CourtListener 10811323•People v. Thomas CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/19/26 P. v. Thomas CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B343235
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA008528)
KEVIN ODELL THOMAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Kevin Odell Thomas (defendant) of special
circumstance murder and second degree robbery, and the trial
court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). Many years later, he requested a People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 hearing to preserve evidence for a future
youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied that
request because defendant is serving an LWOP sentence that
makes him statutorily ineligible for a Franklin hearing. We are
asked to decide whether the governing youth offender parole
statute that makes him ineligible for a Franklin hearing violates
constitutional equal protection or cruel or unusual punishment
guarantees.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Conviction and Sentencing
On the morning of Friday, November 8, 1991, Donald Lee
(Lee), who owned a check cashing business, withdrew $64,000 in
cash from a branch of Wells Fargo Bank located on South
Sepulveda Boulevard in Los Angeles. Moments after Lee left the
bank through its rear door, defendant accosted him. Matters
escalated quickly with both men drawing guns from their
waistbands and opening fire at each other. Lee was hit multiple
times and fell to the ground, fatally wounded. Defendant, also
wounded, grabbed the bag containing most of Lee’s cash and fled
the scene with two accomplices. At the time, defendant was 19
years old.
2
The Los Angeles District Attorney charged defendant by
information with murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and second
degree robbery (§ 211). The information also alleged defendant
committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), personally used a handgun
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and was a principal armed with a handgun
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
A jury found defendant guilty of both crimes and found true
the special circumstance and firearm allegations. The trial court
sentenced defendant to LWOP for the special circumstance first
degree murder, plus five additional years for the personal use
firearm enhancement, and stayed the sentence for the principal-
armed enhancement. The court also stayed a six-year sentence
on the robbery conviction. On direct appeal, a different panel of
this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Thomas (Sept. 28,
1995, B083574) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Defendant’s Franklin Requests
Many years later, in 2019, defendant moved for a Franklin
hearing. The trial court took the matter off calendar after
defendant’s deputy public defender advised that her client was
not eligible for relief under Franklin.2
In March 2023, defendant filed a form motion for a
Franklin hearing and appointment of counsel. In his motion,
defendant argued the exclusion of offenders aged 18 to 25
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
This proceeding involved a different bench officer than the
one whose ruling is the subject of this appeal.
3
sentenced to LWOP from youth offender parole violated his right
to equal protection under the federal and state constitutions and
violated the California Constitution’s ban on cruel or unusual
punishment. Two months later, defendant’s appointed counsel
advised the trial court that defendant was ineligible for relief and
made an oral motion to have the matter taken off calendar, which
the court granted.3
In December 2024,4 defendant filed a handwritten motion
for a Franklin hearing and appointment of counsel. Defendant
argued section 3051’s exclusion of 18-to-25-year-old LWOP
offenders from eligibility for youth offender parole hearings
violates equal protection principles. Defendant contended there
was no rational basis to make 18-to-25-year-old LWOP offenders
ineligible for youth offender parole while 18-to-25-year-old
offenders serving the functional equivalent of LWOP were so
eligible. Although defendant stated in his motion’s preamble that
his request was based on “equal protection an[d] cruel or unusual
punishment principles,” he omitted any discussion of cruel or
unusual punishment principles or their application to him from
his supporting memorandum of points and authorities.
That same day, the trial court summarily denied the
motion. It found that because defendant was 19 years old at the
time of Lee’s murder, “[h]e was not a juvenile offender and
doesn’t qualify for [Franklin] assistance.”
3
This proceeding involved the same judge whose ruling is
the subject of this appeal.
4
Although defendant mailed his motion to the trial court in
mid- November 2024, it was not filed stamped by the superior
court until December 5, 2024.
4
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant makes two equal protection arguments—only
one of which was made below. He argues, as he did in the trial
court, that section 3051 violates equal protection principles by
treating young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP differently
than young adult offenders serving non-LWOP sentences for
murder. As defendant concedes, this argument was rejected by
our Supreme Court in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 and
that holding is binding. Defendant additionally contends section
3051 violates equal protection principles because juvenile
offenders (under 18 years of age) sentenced to LWOP are entitled
to parole hearings while young adult offenders (18 to 25 years
old) are not. This argument is forfeited because it was not raised
in the trial court and it is also unpersuasive because the
distinction drawn by the Legislature has a rational basis.
Defendant additionally contends the exclusion of young
adult offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth parole hearings
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. This argument also
was not made below and it is forfeited. Even putting aside the
forfeiture, numerous appellate courts have upheld LWOP (and de
facto LWOP) sentences for young adults against cruel or unusual
punishment claims, and our Supreme Court has held that even
death sentences are not unconstitutionally disproportionate for a
homicide committed by an offender 18 years old or older.
A. Section 3051
Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to
conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” during the 15th, 20th,
or 25th year of a defendant's incarceration if they were 25 years
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or younger at the time of the “controlling offense,” i.e., “the
offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed
the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subds. (a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4).) The statute excludes several categories of
offenders, however, including those who (like defendant) are
“sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had
attained 18 years of age.” (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Defendants who
are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing may request a
Franklin hearing to develop and preserve evidence of their
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 840.)
B. Defendant’s Equal Protection Arguments Are
Unavailing
The holding in Hardin compels rejection of defendant’s
argument that section 3051 violates equal protection principles
by treating young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP for special
circumstance murder differently than young adult offenders
serving “de facto LWOP” sentences.5 (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at 839 [“When it was considering whether to expand the youth
offender parole system to include not only juvenile offenders but
also certain young adults, the Legislature could rationally
balance the seriousness of the offender’s crimes against the
capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young
adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should
5
The Hardin court stated its holding did not foreclose other
as-applied challenges (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 862, 864), but
defendant presents only a facial challenge to section 3051.
6
remain ineligible for release from prison. Hardin has not
demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining
to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders
convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted
youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other
offenses”].)
Defendant’s second equal protection argument, that section
3051 violates equal protection by treating juvenile and young
adult LWOP offenders differently, is forfeited for failure to raise
it below. (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 [“only
‘claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are
reviewable on appeal’”]; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
886-887 [even constitutional rights are subject to forfeiture];
People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14.) The
argument is also unpersuasive, as various courts before us have
held. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574;
People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204 [“The Legislature
had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the
same sentence (life without parole) based on their age”]; In re
Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 464 [“While section 3051 is
not a sentencing statute per se, it nevertheless impacts the
length of sentence served. We thus believe that in this context,
the line between juveniles and adults remains a rational one”];
People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-197 [“We
conclude defendant’s equal protection challenge to this
classification lacks merit because both the United States
Supreme Court and our high court have repeatedly found the
bright-line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a
rational one when it comes to criminal sentencing”]; People v.
Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780.)
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C. Defendant’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Argument
Is Unavailing
Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution provides
that “[c]ruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or
excessive fines imposed.” A sentence violates the California
Constitution—and the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution’s similar prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment—“when the penalty is ‘grossly disproportionate to
the offense’ [citation] so that it ‘“shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity”’ [citations].”
(People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 378.)
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that
foreclosing young adult offenders over the age of 18 from
obtaining parole consideration (under section 3051) amounts to a
sentence that is constitutionally invalid as cruel or unusual
punishment. This argument was not developed in the trial court
and is forfeited for that reason. (See, e.g., People v. Baker (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [“A claim that a sentence is cruel or
unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not
raised below”].)
Defendant’s argument is also unpersuasive regardless.
Our Supreme Court has rejected “‘the argument that a death
penalty scheme that treats differently those who are 18 years of
age and older, and those younger than 18, violates equal
protection. [Citations.] Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded the United States Constitution draws
precisely this line, prohibiting the death penalty for those
younger than 18 years of age, but not for those 18 years of age
and older.’” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191.) As one
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court has explained, “[i]f the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit a sentence of death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly,
it does not prohibit the lesser LWOP sentence.” (In re Williams
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439, fn. omitted.) Moreover,
numerous appellate decisions have upheld LWOP sentences
imposed on young adults (but not juveniles) against cruel or
unusual punishment challenges. (See, e.g., Sands, supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at 204 [LWOP “does not violate the Eighth
Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the
age of 26”]; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at 781 [Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which held the Eighth Amendment
prohibits sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory term of LWOP,
“applies to juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory LWOP
terms, not 21 year olds”]; Williams, supra, at 438-439 [affirming
LWOP sentence for a 21-year-old]; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1031-1032 [Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit imposing a LWOP sentence on an 18-year-old]; People v.
Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220-1221 [holding LWOP
is constitutional for an 18-year-old defendant].) Absent further
guidance from our Supreme Court, we reach the same result.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
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