CourtListener 10813728•People v. Miranda CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Miranda CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B342326
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF03185)
v.
MICHAEL MIRANDA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
Defendant and appellant Michael Miranda challenges the
trial court’s denial of his motion under Penal Code section
1538.51 to suppress evidence recovered when police officers
detained him and found drugs and an unregistered handgun in
his car. After the court denied his suppression motion, Miranda
pleaded no contest to one count of carrying a concealed firearm in
a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)), and the court sentenced him to
the low term of 16 months (§ 1170, subd. (h)(1)) in jail.
Miranda contends the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain him and asks that we reverse the denial of his
suppression motion. We disagree. The officers detained Miranda
after they observed him in the driver’s seat of his parked car,
along with one other person sitting in the back rear seat. One of
the officers testified that in his experience, when (1) this
configuration of driver and passenger occurs (2) at night in an
area known for drug transactions (3) with a driver who is not
engaged in ride-sharing, all of which facts were present, it is
indicative of an illegal drug sale. The officer’s testimony showed
he acted on “an objective circumstance justifying the detention,”
(People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1046 (Flores)), not
merely a hunch.
We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction, but with a
modification to correct an error in the court’s statement about the
minimum amount it could impose as a restitution fine.
1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL SUMMARY RELATED TO MIRANDA’S
SUPPRESSION MOTION
The sole witness at the preliminary hearing was Andres
Martinez, a field training officer with the Los Angeles Police
Department. Martinez had worked as a peace officer for 10 years
and estimated that he had qualified to testify as a narcotics
expert about five times previously.
At around 10:30 p.m. on May 18, 2024, Martinez was
patrolling the area around Westmoreland Avenue and Oakwood
Avenue in Los Angeles, “an area known for drug transactions”
where he had made many arrests in the past for narcotics-related
offenses. Martinez observed two men seated in a parked vehicle,
with one in the driver’s seat and the other in the rear passenger-
side seat. According to Martinez, this seating arrangement is
“indicative of a drug transaction. Typically, drug dealers, what
they do is they like to control their product and their money and
their skills [sic] up front with them. It also prevents robberies
from happening. So they can easily stay in the vehicle, operate
the vehicle, take off if they need to. And that way they have their
buyer in the back, and the buyer doesn’t have access to the rest of
the supply.” In addition, Martinez saw that there was no
insignia or other indicia that the car was a ride-share vehicle.2
Martinez conducted what he called “an investigative stop”
of the vehicle. He pulled up behind the car and turned on the
2 In their appellate brief, the People state that Martinez
“saw smoke emanating from the car.” But Martinez made no
mention of smoke in his testimony at the preliminary hearing,
and the trial court did not rely on the presence of smoke as a
basis for denying the suppression motion.
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red-and-blue lights atop his patrol car. Martinez asked the
driver, whom he identified as Miranda, to roll down his window
and told him that he had stopped him to investigate a potential
narcotics transaction. As he was doing so, Martinez’s partner,
who was standing on the opposite side of the car, said he saw a
clear baggie near the center console containing a crystal-like
substance.
The officers told Miranda and the passenger to get out of
the car. Martinez recovered the baggie. Martinez searched the
vehicle and found a scale, some other drugs, and a loaded
handgun. Martinez referred to the gun as “a ghost gun” because
it had no serial number. According to Martinez, such a gun
cannot be registered to an individual.
At the close of the preliminary hearing, Miranda made a
motion under section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence recovered
from the vehicle. The magistrate denied the motion. The
magistrate found that Miranda had been detained because a
reasonable person in Miranda’s position would not feel as if he
were free to leave. But the magistrate concluded that the
detention and subsequent search were reasonable based on
Martinez’s testimony that the specific positioning of the two
people in the car in a neighborhood known for drug sales was
indicative of a narcotics transaction.
Miranda filed a renewed motion to suppress on
September 11, 2024, again arguing that Martinez lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain Miranda. The trial court denied
the motion.
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DISCUSSION
A. The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Detain
Miranda
When a defendant challenges the denial of a motion to
suppress evidence on the ground that it was seized illegally
(§ 1538.5, subd. (a)), we review the trial court’s factual findings
for substantial evidence, but “[w]e independently assess whether
the challenged seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, according
to federal constitutional standards.” (People v. Jackson (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 730, 737.)
A reasonable person in Miranda’s position would not have
“fe[lt] free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business’ ”
(Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [111 S.Ct. 2382, 115
L.Ed.2d 389]), and Miranda was thus detained by Martinez and
his partner. Miranda does not deny that the drugs were in plain
view of Martinez’s partner. This would justify the subsequent
search of the entire vehicle (see People v. Waxler (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 712, 719) but only if the officers were “lawfully
located in a place from which the [contraband could] be plainly
seen.” (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 137 [110 S.Ct.
2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112].) The only question, then, is whether the
initial detention of Miranda was justified.
“ ‘[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a
brief investigative . . . stop when [the officer] has “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.” [Citations.] “Although a
mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of
suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously
less than is necessary for probable cause.” [Citations.] [¶]
5
Because it is a “less demanding” standard, “reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity
or content than that required to establish probable cause.”
[Citation.] The standard “depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.” [Citation.] Courts “cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty . . . where none exists.”
[Citation.] Rather, they must permit officers to make
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1041, quoting
Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380-381 [140 S.Ct. 1183,
206 L.Ed.2d 412].)
Miranda’s argument that his detention was unreasonable
relies primarily on Flores, where our Supreme Court held that
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain an individual who
ducked behind a parked car when he saw officers driving nearby.
“One fair interpretation of the facts is that Flores initially tried to
avoid being seen by the officers. Thereafter, and somewhat
inconsistently, he stood and was in view for several seconds. He
then failed to acknowledge the officers’ approach, and sought to
avoid interacting with them.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1043.)
This behavior alone did not justify the detention. The court
reasoned that a person’s presence in a high-crime area “ ‘standing
alone, . . . is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized
suspicion that the person is committing a crime.’ ” (Flores, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 1045.) This is because “a great many law-abiding
Californians live, work, or otherwise find themselves in areas
where criminal activity is prevalent. Their mere presence there
cannot be said to transform them into suspects. Instead, it is ‘a
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factor that can lend meaning to the person’s behavior.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1044.) Flores’s “acts of ducking out of sight, bending with his
hands by his shoe, and not acknowledging the officers’ presence,
suggest an unwillingness to be observed or interact.” (Id. at
p. 1047.) But this alone, “while noteworthy, does not support a
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in illegal activity.”
(Ibid.)
Miranda argues his case is analogous, and that he and his
passenger did not even duck or seek to avoid interacting with the
police: “They were just sitting in a car” in an area known for
illegal drug sales. But there is an important distinction between
Miranda and Flores. The officer who detained Flores “did not see
[him] engage in any conduct suggesting he was there to buy or
sell drugs or was otherwise involved in illegal conduct,” and did
not “see Flores interact with anyone.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 1045.) In this case, Martinez saw Miranda and his
passenger both seated in a car in a specific position that, in the
officer’s experience, suggested a narcotics transaction.
The court in Flores recognized that “facts that may appear
benign in some contexts may reasonably be considered less so in
others. . . . As the high court pointed out in [United States v.
]Cortez[ (1981)] 449 U.S. [411,] 418 [101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d
621], a trained police officer could draw inferences ‘that might
well elude an untrained person.’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 1046.) The court cautioned that, to rely on superficially
innocent conduct as a basis for detention, “the officer must
articulate [his] experience and expertise as an objective
circumstance justifying the detention.” (Ibid.) That is just what
Martinez did here. He not only stated that, in his experience,
drug dealers often have their customers sit in the back seat while
7
they remain in the front, but he explained why they do so: by
maintaining physical separation from their customers, the
dealers reduce the risk of robberies and provide for relatively
easy escape.
What Martinez described was not a hunch, but rather an
objective basis for suspicion tethered to this training and
experience that the trial court could evaluate. Martinez did not
treat Miranda’s presence in a high-crime area as decisive, but
merely as “ ‘a factor that can lend meaning to the person’s
behavior.’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1044.) The lack of
any ride-share insignia on the vehicle reduced the probability of
the most likely innocent explanation of why Miranda’s sole
passenger was sitting in the back seat. In these circumstances,
the trial court did not err in concluding Martinez had reasonable
suspicion to detain Miranda.
B. The Restitution Fine Amount Must Be Corrected
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated “[t]here is
a minimum [fine] of $400 up to $10,000 to the general victim
restitution fund,” and stated, “the court will impose the minimum
of $400 pursuant to . . . section 1202.4[, subdivision ](b).” In fact,
the minimum restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision
(b)(1) for a defendant convicted of a felony is $300.
Miranda contends his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to call the court’s attention to this
misstatement. The Attorney General contends a rational defense
attorney could choose not to object to what he characterizes as a
de minimis error. We need not address any issues related to
ineffective assistance of counsel because “we may review an
asserted legal error in sentencing for the first time on appeal”
even if the defendant did not object in the trial court. (People v.
8
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594.) “When sentencing error
does not require additional evidence, further fact finding, or
further exercise of discretion, the appellate court may modify the
judgment appropriately and affirm it as modified.” (People v.
Haskin (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441.)
Although it misspoke when stating the minimum
restitution fine amount, the record is clear that the court meant
to impose the minimum allowable, which is $300 and not $400.
Accordingly, we direct that the abstract of judgment be corrected
to reflect the restitution fine imposed as $300.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with directions
to reduce the restitution fine imposed to $300. The clerk of the
superior court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of
judgment reflecting the restitution fine amount as $300 and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
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