeal—namely, (1) the notice was filed too early because it was
filed the day before the juvenile court issued the written exit
order he assails on appeal, and (2) the notice does not reach
father’s challenge to the visitation provisions of the exit order
because the notice states only an intent to appeal the “orders of
the court . . . sustaining [the] petition against father and [c]losing
the case giving mother sole physical and legal custody of the
children on 7/21/25 & 7/22/25.”

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We reject both contentions.
As to the Department’s first objection, we have the
discretion to treat a prematurely filed notice of appeal “as filed
immediately after the rendition of judgment” where, as here, the
trial court has announced its intended ruling (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.406(d)), particularly where the opposing party was
in no way misled or prejudiced by the premature filing (see In re
Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369, 375). We elect to
exercise that discretion here, as father’s notice of appeal
accurately identifies both the date of the oral ruling and the date
of the written exit order.3
As to the Department’s second objection, we have a duty to
“liberally construe[]” notices of appeal as well as to treat a notice
as sufficient “if it identifies the particular judgment or order
being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3).) Here,
father identified the order(s) being appealed as the “orders of the
court . . . sustaining [the] petition against father and [c]losing the
case giving mother sole physical and legal custody of the children
on 7/21/25 & 7/22/25.” Although father has focused his appeal on
the visitation element of those orders, his decision to challenge
merely a subset of the orders explicitly designated in the notice
does not render the notice defective.
II. Defects With the Exit Order
Father argues that the juvenile court’s oral ruling and its
written exit order are confusing regarding his right to visitation,
and that a remand is necessary for the court to clarify father’s
visitation rights. We agree, and come to this conclusion after

3 In light of our reasoning, we need not decide whether the
trial court stamped the wrong date on the notice of appeal.

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reviewing the court’s rulings de novo. (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation
Co. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326.)
The juvenile court appears to have issued three conflicting
directives regarding father’s right to visitation:
-- In its oral ruling, the court states that father is to
have “no contact” with the children (which presumably means no
visitation as well), and that this ban is subject to a “rider”
indicating that it may be subsequently lifted only if father
completes certain programs.
-- The court’s written exit order (along with the
attached JV-205 form) indicates that visitation by father would
have been permitted, except that the criminal protective order
bars visitation—but goes on to provide that if that protective
order is “modified,” father “is to have monitored visits only.”
These monitored visits are not explicitly contingent upon father
satisfying the conditions of the “rider” announced by the court at
the hearing.
-- The court’s written exit order (along with the
attached JV-206 form) also indicates visitation is not “ordered” at
all due to father’s failure to complete certain programs.
The juvenile court’s oral ruling was beyond its authority.
The “rider” announced by the court prohibits further modification
of its exit order—which would, by necessary implication, prohibit
subsequent modification by the family court—unless father
satisfies certain conditions (such as completing certain
programs). Yet juvenile courts do “not have authority to
condition the family court’s modification of [an] exit order upon [a
parent’s] completion of [certain] programs.” (In re Cole Y. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456 (Cole Y.); see also In re John W.

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(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.) We accordingly disregard this
invalid language.
However, that still leaves the written exit order, which
simultaneously (1) indicates that monitored visits would be
appropriate once the criminal protective order is lifted4 and (2)
prohibits all visitation. These two mandates are irreconcilable,
and remand is necessary. (See In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
459, 473 [remand is “necessary” where the court “is unable to
discern the actual meaning of the confusing, inconsistent
visitation order”].)
The Department responds with two arguments.
First, the Department points to the juvenile court’s
comments at the hearing that father’s abuse of his family was
“horrific” and that he showed an “inability to have any
accountability,” urging that these comments suggest that the
court meant to deny visitation altogether. We reject this
suggestion because those comments were made by the court while
explaining why no reasonable means existed to prevent removal;
more to the point, the court’s oral comments do not clarify the
inconsistencies in the written order.
Second, the Department argues that father forfeited his
challenges by failing to object below. However, the primary
defect—the inconsistency within the court’s written exit order—

4 The exit order’s recitation of the details of the criminal
protective order are incorrect in two ways—namely, (1) the exit
order uses the case number for the civil protective order
(24SMRO00377) rather than the criminal protective order
(25ARCF00331), and (2) the exit order uses the expiration date
for the civil protective order (November 12, 2027) rather than for
the criminal protective order (“until further court order”). These
errors should also be corrected on remand.

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did not arise until the court issued that order, by which point the
dependency proceedings had already concluded. The subsidiary
defect—the validity of the juvenile court’s orally pronounced
“rider”—is an issue that “cannot be forfeited” because it is a
purely “legal issue” that “goes to the allocation of jurisdiction
between the dependency and family courts.” (Cole Y., supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 1456, fn. 4.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. On remand, the juvenile court is to
enter a custody and visitation order consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
MOOR

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