CourtListener 10815032•People v. Quezada CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Quezada CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B348827
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A644721)
v.
HENRY CARDONA
QUEZADA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pat Connolly, Judge. Affirmed.
Henry Cardona Quezada, in pro. per.; Richard B. Lennon,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Henry Cardona Quezada appeals from the superior court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We appointed counsel to represent Quezada on
appeal. After reviewing the record counsel for Quezada filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 that
did not identify any arguable issues. After independently
reviewing the record and the contentions in Quezada’s
supplemental brief, we have not identified any either. Therefore,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. A Jury Convicts Quezada on Two Counts of Murder
and One Count of Attempted Murder
As we described in our opinion in Quezada’s direct appeal
(People v. Quezada (Nov. 8, 1989, B034685) [nonpub. opn.])
(Quezada), one afternoon in September 1987 Anthony Lewis
drove his car to Quezada’s house and saw Quezada standing
outside. Lewis said, “Go get the gun, and I will get revenge.
Somebody shot at my house.” Quezada went inside, returned
with an assault rifle, and gave it to Lewis. Quezada got into the
driver’s seat of Lewis’s car and drove off, with Lewis in the
passenger seat. (Quezada, supra, B034685.)
Quezada began following three men in a black car. The
driver of the black car was Frederick Ford; Christopher Morgan
was in the front passenger seat, and Arturo Gamboa was in the
back. Quezada pulled alongside the black car, and Lewis made
the sign of a criminal street gang with his fingers. Quezada
slowed down, got behind the black car, and continued to follow it.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Lewis fired 18 or 19 shots at the black car. Quezada drove back
to his house and got out of the car with his rifle, and Lewis drove
away. Ford and Gamboa died of multiple gunshot wounds;
Morgan suffered a gunshot wound to the thigh but survived.
(Quezada, supra, B034685.)
The People charged Quezada with two counts of first degree
murder and one count of attempted murder. For each count, the
People alleged a principal was armed with a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a).
A jury found Quezada guilty on all counts and found true
the firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced Quezada to a
prison term of 26 years to life on one of his murder convictions,
25 years to life on his other murder conviction (the court imposed
and stayed under section 654 execution of a one-year firearm
enhancement), and the upper term of nine years on his attempted
murder conviction. Quezada appealed, and we affirmed.
(Quezada, supra, B034685.)
B. The Superior Court Denies Quezada’s Petition for
Resentencing
In January 2020 Quezada, representing himself, filed a
form petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95.
Quezada checked boxes indicating that he “was convicted of 1st
or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that he “could
not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder” because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
The superior court summarily denied the motion on March 12,
2020. Quezada did not appeal.
3
On September 20, 2021 Quezada, still representing himself,
filed another form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
and checked the same boxes. On November 1, 2021 the superior
court deemed the second petition for resentencing a motion for
reconsideration and summarily denied the petition, ruling
Quezada was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The superior
court concluded Quezada “was convicted of murder but the court
file reflects that the petitioner was not convicted under a theory
of felony-murder of any degree, or a theory of natural and
probable consequences. There are no jury instructions for aiding
and abetting, felony murder, or natural and probable
consequences. Further, the petitioner was convicted as a direct
aider and abettor to the murder.” Nevertheless, on May 20, 2022
the superior court appointed counsel for Quezada and later heard
and denied the second petition for resentencing.
We reversed the order summarily denying the (second)
petition. We held the record did not “as a matter of law refute
Quezada’s allegation the jury convicted him of first degree
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The trial court instructed the jury that principals of a crime are
‘equally guilty’ and that principals included those who ‘aid and
abet’ the commission of the crime. The court further told the jury
that an aider and abettor was liable for the natural and probable
consequence of any acts he or she knowingly and intentionally
aided or encouraged. The court’s instructions thus allowed the
jury to find that Quezada aided and abetted an unspecified crime
and that Quezada was responsible (indeed, as guilty as Lewis) for
the natural and probable consequence of that crime, murder. . . .”
We stated that, though “the trial court did not define the target
crime in the pattern jury instructions, the prosecutor connected
4
the dots for the jurors and told them how to apply the natural
and probable consequences doctrine to convict Quezada of
murder. . . . [¶] The instruction said nothing about a target
crime, instead leaving it up to the jury to surmise the crime that
Lewis contemplated and that Quezada aided and abetted.
And . . . the prosecutor’s argument only increased the uncertainty
about what ‘act’ Quezada helped Lewis commit that resulted in
the murders.” (People v. Quezada (June 4, 2023, B320608)
[nonpub. opn.].) We directed the superior court to issue an order
to show cause, give Quezada an opportunity to amend his
petition, and conduct further proceedings under section 1172.6.
On remand the People filed an evidentiary brief,2 and the
superior court held a new resentencing hearing. The court again
denied the petition. The court ruled Quezada was ineligible for
relief because he was a direct aider and abettor. The superior
court found: “This is a situation where the actual shooter’s home,
allegedly, is shot—or shot at. He wants revenge. The driver, who
is Mr. Quezada, retrieves that [assault rifle], hands it to the
shooter, they both get into the vehicle. They follow the victims.
At some point I believe they actually pull up next to the victims—
I can only surmise to make sure that they see who they are going
to be shooting at. The vehicle then backs off—follows. When the
victim’s vehicle does make the turn, the defendant positions the
vehicle and follows still, so that the actual shooter is able to
2 The People argued the “evidence presented at the trial . . .
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [Quezada] was the driver
in a car-to-car shooting. He was an aider and abettor with the
intent to kill with express malice, or at the very least, an aider
and abettor with intent to kill with implied malice, deeming him
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.”
5
shoot . . . . I believe it was either 18 or 19 shots were fired.
Two individuals were killed. The third individual, who did make
an identification, was shot . . . . And then they retreat, I believe,
back to the driver’s house. But the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that this is direct aiding and abetting of a
murder. The shots fired. The amount of shots fired. The weapon
that is used. The actions of the driver show that he had the exact
same intent as the shooter, and this is the intent to kill. And, as
such, the motion pursuant to [section] 1172.6 is denied.”
Quezada appealed from the order denying his petition.
DISCUSSION
As stated, we appointed counsel to represent Quezada in
his appeal from the order denying his petition for resentencing.
After reviewing the record, counsel advised this court he could
not identify any arguable issues. Counsel advised Quezada on
January 8, 2026 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable
to find any arguable issues and that Quezada could personally
submit any contentions he wanted the court to consider. Counsel
sent Quezada a copy of his brief, as well as the record on appeal.
On February 9, 2026 we received a two-page supplemental
brief from Quezada. In his supplemental brief Quezada argues
that he has been incarcerated for approximately 38 years and
that he has “worked diligently toward rehabilitation and personal
growth.” Quezada asks us to consider that his “co-defendant in
this same case [Lewis] has been released” and that his “sentence
is now not equal to that of [his] co-defendant, but grossly
disproportionate and inconsistent with current standards of
justice.”
6
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts
if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of
murder. (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; People v.
Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 835; People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 468-469; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449-450.) Where, as here, the petitioner has made the requisite
prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief under
section 1172.6, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1); Emanuel, at p. 880;
Oyler, at p. 836.) At that hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Oyler, at p. 836.) The petitioner and
the prosecutor may also offer new or additional evidence “to meet
their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see People v.
Zavala (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 366, 373.) Because a
section 1172.6 hearing is “a continuation of the underlying
criminal proceeding” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 778, 787), the only issue is whether the
“petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294 [“The question is
7
whether the petitioner committed murder under a still-valid
theory, and that is a factual question.”].)
Quezada’s argument he should be resentenced because he
is a changed person is outside the scope of section 1172.6 because
it is not relevant to whether he could presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder. Similarly, that Quezada’s sentence
may be different from his codefendant’s sentence is not relevant
to whether he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6. Neither
Quezada nor his appellate counsel has identified a cognizable
legal issue. Our independent review has not identified one
either. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 231-232; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106,
118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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