CourtListener 10826995•People v. McCoy CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/27/26 P. v. McCoy CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, A169353
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
ANTHONY McCOY, No. 04-23-00280)
Defendant and Appellant.
Anthony McCoy appeals from his convictions for first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). He contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing to
challenge the veracity of a police probable cause affidavit under
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks). He also
challenges the court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial and a
new trial after the deliberating jury was mistakenly provided
with an exhibit that was never admitted into evidence. And he
asserts that his sentence must be corrected pursuant to section
654. We agree that his sentence must be corrected, but we
otherwise affirm the judgment.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
A.
1.
At 11:49 p.m. on September 4, 2022, the 17-year-old
murder victim, Anthony Westbrook, Jr., was gunned down in a
drive-by shooting in front of his grandmother’s house. The
shooter fired out of the rear passenger window of the car. At the
scene, a shell casing from a .40-caliber round, stamped “CCINR
40, S and W,” was recovered from the street.
The victim’s father, Anthony Westbrook, Sr., witnessed the
shooting from the front porch of the house. The victim’s identical
twin brother was also nearby at the time.
Minutes after Westbrook, Jr. was pronounced dead at the
scene, Detective Kristian Palma spoke with his father.
Westbrook, Sr. stated that the car was a “black or dark colored
Infinity four-door or import-type sedan,” and that the shooter was
seated in the right rear passenger seat and was armed with a
handgun. Westbrook, Sr. described hearing approximately six
gunshots.
Just before 3:00 a.m., another detective, Adam Duffy,
talked to Westbrook, Sr. on the front porch. Westbrook, Sr. told
Duffy that he was sitting on the porch when his son was shot. A
dark-colored, possibly red, sedan pulled onto their street and the
rear passenger fired several gunshots out of the car window.
Westbrook, Sr. related that the shooter was not wearing a mask,
was a teenage male, and was possibly black or Hispanic.
A few days later, in a discursive follow-up meeting with
Detective Robert Gerber on September 8, 2022, Westbrook, Sr.
related additional details from the shooting. During the meeting,
Westbrook, Sr. referenced home security camera videos and social
media, and he provided a more detailed description of the
2
shooter. He indicated that after he described the shooter’s
appearance, others had shown him a photograph of McCoy, and
that he believed McCoy was the person who had shot his son.
Based on Westbrook, Sr.’s statements, the police obtained search
warrants focused on McCoy, enabling them to obtain his cell
phone and social media records and search his car.
2.
In the ensuing investigation, the police connected McCoy to
the shooting and developed a theory that he targeted Westbrook,
Jr. due to a gang rivalry. Police believed that Westbrook, Jr. and
his brother, who were commonly known as “the twins,” were
members of the MidTown gang. The Bully Boyz, with whom
McCoy was associated, were MidTown’s main rival. The twins’
grandmother’s house was a common gathering spot for the
MidTown gang.
After reviewing security camera videos from neighboring
properties and photos and license plate information captured by
an automated license place reader system, the police tracked a
red Nissan Altima matching the description of the suspect vehicle
and observed McCoy driving it. Although the rims on McCoy’s
Altima did not match the rims on the car in the security videos
from the night of the shooting, an automated license plate reader
had photographed McCoy’s car on September 8, 2022, sporting
the same rims as the suspect vehicle. The police determined from
later photographs that the rims on McCoy’s car had been changed
in mid-October 2022.
Cell phone records placed McCoy’s phone at the location of
the shooting. On the night of September 4, 2022, McCoy’s phone
was located in the vicinity of the twins’ grandmother’s house at
10:29 p.m., before leaving the area. Between 11:35 and 11:47
p.m., McCoy’s phone was moving back toward the grandmother’s
house. At 11:51 p.m., immediately after the shooting, McCoy’s
phone used the cell tower covering the grandmother’s street
3
address. The phone then quickly moved away from the scene of
the crime toward McCoy’s home. In mid-September, McCoy
recycled a cell phone at a Walmart.
In the days before the September 4th shooting, McCoy’s
Instagram account, “fullyautoant,” exchanged messages with
members of the Bully Boyz gang, discussing finding rivals to kill
and referencing firearms and ammunition. On September 2,
McCoy’s associate sent a message to a group including McCoy’s
account that asked why “the twins” were always running from
Bully Boyz members; McCoy’s account responded “N words2
always running.” McCoy’s associate then messaged that the
twins were at “granny’s house.” Later that night, McCoy’s
account sent messages to the group about arming and going into
rival territory to do a shooting.
In a search of McCoy’s Altima, police discovered two spent
.40-caliber cartridge casings, one of which contained a “CCINR
40, S and W” headstamp. At McCoy’s residence, police found an
empty Glock pistol magazine, ten .40-caliber live ammunition
cartridges, and a full auto selector switch for a Glock pistol.
Police did not find the firearms referenced in McCoy’s messaging
history.
3.
In his defense, McCoy presented testimony that, to enhance
their reputations, gang members sometimes take credit for
crimes they did not commit. McCoy also presented expert
testimony that DNA obtained from a .40-caliber casing recovered
from the scene was not sufficient to conduct a comparison with a
suspect’s DNA profile.
2 During the trial, the phrase “N words” was used as a
substitute to avoid repeating a racial epithet.
4
McCoy’s fiancée provided an alibi. She testified that, on
the night of September 4, 2022, she called McCoy at 10:47 p.m.
and 11:21 p.m., but he did not answer. Each time, McCoy’s
“phone had hung up.” It was unusual for McCoy to hang up on
her. Concerned, she went to McCoy’s residence. When she
arrived at 11:30 p.m., McCoy was at home. He seemed “spooked”
and “fidgety,” and she did not see him with his cell phone. McCoy
went out around midnight to walk his dog. When he returned, he
had his cell phone with him but he still seemed “fidgety . . . ,
nervous[,] and scared.” McCoy kept his phone unlocked all the
time. McCoy’s fiancée did not tell anyone that he was at home
the night of the shooting until the night before she testified, when
she shared the information with his defense attorney for the first
time. Because she had attended the entire trial up until that
point, she was familiar with the prosecution’s case against
McCoy, including all of the cell phone location evidence. She did
not share her account earlier because she was afraid for her
safety and that of her child.
The defense argued that McCoy was a “dupe[]” who was set
up by Bully Boyz members who took his phone and car to commit
the crime while he was at home. Further, McCoy’s social media
statements were not genuine but instead were “all talk.”
B.
In the trial court, McCoy unsuccessfully sought an
evidentiary hearing under Franks, arguing that the probable
cause affidavit made in support of the search warrants included
false statements concerning the information Westbrook, Sr.
provided to police. The court concluded that McCoy had made an
insufficient showing that the statements in the affidavit were
false or in reckless disregard of the truth.
During deliberations, the jury inadvertently received
Exhibit 116 even though it had not been admitted into evidence.
Exhibit 116 contained social media records from the Instagram
5
account of an alleged member of Bully Boyz; one page of the
exhibit provided to the jury contained a handwritten note that
read, “Δ sends murder scene video.” After questioning the jury
about their exposure to the exhibit, the court denied McCoy’s
motion for a mistrial. The court instructed the jury to disregard
the exhibit, replaced one juror3 with an alternate, and directed
the jurors to begin deliberations anew.
After the jury found McCoy guilty of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count one) and conspiracy to commit murder
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count two), the trial court denied McCoy’s
motion for a new trial. The court sentenced him to two
concurrent terms of 25 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
A.
McCoy argues that the trial court erred in declining to hold
an evidentiary hearing under Franks based on his showing that
statements in the probable cause affidavit were deliberately false
or made with reckless disregard of the truth. Reviewing the
issue de novo (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 457
(Panah)), we disagree.
Under Franks, a defendant may seek an evidentiary
hearing to challenge the truthfulness of statements contained in
an affidavit of probable cause made in support of a search
warrant. (See Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 456; Franks, supra,
438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) To obtain an evidentiary hearing, the
defendant must first make a substantial showing that
(1) statements in the affidavit are “deliberately false or were
made in reckless disregard of the truth”; and (2) once the false
3 Before the court had a chance to excuse the juror, the
court learned that the jury had reached a verdict. However, in
light of the circumstances, the court informed the jury that it
could not accept the verdict with the jury so constituted.
6
statements are omitted, the remainder of the affidavit is
insufficient to establish probable cause. (Panah, at p. 456.)
Merely negligent misrepresentations are inadequate. (Ibid.)
Here, McCoy’s showing fails at the first step.
McCoy argues that Detective Gerber falsely represented
that Westbrook, Sr. was able to recall the physical characteristics
of the shooter during the September 8, 2022 interview, when in
fact he was describing details he gathered by conducting an
investigation on social media and watching security camera video
footage. Specifically, Gerber related statements from Westbrook,
Sr. that the shooter had leaned out of the car window and that
the shooter was light-skinned with dark, curly hair, a straight-
cut hairline, and a narrow face. According to McCoy, the
affidavit created the false impression that Westbrook, Sr.
subsequently remembered these details from the night of the
shooting. McCoy further asserts that Westbrook, Sr.’s earlier
statements to Detectives Palma and Duffy—given the night of
the shooting—establish that he was simply unable to provide a
detailed description of the shooter.
Our review of the audio recording of the September 8, 2022
interview, along with the evidence of Westbrook, Sr.’s statements
on the night of the shooting, does not support McCoy’s
contentions.
Although Westbrook, Sr. mentioned Instagram photos and
security camera videos during the September 8 interview, he
never indicated that his physical description of the shooter was
based on such sources. Instead, his statements suggested that
his description was based on his own first person observation of
the shooter. At the start of the interview, he told police that after
he “told the kids . . . how [the shooter] looked, . . . the first person
they showed me, . . . that’s him, . . . Anthony McCoy.” Westbrook,
Sr. then told the police: “That person I seen, that shot my son,
[that’s] . . . Anthony McCoy.” Subsequently, Westbrook, Sr.
7
provided a more detailed physical description after the police said
to him, “You’ve had some time to think about it. Is there any
other details [sic] you’ve thought of since then you can share?”
Westbrook, Sr. then responded that the gunman was a “light
skinned brother” with “a long face,” “a straight cut hair line,” and
“black hair that’s curly.” He made clear that the shooter’s face
had been visible, explaining that the shooter leaned “out the car”
and commenting, “[w]hoever’s leading these little kids to do this
shit are not telling ‘em you oughtta have a mask on, young buck!”
Later, he asked the police if they heard in the security camera
video that there were four “pop[s],” and he told them that for the
last “pop . . . I was staring him in the face.” Near the end of the
recording, the police asked Westbrook, Sr. “how sure are you”
about his account, and he responded, “I’m so sure, a hundred
percent sure . . . I’m so sure, it’s to where . . . when I was telling .
. . when I was describing him, the first person . . . when they
showed that picture, I said that’s him!” Westbrook, Sr. confirmed
that the shooter was not wearing a mask or hat, saying he was
wearing “nothing, no mask, no hat, no nothing. He was straight
fucking bare-faced.” McCoy has not made a substantial showing
that Gerber’s statements in the affidavit—that Westbrook, Sr.
had “remembered” the foregoing details—falsely represented the
interview.
Nor has he made a substantial showing that the affidavit
recklessly disregarded the truth. McCoy argues that police
should have known that Westbrook, Sr.’s subsequent description
was fabricated because he did not share the same details on the
night of the shooting. McCoy’s argument is based on the
erroneous premise that Westbrook, Sr.’s statements on the night
of the shooting comprehensively related to the police every detail
about the shooting that he perceived. That premise is not
supported by the record.
8
Although Westbrook, Sr. volunteered some information the
night of the shooting, he did not give an extensive police
interview at the time. Westbrook, Sr. spoke with Detective
Palma minutes after his son was pronounced dead. While
speaking with Palma, Westbrook, Sr. was “emotionally upset”
and had “spells of crying, spells of . . . yelling” and “grieving.”
Westbrook, Sr. told Palma that the gunman was in the right rear
passenger seat and was armed with a handgun, but did not
describe any physical characteristics. Palma did not ask
Westbrook, Sr. follow-up questions to attempt to elicit further
details of the shooter’s physical description and never asked
whether he was able to see the shooter’s gender or race.
Similarly, when Detective Duffy spoke to Westbrook, Sr. at 2:43
a.m., Westbrook, Sr. was, understandably, still “shocked” and
“emotional.” At that point, a little over two and a half hours after
he spoke with Palma, Westbrook, Sr. was able to relate additional
details, including that the shooter was not wearing a mask, was a
teenaged male, and was “possibly black or Hispanic.”4
Westbrook, Sr. never indicated that he was unable to recall or
provide additional details, nor was there evidence that Palma or
Duffy pressed him for a more specific description.
Given Westbrook, Sr.’s emotional state, the informality and
length of the interviews, and the fact that the police did not
question him in detail, the limited description he shared in the
minutes and hours immediately following his son’s violent
murder does not support a conclusion that his later, more
detailed statements were false. (Cf. People v. Scott (1963) 218
Cal.App.2d 249, 255 [“It is settled that a witness may not be
impeached by showing that he omitted a fact or stated it less
4 McCoy does not argue that these additional details were
unlikely to be true because Westbrook, Sr. did not share them in
his initial interview with Palma.
9
fully at a prior proceeding unless his attention was called to it at
that time”].)
B.
McCoy contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial after members of the jury
reviewed inadmissible evidence in the form of records from the
Instagram account of an alleged Bully Boyz member Tejean
Hornbeak (Exhibit 116). We discern no abuse of discretion.
1.
The court discovered the problem when, during
deliberations, the jury foreperson sent a note that read: “Are we
supposed to have Exhibit 116? There is a sticky note with odd
note [sic].” After conferring with counsel, the court sent the
following response to the jury: “No. Do not consider anything
from Exhibit 116 and do not discuss it.”
The next morning, the court discussed Exhibit 116 with
counsel, identifying the exhibit as “the Meta Platform records of
the . . . Instagram account” belonging to Tejean Hornbeak. The
exhibit contained a string of metadata and message threads
between Hornbeak, McCoy, and other alleged co-conspirators.
One page of Exhibit 116 had affixed to it a handwritten “sticky
note” stating “Δ sends murder scene video,” presumably referring
to the defendant. The note was placed next to text in the exhibit
indicating that on September 8, 2022, four days after the murder,
McCoy’s Instagram account, “fullyautoant[,] sent a video.”
Because the court had ruled Exhibit 116 inadmissible, it was
never admitted into evidence, so the court found that “it went
into the jury by error.”
The court questioned the members of the jury about their
exposure to Exhibit 116. The foreperson informed the court that
“two of us had glanced through some of it, but there was no group
discussions about it.” Other than the foreperson, the only juror
10
who had looked at Exhibit 116 was Juror No. 1, who stated that
she “just briefed through it” and “mainly saw the sticky note.”
When asked whether there was any discussion about the contents
of the exhibit, the foreperson responded, “No.”
The court then instructed the jury: “I’m going to send you
back to deliberate. And I want anyone who leafed through,
looked at, whatever, referenced Exhibit 116, you are to
completely disregard it. . . . [I]t is not to be considered by you in
your deliberations at all. I don't want any reference to it;
nothing. Can you all agree to that?” All of the jurors said “[y]es”
except for Juror No. 1, who did not respond or otherwise indicate
their assent. Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel
stated, “I’m unsatisfied by that response by” Juror No. 1, adding
“[t]he others clearly were okay, but the one that was at least
tangentially involved did not give that assurance.”
The court replaced Juror No. 1 with an alternate and
instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew, but it declined to
grant a mistrial or new trial.
2.
McCoy argues that the trial court should have granted his
motions for mistrial and for a new trial because the jurors’
exposure to the statement “Δ sends murder scene video” could not
be cured by the court’s admonition. He asserts that the note
amounted to a confession that he committed the murder. We are
unpersuaded.
The trial court must grant a mistrial in the event of a
prejudicial incident that cannot be cured by admonition or
instruction. (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 703.) The
question is whether the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial
has been irremediably damaged. (Ibid.) Because whether a
particular occurrence is “ ‘ “incurably prejudicial” ’ ” is necessarily
speculative, the trial court has “ ‘ “considerable discretion” ’ ”
11
when deciding a mistrial motion. (Ibid.) As for a new trial
motion, the trial court may grant relief only where the defendant
has demonstrated reversible error. (People v. Clair (1992) 2
Cal.4th 629, 667.) On appeal, we review the denial of a new trial
for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 667.)
In conducting our review, we presume that the jury
followed the court’s instruction to disregard Exhibit 116,
particularly where, as here, the remaining members of the jury
affirmatively agreed to do so. (See People v. Turner (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 117, 128.) The jury’s exposure to improper evidence
“can almost always” be cured by an appropriate instruction or
admonition (People v. Navarrete (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 828, 836
(Navarrete)), such as where the exposure was “brief, isolated, or
ambiguous.” (Turner, at p. 129). There may be “ ‘exceptional
circumstances’ ” in which a curative instruction is inadequate,
however. (Id. at p. 128.)
For example, courts have deemed curable any prejudice
where a witness volunteered that the defendant was being
retried after an earlier conviction was reversed (People v.
Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 683), and when a witness
referenced the defendant’s recent imprisonment (People v. Avila
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73,
124-125). In Navarrete, by contrast, the court held that the
prejudice could not be cured by an instruction where a police
witness improperly gave testimony suggesting that the defendant
had confessed to the charged crime, committing a lewd act upon a
child. (Navarrete, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829, 834-837.)
Navarrete reasoned that a “jury’s belief that a defendant may
have confessed eviscerates the presumption of innocence,” and
“jurors cannot be expected to wipe from their minds knowledge
that a [defendant] has confessed even when a trial court instructs
them to do so.” (Id. at pp. 834-835.)
12
McCoy contends that his case is like Navarrete, asserting
that the statement that he sent a murder scene video amounts to
a confession. We disagree that, in the circumstances here, a
jury’s knowledge that the defendant sent a murder scene video
has the same effect as a jury’s knowledge that a defendant
confessed to the crime. Neither possession nor transmission of a
video of a crime scene that took place on a public street means
that the possessor or sender filmed or appeared in the video, let
alone committed the crime. Indeed, there may be multiple
innocent explanations for how a person could come into
possession of a video of the scene. For example, the defendant
might have received the video from someone else through social
media or text message, and then forwarded it to others via
Instagram. Here, the jury heard evidence that McCoy was active
on social media and posted both photos and videos in his
Instagram account. The jury also received evidence that multiple
home security cameras in the vicinity recorded events from the
night of the shooting, including the shooting itself and audio from
the shooting. McCoy does not explain how sending a video of the
crime scene on social media implicates him as the shooter.
Because the statement “Δ sends murder scene video” is at best
ambiguous and does not inculpate McCoy as the perpetrator, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
mistrial, excusing one juror, and admonishing the jury. For the
same reason, the trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial
was within its discretion.
C.
Finally, the parties agree that under section 654, the trial
court erred in imposing two concurrent sentences of 25 years to
life in prison for first-degree murder (count one) and conspiracy
to commit murder (count two). We agree that McCoy’s sentence
on count two must be stayed.
13
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Italics added.) Under section 654, a criminal
defendant may not receive more than one punishment for a single
act, nor may a defendant receive multiple punishments for acts
that comprised a single, indivisible course of conduct in service of
a single objective. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 550-552.)
As a result, section 654 prohibits punishing a defendant for both
conspiracy to commit murder and the underlying murder.
(People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 866, disapproved of
on another ground by People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758,
824, fn. 32.)
Here, the trial court recognized that count two, “the
conspiracy charge[,] is based on the exact same conduct as found
to be true in [c]ount [one],” the murder charge. The court
properly concluded: “under . . . [s]ection 654, I cannot punish
separately on [c]ount [two].” However, in pronouncing McCoy’s
sentence, the court did not stay the sentence on count two, which
was necessary to avoid double punishment. (See People v.
Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 689.)
Where, as here, the punishment is the same for the two
counts at issue, a remand is unnecessary because it would not
change the defendant’s sentence. (People v. Bey (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 144, 167.) Accordingly, we will modify the judgment
to stay the sentence for count two. (See ibid.)
DISPOSITION
Pursuant to section 654, the judgment is modified to stay
the sentence on count two. The trial court is directed to prepare
an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and
to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
14
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.
People v. McCoy (A169353)
15
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