CourtListener 10812468•Edgcomb v. Powers CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/20/26 Edgcomb v. Powers CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JOHN EDGCOMB,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171951
v.
APRIL POWERS, (Marin County
Defendant and Respondent. Super. Ct. No. FL1600953)
In 2018, after 21 years of marriage, John Edgcomb and April Powers
negotiated a marital settlement agreement requiring John to pay $15,000 per
month in spousal support to April, plus capped bonus support.1 After his
income declined in 2023, John filed a request to terminate the spousal
support under Family Code section 4322, or in the alternative to modify the
amount of spousal support under Family Code section 4320.2 April agreed
that John’s diminished income warranted reducing her level of support to
$10,350 per month, but she otherwise opposed John’s request.
1 As is customary in family law cases, we use the parties’ first names
for clarity, not out of disrespect. (In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 830, 832, fn. 1.)
2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family
Code.
The trial court found that John’s drop in income constituted a material
change of circumstances, but it further determined that April’s separate
estate was not sufficient to meet her needs. Accordingly, the court denied
John’s request to terminate spousal support, and it granted his request to
modify the spousal support, lowering it to $10,000 per month. John appealed
both rulings. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
John and April married in October 1993. They had one daughter, who
reached majority in April 2018. John and April enjoyed a high marital
standard of living. John was the primary earner, working as the partner of a
law firm and generally earning seven figures in annual income. April was
the primary caretaker for their daughter, and she worked part-time as a
physical education instructor. In 2014, the last year she worked, April
earned less than $30,000.
John and April separated in May 2015 and subsequently negotiated a
marital settlement agreement. Judgment was entered incorporating the
agreement on March 15, 2018. Each party received $3.2 million in
community property; April’s share included the family residence. The
judgment recognized John’s “base income” as $579,000, and it imputed
$70,000 in income to April. The judgment required John to pay $15,000 per
month in spousal support to April, plus bonus support in the event John’s
annual income exceeded $579,000 up to a cap of $900,000.3
3 The spousal support payments were taxable to April and deductible to
John. The percentage of John’s income payable as bonus support gradually
decreased, starting at 25 percent from 2018 through 2020, dropping to 22
percent from 2021 through 2024, and dropping again to 10 percent in 2025
and beyond.
2
After the parties divorced, April sold the family residence and
purchased a home with a mortgage. John purchased a home with all cash.
In 2023, John’s annual income was $385,000, a decrease of roughly a
third from his $579,000 base income as determined by the judgment. In
October of that year, he filed a Request for Order to Change Spousal Support
(RFO), seeking “termination of the order for spousal support issued on March
15, 2018 or in the alternative, a substantial reduction in the amount of
spousal support.” He asserted two grounds for the requested relief: his
decreased income and April’s ability to support herself at the marital
standard of living due to the growth in the net worth of her assets.
April agreed there was “one changed circumstance . . . John’s ability to
pay spousal support.” But she disputed that the value growth in her asset
portfolio constituted changed circumstances. She represented that her
expenses were about $15,000, excluding her healthcare costs, and therefore
she required $21,000 per month in gross income.4 She calculated that
“[u]sing a 3% return on her invested assets, she could generate investment
income of approximately $5,250 per month.” If she also began taking $1,298
per month from a pension, bringing her gross income to “approximately
$6500,” then she would “still need[] $14,500 per month to meet her needs
unless she [began] drawing down savings and principal.” Thus, she argued
that John was entitled to a reduction—but not a termination—of spousal
support, and she consented to decreasing her spousal support to $10,350 per
month, nearly one-third less than the amount set by the judgment.
4 April’s memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to John’s
RFO stated that her expenses were “$15,085 per month not including
Medicare and gap policy.” In her attached declaration, April stated that her
“monthly expenses [were] $14,894, not including $820 per month for
Medicare plus and a supplemental Blue Shield plan.”
3
In reply, John countered that April’s request for a mere reduction in
spousal support was inappropriate. He contended, inter alia, that her
“demand [was] premised on the false notion that: 1) she should not have to
expend any principle (savings) to pay for the cost of the . . . lifestyle she has
enjoyed since the separation . . .; 2) she need not take full advantage of
prevailing money market interest rates above 5% . . . because she is risk
averse . . . .” Along with his reply briefing, John filed the declaration of his
expert, Natalie McFarlin, who calculated April’s post tax assets and pretax
retirement assets available through 2042 (the end of April’s actuarial life
expectancy at age 84).
The trial court held a hearing on John’s RFO at which it heard John
and April’s testimony, and then the matter was continued. Neither party
requested an evidentiary hearing. But April submitted a memorandum of
points and authorities in rebuttal to McFarlin’s declaration, and McFarlin
submitted an updated declaration. McFarlin’s updated declaration assumed
April’s $14,894 asserted monthly expenses would increase at the same rate as
inflation over the past 20 years. McFarlin found that April’s post tax assets
were $2,430,719 and her pretax retirement assets were $839,411, and
McFarlin assumed a 5% rate of return on those investments. McFarlin also
anticipated that April would receive “social security starting at her
retirement age, 50% of [John’s] social security at his full retirement age
(replacing the amount she previously received under her own benefit), [her]
pension payment . . . and age-based mandatory withdrawals from retirement
accounts.” Based on those findings and assumptions, McFarlin calculated
that April’s cashflow would be negative, starting at a roughly $80,000 deficit
in the near term but growing to roughly a $190,344 deficit in the year 2042.
By withdrawing principal from her assets to make up for her insufficient
4
income, McFarlin determined that April would have post tax assets of
$147,756 and retirement assets of $1,147,233 at age 84. McFarlin separately
projected that the value of April’s home would increase at the same rate as
other homes in her zip code had increased over the past 20 years (11.22%),
resulting in $4,906,488 of home equity at age 84.
At the continued hearing, John requested a statement of decision, and
the court heard counsels’ arguments. The court duly issued a proposed
statement of decision, to which John filed objections.
In its final statement of decision, the trial court found that John’s
reduction in income constituted a material change in circumstances,
authorizing the court to consider John’s RFO. Specifically, the court accepted
that John’s annual income had dropped from $579,000 at the time of
judgment to $385,000 at the time of trial. Based on McFarlin’s findings, as
well as April’s evidence and testimony, the court found April’s post-tax assets
totaled $2,430,719 and her pretax retirement accounts totaled $839,411.
Finding that April “could generate more income from her estate” than she
was, the court also adopted McFarlin’s determination that a reasonable rate
of return on April’s assets was 5%. The court found April’s calculation of her
expenses—$15,7145 per month—to be credible. Thus, in line with McFarlin’s
calculations, the court found that “[e]ven if [April’s] assets were all
reasonably managed, and [April] is able to earn a 5% return on her
assets . . ., and assuming [April] eventually does receive the amounts
attributed to her by [John] from [April’s] pension and social security, [April]
still has a deficiency which would require [April] to invade capital and draw
down principal in order to meet her expenses.”
5 This amount is the aggregate of “$14,894, plus $820 for health
insurance.”
5
The trial court held that it “need not look beyond the actual income
produced from a supported spouse’s assets in cases where those assets are
reasonably managed.” It expounded that April “may be required to invade
principal and draw down on capital, but only to the extent that those assets
would create income if reasonably managed.” The court declined to speculate
that April’s home equity would appreciate over the next 19 years at the
historical rate of the past 20 year period, stating it was premature to do so
and that April was “entitled to remain in her home.” Thus, “[a]fter
computation of [the 5%] imputed rate of return, and even if [April’s] expected
pension and social security income are attributed to [April]” the court found
that April’s separate estate was not sufficient for her proper support and
therefore denied John’s request to terminate spousal support.
Having determined that April still required spousal support to
maintain the marital standard of living, the trial court then applied the
enumerated factors in section 4320 to determine if the spousal support award
should be reduced. In view of those factors, the court modified the spousal
support to $10,000 per month, taxable to April and deductible to John, and
eliminated the bonus spousal support.
John appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
We generally review orders to modify spousal support for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) “In
reviewing findings supporting a trial court’s exercise of discretion in
modifying spousal support, ‘ . . . this court must accept as true all evidence
tending to establish the correctness of the trial judge’s findings, resolving all
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and indulging in all
6
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 71, 82, fn. 5 (Stephenson).) A
trial court’s failure to base findings on substantial evidence constitutes an
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47.)
“However, where the appeal raises a question regarding the proper
interpretation of a statute, or the proper application of the law to uncontested
facts, the standard of review is de novo.” (Left, at p. 1145.)
Before a trial court may consider modifying a prior spousal support
order, it “must first find ‘ “ ‘a material change of circumstances since the last
order.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of T.C. & D.C. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 419, 424
(T.C.).) When a marital settlement agreement governs spousal support, “the
trial court’s changed-circumstances determination must ‘ “ ‘give effect to the
intent and reasonable expectations of the parties as expressed in the
agreement.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The moving party bears the burden of establishing a
material change of circumstances . . . .” (Stephenson, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th
at p. 77.)
Where there is a material change in circumstances in view of the
parties’ reasonable expectations, the trial court has broad discretion to decide
whether to modify a spousal support order. (In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 921, 928 (Terry).) In exercising this discretion, the court must
consider and apply the factors set out in section 4320.6 (Ibid.; see In re
6 These criteria include: (1) “[t]he extent to which the earning capacity
of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established
during the marriage”; (2) “[t]he extent to which the supported party
contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a
license by the supporting party”; (3) “[t]he ability of the supporting party to
pay spousal support”; (4) “[t]he needs of each party based on the standard of
living established during the marriage”; (5) “[t]he obligations and assets,
including the separate property, of each party”; (6) “[t]he duration of the
7
Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1273.) While each factor
must be applied, the court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight
to accord to each. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Morton
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049.) Independent of the section 4320 factors,
however, section 4322 mandates that the trial court terminate spousal
support in a modification proceeding “where there are no children” if the
supported spouse has “acquire[d] a separate estate, including income from
employment, sufficient for the party’s proper support.” (See Terry, supra, 80
Cal.App.4th at p. 928.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying John’s Request to
Terminate Spousal Support Under Section 4322
At the threshold, John contends that the trial court was authorized to
consider whether to terminate support under section 4322 (in addition to
conducting its section 4320 analysis) because the court found there was a
material change of circumstances concerning his ability to pay. April
disagrees, arguing that changes of circumstance material to section 4322
analysis are the supported spouse’s acquisition of a separate estate, the
growth of the supported party’s existing separate estate, or a material
decrease in the supported party’s needs. Because the court did not find, and
John did not present evidence showing that her assets had materially
marriage”; (7) “[t]he ability of the supported party to engage in gainful
employment”; (8) “[t]he age and health of the parties”; (9) “[a]ll documented
evidence of any history of domestic violence . . . between the parties or
perpetrated by either party against either party's child”; (10) “[t]he
immediate and specific tax consequences to each party”; (11) “[t]he balance of
the hardships to each party”; (12) “[t]he goal that the supported party shall
be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time”; (13) “[t]he criminal
conviction of an abusive spouse”; and (14) “[a]ny other factors the court
determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320, subds. (a)–(n).)
8
changed in a way not anticipated by the parties’ marital settlement
agreement, April asserts the court’s section 4322 decision must be affirmed.
We are skeptical of John’s position. The purpose of the changed
circumstance prerequisite under section 4322 is to bar collateral attacks on a
prior final order and provide legal protection to marital settlement
agreements, thereby providing litigants with greater certainty. (In re
Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479; In re
Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480.) Establishing a material
change of circumstance on one ground and then attacking the final order on
another, circumvents that purpose. But we need not resolve this legal
question because John’s argument fails on the merits. (Cf. In re Marriage of
Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 956 [“Although the trial court may not
modify spousal support without proof of a change in circumstances, the
converse is not true”].)
John argues that the trial court erred in assessing April’s separate
estate by failing to consider April’s “present and future” social security
income and pension income, April’s “investment and retirement account
balances,” income from April’s retirement account, or April’s home equity. He
further urges this court to conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
evaluation of April’s “separate estate.” While the statutory definition of
“separate estate” is a legal question we review de novo,7 the record refutes
7 Under the instant circumstances, we agree with John (and April does
not dispute) that April’s “separate estate” pursuant to section 4322 must
include all of her assets and income. (See Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
p. 930; but cf. In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926, 1934
[community property transferred to wife during pendency of divorce to offset
community funds spent by husband was not part of wife’s “separate estate”
for purposes of section 4322 and continued to be characterized as community
property until the final property division].)
9
John’s contention that the court did not consider all of April’s assets and
income.
The trial court expressly restated McFarlin’s determination that April
had $2,430,719 in post-tax assets and $839,411 in a pretax retirement
account, and it found those figures were “confirmed” by April. The court
agreed with McFarlin that April “could reasonably earn a 5% return on her
investments and cash assets, or $121,536 in 2024.” The court also walked
through McFarlin’s calculations and projections of April’s income, including
“the monthly social security payments . . . which Ms. McFarlin anticipates
[April] will receive” as well as “the monthly . . . pension payments which
McFarlin anticipates [April] will receive in the future . . . .” The court
acknowledged the parties’ agreement that $70,000 in income would be
imputed to April. And the court further noted McFarlin’s “predictions”
regarding April’s home equity. Thus, contrary to John’s contention, the trial
court assessed April’s “separate estate” under section 4322 by taking stock of
all of April’s assets and potential income streams.
Nonetheless, as evidence the trial court did not consider all of April’s
assets, John points to the court’s statement that it was “premature” to
consider April’s pension and social security payments. But rather than
reveal that the court did not consider those expected payments as part of
April’s separate estate, the passage referenced illustrates that the court
found those future payments were insufficient to provide “proper support” at
present. (See In re Marriage of Swain, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 836 [“a
modification order must be ‘based on current facts and circumstances’ ”].)
Moreover, the court went on to state that “even assuming [April] eventually
does receive the amount attributed to her by [John] from [her pension] and
social security, [April] would still have a [cash flow] deficiency . . . .”
10
The trial court’s discussion of April’s other assets shows that it properly
took account of April’s separate estate, but it did not share John’s view that
they were sufficient or appropriate to meet April’s needs. For example, after
acknowledging April had equity in her home, the court declined to require
her to invade her home equity to meet her needs. Also, the court’s calculation
that April’s investments and cash would yield $121,536 in 2024 was based
solely on April’s post-tax assets. But this does not mean it did not consider
April’s pre-tax retirement account in assessing April’s separate estate.
Echoing McFarlin’s declaration, the court found that April would suffer a
$190,344 shortfall in income in 2042. McFarlin reached that conclusion
despite assuming April would start making mandatory withdrawals from her
pre-tax retirement account in 2030. Thus, it is reasonable to infer the court
considered the pre-tax account in assessing April’s estate in totality but
adopted McFarlin’s assumptions and projections. (Stephenson, supra, 39
Cal.App.4th at p. 82, fn. 5.)
It appears that John’s fundamental objection is to the trial court’s
refusal to find that April’s separate estate could provide for her proper
support by “draw[ing] down on her investment and retirement principal as
needed to cover any budget deficits.” He contends that this court’s divided
opinion in Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 921 illustrates that the trial court did
not properly assess all of April’s assets or consider how those assets were
sufficient for April’s proper support. We disagree, and we conclude that the
court correctly understood and properly applied section 4322. (Terry, at
p. 929 [while the trial court’s finding of the amount that constitutes proper
support is a question of fact, the determination whether a separate estate is
sufficient to provide proper support is reviewed de novo].)
11
In Terry, the issue was whether the wife’s separate estate—in view of
its appreciation over time—was reasonably capable of generating income
necessary for the wife’s proper support. (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
p. 928.) To answer that question, the majority first clarified that “the section
4322 concept of a ‘separate estate’ is not limited to the income actually and
presently produced by the estate.” (Id. at pp. 929–930, italics added.) The
majority explained that when evaluating the separate estate, courts need not
“look beyond the actual income produced from a supported spouse’s assets in
cases where those assets are reasonably managed.” (Id. at p. 930, italics
added.) It expounded: “Again, the ultimate section 4322 determination is
whether a particular estate is, or is not, reasonably capable of providing for a
spouse’s proper support. That determination will vary with the nature of the
particular estate. Where, as here, the supporting spouse challenges the
reasonableness of the supported spouse’s investment strategy, the court
should look to the estate as a whole, including the actual and reasonable
income potential from investment assets, as well as their total value, in
resolving the issue of the estate’s sufficiency for proper support.” (Ibid.)
Turning to the question before it, the majority discussed how the wife
had pursued an investment strategy that grew her investment portfolio from
about $2 million to over $3.5 million in just 40 months, “[y]et the estimated
annual income from the . . . account was $95,130, for a lower yield of
approximately 2.7 percent.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) In view
of her other assets and income, the wife’s overall yield was “approximately
2.8%.” (Ibid.) The court further noted that the wife “could . . . draw on [her
retirement] account without penalty.” (Ibid.) Given that the upper end of the
wife’s expenses was “$144,000 per year, net of taxes,” the majority rejected
the trial court’s determination that the wife’s estate was not sufficient to
12
meet her needs because she could reasonably shift her investment strategy to
generate more income or draw upon her retirement account. (Id. at pp. 931–
932.) In other words, because the wife’s assets, if reasonably managed, could
reasonably produce income sufficient to support her proper needs, her estate
met the “legal standard of sufficiency” and section 4322 applied. (Id. at
p. 932.) The majority concluded “[i]t is time for [the wife] to either generate
more income or otherwise resort to a negligible portion of her growing capital
to meet her needs.” (Ibid.)
Contrary to John’s assertion, the majority opinion in Terry did not
“[e]xpress[] frustration with the trial court’s refusal to consider all the assets
available to [the wife].” Rather, it rebuked the trial court for “persist[ing] in
its reticence to do anything that might prompt [the wife] to change her
investment strategy, draw down on the retirement account or liquidate or
leverage any of her substantial assets.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
p. 932.) The majority spelled out that “[t]he trial court’s job is to ascertain
whether the estate reasonably could generate sufficient income for proper
support,” and, having done so, it was up to the spouse to make her own
financial decisions. (Ibid., italics added.) John is therefore mistaken in
asserting that there is an inconsistency in the majority’s conclusion that “the
separate estate is not synonymous with income” and its statement that courts
need not “look beyond the actual income produced from the supported
spouse’s assets in cases where those assets are reasonably managed.” (Id. at
p. 930.)
Terry does not stand for the proposition that a supported spouse is
required to invade the principal of his or her assets before he or she may
qualify for support. Nor does it stand for the proposition that a separate
estate is sufficient, as a matter of law, to generate proper support if the value
13
of the estate’s assets divided by the supported spouse’s expected number of
remaining years renders enough capital to meet that spouse’s annual
expenses within the expected life span of the supported spouse. Nor does
Justice Sepulveda’s dissent assert that the majority’s opinion stands for
either proposition. Instead, she described the majority opinion as creating a
two-step approach: first, a trial court must aggregate the value of a
supported spouse’s assets;8 second, the court must “look to the ‘totality of the
facts’ to determine whether the estate is sufficient to provide for his or her
proper support.”9 (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at pp. 942–943 (dis. opn. of
Sepulveda, J.).)
The instant order demonstrates that the trial court properly
understood Terry. The court found that April’s estate as a whole, including
her actual and reasonable income potential, could generate more income from
her investments if they were reallocated. But even based on a reasonable 5%
rate of return on her investments, and expected pension and social security
income, the court found April’s separate estate still did not generate
sufficient income to provide proper support. The court acknowledged that a
8 Regarding this first step in a section 4322 inquiry, Justice Sepulveda
was critical of the majority’s holding that “assets acquired through the final
division of community property should be considered in assessing the
sufficiency of the estate for proper support.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at
p. 931 (maj. opn.); id. at p. 942 (dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).) The majority’s
approach to aggregating separate and community property is not at issue
here. (See ante, fn. 7.)
9 Justice Sepulveda was also critical of the second step, asserting that
“California courts do look only to actual income produced from the supported
spouse’s assets,” as opposed to potential income from the reallocation of
“ ‘nonincome producing property.’ ” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 944
(dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).) She further asserted that “the majority stop[ped]
short of announcing a clear rule as to how the trial court should analyze the
‘totality of the facts’ before it.” (Id. at p. 945.)
14
“[supported spouse] may be required to invade principal and draw down on
capital, but only to the extent that those assets would create income if
reasonably managed.” Again, John is mistaken that the court contradicted
itself by also articulating the corollary rule—i.e., “once the court
determines . . . that [supported spouse’s] investments are reasonably
managed and producing a reasonable income, then the court need not require
a supported spouse to invade capital and principal.”
We find no error in the trial court’s factual findings about April’s
proper needs, her assets and income, or the realistic rate of return if her
assets were reasonably managed. Substantial evidence—notably, the
calculations and projections of John’s expert, McFarlin—supports those
findings. Because the court found there is a yawning gap between April’s
income—assuming April reasonably manages her assets and assuming she
collects the pension and social security payments anticipated by McFarlin—
and April’s expenses, we conclude her separate estate is not legally sufficient
to provide for her proper needs. Accordingly, section 4322 does not apply.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Erroneously Omit Income in Its
Section 4320 Analysis
John argues the trial court improperly omitted $56,803 of April’s 2024
income—$14,832 in social security income and $41,971 in income from her
pre-tax retirement account—from its section 4320 analysis and “offer[ed] no
reason” for doing so. John is incorrect, and he misreads his own expert’s
calculations concerning April’s preretirement account’s returns.
April was not receiving income from social security payments at the
time of the hearing. John argued that “April [would be] entitled to start
drawing a monthly benefit of $1,236 at age 66.”10 However, McFarlin
10 John’s assertion that the trial court omitted $14,832 of April’s income
in 2024 is based on this monthly amount.
15
asserted that April would be entitled to $1,293 in monthly social security
payments when she reached “full retirement age on September 8, 2024,”
which sums up to $5,172 for all of 2024.
As the trial court explained, “[a] modification order must be based on
current facts and circumstances.” (See In re Marriage of Swain, supra, 21
Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) The order was “made without prejudice to [John’s]
right to request modification in the future.” In any event, the court found
that the “anticipated amounts” of April’s social security income based on
McFarlin’s computations from 2024 to 2042 were insufficient to close the gap
and meet April’s proper needs. There was substantial evidence in support of
this finding. And considering April would still have suffered a large shortfall
in 2024 even if she began drawing benefits in January of that year,11 we
perceive no abuse of discretion by the court in adopting McFarlin’s
assumption and permitting April to wait to reach full retirement age before
drawing benefits.
The trial court did not omit income from April’s pre-tax retirement
account either. John is confused. McFarlin did not calculate that “April
would earn $41,971 of income on her retirement account in 2024.” (Italics
added.) Nor did McFarlin include the returns on April’s pre-tax retirement
account as a component of April’s income. Instead, McFarlin included the
mandatory withdrawal amounts starting in 2030 as a component of April’s
income. John appears to conflate an investment’s rate of return (i.e., capital
growth) and its yield (i.e., income), suggesting a mathematical impossibility
that April could withdraw 5% from the account every year (not to mention
11 While John asserts April could have narrowed her $80,197 shortfall
by drawing $14,832 in social security benefits, McFarlin’s computation
included $5,172 of social security benefits. Thus, taking these numbers at
face value, April would still be over $70,000 shy of her needs.
16
additional mandatory withdrawals) and still have the account grow due to a
5% annual rate of return.
Using an assumed 5% return on capital, McFarlin calculated that the
account’s value would grow by $285,480 in the 6 years from 2024 through
2029 (i.e., from $839,411 to $1,124,891). Assuming the same return on
capital but also assuming April would begin making mandatory withdrawals
in 2030, McFarlin calculated the account’s value would grow by only $62,347
over the next 7 years from 2029 to 2036 (i.e., from $1,124,891 to $1,187,238)
before slowly falling by $40,005 over the next 6 years. None of McFarlin’s
arithmetic works if April also withdrew 5% from the account starting in 2024.
John fails to show that the trial court erred in its section 4320 analysis.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. April is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of the Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
17
_________________________
Moorman, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Brown, P. J.
_________________________
Streeter, J.
Edgcomb v. Powers/A171951
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
18
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