CourtListener 10814906•In re L.C. CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/25/26 In re L.C. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A173033
L.C.,
(Mendocino County Super Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. No. 25JD0002603)
L.C. appeals from a disposition order adjudging him a ward of the court
after a contested hearing in which the juvenile court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that L.C. committed the felony offense of criminal threats
(Pen. Code,1 § 422) based on testimony that L.C., whom the victim believed to
be a “gangbanger” and a “Norteno,” directed the victim to “get on your knees
because we’re going to kill you” and “put a bullet through your head.” In this
appeal, L.C. challenges the gang references as “hearsay” and argues the
record is “devoid of evidence that any gang affiliation was connected to the
offense.” Thus, he contends the juvenile court’s imposition of gang-related
probation conditions was error. We disagree, concluding that (1) L.C. has
1Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
forfeited his claim, and, even if not, (2) the conditions imposed were
appropriately evidence-based and “reasonably related to . . . future
criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) superseded by
statute on another ground as stated in People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398,
403, fn. 6.) We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
In four different wardship petitions filed between February 2024 and
March 2025, L.C. was alleged to have committed crimes arising out of four
different incidents that occurred between January and August 2024. Three
of the petitions were resolved by negotiated dispositions, and one—the third
petition involving criminal threats that is the subject of this appeal—was
decided after a jurisdictional hearing.
I. The First, Second, and Fourth Petitions2
In the first petition, L.C. was alleged to have brought a weapon on
school grounds on January 5, 2024 (§ 626.10, subd. (a)(1)), specifically, a knife
that was “nine-and-one half inches in overall length and had a five-inch fixed
blade.”
In the fourth petition, L.C. was alleged to have committed on February
1, 2024, felony vandalism/damage or destruction of property of $400 or more
(§ 594, subd. (b)(1)) and felony taking of a vehicle without the owner’s consent
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)).
The second petition alleged L.C. entered a “Granny Unit of a residence
or inhabited portion of a residence” in Fort Bragg on August 8, 2024, with the
intent to commit larceny and then “willfully and/or unlawfully” took a “rifle
2 With the exception of the third petition, which was filed on January
23, 2025, based on a June 23, 2024 incident, we discuss the incidents
chronologically, not in the order in which they were charged.
2
and a revolver.” L.C. was charged with felony burglary in the first degree
(§ 459/460, subd. (a)) and felony grand theft of a value greater than $950, to
wit, a rifle and a revolver (§ 487, subd. (a)).
On January 28, 2025, by way of a negotiated disposition, L.C. admitted
the first petition, the misdemeanor violation of section 626.10 for bringing or
possessing a knife on school grounds, and the second petition, arising out of
the August 2024 burglary allegations, was dismissed. The associated
disposition hearing trailed the jurisdictional hearing on the third petition
concerning the criminal threats allegations discussed below.
The fourth petition was resolved on April 24, 2025, by way of a
negotiated disposition—days after the instant notice of appeal was filed—in
which L.C. admitted misdemeanor vandalism in violation of section 594,
subdivision (b)(1), and the court dismissed the vehicle theft charge. In L.C.’s
associated waiver of rights form completed and filed in connection with his
admission, L.C. waived his “right to appeal, or ask another court to look at,
decisions by the judge that [he] disagree[d] with.” According to the minute
order accompanying the change of plea, L.C. was to be continued on probation
under “[a]ll previous terms and conditions.”3
II. The Third Petition
The third petition was filed on January 23, 2025, before the resolution
of the first and second petitions, and alleged L.C. willfully threatened to
commit a crime, “which will result in death or great bodily injury” to Manuel
Gonzalez Sanchez, the ex-boyfriend of his mother. (§ 422.) On June 23, 2024,
Gonzalez Sanchez was inside his trailer home when he heard L.C. and his
brother yell at him to “get out” and “get on your knees because we’re going to
3 According to L.C., the proceedings on April 24, 2025, “were apparently
not reported.”
3
kill you.” Gonzalez Sanchez had dated L.C.’s mother for more than two and a
half years and had heard L.C.’s voice many times. L.C. and his brother each
said they “were going to put a bullet through [Gonzalez Sanchez’s] head.”
L.C.’s brother kicked the door to the trailer, making “a hole in the door.”
“[H]e poked his head through” and then “inserted his whole hand to try to
open the lock.” While L.C.’s brother kicked at the door, Gonzalez Sanchez
told the assailants to leave and called 911. Gonzalez Sanchez identified the
individuals trying to harm him as L.C. and his brother and explained to the
911 operator, “They say they were going to kill me and shit. They going to
fucking shoot me, I don’t know what the fuck they trying to do . . . . Yeah
they gang bangers so they, they, I guess they got guns and whatever.” The
operator asked Gonzalez Sanchez to clarify if the assailants were involved in
a gang, and he responded, “Yeah they Nortenos I guess. They just fucking
destroy my door and everything.”
After L.C.’s brother saw Gonzalez Sanchez was on the phone with the
police, he and L.C. fled the area in a vehicle. The whole incident lasted less
than five minutes.
At the March 13, 2025 jurisdictional hearing, the responding police
officer testified and authenticated photographs of the hole in the trailer’s
door. The 911 call was played and admitted into evidence as an excited
utterance over L.C.’s hearsay objection.4 Gonzalez Sanchez also testified
consistent with the above, explaining he had been able to identify L.C. and
his brother as the individuals who came to his home and threatened him
because he saw L.C.’s brother when he poked his head through the door and
4 On appeal, L.C. renews his complaint that Gonzalez Sanchez’s
statements made to 911 about L.C.’s gang involvement were “based on
unspecified hearsay.”
4
also recognized L.C. and his brother by their voices, which “sound different.”
As relevant to this appeal, Gonzalez Sanchez stated that he was “scared”
during the incident and believed the threats made because he believed L.C.
was in a gang5 “because [L.C.] has four points on his hand tattoo—the tattoo
on his hand, and I’ve also heard [from] his mother.”6 Gonzalez Sanchez
continued, “that’s a sign of the gang, supposedly; the three or four points.”
At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court found the third
petition to be true and continued the matter for disposition.
In the subsequently filed disposition report and recommendation, the
probation department confirmed L.C. “has gang tattoos” and represented that
while L.C. was detained in juvenile hall, a youth correctional officer observed
gang tagging in L.C.’s room on the wall that suggested “[L.C.] may be a
member or associate with members of the Norteno Criminal Street Gang”
including “red markings of a Huelga bird, ‘14’, and ‘VLN’ (Varrio Loco
Norteno). Nortenos are associated with the color red and the number ‘14’ and
5 Gonzalez Sanchez initially testified he was scared because, “they
belong to a gang.” The court sustained L.C.’s objection to this gang reference
as lacking foundation but did not strike the statement and permitted the
district attorney to “lay some foundation for the knowledge that he has.” The
testimony about L.C.’s tattoo followed.
6 L.C. repeated his foundational objections, which the court overruled,
allowing the testimony “as to the reasonableness of this witness’s perception.
What’s important in the court’s mind is what this witness believed about the
perpetrator not necessarily whether the minor is an active gang member or—
or a member of what we call a group that meets the definition of a gang. It’s
more the perception of what surrounds that perception is how the court is
receiving it.” The court also overruled L.C.’s hearsay objection to Gonzalez
Sanchez’s statement, “I’ve also heard his mother,” because “There’s no
particular statement the court has.”
5
the fourteenth letter of the alphabet is ‘N.’ ”7 The probation department
noted L.C. had “behavioral issues” at school and had only been present for six
days since his February 2025 enrollment. On February 5, 2025, his first day
attending his new school, L.C. “ ‘bullied a kid to tears’ ” and instigated a
fight; and on February 11, L.C. was “observed on school video surveillance
drawing gang symbols on a classroom whiteboard and another student’s
artwork.”
The report also included a statement to an investigating police officer
by L.C.’s mother that had not been introduced at the jurisdictional hearing.
L.C.’s mother represented that L.C.’s brother “had previously been found
with a ‘ghost gun’ but stated the gun belonged” to L.C. She explained that
L.C.’s father “had found the gun, but was too scared to dispose of it because
he feared [L.C.’s] gang friends would shoot him if he did.”
The probation department assessed L.C. to have a high risk of re-
offense because of factors including: “criminal associates, antisocial
personality, and antisocial behavior.” The probation department was
“concerned with [L.C.’s] gang involvement,” because “although the minor has
denied any gang involvement, [he] has repeatedly tagged gang symbols not
only on school property but also while in custody at the juvenile hall. [His]
brother is a known gang member, and the minor has gang tattoos
symbolizing allegiance with the criminal street gang.” Accordingly, the
probation department recommended that L.C. be declared a ward of the court
and placed on formal probation with “standard terms and conditions” and
“gang terms.”
7 The report represents the gang tagging was observed on March 11,
2024, but L.C.’s custodial history suggests the 2024 reference was a
typographical error; the tagging was observed on March 11, 2025.
6
At the March 27, 2025 disposition hearing on the first and third
petitions, the court admitted the probation report into evidence without
objection from the parties, who, with limited comment, submitted on the
report and probation’s recommendation.
The court stated it would “go along with the recommendation,” declared
L.C. a ward pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, with a
maximum aggregated confinement time of two years and four months, and
ordered L.C. to serve 90 days in juvenile hall with 48 days credit for time
served, pay restitution, and complete 25 hours of community service. The
court also ordered L.C. to “stay away from/have no contact” with Gonzalez
Sanchez and ordered the “standard probation conditions.” The court further
directed L.C. to abide by gang terms while on probation: “[Y]ou shall not be a
member of or act in furtherance of or for the benefit or associate with any
organization or group of three or more people that you know to be a criminal
street gang. You’re not to associate with any person known to you to be a
criminal street gang member, and you shall not be in any areas where
criminal street gang members are known to you to meet or gather or areas
known or told to you by probation that are known for gang-related activity.
[¶] You’re not to wear or display items or emblems reasonably known to you
or your probation officer informs you are associated [with] or symbolic of gang
membership, and you shall submit to photographing as directed by probation
or other law enforcement. [¶] You’re not to possess any articles that are
known to be graffiti materials like acid, spray paint cans, marker pens. [¶]
You shall not obtain any new gang-related tattoos, brands, burns, piercings,
or scarring, and shall submit to photographing of all tattoos that exist to
date. [¶] You’re not to remain in any building, vehicle, or in the presence of
any person where any dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or
7
ammunition are known to you to exist. No weapons, including firearms or
ammunition.”
L.C. timely appeals.
DISCUSSION8
L.C. contends that the trial court erred in imposing gang conditions
because the record is “devoid of evidence that any gang affiliation was
connected to the offense” and the “motivation for the offense certainly was not
gang-related,” thus, he argues, “ ‘any connection between [the Minor’s]
offense and gang activity is speculation,’ ” citing In re Edward B. (2017)
8 On January 13, 2026, we asked the parties to file letter briefs as to
whether L.C.’s negotiated disposition to the fourth petition in which he
accepted “All previous terms and conditions of probation” moots his current
appeal. L.C. contends the issue is not moot; the fourth petition is unrelated
to the third petition and was “resolved independently”; he did not stipulate to
“gang registration” in resolving the fourth petition.
The Attorney General disagrees, stating that L.C. “subsequently
negotiating resolution of the fourth petition, waiving his right to appeal the
judgment, and accepting the same probation conditions originally imposed in
connection with the first and third petitions, rendered moot his present
challenge to the gang probation conditions” because any “reversal of the
challenged conditions . . . would be without any practical effect.” Neither
party provided any information about subsequent proceedings that may be
relevant to the issue of mootness or this appeal.
We agree with the Attorney General that because, according to the
available record, L.C. appears to have accepted the same gang conditions
contested here in a subsequent petition’s disposition, reversal on appeal
would not provide him with “effectual relief.” (In Re Antoine D. (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 1314, 1324 [“An appeal is moot, and should be dismissed, when
any ruling by this court would not have practical impact or provide the
parties effectual relief”].) However, because there is no transcript verifying
the scope of the accepted and ordered conditions on the fourth petition, we
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of this appeal. (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].)
8
10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1236 (Edward B.). We conclude L.C.’s failure to object
has forfeited this argument, but even if not, it has no merit.
I. Forfeiture
As the Attorney General points out and L.C. concedes, his counsel at
the dispositional hearing did not object to the juvenile court’s imposition of
the gang-related probation conditions. While the Attorney General therefore
asserts forfeiture (citing People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 960, 978
[“It is well established that a defendant may not raise a Lent challenge for
the first time on appeal”]), L.C. contends the issue is not forfeited because the
failure to object could not have been a tactical decision; his counsel was
ineffective. In the alternative, L.C. contends that the court should reach the
issue because “juvenile delinquency probation conditions often receive
appellate review in the absence of an objection in the juvenile court.”9 (Citing
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 884–886.) We agree that L.C.’s failure
to object forfeited the issue on appeal, but as stated below, exercise our
discretion to decide the propriety of the conditions imposed.
First, “ ‘ “[n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than
that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the
right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ ” [Citations.]
9 On reply, L.C. expands his argument for review, asserting that the
imposed gang conditions improperly infringe upon his “constitutionally
protected right of free association” and claims L.C. is “constitutionally
entitled to spend time with his brother, regardless of whether his brother is a
gang member” because the due process clause of the United States
Constitution “protects the right of families to live together as families.”
(Citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) 431 U.S. 494.) But because
L.C. failed to raise these arguments in his opening brief, he has forfeited
them; we do not discuss them further. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527,
550, fn. 9 [“the claim is omitted from the opening brief and thus waived”].)
9
‘The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the
attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]’ ” (In re
Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 880–881.)
Second, the abundance of evidence of L.C.’s gang involvement or risk
thereof suggests that the decision of L.C.’s trial counsel not to object to the
gang conditions was an appropriate tactical decision. L.C. was named in four
wardship petitions involving varied criminal conduct over a period of eight
months. Much of this conduct and L.C.’s personal behavior at school and at
the juvenile hall demonstrated, at minimum, a risk of gang involvement, if
not direct involvement. Considering this record, the trial counsel’s decision
not to object to the gang conditions appears tactically effective rather than
ineffective assistance. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161–1162 [“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance
by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines
would be futile”]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540 [“An attorney may
choose not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely
establishes ineffectiveness of counsel”].) However, we need not analyze L.C.’s
trial counsel’s decision not to object to the probation conditions because we
exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits in the alternative.
(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [“neither forfeiture nor
application of the forfeiture rule is automatic,” and appellate courts have
discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges].)
II. The Imposition of Gang Conditions
Turning to the merits, we disagree with L.C.’s contention that because
the June 2024 threats may have been spurred by domestic violence, the
record is “devoid of evidence that any gang affiliation was connected to the
10
offense” and instead conclude that (1) the record’s evidence of gang
involvement or risk of gang involvement and its “relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted” provides sufficient basis to impose gang
conditions, and (2) because the gang conditions forbid conduct “ ‘ “reasonably
related to future criminality,” ’ ” their imposition was not an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin); Lent, supra,
15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
On appeal, “We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.”
(Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) “That is, a reviewing court will disturb
the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if,
under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is
wholly unreasonable.” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403.) Courts
may impose conditions that have a “ ‘ “relationship to the crime of which the
offender was convicted” ’ ” (Olguin, at p. 379) and may also “impose
conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
A “condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent, supra,
15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The connection between a probation condition and
future criminality must be more than abstract or hypothetical, meaning there
must be a strong connection between “the burdens imposed by the challenged
condition and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.” (In re
Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1120–1121 (Ricardo P.).) Conditions of
probation may properly be based on information in a probation report
unrelated to a prior offense that raises concerns about future criminality.
11
(Id. at p. 1122.) The Lent test “is conjunctive—all three prongs must be
satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (Olguin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379; Edward B., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1236
[“But because the gang condition imposed by the juvenile court prohibits
Edward from engaging in otherwise legal conduct, we can uphold it only if
there is a reasonable connection between the condition and the offense or
between the condition and future criminality” (italics added)].) In other
words, “even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of
which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself
criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related
to preventing future criminality.” (Olguin, at p. 380, citing People v.
Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) “Although Lent involved an adult
probationer, the Courts of Appeal have ‘consistently held that juvenile
probation conditions must be judged by the same three-part standard applied
to adult probation conditions under Lent.’ ” (Ricardo P., at pp. 1118–1119.)
L.C.’s briefing primarily focuses on the first prong under Lent; he
contends that “the record on appeal [is] devoid of substantial evidence that
[L.C.] was gang-affiliated at the time of the offense, it is also devoid of
evidence that any gang affiliation was connected to the offense.” L.C.
compares his case to Edward B., where, with the Attorney General’s
agreement, the Court of Appeal struck the gang conditions imposed in a
purse-snatching case because there was no “reasonable factual nexus”: and
“[a]ny connection between Edward’s offense and gang activity is speculation”
and “the absence of evidence of gang affiliation or association with gang
members or risk of gang involvement on Edward’s part, the gang condition is
not tailored to his future criminality.” (Edward B., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1236.) L.C. argues that here, too, “ ‘any connection between [the Minor’s]
12
offense and gang activity is speculation,’ ” because L.C. threatened to kill
Gonzalez Sanchez because he had “engaged in domestic violence against
[L.C.’s] mother earlier the same day”; the offense was not motivated by gang
activity.10 L.C. further contends that the gang conditions cannot be justified
as a general deterrent for future criminality because there is “no connection
between [L.C.’s] apparent interest in gang culture, and criminality past or
future.”
We first address L.C.’s argument under the first Lent prong that the
gang conditions have “ ‘ “no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted.” ’ ” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Here, the gravamen
of L.C.’s appeal rests on his claim that the assault against Gonzalez Sanchez
was motivated by L.C.’s personal animus toward him rather than specific
gang activity. But even if L.C.’s claims of a domestic violence incident being
his motivation (i.e., revenge) are true, they do not negate the first Lent prong.
Assaultive conduct is by definition violent. (§ 240 [“An assault is an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another”].) As L.C. acknowledges in his briefs, “Street gangs are
doubtless responsible for much violence in our society today” and frequently
engage in conduct motivated by “revenge” or a perceived wrong of another.
(See, e.g., People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1025 [defendant was a
member of the Tiny Rascals Gang who “expressly or tacitly reached an
agreement to murder [a victim], mistaken to be an Asian Boyz gang member,
10 L.C.’s father represented to the probation department that L.C.
“found out his mother was physically abused by [Gonzalez Sanchez], which is
what started this incident.” L.C. expressed remorse to the probation
department for how the incident impacted his mother, but “did not feel bad”
for Gonzalez Sanchez, saying he “deserved it” because Gonzalez Sanchez “hit
his mother, and he did not want his mother and him to be together.”
13
as revenge for the killing” of another fellow gang member].) That is exactly
what L.C. did here. At the time of the assault, neither he nor his mother was
in imminent danger or being threatened by Gonzalez Sanchez. In fact,
according to L.C., he had learned of the domestic violence “earlier that day.”
An earlier claim of danger or fear does not afford an affirmative defense for
defense of others. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 530 [“defense of
others requires a fear of imminent harm”].) Yet L.C. partnered with his
brother, an acknowledged gang member—per the testimony of Gonzalez
Sanchez, the recitations in the probation report, and L.C. in his appellate
briefs—in order to exact revenge on Gonzalez Sanchez, threatening to kill
him and “put a bullet through [his] head.” As L.C. stated, he “did not feel
bad” for Gonzalez Sanchez; in fact, the incident was “not . . . memorable
enough to remember.”
Moreover, L.C.’s “no relationship” argument ignores the fact that the
March disposition hearing also concerned the first petition, in which L.C.
admitted having brought a nine-inch knife to school. The combination of
these circumstances more than satisfies the imposition of gang conditions
under the first Lent prong, even without considering the additional evidence
of gang involvement included in the probation report.
We next consider if the imposed gang conditions are “reasonably
related to future criminality” as set forth in Lent’s third prong, discussed in
the Attorney General’s brief and L.C.’s reply brief.11 (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d
11 We need not reach the second prong because the Lent test “is
conjunctive,” and we conclude L.C. has failed to satisfy the first and third
prongs, which are the focus of the parties’ briefing. (Olguin, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Moreover, no party contests the second prong, the
criminality of the prohibited conduct, seemingly because “under Penal Code
section 186.22, active participation in a street gang, defined as a criminal
enterprise, is a crime.” (In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1501
14
at p. 486.) Gangs are known to be criminal enterprises. (In re Laylah K.,
supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1501 [“Association with gang members is the first
step to involvement in gang activity”].) Although L.C. denied being a
member of a gang, the record contains substantial evidence to the contrary.
Putting aside what Gonzalez Sanchez may have “heard” from L.C.’s mother
(who separately reported that L.C. had a “ ‘ghost gun’ ” his father had found
but was afraid to dispose of “because he feared [L.C.’s] gang friends would
shoot him if he did”), Gonzalez Sanchez testified that L.C. had a tattoo of four
points on his hand, which he understood to be a sign of gang association,
specifically Nortenos.
L.C.’s own conduct supports Gonzalez Sanchez’s suspicions. For
example, while L.C. was detained in juvenile hall, a Youth Correctional
Officer saw that the wall of L.C.’s room had been tagged with “red markings
of a Huelga bird, ‘14’, and ‘VLN’ (Varrio Loco Norteno).” The drawings
suggested that L.C. “may be a member or associate with members of the
Norteno Criminal Street Gang.” In addition to bringing a knife onto one
school campus, the probation department also noted L.C.’s “behavioral
issues” at his new school that can be considered gang related, including
bullying, fighting, and drawing gang symbols on a “classroom whiteboard and
another student’s artwork.”
Moreover, the probation department affirmed L.C. had tattoos
“symbolizing allegiance with the criminal street gang” and was “concerned
with [L.C.’s] gang involvement.” The probation department assessed L.C. to
have a high risk of re-offense because of factors including: “criminal
disapproved on other grounds in In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 962,
fn. 2, 983, fn. 13.)
15
associates, antisocial personality, and antisocial behavior.” The probation
department also represented that L.C.’s brother is a “known gang member.”
These circumstances are in stark contrast with Edward B., where the
only “evidence” purportedly connecting the involved minor to a gang was his
father’s statement that one of his son’s friends, “ ‘whom he believes his son,
no longer associates with, has some involvement with a criminal street
gang.’ ” (Edward B., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1234.) Conversely, here, as
stated, there is plentiful evidence of L.C.’s gang association and risk of future
gang involvement; the gang conditions imposed are therefore appropriately
tailored to his future criminality. (See id. at p. 1236; Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d
at p. 486.)
L.C.’s suggestion that the record must show he was “gang-affiliated at
the time of the offense” is not the standard for a reasonable connection
between a condition and future criminality. (Italics added.) (Ricardo P.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) Indeed, our Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that Lent’s third prong requires “ ‘a nexus between the probation
condition and the defendant’s underlying offense or prior offenses.’ ” (Ricardo
P., at p. 1122.) The “conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the
offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime” as long as
they are “reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality.”
(People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 404–405.) “[C]ourts may properly
base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises
concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (Ricardo P.,
at p. 1122). Thus, “even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the
crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not
itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably
related to preventing future criminality.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
16
p. 380.) Where, as here, the imposition of gang conditions related to the
underlying offenses and to preventing future criminality, their imposition
was not error.12 (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
12 Because we find no error, we need not address L.C.’s single,
unsupported assertion that the “imposition of gang conditions of juvenile
probation is not harmless.” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 435 fn. 13
[the court need not address arguments where the court’s conclusion on
another issue is dispositive].)
17
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
MILLER, J.
In re L.C. (A173033)
18
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