CourtListener 10829928•People v. Rivera CA1/2
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Filed 3/30/26 P. v. Rivera CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173596
v.
SEVION MICHAEL RIVERA, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2202614)
Defendant and Appellant.
After defendant Sevion Michael Rivera pleaded guilty to receiving
stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)),1 he was placed on probation and
ordered to pay $7,852.90 in victim restitution. Defendant appealed from the
restitution order. In that appeal, we accepted the Attorney General’s
concession that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the restitution
award, and therefore reversed the restitution order and remanded the matter
for the trial court to conduct another restitution hearing. (People v. Rivera
(A169694, Nov. 21, 2024) [nonpub. opn.] (Rivera I).)
The trial court conducted such a hearing, after which it again ordered
defendant to pay $7,852.90 in victim restitution. Defendant appeals from
that order, arguing the restitution award was improper because (1) he did not
cause the victim’s claimed loss and (2) the evidence was insufficient to
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
support the amount of the claimed loss. We reject both contentions, and we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Prior Proceedings and the First Appeal
On September 19, 2022, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a
felony complaint charging defendant with first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (a)) (count 1) and receiving stolen property with a value exceeding $950
(§ 496, subd. (a)) (count 2).
As recounted in our prior opinion, the probation report provided the
following facts underlying the offenses:
“[O]n May 19, 2022, Davis D.,2 the victim in this case and defendant’s
former friend, reported to the police that someone had broken into his
apartment while he was out of town. Davis reported that the following were
missing: several firearms (a Smith and Wesson model 60, a .38 special
revolver, a Stoeger Arms shotgun, a Henry Repeating Arms AR-7 .22 rifle,
and an AMT Backup semiautomatic .38 pistol), one box of miscellaneous
ammunition, and ‘other items.’ Davis’s girlfriend also reported that her
laptop and gaming console were taken from Davis’s apartment.
“Davis told police that he believed defendant was the culprit based on
their previous interactions. Defendant and Davis recently had a falling out
after defendant visited Davis’s apartment and apparently became upset when
he noticed a pair of his AirPods were missing. Defendant threatened to break
into Davis’s apartment and steal some of his belongings.
“Later on May 19, Davis reported to police that defendant had
contacted their mutual friend and that defendant may have given her some of
2 “We omit Davis’s last name to protect his privacy interests. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)”
2
Davis’s stolen property. A police officer contacted the mutual friend, who
reported defendant had asked her to temporarily hold onto some of his
belongings because he had been kicked out of his residence. She agreed to do
so, and defendant dropped off the items in two large trash bags. When Davis
informed his friend that the trash bags may possibly contain stolen firearms,
she turned over the trash bags to the police.
“Inside the trash bags were a black Paradigm sub-woofer speaker; a
pair of AKG N90Q headphones; a case of Norske drill bits; a Sony stereo; two
Dewalt cordless drills; a silver Pro laptop; an Adidas bag; a Krome gun
cleaning supply case; a DoorDash carry bag; a white Sony PlayStation 5
controller; a black Logitech computer keyboard; one pair of blue jeans; one
Fanatec F1 gaming steering wheel; and an empty FN Five Seven pistol case.”
(Rivera I, supra, A169694.)
On March 16, 2023, defendant pleaded guilty to receiving stolen
property as charged in count 2 in exchange for the dismissal of the burglary
charged in count 1. The burglary count was dismissed without a Harvey3
waiver.
On April 25, the trial court placed defendant on two years’ probation
subject to various terms and conditions, including that he pay direct victim
restitution to be determined at a later hearing.
As we summarized the original proceedings on the issue of victim
restitution: “On May 30, the People filed a motion for an order awarding
Davis $7,852.90 in victim restitution. Attached as ‘Exhibit A’ to the motion
were screenshots of various items listed on retail websites. These items were
a set of used Klipsch speakers ($239.99); a 65-inch QLED TV ($3,999.99); a
Yamaha receiver ($399.95); a Panasonic LCD display ($1,307.99); a Logitech
3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey).
3
wireless keyboard and mouse set ($54.99); a Gamerstation gaming console
($1,550); a ‘Pre-Built Entry Level Gaming PC’ ($950); a ‘Dell Latitude 10-Key
Work/School Laptop’ ($375 to $400); a Ryzen 5 gaming console ($650); and a
Henry AR-7 semiautomatic rifle ($299.99). . . .
“On January 18, 2024, the trial court held a restitution hearing. The
parties relied on the submitted documents and oral argument; neither
presented any new evidence or testimony, including from Davis, who
apparently was present at the hearing.
“Citing People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310 and People v.
Scroggins (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 502, defense counsel argued ‘there has to be
a connection between the victim’s loss and the defendant’s crime,’ and here,
there was no evidence that defendant possessed the items claimed in Exhibit
A to the People’s restitution motion.
“The prosecutor responded, ‘There most certainly is a connection to the
defendant and the items that the People have addressed in their motion.’
The prosecutor reasoned that defendant threatened to burglarize Davis’s
apartment ‘because there was some thought that maybe the victim had taken
his Airpods,’ and ‘[l]ow [sic] and behold, the victim’s apartment does shortly
thereafter get burglarized.’ The prosecutor went on, ‘The defendant did plead
guilty to being in receipt of stolen property. That property was the victim’s
property in this case.’ The prosecutor then explained that although some
items were returned to the victim, others were not, and that ‘[t]he items that
the People have addressed in our motion here were the items that were not
returned to the victim.’
“Following that argument, the trial court granted the People’s motion
and ordered the $7,852.90 sought in victim restitution. The court stated,
‘[Defendant] pled guilty to possession of stolen property, specifically, that
4
property belonging to the individual who provided the information that the
District Attorney filed . . . [T]he named victim in the matter isn’t requesting
restitution for any items that had been returned, just for the items that were
not returned.
“On January 19, defendant filed a notice of appeal.” (Rivera I, supra,
A169694, fn. omitted.)
In that appeal, defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion
when it awarded Davis $7,852.90 in restitution because the People did not
present sufficient evidence to support that award. The Attorney General
conceded the point. We accepted the Attorney General’s concession. (Rivera
I, supra, A169694.)
We explained: “Defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property,
namely the items in the trash bags that he had entrusted to his and Davis’s
mutual friend and were eventually turned over to the police. In the
restitution motion and at the hearing, the prosecutor represented that the
items set forth in Exhibit A to their motion: (a) were the same items that
were contained in the trash bags recovered by the police; (b) belonged to
Davis; and (c) were never returned to Davis. Thus, the prosecutor argued
that Davis was entitled to recover the value of the items set forth in Exhibit
A. However, as the Attorney General acknowledges, the People presented
insufficient evidence to support their representations.
“For one, there were several items in Exhibit A that were never
reported as stolen, much less found in the trash bags in defendant’s
possession and later recovered by police. Those items included, for example,
a flat screen television, a Yamaha receiver, a Panasonic flat screen LCD
monitor, and three gaming computers. Moreover, although other items in
Exhibit A appear to be similar to the stolen items in the trash bags—for
5
example, subwoofer speakers, a Logitech keyboard, and a laptop—the People
did not present evidence demonstrating that those items belonged to Davis,
and, assuming that they did belong to him, that they were not returned to
him.
“Therefore, as the Attorney General acknowledges, the record does not
contain evidence that ‘any of the items claimed were stolen from [Davis] and
not recovered.’ Indeed, the People did not ask Davis to submit a declaration,
testify, or otherwise explain the actual losses he sustained. In sum, we agree
with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Davis
$7,852.90 in restitution because the award lacks an adequate factual basis.
Accordingly, the restitution order must be vacated, and the matter remanded
to the trial court for a new restitution hearing.” (Rivera I, supra, A169694.)
The Second Restitution Hearing
Following remand, on June 13, 2025, the trial court conducted a new
restitution hearing. The court took judicial notice of Exhibit A to the People’s
restitution motion, and this time, Davis testified. His testimony was as
follows:
Davis returned home one day and found his residence had been
burglarized. He then called his friend “Nesta,” who was also a close friend of
defendant’s. Nesta said defendant had told her “that that night he got kicked
out of his brother’s house and wanted to bring some belongings over to her
house,” which he did.
Davis asked Nesta what the belongings were, and she said they were in
black bags. Davis asked her to look inside the bags. Nesta, who had “been to
[Davis’s] house plenty of times” said, “ ‘Wow, it’s all your stuff,’ ” before
“crying and freaking out thinking she was going to get in trouble.” Davis
recovered the items in the trash bags and was not seeking restitution for
those items.
6
Referring to the list of items in Exhibit A to the People’s motion, Davis
testified that there were other items of his that were taken during the
burglary, not contained in the trash bags, and never returned to him:
speakers, a Samsung television, a Yamaha stereo, a Panasonic monitor, a
wireless keyboard and mouse, a gaming computer, and a Survivor .22-caliber
rifle. The combined value of these items was $7,852.90.
Davis said he believed he was entitled to receive this amount from
defendant because while Davis was out of town, defendant “came into [his]
home, took everything out and brought half of it to Nesta’s house,” and then
he “never saw anything again.” Davis said that defendant “had threatened to
do this to [him] a number of times before it happened,” that defendant
became “more . . . and more upset” from several altercations they had in the
weeks leading up to the burglary, and that he believed from the beginning
that defendant was the person responsible for it.
Following this testimony, the prosecutor argued that “the People have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [Davis’s] house was burglarized, that
items from his house were found in Nesta’s house which [defendant] brought
to Nesta’s house. Additionally, he did claim that he didn’t receive some of his
property back. Those are the bigger items that probably couldn’t fit in a
trash bag.”
Defense counsel argued that defendant had been convicted of receiving
stolen property, not burglary, and that the People did not show a “sufficient
nexus between the amount requested and the crime for which [defendant]
was convicted.” Counsel also argued that the People presented hearsay
evidence to “implicate [defendant] in the burglary for which he was never
convicted.” Counsel went on to argue that while Davis “no doubt . . . believes
that [defendant] committed the burglary based on the stolen property being
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in his possession,” that was not “enough for the Court to hold [defendant]
responsible for [the burglary].”
Following that argument, the court rejected defendant’s assertion that
there was not a causal connection between his criminal conduct and the
losses claimed by the victim, whose testimony the court found credible. The
court found that the evidence of defendant’s possession of stolen property, the
crime to which he pled guilty, “did contribute to the victim’s loss in this case.”
The court thus “order[ed] restitution in the amount requested.” It then
directed the prosecution to “file an Order After Hearing for restitution in that
amount.”
The court then asked the parties if they wished to address additional
matters, to which the prosecutor mentioned that Davis “has received
approximately 300 to $400 already from revenue recovery prior to the appeal
going through . . . .” The prosecutor then asked that defendant “get credit for
the monies . . . that [Davis] has already received and I think that can be
settled through Revenue Recovery.”
The court agreed that defendant “should get credit for the money he’s
paid thus far.” The court stated: “I’m going to leave that to counsel to
determine what amount has been ordered. I think in terms of the Order
After Hearing there should be an indication of that total amount. But I’ll
make it clear that any monies that have been paid by [defendant] towards
restitution should apply against the Order that’s going to be submitted by
[the prosecutor] here shortly.”
On June 20, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On June 25, the court sent the parties a “Notice of Hearing” set for July
9, indicating that “[t]he matter is being scheduled for clarification of
restitution amount in order to have the exact amount of restitution
8
determined by the Judicial Officer. It did not appear in the minutes or in the
reporter’s transcript what the final restitution amount ordered at the
Restitution Hearing was.” Such a hearing was held on July 9, and on that
same day, the court entered its “Order for Victim Restitution,” which
indicated that defendant was ordered to pay Davis $7,852.90 in victim
restitution.4
DISCUSSION
General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in California.
([Citation]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The constitutional mandate for
restitution is carried out through Penal Code section 1202.4 . . . .” (People v.
Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045, fn. omitted.) A victim’s right to
restitution is to be broadly and liberally construed. (In re Johnny M. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) states, “in every case in which a victim
has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court
shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in
an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by
the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Restitution “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse
the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the
result of the defendant’s criminal conduct . . . .” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)
“A restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual
loss and is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall.” (People v.
4 Assuming without deciding that defendant’s notice of appeal was
premature since it was filed before the issuance of the July 9 “Order for
Victim Restitution,” we “treat the notice as filed immediately after the
rendition of . . . the making of the order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(d).)
9
Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172 (Chappelone).) “A defendant
is entitled to a restitution hearing to ‘dispute the determination of the
amount of restitution.’ ” (Ibid.) “The victim must make a prima facie
showing of the loss, which the defendant is entitled to rebut. ‘Once the victim
makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the
defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the
amount of losses claimed by the victim.’ ” (People v. Pittman (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1252, 1258.)
On appeal, we review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.
(Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) “The abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according
to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings
of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only
if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th
706, 711–712.) No abuse of discretion will be found if there is a factual and
rational basis for a victim restitution order. (People v. Dalvito (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 557, 562.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, “our review is limited to the
determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is
substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the trial court’s decision. In that regard, we give great deference to
the trial court and resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the
judgment [or order].” (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849.)
The Restitution Order Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Causation
Defendant’s first argument is that there was no evidence that the
losses claimed by Davis were caused by defendant’s criminal conduct. As a
10
result, defendant contends that the restitution order does not comply with
section 1202.4 and consequently amounts to an abuse of discretion. We
disagree.
As noted previously, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) provides that “[t]o
the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount that
is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined
economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”
(Italics added.) Courts have interpreted that provision to require a causal
connection between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the damages
claimed by the victim. (See People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310,
1321 (Holmberg); People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 424–427.) The
“requirement that the damages result from the defendant’s criminal conduct”
means that the criminal conduct must be both a “ ‘ “ ‘necessary
antecedent’ ” ’ ” and a “ ‘ “proximate cause” ’ ” of the damages. (Holmberg,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321.) “California courts have adopted the
‘substantial factor’ test for analyzing proximate cause.” (People v. Foalima
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1396.) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a
relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual
cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” Thus, “a force which plays only
an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage or loss
is not a substantial factor” [citation], but a very minor force that does cause
harm is a substantial factor [citation].’ ” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1321–1322.) Moreover, there can be multiple causes that can combine
and cause injury. (Id. at p. 1322.)
Several cases help to explain the meaning of causation in restitution
cases. In People v. Scroggins (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 502 (Scroggins), the
defendant lived in an apartment with his sister. Four apartments in their
11
complex were burglarized and several items were taken, including video
cassette recorders, televisions, cameras, jewelry, telephone answering
machines, purses, and a blood pressure cuff. (Scroggins, supra, 191
Cal.App.3d at p. 504.) The defendant’s sister discovered three of the stolen
items, all belonging to one victim, in her apartment and called the police.
(Ibid.) Scroggins pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property. At sentencing,
the probation department reported that the value of the “still missing
property” from the other three burglaries was $2,366. (Ibid.) The court
granted probation and ordered Scroggins to pay $2,366 in victim restitution.
The appellate court reversed. It explained that “Scroggins was never charged
with or found criminally responsible for the burglaries.” (Id. at p. 506.) Since
Scroggins instead was convicted of receiving stolen property, and the stolen
items were recovered by the police and returned to the victim, the trial court
erred in ordering restitution to the three remaining victims where there was
no evidence that Scroggins was responsible for their losses. (Ibid.)
Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 1310 is also instructive. There, the
defendant pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property that had been
taken in the course of several burglaries, and was ordered to pay victim
restitution. (Id., at pp. 1315, 1316, 1318.) On appeal, he argued that “his
conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the victims’ losses because
their losses were due to the burglary or theft.” (Id. at p. 1318.) The court
rejected that claim, concluding that the defendant’s conduct was a
“concurrent cause of the victims’ losses and a substantial factor in depriving
them of the use of their property.” (Id. at p. 1322.) The court reasoned that
“[t]here was evidence that defendant received the stolen property on the day
it was stolen” and the defendant “admitted he knew the property was stolen
when he possessed it.” (Ibid.) Because “nothing prevented defendant from
12
turning over the known stolen items to the police,” his “concealing of the
stolen property was a concurrent cause in depriving the victims of the use of
their property.” (Ibid.) For this reason, the Holmberg court found Scroggins
distinguishable. (Holmberg, at pp. 1322–1333.)
Defendant argues the order to pay restitution to Davis was analogous
to the restitution order overturned in Scroggins. He emphasizes that he
pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property, and that although he was charged
with burglary, that count was dismissed. And he asserts that “[t]he record
shows that the claimed unrecovered losses flowed from the residential
burglary, not from the possession of stolen property offense to which
[defendant] initially pled no contest. . . .” Defendant goes on, “What is more,
if [the items for which restitution was sought] were not in the black trash
bags that the victim testified his friend held onto for [defendant], then there
is no evidence that [defendant] was ever even in possession of the
unrecovered items. Thus, there was no evidence that the crime for which
[defendant] was convicted, receiving stolen property, caused the economic
loss to the victim.”
The Attorney General, on the other hand, maintains that Scroggins is
distinguishable, explaining: “In Scroggins, there was no evidence linking the
defendant to any of the burglaries, let alone all four. Although unclear, it
does not appear that the defendant in Scroggins possessed items from all four
burglarized apartments. Nor was there any evidence about when or how the
defendant obtained the stolen items, or who had committed the burglaries.”
The Attorney General asserts: “Here, in contrast, while not convicted,
[defendant] was in fact charged with the burglary and it was only dismissed
as part of the plea bargain. Additionally, the evidence at the restitution
hearing established that [defendant] made repeated threats to burglarize
13
Davis in the period leading up to the burglary. Then, immediately after the
burglary, [defendant] attempted to conceal multiple trash bags full of Davis’s
stolen property. Based on these facts, it was reasonable to conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that [defendant] was involved in the burglary
in some capacity and received the items that were stolen from Davis,
including those which were never recovered. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in order that [defendant] compensate Davis for the
unrecovered items.”
In his reply brief, defendant argues that accepting the Attorney
General’s argument, which relies on facts underlying the dismissed burglary
count, “would circumvent Harvey.”5 Defendant also appears to assert that
even if that evidence is considered, there still was insufficient evidence to
establish he was responsible for the losses claimed by Davis.
Initially, we address the Harvey issue. As we explained People v.
Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 678: In Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d
754, “our Supreme Court held that facts underlying charges dismissed as
part of a negotiated plea may not, absent contrary agreement by the
defendant (now called a Harvey waiver), be used to impose adverse
sentencing consequences. The principle expanded to cover victim restitution
5 As discussed above, at the restitution hearing the People presented and
relied on evidence underlying the dismissed burglary count. Defense counsel
did not object on Harvey grounds; instead counsel asserted that the People’s
evidence “contain[ed] much hearsay” and was not “enough” to establish that
defendant committed the burglary, as well as that there was no causal
connection between the crime of which he was convicted and Davis’s claimed
losses. Thus, the trial court did not have an opportunity to address whether
there was a violation of Harvey. However, we need not decide forfeiture,
because in any event we would exercise our discretion to address the issue
given that the relevant underlying facts are not in dispute, and to foreclose
any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
14
[citation], and was soon codified. (Stats. 1988, ch. 287, § 1, p. 989, adding
Pen. Code, § 1192.3, subd. (b) [‘If restitution is imposed which is attributable
to a count dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, . . . the court shall obtain a
waiver pursuant to [Harvey, supra,] 25 Cal.3d 754 from the defendant as to
the dismissed count.’].)”
There is, however, an exception to this rule. Harvey allows a trial court
to consider facts underlying a dismissed count if that conduct is
“transactionally related to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty.”
(Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 758, italics omitted.) A transactional
relationship exists where “it could at least be inferred that some action of the
defendant giving rise to the dismissed count was also involved in the
admitted count.” (People v. Beagle (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 415, 421.)
The Attorney General acknowledges that the People did not obtain a
Harvey waiver when the burglary charge was dismissed as part of
defendant’s plea. However, the record supports a finding that the dismissed
burglary count and the admitted receiving stolen property count were
“transactionally related.”
Defendant does not dispute the Attorney General’s assertion that the
evidence demonstrated defendant “was involved in the burglary in some
capacity.” As set forth above, the evidence indisputably showed that
defendant had threatened to burglarize Davis in the weeks leading up to the
burglary; Davis’s residence subsequently was burglarized; his property was
stolen during that burglary; defendant was in possession of some of the stolen
property; and that defendant falsely told Nesta that the property was his
when he dropped off some of the items in the trash bags. The trial court
could reasonably infer from the circumstances that defendant was involved in
the burglary and the theft of the property taken during the burglary. (Cf.
15
People v. Russell (1932) 120 Cal.App. 622, 625 [“to warrant the conclusion
that the accused is guilty of a transaction involving the theft of stolen
property there must be, in addition to its possession by the defendant shortly
after the commission of the crime, corroborating circumstances, acts, conduct,
or declarations of the defendant tending to show his guilt,” such as, for
example, “false statements as to how the property came into defendant’s
possession”]; accord, People v. Citrino (1956) 46 Cal.2d 284, 288 [possession of
property stolen in a burglary alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of
that burglary, but may be sufficient where there is corroborating evidence,
even if slight, of acts or conduct of the accused tending to show guilt].)
Indeed, defendant concedes that “[t]he evidence of threats of timing might
have supported a burglary conviction.”
Accordingly, on this record “it could at least be inferred that some
action of the defendant giving rise to the dismissed [burglary] count was
involved in the admitted [receiving stolen property] count.” (People v. Beagle,
supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 421.) It follows that the Attorney General’s
reliance on facts underlying the burglary count does not “circumvent Harvey.”
We next address whether the evidence as a whole, including the
evidence underlying the dismissed burglary count, was sufficient to support
the court’s conclusion that defendant’s conduct proximately caused the losses
claimed by Davis. We conclude it was.
As just discussed, there is no dispute that defendant was in possession
of some of the items stolen during the burglary of Davis’s residence, and the
evidence raised the reasonable inference that defendant was involved in that
burglary. That some of the stolen items—speakers, a television set, a stereo,
a monitor, a wireless keyboard and mouse, a gaming computer, and a .22-
caliber rifle—were not discovered by the police or found in defendant’s
16
possession does not undermine the reasonable inference that those items
were lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. The evidence showed
only one burglary; no evidence was introduced of another burglary.
Moreover, there was no evidence that Davis’s property went missing at
different times; Davis simply testified that when he came home to find his
house burglarized, his personal property (both the items later found in the
trash bags, as well as the other items he would eventually never recover) was
no longer there. Based on this, the court could reasonably infer that the
unrecovered items were stolen during the same burglary. Consequently, we
conclude there was substantial evidence to demonstrate that defendant’s
conduct played more than a negligible or theoretical part in bringing about
Davis’s losses and thus was a substantial factor in causing those losses. (See
Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1321–1322.)
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
defendant to pay restitution for the losses claimed by Davis.
Amount of the Restitution Award
Defendant’s second argument is that the evidence was insufficient to
support a prima facie finding that the value of the stolen property was “the
replacement cost of like property,” as required by section 1202.4, subdivision
(f)(3)(A).6 Again, we disagree.
Section 1202.4 provides that “[t]he value of stolen or damaged property
shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing
the property when repair is possible.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).) Thus, “the
6 Defendant acknowledges that this counsel did not object to the
restitution order on this specific ground, but argues that if we were to find
forfeiture based on counsel’s failure to object, counsel provided ineffective
assistance. We need not address forfeiture because even if we were to
consider the claim on the merits, it fails.
17
People were required to make a prima facie showing of the replacement value
of the stolen property.” (People v. Pittman, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1262.)
Defendant acknowledges that “the valuation evidence consisted of
Exhibit A—retail website screenshots,” but contends this was insufficient
evidence of replacement value because the People did not present any
evidence of “when the items were acquired, the condition they were in,
whether they were current or prior‑generation models, whether comparable
used replacements were available, or what it would cost to replace them with
like property.” Relying on People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988
(Thygesen), defendant argues that “without age/condition evidence, a court
cannot rationally equate brand-new pricing with the amount needed to make
the victim whole for these items. This argument is unavailing.
In Thygesen, the defendant rented but failed to return a cement mixer.
He eventually pleaded guilty to theft of the mixer. The trial court ordered
restitution for 13 months of lost use, calculated by multiplying the mixer’s
monthly fee times 13. (Thygesen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.) Thygesen
held that loss of use was a proper basis for a restitution award (id. at p. 994),
but that the formula used by the trial court to calculate loss of use was
flawed, in that “there was absolutely no evidence presented to the trial court
from which a rational determination as to” lost use could have been made.
(Id. at p. 995.) To accurately determine the value of lost use, the trial court
should have considered factors such as, inter alia, how often the item was
rented and how much revenue its rent historically produced. No evidence
was presented from which the trial court could have made these calculations.
(Ibid.)
Thygesen is inapposite. Here, unlike in Thygesen, the trial court was
not faced with a complicated calculation of loss of use; instead, the victim in
18
this case apparently had a more straightforward claim of economic loss—i.e.,
the actual value of the items that were stolen, which, we imagine, can be
found with minimal effort and in fairly short order. Indeed, as Thygesen
recognized, “[l]osses to victims will vary from case to case. For example, in a
situation involving a victim who has a ring or necklace stolen, there may be
no economic loss other than the actual value of the ring or necklace.”
(Thygesen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.)
Thygesen is further distinguishable because in that case there was
“absolutely no evidence presented . . . from which a rational determination as
to either type of loss could have been made.” (Thygesen, supra, 69
Cal.App.4th at p. 995.) There was such evidence here. Davis testified that
the items that were stolen from, and never returned to, him were speakers, a
Samsung television, a Yamaha stereo, a Panasonic monitor, a wireless
keyboard and mouse, a gaming computer, and a Survivor .22-caliber rifle. He
testified that the combined value of these items was $7,852.90. That amount
was consistent with Exhibit A to the People’s restitution motion, which
consisted of screenshots of various retail store website listings of the same or
like items, the combined value of which was $7,852.90.7 Such evidence was
sufficient to make a prima facie showing of Davis’s economic loss. (See
Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172 [“ ‘a prima facie case for
restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or
other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss.’ ”].)
Once the People made a prima facie showing of Davis’s loss, “ ‘ “the
7 Specifically, Evidence A included the following items and pricing:
Klipsch speakers ($ 239.99); 65-inch QLED TV ($3,999.99); a Yamaha stereo
receiver ($399.95); a Panasonic LCD display ($1,307.99); a Logitech wireless
keyboard and mouse set ($54.99); a “Gamerstation Budget Gaming PC”
($1,550.00); and a Henry AR-7 .22-caliber rifle ($299.99).
19
burden shift[ed] to . . . defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss
is other than that claimed by the victim.” ’ ” (Chappelone, supra, 183
Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) Defendant did not do so. Therefore, the court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution to Davis in the
amount of $7,852.90.
DISPOSITION
The victim restitution order is affirmed.
20
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
(A173596N)
21
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