CourtListener 10829998•In re Dylan B. CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/30/26 In re Dylan B. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re Dylan B., a Person Coming B336272
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 23CCJP04012A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Alfredo S.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marguerite Downing, Judge. Dismissed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Alfredo S. (Father) contends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders concerning his son Dylan S. must
be reversed because the court failed to ensure the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) complied with its duties under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) to interview
Dylan’s maternal grandparents about possible Indian ancestry.
After the notice of appeal was filed, the juvenile court ordered the
Department to interview the grandparents, as well as all
available extended family members, and to prepare a report for
the court. The appeal is moot because the court has already
ordered the Department to do what Father asks us to order.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The juvenile court sustained the Department’s dependency
allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b),1 that (1) Mother engaged in a violent altercation
with two women in Dylan’s presence; (2) Mother had a history of
substance abuse including marijuana and alcohol, and Father
failed to protect Dylan; (3) Mother had mental and emotional
problems including diagnoses of anxiety and postpartum
depression and had exhibited bizarre and aggressive behaviors
and expressed homicidal and suicidal ideations, and Father failed
to protect Dylan; (4) Father had a history of abusing
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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amphetamine and methamphetamine, and Mother failed to
protect Dylan; and (5) Mother and Father had a history of
engaging in violent altercations in Dylan’s presence, and Mother
failed to protect Dylan by allowing Father unlimited access to
him.
The court declared Dylan a dependent of the court,
removed him from both parents, and ordered reunification
services for both parents.
Father timely appealed from the disposition order, and
challenges only the Department’s compliance with ICWA.
B. ICWA Investigation
Mother initially denied having any Indian ancestry, but at
the detention hearing on November 27, 2023, she submitted a
form ICWA-020 indicating that D.B., the maternal grandfather,
“is or was a member” of the Choctaw Indian tribe. On
November 27, the court found Mother may have some Choctaw
ancestry and ordered the Department to investigate her claim.
The Department interviewed Mother, who provided the
names and address of the maternal grandparents, but Mother
indicated she had been estranged from them for over a year due
to a restraining order. She also provided the name of the
maternal great-great-grandfather, along with the limited
information that he had died on a Choctaw Indian reservation.
Mother said she was unable to provide additional details or
identify other family members who may have knowledge of
possible Indian heritage. On November 20, maternal aunt N.A.
denied any Indian ancestry, and on December 6, Mother’s
godmother stated she was unaware the family had any Indian
ancestry.
3
On December 8, 2023, the Department sent the Choctaw
tribe a notice of child custody proceedings using Judicial Council
form ICWA-030 that included information regarding Dylan’s
family, including Mother, Father, the maternal grandparents,
and maternal great-great-grandfather M.K. The form stated
M.K. was born in Oklahoma and had died on a Choctaw Indian
Reservation.
On December 22, 2023, at his first court appearance,
Father submitted an ICWA-020 form claiming he did not have
Indian ancestry. The court ordered the Department “to comply
with its ongoing ICWA obligations.”
On January 11, 2024, the court continued the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing at the Department’s request because it
had not yet received a response from the Choctaw tribe. On
January 12, 2024, the Department received a response indicating
Dylan and his family members were not enrolled tribe members
and were not eligible for enrollment in the Choctaw tribe. When
the jurisdiction and disposition hearing went forward on
February 14, 2025, the court was in receipt of the Choctaw tribe’s
letter, but it did not make any finding about whether ICWA
applied.
On June 27, 2025, the date of the section 366.22 hearing at
which the court terminated the parents’ reunification services
and ordered adoption as the permanent plan for Dylan, the
juvenile court ordered the Department to conduct a further ICWA
inquiry, including interviewing the maternal grandparents. The
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court also found it did not have reason to know Dylan was an
Indian child.2
DISCUSSION
A. The Duties of Inquiry and Notice Under ICWA, and Father’s
Contention That the Department Failed To Comply
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (Dezi C.).) “To ensure tribes have
the opportunity to exercise their rights in dependency
2 Over Father’s objection, we grant the Department’s request
for judicial notice of the June 27, 2025 post-appeal juvenile court
order directing the Department to conduct a further ICWA
investigation. In opposing the request, Father relies on In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, in which the Supreme Court
prohibited “consideration of postjudgment evidence of changed
circumstances in an appeal of an order terminating parental
rights.” (Ibid.; see also In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087,
1103 [reviewing court may not rely on postjudgment evidence
following termination of parental rights to determine juvenile
court’s ICWA inquiry was sufficient because reviewing court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court].)
However, neither Zeth S. nor Kenneth D. addressed the propriety
of considering a post-appeal court order that renders the appeal
moot because it gives the appellant the very relief he or she
seeks. (See In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422
[distinguishing Zeth S. and concluding appellate court may
properly consider post-appeal evidence that shows issue on
appeal is moot].) We also take judicial notice on our own motion
of the court’s June 27, 2025 minute order stating ICWA did not
apply.
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proceedings, an investigation of [whether] a child may have
Indian ancestry must be undertaken and notice provided, where
appropriate, to the relevant tribes.” (In re T.R. (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 206, 218 (T.R.); see § 224.2, subd. (a).)
“The juvenile court and child welfare agency ‘have “an
affirmative and continuing duty” in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.’ ” (In re Claudia R. (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 76, 84; see § 224.2, subds. (a), (b)(1); Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1132.) The duty of inquiry
“ ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child
abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child.’ ” (Dezi C., at p. 1132, quoting § 224.2, subd. (b); see T.R.,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.) “Extended family
member” refers to any “person who has reached the age of
eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c).)
A duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court or
the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) That further inquiry requires
interviewing, “as soon as practicable,” extended family members,
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of
Social Services, and contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other
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person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or
eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C); see T.R., at p. 219.)
If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child is an
Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3
apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; accord,
T.R., at p. 219; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a).) An
inadequate initial ICWA inquiry typically requires conditional
reversal with directions for the Department to comply with the
inquiry requirement of section 224.2. (See Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1136; accord, T.R., at p. 220.)
Father contends that “Mother identified relatives who she
believed had Choctaw Indian ancestry, including the maternal
grandparents, who were alive and living in Los Angeles with a
known address. There is no indication in the reports that the
social worker contacted them to gather information to determine
if the child had Indian ancestry.” Father contends the
Department thus failed to satisfy its duty to inquire of available
extended relatives under section 224.2, subdivision (b). Because
“the juvenile court failed to ensure [the Department] complied
with ICWA and the related statutes,” Father asserts “the orders
and judgments at the adjudication and dispositional hearings
should be reversed to address these issues” on remand.
B. The Appeal Is Moot
As stated, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to conduct a further ICWA inquiry. On
June 27, 2025, the court ordered Mother and Father to provide
the Department with contact information for their relatives;
ordered the Department to interview or attempt to interview all
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known and available extended family members, including the
maternal grandparents, about whether the child is or may be an
Indian child; and ordered the Department to document all its
efforts and submit a written report on the results of the
interviews or attempts to interview all extended family members.
The Department then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot or
“not yet ripe for review.”
An appeal “becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(Ibid.) “In this context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.)
Father argues the Department failed to comply with its
duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to contact the maternal
grandparents to seek information about whether Dylan had
possible Indian ancestry. The relief Father seeks is reversal of
the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders with directions for
full compliance with the inquiry provisions of ICWA. However,
Father already has the relief he seeks on appeal: The juvenile
court has ordered the Department to interview all available
extended family members, including the maternal grandparents,
and to report the results to the court.
In In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, a case in a
similar procedural posture, the court held “all we could order in
resolving this appeal is that the Department and juvenile court
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fulfill their inquiry and notice obligations under ICWA and
related California law. Because that is what the Department is
already doing, and because we are not in a position to
micromanage that process in this appeal (detailing, for instance,
all those who must be interviewed, what they must be asked, and
what must be included in any notice to tribes that is required),
there is no effective relief we can now provide. The juvenile court
must direct that process, at least in the first instance. This
appeal is moot.” (Id. at pp. 638-639.)
We cannot provide any effective relief to Father by ordering
the juvenile court to take the action it has already taken. The
appeal is therefore moot.
DISPOSITION
The Department’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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