People v. Pusok CA4/2

CourtListener 10812455Calctapp20.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Pusok CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084050

v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI23003014)

FRANCIS JARED PUSOK, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Debra Harris,

Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part with directions.

Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,

Daniel Rogers, and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Francis Pusok violently assaulted a gas station clerk after

the clerk told him to stop harassing two women. Defendant then led a responding

sheriff’s deputy on a high-speed car chase. During that chase, defendant drove in the

wrong lane and nearly crashed headfirst into another responding deputy’s car driving in

the opposite direction. The chase ended with Pusok crashing. When being transported

by an ambulance, Pusok kicked one of the responding deputies in the knee.
1
A jury convicted defendant of (1) battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d); count 1),

(2) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c); count 2), (3)

possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3), (4) evading an officer

against traffic (Veh. Code § 2800.4; count 4), and (5) assault by means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury (GBI) (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5). As to count 5, the jury

also found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted GBI (§ 12022.7, subd.

(a)). The trial court found that defendant had two prior serious-felony strike convictions

and sentenced him to five years, four months, plus 60 years to life.

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
Defendant contends (1) the trial court gave the jury an erroneous definition of GBI

and the prosecutor erroneously defined GBI in closing argument, (2) the trial court

improperly precluded defendant from cross-examining two sheriff’s deputies about a

2015 incident involving defendant and sheriff’s deputies and, in turn, improperly denied

his motion for a new trial based on that ruling, (3) the trial court erroneously declined to

strike one or more of his prior convictions, (4) his sentence is cruel and unusual, and (5)

the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.

Defendant also asks that we independently review police personnel records (see Pitchess

v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)).

As we explain below, we conclude the trial court and the prosecutor both used a

correct definition of GBI. We conclude, however, that the trial court prejudicially

violated the Confrontation Clause (U.S. const., amend. VI) by overly restricting

defendant’s cross-examination of two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only

prosecution evidence presented on counts 2 and 4. We therefore reverse defendant’s

convictions on those counts and remand for further proceedings, which moots defendant’s

claims of sentencing errors. And although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots

defendant’s Pitchess request, we exercise our discretion to address the issue and find that

the trial court should have ordered the production of two civilian complaints. Given this

disposition, we need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is

incorrect, since the trial court must enter a new judgment on remand.

3
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around 1:00 a.m., defendant approached two women sitting in a car at a gas pump

and asked them if they wanted to buy a phone, AirPods, or alcohol. After the women said

no, defendant threw the AirPods on the hood of the car, shoved the phone through a crack

in the car’s window, and then climbed on the hood of the car.

The gas station clerk came outside and asked the women if they knew defendant or

if he was bothering them. The women said they did not know him, so the clerk asked

him to leave. Defendant and the clerk began yelling at each other, so the clerk said he

was going to call the police and turned to go back inside.

Defendant then ran at the clerk, jumped on him, and knocked him down.

Defendant then straddled the clerk and punched him in the face about 15 times. The clerk

was eventually able to run inside and close the door behind him, but defendant ran to the

double doors and began pulling on them as the clerk held them shut. Defendant then ran

to his car and drove off, and the clerk called 911.

After a San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy responded to the scene, defendant

returned. Defendant drove past the deputy, did a U-turn, and sped off. The deputy turned

on his lights and pursued defendant.

Defendant then led the deputy on a high-speed chase during which defendant

exceeded the speed limit, drove through stop signs, drove in the wrong lane, turned off

his headlights, and drove across multiple lanes of traffic.

4
At one point, a second San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy with lights

activated drove toward defendant from the opposite direction. Defendant was driving

toward the deputy in the wrong lane. As they approached each other, defendant did not

move over to the correct lane, which forced the deputy to move after nearly colliding into

defendant.

Later, defendant briefly stopped at an intersection, so the two deputies stopped and

waited for him. Defendant then accelerated at the deputies. They moved out of the way

and resumed chasing defendant. Defendant eventually lost control of his car, crashed,

and his car rolled over to a stop.

The deputies arrested defendant and found a gun underneath his car. They

summoned medical care for defendant, and one of the deputies rode in the ambulance

with defendant to the hospital. During that ride, defendant became violent and kicked the

deputy in the knee.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends (1) the trial court gave the jury an erroneous definition of GBI

and the prosecutor erroneously defined GBI in closing argument, (2) the trial court

improperly precluded defendant from cross-examining two sheriff’s deputies about a

2015 incident involving defendant and sheriff’s deputies and, in turn, improperly denied

his motion for a new trial based on that ruling, (3) the trial court erroneously declined to

strike one or more of his prior convictions, (4) his sentence is cruel and unusual, and (5)

5
the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.

Defendant also asks that we independently review police personnel records (see Pitches,

supra, 11 Cal.3d 531).

As we explain below, we conclude the trial court and the prosecutor both used a

correct definition of GBI. We conclude, however, that the trial court prejudicially

violated the Confrontation Clause by overly restricting defendant’s cross-examination of

two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only prosecution evidence presented on

counts 2 and 4. We therefore reverse defendant’s convictions on those counts and remand

for further proceedings, which moots defendant’s claims of sentencing errors. And

although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots defendant’s Pitchess request, we

exercise our discretion to address the issue and find no error. Given this disposition, we

need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is incorrect, since the

trial court must enter a new judgment on remand.

A. Instructional Error

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 80 and 875, which

explained that GBI “means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is

greater than minor or moderate harm.”

The prosecutor argued during closing argument: “Great bodily injury means that

there is a significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than

minor or moderate harm. [¶] Not to be repetit[ous] here, however, [the clerk] again

testifies that he separated or dislocated his shoulder, which he had to reset. He has

6
memory loss issues. And he’s got significant bruising. All that qualifies. Therefore, the

special allegation for great bodily injury is true. [¶] Therefore, based on [c]ount 5 the

defendant is guilty of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and the

associated great bodily injury itself.”

“A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo . . . . In reviewing a claim of

instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that

the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the

Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable

likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’” (People v.

Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)

Defendant contends the instruction improperly allowed the jury to find that GBI is

an injury that is greater than minor but not greater than moderate. Like several other

courts, we reject this argument. (People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 881,

902-904; People v. Sandoval (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 357, 360-362; People v. Quinonez

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 461-466.) For the reasons outlined in these opinions, the

definition of GBI the trial court here used was correct and clear. “‘Injury that is greater

than minor or moderate harm’ cannot reasonably be read to mean injury that is more than

minor but less than moderate. Such an interpretation simply does not make sense, legally

or grammatically, particularly when the phrase is preceded by the explanation that great

bodily injury means physical injury that is ‘significant or substantial.’” (People v.

7
Sandoval, supra, at p. 361.) We thus conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury.

And because the prosecutor used the same proper definition of GBI in closing, the

prosecutor did not misstate the law.

B. Evidence of 2015 Incident

1. Background

In 2015, San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputies arrested defendant for

reportedly stealing a horse. The incident was captured by a media helicopter and

captured several deputies apparently punching and kicking defendant while he appeared

to be surrendering. Three of the deputies involved in the arrest were charged with felony

charges for assaulting defendant. After the jury deadlocked on those charges, they were

dismissed as part of a plea deal. The deputies then pled no contest to misdemeanor

charges of disturbing the peace. Defendant received a $650,000 settlement from San

Bernardino County for the incident.

The only two witnesses for count 2 (assault on a police officer) and count 4

(evading an officer against traffic) were San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputies G.

Dominguez and J. Kabluyen. Defendant thus sought to introduce evidence of the 2015

incident to show that the deputies were biased against him and thus undermine their

credibility.

During voir dire, however, the trial court precluded the parties from asking

prospective jurors about the 2015 incident. Instead, they could ask only if anyone was

familiar with defendant.

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At several points during the trial, the trial court precluded defendant from asking

about the deputies’ knowledge of defendant. One of the women from the gas station,

Jeanene Snyder, testified on direct that a deputy brought her to where defendant crashed

his vehicle and provided her statement there. On cross-examination, defense counsel

asked, “And isn’t it true that you asked the deputies if you could take photographs of the

crash?” The prosecutor objected, and the court held a sidebar. Defense counsel

explained the question was relevant to establish the deputies’ bias because an unidentified

deputy told Snyder that she could not take a picture of the crash, but told her who
2
defendant was and that she could “Google him to watch the video.” The trial court then

sustained the prosecutor’s objection, ruling that defense counsel had to first ask the

deputy about his statement.

During Deputy Dominguez’s cross-examination, he stated that he was “familiar

with who [defendant] is generally,” and that he knew of a “prior incident between

[defendant] and the sheriff’s department in 2015.” The prosecutor objected, and the court

held a sidebar. After defense counsel explained the questioning was to probe Deputy

Dominguez’s “bias, motive to lie,” the trial court ruled that defense counsel could ask

“‘Do you have a bias,’” reasoning that “anything else is not relevant because he said, ‘I

know of him.’” Defense counsel said he would ask that question, and the trial court

reiterated: “So just ask him, ‘Based on your knowledge of who [defendant] was, do you

have a bias in your testimony?’” Defense counsel accordingly asked that question, and

2
The record is unclear as to which deputy told this to Snyder.

9
Dominguez replied, “No.” Defense counsel then asked, “[B]ased on your knowledge of

who [defendant] is, do you have a motive to lie?” Dominguez replied, “No.”

The trial court later revisited its ruling on its own. The court explained: “If

defense got permission to bring up that bias when the officers said, no, I’m not bias[ed],

there’s nothing to be gained than opening the door for the People to use that information

for motive. Specifically motive, why would a person drive a car directly into another

oncoming vehicle? Why would an individual want to be armed? Because that’s an

allegation. The firearm was there for him to use it.” The court noted that a jury

instruction explained that motive was not required, but could be used if the jury found

one. But to “keep everything clean,” the court again found that evidence of the 2015

incident was “not relevant.” Defense counsel confirmed whether this ruling applied to

both deputies, and the court confirmed that it did. The court explained that defense

counsel could ask, “[D]id you know of him, or, if you had prior knowledge, that prior

knowledge, did it cause you to have any knowledge into whatever.”

Later, when cross-examining Deputy Kabluyen, defendant asked, “are you

generally familiar with [defendant]?” Deputy Kabluyen responded that he was “familiar

with who he is” and had “heard the name” before “this incident.” Defendant then asked,

“[D]o you have a motive or bias against [defendant] that would cause you to lie about

him?” The deputy said that he did not.

The trial court’s ruling limiting cross-examination of the deputies was one of

several grounds for defendant’s motion for new trial after his conviction. Defendant

10
argued the ruling improperly precluded him from cross-examining the deputies about

their bias against him. Defendant argued the deputies had significantly different versions

of the pursuit and arrest of defendant, and Deputy Kabluyen’s trial testimony differed

from his preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant thus argued that, by excluding

evidence of the 2015 incident, he was prevented from effectively presenting “an essential

part” of his defense, which was that the deputies “were lying about him because of his

past.”

Defendant noted there was evidence showing that the deputies knew who he was.

“First, a deputy rewarded Ms. Snyder for giving a statement by telling her who

[defendant] was. The deputy wanted to ‘give [her] one thing for [her] efforts,’ told her

[defendant’s] name, to [G]oogle him, and to watch the video of [defendant] being beaten

by San Bernardino County [s]heriff’s deputies in 2015. Second, Deputy Kabluyen on his

audio can be heard talking to another individual, presumably law enforcement associated

with the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department, about [defendant] declining

medical treatment but then needing to be taken back. The other person said, ‘so when he

does it again,’ which can reasonably be associated with suing the department, and Deputy

Kabluyen says, ‘I said the same thing.’”

At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel emphasized that evidence of the

2015 incident was relevant to prove that the deputies were biased against defendant and

that it should have been admitted to allow the jury to assess their credibility. The trial

11
court denied the motion, finding that defendant had a sufficient opportunity to attack the

deputies’ credibility by asking them if they knew defendant and were biased against him.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. (People v.

Royal (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 121, 149.) But they have a right only to “reasonable cross-

examination.” (Olden v. Kentucky (1988) 488 U.S. 227, 231.) Trial courts therefore have

“wide discretion in determining the appropriate scope of cross-examination.” (People v.

Royal, supra, at p. 149; People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 406.)

Although trial courts may reasonably limit a defendant’s cross-examination of a

witness’s bias, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause restricts the court’s

discretion. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455-456.) “[A] criminal defendant

states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from

engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical

form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the

witness.’” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 (Van Arsdall).) Put

another way, the trial court’s restrictions on a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness

for bias does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant shows that “[a]

reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression” of the witness

had the defendant been “permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.”

(Ibid.; accord, People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623; see also People v.

12
Castaneda-Price (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282 (Castaneda-Price).) However,

excluding “evidence of marginal impeachment value” generally does not violate the

Confrontation Clause. (People v. Pearson, supra, at p. 455.)

Thus, the threshold question is “whether the trial court exercised sound discretion

under state law evidentiary standards in limiting the scope of cross-examination” under

“the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review governing such discretionary

questions.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282.) “If the trial court

excluded ‘evidence of marginal impeachment value’ [citation], or otherwise merely

carried out the routine evidentiary function of controlling the scope of permissible cross-

examination, the answer to this initial evidence question will generally be yes—the trial

court was within its discretion—and the inquiry comes to an end. There was no error,

under either state law or under the Sixth Amendment.” (Ibid.) But when a trial court

“effectively renders cross-examination an exercise in futility, we must proceed to a

second stage of analysis” and ask “whether ‘[a] reasonable jury might have received a

significantly different impression’ of the challenged witness’s credibility if the proposed

line of cross-examination had been permitted.” (Ibid., italics added.)

We review the trial court’s order restricting defendant’s cross-examination of the

deputies for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 765.) We

likewise review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial for an abuse

of discretion. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 957.)

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3. Analysis

We first reject the People’s argument, echoing the trial court, that any questioning

of Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen about the 2015 incident was improper because it

could have opened the door for the prosecution to use the incident as evidence of

defendant’s motive. That tactical decision (which was defendant’s to make) has no

bearing on whether the trial court properly limited defendant’s cross-examination of the

deputies. The issue is whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine

the deputies’ potential bias, not whether that cross-examination might benefit the

prosecution. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 678-679.)

We next address the People’s contention that no Confrontation Clause violation

occurred because defendant could have questioned the deputy who told Snyder to

“Google” defendant “and watch the video” and could have questioned the person on the

radio who “‘said the same thing’” as Deputy Kabluyen and told him they were calling

medical attention for defendant despite his denial “‘so when he does it again.’”

That defendant could have asked other witnesses about the 2015 incident to attack

the deputies’ credibility is beside the point. Defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to

reasonably probe the deputies’ credibility by cross-examining them. (See People v. Smith

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 513 [Confrontation Clause allows “‘appropriate cross-

examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness’”];

People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 623 [“[T]he right of confrontation includes

the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility.”].)

14
The issue here is, again, whether the trial court’s limitation on defendant’s cross-

examination of Dominguez and Kabluyen violated the Confrontation Clause, not whether

defendant had other available means to explore the deputies’ bias beyond cross-

examining them. The People offer no authority that suggests otherwise.

The People next argue no Confrontation Clause violation occurred because

defendant did not “attempt to introduce affirmative evidence of his 2015 arrest” and so

the trial court did not “exclude such evidence.” The People further maintain that the trial

court did not err because “neither of the deputies who testified at this trial appear to have

been at [defendant’s] 2015 arrest,” so “what they heard is inadmissible hearsay.”

To the extent the People argue that the trial court did not err because defendant did

not introduce evidence of the 2015 arrest by other means, we disagree. Again, the issue

is whether the trial court’s limiting defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies violated

the Confrontation Clause.

We likewise disagree with the People’s conclusory, wholly unsupported argument

that the deputies could not have testified about anything to do with defendant’s 2015

arrest since everything would have been inadmissible hearsay. We do not know what

exactly the deputies knew about the incident, how they learned about it, and the extent to

which their testimony about it would be admissible. On this record, it is entirely

speculative that defendant could not establish that the deputies knew of the incident, the

ensuing prosecution of the sheriff’s deputies, and defendant’s settlement without relying

entirely on hearsay.

15
What Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen knew about these things was not “of

marginal impeachment value.” The 2015 incident was so highly publicized that the trial

court “doubt[ed] anybody in this county would not know” about it. The incident resulted

in three sheriff’s deputies—potentially former or current colleagues of Deputies

Dominguez and Kabluyen—being criminally charged with felonies (but pleading to

misdemeanors) for their conduct when arresting defendant. Defendant also received a

$650,000 settlement from the county—the deputies’ employer—because of the charged

deputies’ conduct.

The People argue the trial court properly precluded defendant from asking any

questions about these events because the deputies’ testified that they knew of defendant

and were not biased against him. The People thus claim that exploring the deputies’

specific knowledge of “an unrelated event . . . would not have established an additional

basis for bias.” We disagree. A reasonable jury, knowing that sheriff’s deputies were

prosecuted for assaulting defendant and that he received a large settlement for the

incident, could reasonably find that Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen had a negative

opinion about defendant. That, in turn, could lead a reasonable jury to question the

deputies’ credibility. (See Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1280 [“[F]acts

showing bias are considered so highly probative of credibility . . . .”].) We thus agree

with defendant that evidence of the deputies’ knowledge of the 2015 incident, the ensuing

prosecutions, and defendant’s large settlement could have given the jury “a plausible

16
basis” to find that Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen “harbored animosity or bias

against” him, thereby undermining their credibility.

The testimony of Deputies Dominguez and Kabluyen was effectively the only

evidence presented on the assault on an officer and felony evading charges (counts 2 & 4)
3
since they were the only witnesses to those offenses. Evidence about the deputies’

knowledge of the 2015 incident was thus not of marginal impeachment value, nor was it
4
“not relevant,” as the trial court incorrectly concluded. (See United States v. Abel (1984)

469 U.S. 45, 52 [“Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of

fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which

might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”].) This was the only

evidence that showed the deputies might have been biased against defendant, despite

their denials, and could have influenced the jury’s view of their testimony. (Castaneda-

Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1280 [“[B]ias has traditionally been viewed as

especially powerful.”].) Given that defendant’s guilt on counts 2 and 4 hinged on the

deputies’ testimony, their credibility was a critical issue on those counts. (See Abatti v.

Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 52 [“Impeachment of a witness can make the

difference between acquittal and conviction, especially where credibility is the major

3
Defendant conceded he was guilty of misdemeanor evading.
4
We note that the People do not argue that the trial court properly excluded the
evidence under Evidence Code section 352.

17
issue in a case and evidence at trial will consist of opposing stories presented by the

defense and the prosecution witnesses.”].)

The trial court’s ruling allowed defendant to ask the deputies only whether they

knew defendant and whether they were biased against him. When both deputies said they

were not biased against him, defendant could not then probe any potential bias stemming

from the 2015 incident, even though the jury might have reasonably found that the

incident gave the deputies a motive for favoring the prosecution. Defendant effectively

had to accept the deputies’ response at face value and move on with the cross-

examination. In our view, the trial court’s ruling made defendant’s cross-examination of

Deputies’ Dominguez and Kabluyen “an exercise in futility.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra,

94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282; see also Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 679 [“blanket” ruling

“prohibit[ing] all inquiry into” a witness’s potential bias violated Confrontation Clause].)

We therefore turn to the second step of the analysis, which asks “whether ‘[a]

reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression’ of the

challenged witness’s credibility if the proposed line of cross-examination had been

permitted.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282, italics added.) This

requires us to focus “on the witness’s cross-examination rather than the outcome of the

trial as a whole, examining whether the defense had other means of impeachment” of the

witness during cross-examination. (Id. at pp. 1282 & 1282, fn. 9.) We review the issue

de novo. (Ibid.)

18
We conclude that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different

impression of the deputies’ credibility had defendant been allowed to cross-examine them

about their knowledge of the 2015 incident and its aftermath. In Davis, our Supreme

Court held the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by precluding the defendant

from asking a prosecution witness any questions probing whether he was testifying for

the prosecution, and thus biased in favor of the prosecution, to protect his probation

status. (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 317-318.) The Court reasoned: “While

counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to

make a record from which to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or

otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis of

the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that

defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility

of an apparently blameless witness . . . .” (Id. at p. 318, italics added.)

So too here. Defendant was allowed to ask the deputies whether they knew

defendant and whether they were biased against him, but he was not permitted to ask any

further questions as to why they might be biased against him. Defendant thus was not

“permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw

inferences relating to the reliability of the witness[es].” (Davi v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S.

at p. 318.) Without any further context, this two-question line of inquiry could have left

the jury thinking that defendant was baselessly attacking the deputies for being biased

against him. Had defendant cross-examined the deputies about their knowledge of the

19
2015 incident, the resulting prosecution of three sheriff’s deputies, and defendant’s

$650,000 settlement with the county, the jury might have received a significantly

different impression of the deputies’ credibility. By cutting off all questioning about an

event that the jury might reasonably have made the deputies biased in the prosecution’s

favor, the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s right to cross-examine.

Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s Confrontation

Clause right to cross-examine the deputies, we must reverse the convictions on counts 2

and 4 unless the People show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Van
5
Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.) The People have not done so.

The People offer two unpersuasive reasons why the error was harmless. First, they

contend that the deputies’ “[c]andid responses could have added to [their] credibility,”

and note that their previous knowledge of defendant and his involvement with the

sheriff’s department “may have explained a lack of aggressive tactics such as a PIT

maneuver.” But the People cite no evidence in the record showing that the deputies knew

defendant was the driver before or during their pursuit of him. In any event, the fact that

the deputies may have not used “aggressive tactics” during the pursuit because they knew

of defendant does not dispel their potential bias stemming from the 2015 incident, which

may have affected the credibility of their testimony. That is a credibility issue the jury

should have decided.

5
The People incorrectly argue we review the error under the less-stringent state
law standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

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Second, the People reiterate their argument that the trial court’s ruling was proper,

and thus harmless, because the deputies’ testimony about the 2015 incident could have

shown defendant “had a motive for assaulting the deputies.” That may be, but it is also

possible that the jury could have found that the evidence hurt the deputies’ credibility.

Again, this is a credibility issue the jury should have decided.

Van Arsdall held that whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless

“depends upon a host of factors,” but identified five specific factors that are “readily

accessible to reviewing courts”: (1) “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the

prosecution’s case,” (2) “whether the testimony was cumulative,” (3) “the presence or

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on

material points,” (4) “the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,” and (5) “the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684.)

Here, the deputies’ testimony was crucial on counts 2 and 4 since it was effectively

the only prosecution evidence for those counts. For that reason, their testimony was not

cumulative. And there was no evidence, such as dashcam footage, “decisively

corroborat[ing] or contradict[ing]” their account. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94

Cal.App.5th at p. 1293.) The fourth factor “strongly favors” defendant because the 2015

incident was the only grounds defendant had for showing the deputies’ bias against him,

and the trial court effectively only allowed him to ask the deputies whether they were

biased against him. (See Reiner v. Woods (6th Cir. 2020) 955 F.3d 549, 560.) Finally, as

to the fifth factor, “[i]n a case that rested almost entirely on credibility . . . we cannot say

21
the overall strength of the prosecution’s evidence compelled but one conclusion—

[defendant] was guilty [of counts 2 and 4] as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Again, the prosecution submitted no evidence beyond the deputies’ testimony to prove

defendant’s guilt on those counts. (Castaneda-Prado, supra, at p. 1293.)

For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court’s ruling restricting defendant’s

cross-examination of Deputies’ Dominguez and Kabluyen violated the Confrontation

Clause, and that violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore

reverse defendant’s convictions on counts 2 and 4.

C. Pitchess Motion

Before trial, defendant moved for disclosure of the personnel records of Deputies

Dominguez and Kabluyen. Specifically, defendant sought any personnel records about

the officers’ “(1) falsifying police reports or providing false testimony, (2) failure to

follow departmental policy, (3) fabrication of charges, (4) false arrest, (5) disciplinary

records, and (6) dishonesty and improper tactics no matter how catalogued by the

department.” Defendant sought these records to support his argument that the deputies’

testimony was not credible. The trial court reviewed the records in camera and found no

disclosable material.

Although this claim is moot given our reversal of counts 2 and 4, we exercise our

discretion to address it for the sake of judicial economy since it may reoccur if defendant

is retried on those counts. (See People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930,

938; Monty v. Leis (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1372.) We have likewise reviewed the

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records filed under seal in this court, and disagree with the trial court there is no

disclosable material.

A defendant is “entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the

confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of misconduct.” (People v.

Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179.) “If the defendant establishes good cause, the court

must review the requested records in camera to determine what information, if any,

should be disclosed.” (Ibid.) The trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such

information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’”

(People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) Information is relevant, and thus should

be disclosed, if it “will ‘facilitate the ascertainment of the facts’ at trial [citation], that is,

‘all information pertinent to the defense.’” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002)

29 Cal.4th 1, 7 14.) Thus, the trial court’s “duty to disclose encompasses information that

is not itself admissible but which ‘may lead to admissible evidence.’” (People v.

Gaines, supra, at p. 182.) We review the trial court’s ruling on a Pitchess motion for an

abuse of discretion. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220-1221.)

In March 2022, a citizen filed a Civilian Complaint (No. P# 2022-0233) against

Deputy Dominguez and other sheriff’s deputies related to his arrest. The complaint

alleged, among other things, that Deputy Dominguez intentionally “failed to document

his [the complainant’s] injuries in a deputy report” following the complainant’s arrest.

The Sheriff’s department’s Internal Affairs Division investigated the complaint and

23
determined it to be “unfounded” because an officer’s “audio belt recording confirmed

[the complainant] indicated he did not want a Deputy Report taken.”

In November 2021, a citizen filed a Civilian Complaint (No. P# 2021-0272)

against Deputy Kabluyen and other sheriff’s deputies related to the complainant’s son’s

arrest. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Deputy Kabluyen (1) unlawfully

arrested the complainant’s son, (2) coerced him to provide incriminating statements, and

(3) falsified a deputy report. The department’s Internal Affairs Division investigated the

complaint and found these allegations to be “unfounded.”

In our view, these complaints are discoverable because they may lead to

admissible evidence to support defendant’s challenge to the deputies’ credibility. (See

(People v. Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 182; People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88,

101.) As outlined above, the deputies’ credibility was a critical issue given that their

testimony was effectively the only prosecution evidence for counts 2 and 4. The fact that

the complaints were found to be unfounded is immaterial because “unsustained

complaints are discoverable.” (People v. Zamora, supra, at p. 93 fn.1.) This is because

“the burden for preparing a criminal defendant’s case rests with his counsel, not with the

police department. That burden cannot be properly discharged unless counsel has direct

access to potential witnesses, for it is counsel who must decide if they can aid his client,

not the police department's internal affairs division, however sincere and well motivated

the latter may be.” (Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829.)

24
On remand, if the People elect to retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court

is directed to order the sheriff’s department to disclose to defendant (1) the name,

address, and phone number of the complainants who filed Civilian Complaints (No. P#

2022-0233) and (No. P# 2021-0272), (2) the name, address, and phone number of any

witnesses to the incident(s) in question, and (3) the dates of the incidents in question.

(People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1054.) The trial court must then give

defendant a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial on

counts 2 and 4, if any. If the People do not retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, then the

trial court is directed to deny defendant’s Pitchess motion as moot.

D. Remaining Issues
6
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his Romero motion to strike

one or more of his prior serious felony convictions, his sentence is unconstitutional, and

the abstract of judgment is incorrect. Because we reverse his convictions on counts 2 and

4 and remand for further proceedings, these claims of error are moot. (See People v.

Jeter (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218; People v. Hishmeh (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 46,

55.)

6
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. Defendant’s convictions on

counts 2 and 4 are reversed, but his convictions on counts 1, 3, and 5 are affirmed.

Defendant’s sentence is therefore vacated. On remand, if the People do not timely retry

defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court shall resentence him on counts 1, 3, and 5

accordingly. If the People timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court is

directed to disclose the Pitchess records consistent with this opinion and afford defendant

a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

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