CourtListener 10814909•In re A.O. CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/25/26 In re A.O. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.O., a Person Coming B349018
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 22CCJP03402B)
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.L. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.L.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant D.O.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Eden Gharapet, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
J.L. (mother) and D.O. (father) appeal from the termination
of their parental rights to their daughter A.O., arguing that the
juvenile court erred in finding her adoptable. Substantial
evidence supports this finding, so we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father share a daughter, A.O. (born April
2023), and mother has a son, D.S. (born December 2021), with a
different father.
On August 27, 2022, D.S. was hospitalized, unresponsive
and nearly dead, with injuries that included a fractured skull,
bruises in various stages of healing all over his body, and human
bite marks. D.S. has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and will
likely “need lifetime therapeutic services, due to significant
delays from the injuries.” Father (who is not D.S.’s father) was
charged, convicted, and served time in jail for D.S.’s injuries.
D.S. was discharged from the hospital and placed in foster care in
September 2022.
On March 9, 2023, the juvenile court sustained a section
3001 petition, exerting jurisdiction over D.S. based on mother’s
history of substance abuse, her allowing father—also a drug
user—to reside in the home with unlimited access to D.S.,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
mother’s mental and emotional problems, and allegations related
to D.S.’s father.
On April 25, 2023, the Department of Children and Family
Services (the Department) filed a section 300 petition as to A.O.,
who had just been born, based on the serious injuries to her half
sibling D.S., mother’s substance abuse and mental and emotional
problems, father’s substance abuse, and both parents’ violation of
a no-contact order. A.O. was detained from father but was
allowed to remain with mother.
On September 27, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the
petition with some amendments. A.O. was placed with mother
over county counsel’s objection and was ordered removed from
father. The parents were again ordered to have no contact with
each other.
On November 30, 2023, A.O. was removed from mother on
an expedited basis after mother and father engaged in violence in
A.O.’s presence. She was placed with D.S.’s caregivers.
Supplemental petitions were filed in December 2023 (and
sustained in January 2024) based on domestic violence between
mother and father and their failure to obey a no-contact order.
A.O. was examined in December 2023 and found to have
“Global Developmental Delay.” She was found eligible for
regional center services, which she began in February 2024.
The caregivers reported A.O. had difficulty sleeping and
self-soothing and showed “tantrum like behaviors” when she does
not get what she wants. However, on July 23, 2024, they
reported that A.O. had been doing well and was sleeping better.
On October 16, 2024, the juvenile court terminated
reunification services for father but continued them for mother.
3
As of January 2025, A.O. was making slow progress in
meeting milestones but was comfortable in the caregivers’ home
and had a strong bond with D.S. The juvenile court terminated
mother’s reunification services on January 22, 2025.
A.O. continued having some difficulty with sleeping, self-
soothing, and tantrums into May 2025. A.O. was two years old,
but scoring between eight and 14 months on various tests. She
did not have any extensive medical needs, however.
Mother gave birth to another child in June 2025, who is the
subject of another dependency proceeding.
In July 2025, an Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children (ICPC) was approved for A.O. to go with D.S. to live
with his paternal relatives in Michigan.
On August 6, 2025, A.O. was placed in the ICPC-approved
home in Michigan with D.S.’s relatives, who were “willing and
able” to provide permanency for both siblings.
As of September 16, 2025, the caregivers reported that A.O.
was “doing well and appear[ed] to be adjusting as she has been
able to establish a routine.” She was “beginning to bond with
caregivers and [their] son as the children are close in age and
enjoy playing together.” The caregivers were not having “any
issues with [A.O.’s] behavior or excessive tantrums at this time.”
They enrolled her in “an early head start” program shortly after
she arrived in Michigan. The Department recommended that the
juvenile court terminate parental rights and release A.O. for
adoption.
The juvenile court convened the permanency planning
hearing on September 16, 2025. Mother requested a continuance
for the adoption assessment to be completed, which the court
denied. Father testified, and the court admitted the
4
Department’s reports and took judicial notice of the record in
D.S.’s dependency case. It then found “by clear and convincing
evidence that [A.O.] is adoptable” and “no exception to adoption”
applied, and terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights
over A.O.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law
“After reunification services have terminated, the focus of a
dependency proceeding shifts from family preservation to
promoting the best interest of the child including the child’s
interest in a ‘placement that is stable, permanent, and that
allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the
child.’ ” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
At the permanency planning hearing, “the court shall
terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption”
if it finds “by a clear and convincing standard . . . that it is likely
the child will be adopted.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The likely to
be adopted standard is “a low threshold.” (In re J.W. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 263, 267 (J.W.); In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
1275, 1292 (K.B.).) “The court must merely determine that it is
‘likely’ that the child will be adopted within a reasonable time.”
(K.B., at p. 1292.) We review that finding for substantial
evidence, giving the juvenile court’s determination “the benefit of
every reasonable inference.” (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.)
2. Substantial evidence supports the adoptability finding
Both parents argue that the absence of the adoption
assessment the Department was required to prepare (§§ 366.21,
subd. (i), 366.22, subd. (c)) renders the record inadequate to
sustain the juvenile court’s finding that A.O. is adoptable. We
5
disagree. The Welfare and Institutions Code requires the
Department to prepare an adoption assessment to address
various subjects, “including the child’s medical, developmental,
scholastic, mental, and emotional status”; the “likelihood that the
child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated”; “ ‘the
eligibility and commitment of any identified prospective adoptive
parent[s],’ ” including their ability to meet the child’s needs; and
“ ‘[t]he relationship of the child to any identified prospective
adoptive parent . . . , the duration and character of the
relationship, [and] the motivation for seeking adoption or
guardianship.’ ” (In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, 11–
12 (Valerie W.), citing § 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(C)–(G).) Although the
juvenile court had not received this formal report, its absence
does not negate the substantial evidence in the record showing
that A.O. was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
When there is a prospective adoptive home in which the
child is already living, and the only indications are that the child
will be adopted into that home, adoptability is established. (J.W.,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 268; K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1293; see also In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 80
(Helen W.) [“a prospective adoptive parent serves as evidence a
child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by
the prospective adoptive parent or some other home”].) When a
child is deemed adoptable because a particular caretaker is
willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from the characteristics of the
child to whether there is any legal impediment to the caretaker’s
adoption and whether they are able to meet the child’s needs.
(Helen W., at p. 80; In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051,
1062.)
6
The record reveals no legal impediment to A.O.’s adoption
and shows that the caretakers are willing and able to meet her
needs. Mother and father both point to A.O.’s developmental
delays and sleeping and behavioral problems to argue that
insufficient evidence supports the adoptability finding. “Very few
children in the dependency system are without problems,” and to
deny A.O. “the chance to permanently become a member of the
family that loves [her], simply because [she] has special needs,
would derail the entire concept of permanent planning.” (J.W.,
supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 268–269.) The record shows that
A.O. adjusted well to her prospective adoptive parents, and that
the latter “were excited to welcome [A.O.] into their home and . . .
express[ing] a strong willingness and ability to provide
permanency” for her. Such evidence distinguishes this case from
In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, which mother cites,
where not only was there no adoption assessment report, but
there were also no prospective adoptive parents. (Cf. J.W., supra,
26 Cal.App.5th at p. 265; Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at
p. 80.)
Mother also points out that A.O. had not yet been tested
and formally diagnosed with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder,
which she urges might have impacted the caregivers’ willingness
to adopt. We are not persuaded. There is no requirement that a
child’s medical condition be certain before a court can find
adoptability. (Helen W., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) The
record shows that the caregivers were aware of A.O.’s
developmental delays and problems and were willing to provide
permanency for her nonetheless, in large part due to her bond
with D.S., a relative whom they wanted to adopt.
7
Mother cites Valerie W. to argue that the lack of a formal
diagnosis (or ruling out of) a serious medical condition precluded
an adoptability finding in this case. The circumstances of Valerie
W. were very different: In that case, the record was ambiguous
as to whether the juvenile court was aware of the plan for a
mother and daughter to “jointly adopt,” and the question of
whether there was a “legal impediment” to such an adoption
remained unanswered. (Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at
p. 16.) There had also been no home study or basic assessment of
one of the proposed joint adopters. (Id. at p. 15.) Nor was there
any report of “the relationship between the children and each
applicant[ and] the motivation of each . . . for seeking adoption
and . . . for seeking a ‘joint adoption.’ ” (Id. at pp. 13–14.) These
significant deficiencies, in addition to “a lack of evidence
concerning the child’s condition, prognosis and treatment needs,”
rendered the evidence insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s
adoptability finding. (Id. at p. 14.)
Mother also points to the fact that A.O. had only resided in
the prospective adoptive home for “41 days” before the juvenile
court found her adoptable. But mother does not cite any
authority to show that this circumstance is dispositive.2 Aside
from the consistent statements and conduct of the caregivers
showing their willingness and readiness to adopt A.O., several
other factors support the juvenile court’s finding that A.O. was
likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. The caregivers
desired to adopt D.S. (who is their relative), and recognized the
2 Mother cites subdivision (n)(1) of section 366.26, but that
provision concerns the designation of prospective adoptive
parents, and this appeal concerns a finding of adoptability—i.e.,
the finding that A.O. will be adopted within a reasonable time.
8
bond he shared with his half sibling A.O. A.O. had been placed
with her prior caregivers for “over 20 months” before she moved
to the prospective adoptive home, which suggests that those
motivated to care for her could do so on a long-term basis. A.O.
had adjusted well to her new home in Michigan, had a “great
appetite,” was “sleeping well,” and “enjoy[ed] playing” with the
caregivers’ other son. The caregivers also enrolled her in an early
head start program shortly upon her arrival. As discussed by the
Department, the prospective adoptive home was approved under
the ICPC (see Fam. Code, § 7901 et seq.), meaning that the home
and caregivers underwent an assessment to ensure A.O.’s safety.
This undermines mother’s assertion that the juvenile court “had
no clue” as to whether the new Michigan caregivers had histories
of crime or child abuse.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile
court’s finding that A.O. was likely to be adopted within a
reasonable time.
9
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
GILBERT, J.*
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
*
Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
10
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