Sharp v. A Star Holdings CA1/5

CourtListener 10829964Calctapp30.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/30/26 Sharp v. A Star Holdings CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

WENDY SHARP,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172679

v. (San Francisco City &
A STAR HOLDINGS LLC et al., County Super. Ct. No.
CPF-24-518797)
Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants and appellants A Star Holdings LLC (A Star) and Peter
Acworth (Acworth) appeal from the trial court’s judgment confirming an
award against them following an arbitration with plaintiff and respondent
Wendy Sharp (Sharp). We direct the trial court to correct a mathematical
error in the arbitrator’s award and otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sharp is the owner of a property on 14th Street in San Francisco.
Appellant A Star owns an adjacent property (A Star’s Property). The two
properties are separated by an alley, which is the subject of an easement at
issue in the present case.
In 2007, Sharp entered into an agreement with a prior owner of A
Star’s Property, whereby Sharp provided an easement to the alley (Easement
Agreement or Agreement). As a condition of access, a provision of the

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Agreement entitled “Trash and Trash Removal” requires that the alley be
kept “reasonably clean and sanitary.” That same provision also provides a
limited procedure for the owner of A Star’s Property to use the alley for
construction materials. That portion of the provision reads: “No more than
two (2) times during each calendar year, [the owner of A Star’s Property] may
use the Easement Area to store construction debris and possessions of
tenants during periods of construction or vacancy of apartments (‘Debris’).
Such Debris shall be stored in a sanitary and clean manner, . . . in a way that
does not obstruct Pedestrian Access through the Easement Area and that
reasonably minimizes interference with the use of the alley by Sharp. Such
Debris shall not remain in the Easement Area for a period in excess of five (5)
days and upon removal, [the owner of A Star’s Property] shall restore the
Easement Area to the condition existing prior to the storage of the Debris.
[The owner of A Star’s Property] shall give Sharp three (3) days prior written
notice of any such usage before doing so, and agrees to pay Sharp $300.00 per
day as a penalty for any usage beyond the five (5) day period provided
herein.”
In 2022, Sharp requested an “Easement Penalty” from A Star due to
rotting garbage and garbage bag obstructions between September and
December 2022. In February 2024, Sharp made a demand for arbitration
pursuant to the Easement Agreement. Among other things, she claimed that
appellants had locked her out of the alley; left “mounds of garbage” in the
alley; and “continuously conducted construction work in the [alley] without
the required notice or documentation . . . .” Sharp requested damages in an
amount to be proven at arbitration, as well as attorney fees and costs.
The arbitrator took documentary and testimonial evidence, but the
arbitration was not transcribed. On November 17, 2024, the arbitrator

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issued his award. He determined there had been 94 days of violations of the
Easement Agreement in 2022, 231 days of violations in 2023, and 77 days of
violations in 2024. The arbitrator awarded Sharp damages at $300 per day
for a total of $120,600. He also awarded Sharp $105,450 in attorney fees;
$42,308.32 in costs; and $12,754.54 in expert witness fees. The arbitrator
declared the total to be $180,512.86 for those items.1 He also found that
appellant Acworth was a proper party to the arbitration.
In December 2024, Sharp filed a petition and motion requesting the
trial court to confirm the arbitration award. In January 2025, appellants
responded to the petition and opposed the motion, requesting vacation or
correction of the award. The trial court granted Sharp’s motion and denied
the requests in appellants’ opposition, and entered judgment accordingly on
January 31, 2025. The present appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“Because of the strong public policy favoring arbitration as a speedy
and relatively inexpensive method of dispute resolution, we subject
arbitration awards to very narrow judicial review. We will not examine the
merits of the dispute, the reasoning of the arbitrator, or the sufficiency of the
evidence. [Citation.] Judicial review is restricted to the statutory grounds
for vacating or correcting an award, as found in Code of Civil Procedure
sections 1286.2 and 1286.6.”2 (Alternative Systems, Inc. v. Carey (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039, abrogated on other grounds in Schatz v. Allen
Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP (2009) 45 Cal.4th 557.) Appellants
contend the trial court erred in entering the judgment because the arbitrator

1 Appellants call this total “an apparent math error.”

2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless

otherwise indicated.

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exceeded his authority, and because the arbitrator made a mathematical
error, which are both proper grounds for vacating or correcting an award.
Our review of the award is de novo. (Ajida Technologies, Inc. v. Roos
Instruments, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)3
I. The Damages Award
Appellants first contend the arbitrator “exceeded his authority” by
assessing damages of $300 per day that they violated the Easement
Agreement. Appellants argue that “the arbitrator’s creation of an illegal
daily penalty for garbage overflows is not derived from the general
framework or intent of the [A]greement,” because the $300 per day provision
relates only to construction debris “during the turn over or construction in
the apartments owned by” A Star, not to debris generated by their tenant
restaurant. The arbitrator concluded “the measure of damages established
by the Easement Agreement is a fair and reasonable attempt by the parties
to calculate the amount reasonably necessary to compensate [Sharp] for
extended intrusions and obstruction of the Easement Area by any of
[appellants’] tenants.” The arbitrator added, “Assessing general damages in
this case might potentially yield a result more favorable to [Sharp] than the
request she makes for an award limited by the contractual provision.”

3 Although the trial court’s order did not conclude that appellants’

objections were untimely, Sharp argues appellants forfeited their claims
because they failed to respond to Sharp’s petition to confirm the award within
10 days. (§ 1290.6.) But appellants argue the petition was not properly
served on them: they point out there is no proof in the record that it was
mailed to them at the same address to which it was delivered to an employee.
(§ 415.20, subd. (a).) In particular, the proof of service states that “a
declaration of mailing is attached,” but no declaration showing mailing to the
same address as the service address is attached. Therefore, Sharp has not
shown the judgment can be affirmed on the alternate ground that appellants’
objections were untimely.

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Appellants’ argument fails under the standard articulated in the case
they rely upon. In Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9
Cal.4th 362, 381 (Advanced Micro Devices), the court held that “[a]rbitrators
are not obliged to read contracts literally, and an award may not be vacated
merely because the court is unable to find the relief granted was authorized
by a specific term of the contract. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] The award must
be related in a rational manner to the breach (as expressly or impliedly found
by the arbitrator). [Fn. omitted.] Where the damage is difficult to determine
or measure, the arbitrator enjoys correspondingly broader discretion to
fashion a remedy.” The court continued, “The award will be upheld so long as
it was even arguably based on the contract; it may be vacated only if the
reviewing court is compelled to infer the award was based on an extrinsic
source.” (Ibid.)
Here, the arbitrator’s award was expressly based on the measure of
damages in the Easement Agreement. Even assuming appellants are correct
that the provision literally only applies to construction debris from
apartments, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in concluding it was also
an appropriate measure of damages for debris in violation of the Agreement
but unrelated to the apartments. This was not a remedy “expressly forbidden
by the arbitration agreement.” (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 381.) Appellants’ challenge to the damages award fails.4

4 Appellants also argue the arbitrator erred because he awarded

damages for 325 days of violations but Sharp only sought penalties for
approximately 184 days in her original demand for arbitration. But the
demand also requested damages in an amount to be proven at arbitration
and appellants do not—and cannot, given the absence of a transcript—
dispute that Sharp showed 325 days of violations at the arbitration. In any
event, appellants cite no authority the arbitrator was bound by Sharp’s
original demand.

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II. The Inclusion of Appellant Acworth
Next, appellants argue the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
awarding damages against appellant Acworth, in addition to appellant A
Star. In support of that contention, appellants cite only Williams v. Atria Las
Posas (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1053, for the general proposition that
“ ‘[p]arties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do
so.’ ” They point out that Acworth is not a signatory to the Easement
Agreement.
Sharp asserts that the evidence at the arbitration showed that Acworth
is “the sole agent and manager” of A Star; that “the LLC is without any
assets, employees, or active business operations, exists only on paper and
serves only to hold title to Acworth’s various properties”; and that “Acworth is
in charge of the operation of [a business at A Star’s Property] and of the
easement usage.” Given the lack of a transcript of the arbitration, appellants
cannot dispute the sufficiency of those showings. And appellants cite no
authority that or make any argument why an individual may not be made
party to an arbitration in such circumstances.
A judgment is presumed correct and it is not this court’s obligation to
develop a party’s arguments on their behalf. (Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza
Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11; Interinsurance Exchange v.
Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.) Appellants have not shown the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by including Acworth in the award.
III. The Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
Finally, appellants point out that the arbitrator erred in calculating the
award for attorney fees, costs, and expert witness fees. In those categories,
the arbitrator awarded $105,450; $42,308.32; and $12,754.54, respectively,
totaling $160,512.86. But, without explanation, the arbitrator stated the

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total as $180,512.86, a $20,000 discrepancy. Sharp does not dispute that the
arbitrator made a calculation error. We will direct the trial court to correct
the arbitrator’s award. (§ 1286.6 [trial court “shall correct the award and
confirm it as corrected if the court determines that: [¶] (a) There was an
evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of
any person, thing or property referred to in the award”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to correct the arbitrator’s award to reflect
that $160,512.86 was the total amount awarded by the arbitrator for attorney
fees, costs, and expert witness fees. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

SIMONS, Acting P. J.

We concur.
BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.

(A172679)

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