People v. Mendoza CA5

CourtListener 10810025Calctapp17.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/17/26 P. v. Mendoza CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F089002
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F24905383)
v.

BENNY MENDOZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Noelle Pebet,
Commissioner.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Paul E. O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
Defendant Benny Mendoza contends on appeal that the no-contact criminal
protective order (CPO) issued by the court on October 22, 2024 must be reversed and, if
necessary, the matter be remanded for further proceedings. The People disagree, and as a
threshold issue, argue defendant forfeited the issue because he failed to object at
sentencing. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On August 23, 2024, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an amended
complaint charging defendant with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,1 § 245,
subd. (a)(2); count 1); misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 2); corporal injury to a fiancé (§ 273.5, subd. (a);
count 3); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 4); and
dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); count 5). As to counts 1 and 3, it was further
alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving
domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). As to all counts, it was further alleged defendant suffered three prior strike
convictions (§§ 667/1170.12) and was released on bail or own recognizance at the time of
the offense (§ 12022.1). The court terminated a no-contact CPO that had been imposed
on August 12, 2024, prohibiting defendant from contacting Jane Doe. It then imposed a
peaceful contact CPO.
On September 6, 2024, defendant pled no contest to count 5, pursuant to a
negotiated plea in exchange for a term of two years in state prison.
On October 22, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to two years on count 5,
pursuant to the plea agreement. The court terminated the peaceful contact CPO imposed
on August 23, 2024. It then imposed a no-contact CPO prohibiting defendant from
contacting Jane. Defendant received 157 days of credit.
On November 26, 2024, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.

2.
FACTUAL SUMMARY2
Shooting Incident
On August 4, 2024, police responded to a report of a gunshot victim. Jane Doe
(Jane), the victim and defendant’s fiancé, had been shot in the stomach while in a motel
room with defendant.
A witness told police that a single gunshot had been fired before Jane left the
motel room, screaming for help and saying, “I got shot.”
Jane refused to tell police who had shot her during repeated interviews.
Later that evening, police apprehended defendant at a park and found a pistol
nearby. Defendant denied shooting Jane.
Jane and defendant had been staying in the motel room together. Upon searching
the room, they found a firearm case, a black BB gun, an expended bullet, 13 live
.40-caliber cartridges, one live .270 cartridge, a small box of ammunition of various
calibers, and two firearm holsters. Security surveillance video recording from the motel
showed defendant leaving the room and walking away after the shot was fired, then
showed Jane stumbling out of the room.
Count 5 (Dissuading a Witness)
On August 6, 2024, defendant called Jane from jail on a recorded call. He told her
to tell the police she would not testify against him and that she accidentally shot herself.
During the call, defendant referred to a CPO he believed had already been imposed and
told Jane to get it removed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
October 22, 2024 oral motion to allow for peaceful contact in the postconviction CPO
because there was no CPO in effect on August 6, 2024, when he attempted to dissuade
Jane, as he and the court both mistakenly believed. The People disagree, and as a

2 The facts underlying the offenses are taken from the probation report.

3.
threshold issue argue defendant forfeited the claim because he failed to object at
sentencing. We agree with the People.
A. Background
August 4, 2024 – Shooting Incident
On August 4, 2024, the shooting incident occurred.
August 6, 2024 – Phone Call from Defendant to Jane Doe
On August 6, 2024, defendant called Jane from jail and referring to what he
believed was an existing CPO, instructed Jane to have it removed.
On August 7, 2024, a complaint was filed.
August 12, 2024 – First No-Contact CPO Issued
On August 12, 2024, the trial court imposed the first CPO, which included full
no-contact terms.
August 23, 2024 – Peaceful Contact CPO Issued
On August 23, 2024, the trial court held a preliminary hearing. Defense counsel
orally moved the court to modify the August 12, 2024 CPO to include peaceful contact
with Jane. The court granted the motion and the August 12, 2024 CPO was terminated.
The court issued a new CPO allowing peaceful contact and defendant was advised of and
acknowledged the new order’s terms as set forth on the record and was served with the
new CPO in open court.
September 6, 2024 – No Contest Plea to Count 5 (Dissuading a Witness)
On September 6, 2024, defendant pled no contest to dissuading a witness
(count 5). The plea agreement did not include a Harvey waiver. (People v. Harvey
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 [consideration of dismissed counts prohibited when sentencing
pursuant to plea bargain].)
October 22, 2024 – Sentencing Hearing and No-Contact CPO
On October 22, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. When discussing
sentencing, the court referred to defendant’s August 6, 2024 call to Jane, stating,
“[T]he jail call [on August 6, 2024,] was most telling because if this had
been anything other than what it was, which is [defendant] shooting this

4.
victim, he wouldn’t have had to say, after I had issued a criminal protective
order, that [‘]I don’t give a fuck about the restraining order. They can kiss
my ass, suck my dick, all that.[’] It clearly shows [defendant] is not a
suitable candidate for probation. [Defendant] goes on to say, [‘L]ook, they
can’t force you to go to court. They can’t force you to do nothing. Don’t
let them tell you to do anything.[’] He goes [on to] continue to tell her not
to come to court, to say it was all an accident, and even when he gives a
statement, he doesn’t know why this is in the jail. This is all the victim and
[the] victim’s fault.”
The trial court stated it intended to impose a three-year CPO.
Defense counsel then stated, “We’re requesting a peaceful contact order. That’s
what’s been in place I think over the last month. So, we’re requesting peaceful contact at
this time. And I believe that’s what the victim, [Jane Doe], is requesting as well.” The
victim advocate agreed, “It is, Your Honor.”
The prosecution submitted on the issue, stating, “The [peaceful contact CPO] has
been what [Jane Doe has] been requesting all along. I don’t have anything to add to
what’s been in the record.”
The probation officer then stated, “Your Honor, in light of the lengthy criminal
history and the circumstances of the offense, we would recommend full no contact.”
The trial court stated, “I agree, considering that [defendant] already violated the
[CPO] while in custody. [⁋] So, in light of that, the Court is going to issue a three year
[no-contact CPO].”
The victim advocate stated, “The victim would appreciate clarification on why
peaceful contact was granted in the first place if it is being revoked now.”
The trial court denied defense counsel and the victim advocate’s request for
peaceful contact and imposed a no-contact CPO, stating,

“Because I didn’t do it. And there is no change in circumstances
that occurred on August 23rd. And I don’t know if that judicial officer
knew that the defendant had already violated the criminal protective order
before that modification was made. And because based on the information
I have regarding the current facts of the case, and the intimidation in that
phone call, I’m denying that request.”

5.
B. Forfeiture
As a threshold issue, the People contend defendant forfeited the issue of whether
the trial court could impose a no-contact CPO on October 22, 2024, because defense
counsel failed to object below at the sentencing hearing. They argue that whether there is
a defect in the court’s statement of reasons when it imposed the no-contact CPO is a
simple factual issue that could have easily been corrected at the sentencing hearing, had
defendant objected below. We agree.
“[T]he right to challenge a criminal sentence on appeal is not unrestricted. In
order to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of
unnecessary appellate claims, reviewing courts have required parties to raise certain
issues at the time of sentencing. In such cases, lack of a timely and meaningful objection
forfeits or waives the claim. [Citations.] These principles are invoked as a matter of
policy to ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331, 351.) “That decision holds that while a trial court objection is generally
necessary to preserve a claim of sentencing error for appeal, a ‘narrow exception’ exists
when the trial court has imposed an ‘ “unauthorized sentence.” ’ [Citation.] A
challenged sentence falls within this exception when it ‘could not lawfully be imposed
under any circumstance in the particular case,’ such that it is ‘ “clear and correctable”
independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.’ [Citations.] In
contrast, ‘claims deemed waived on appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise
permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner.’ ” (People
v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309.)
“Courts of Appeal have applied the waiver doctrine to various issues concerning
the manner in which sentence is imposed and the hearing is conducted. Most notable are
a minority of cases holding that a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal
about the court’s failure to state reasons for a sentencing choice.” (People v. Scott, supra,
9 Cal.4th at pp. 352–353, fn. omitted.) “[T]he waiver doctrine should apply to claims

6.
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices. Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons
allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly
erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various
factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.…
Although the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged
with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the
hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and
corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Id. at p. 353.)
Here, the trial court’s statement of reasons shows it mistakenly believed that there
was already a CPO in place on August 6, 2024, prohibiting defendant from contacting
Jane when he called her from jail to dissuade her from testifying against him. However,
while the court was mistaken and there was actually no CPO in place at the time of the
phone call on August 6, 2024, defendant did not object during the October 22, 2024
sentencing hearing when the trial court cited that as one of the factors it considered when
imposing the no-contact CPO. Had defendant objected, this “[r]outine defect[ ] in the
court’s statement of reasons” could have easily been prevented and corrected if called to
the court’s attention. (See People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) Instead, because
the court relied on factually flawed reasoning, but the sentence was otherwise permitted
by law, defendant forfeited the issue of whether the court abused its discretion when it
imposed the no-contact CPO on October 22, 2024. (See People v. Scott, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 1309.)
Defendant argues that his failure to object at his sentencing hearing should be
excused because such an objection would have been futile after the trial court stated on
the record that defendant had violated a CPO when he called Jane from jail. We disagree.
“ ‘[R]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an
issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by

7.
substantive law then in existence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92.)
However, although reviewing courts “ ‘ “have traditionally excused parties for failing to
raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile” ’ ” (People v. Perez
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 7–8), this futility exception only applies in “ ‘unusual circumstances’ ”
or “extreme case[s].” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212, italics omitted) As
explained in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, the bar is quite high. There, the
California Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s “continual misconduct, coupled
with the trial court’s failure to rein in her excesses, created a trial atmosphere so
poisonous” that defense counsel’s continual objections would have been “futile and
counterproductive to his client.” (Id. at p. 821, italics added.) Our high court therefore
excused the defendant “from the legal obligation to continually object.” (Ibid.) By
contrast, our high court in People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469 declined to apply
the futility exception because “[t]he trial atmosphere … was not poisonous … and the
record fail[ed] to establish that objections would have been futile.” (Id. at p. 502.)
As in Hillhouse, there are no “unusual circumstances” warranting the application
of the futility exception here. Nothing in the record suggests that the atmosphere at
sentencing was “poisonous” or that defendant’s objections would have been futile.
Indeed, as stated above, “[r]outine defects in the [trial] court’s statement of reasons are
easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention” at the hearing. (Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) Defendant argues the trial court had already decided to deny
his request for a peaceful contact CPO, pointing to the fact that the trial court was
mistaken in its belief that there was already a CPO in place when defendant contacted
Jane from jail on August 6, 2024, and contacted her. However, this is purely speculative.
The court’s statement gives no indication that it would not have considered the fact that
there was not actually a CPO in place at that time, had defendant objected and made the
court aware of that fact. Because the record does not demonstrate that defendant’s

8.
objection would have been futile, we find that defendant forfeited any argument against
the imposition of the no-contact CPO.
C. No-Contact Order
However, regardless of whether defendant forfeited the issue, there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s denial of defendant’s October 22, 2024 request for a
peaceful contact CPO. Accordingly, we affirm.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request
for the October 22, 2024 CPO to allow for peaceful contact between himself and Jane
because it relied on its mistaken belief that defendant violated a non-existent CPO when
he called her from jail on August 6, 2024.
Section 136.2, subdivision (i) provides that “[w]hen a criminal defendant has been
convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as defined … in Section 6211 of the
Family Code, … the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order
restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime.” (§ 136.2,
subd. (i).) Although the statute does not expressly provide for it, a court may order
“peaceful contact” with the named victim instead of “no contact.” (See People v. Fuentes
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1286, 1290 [ordering peaceful contact with girlfriend].)
“We review issuance of a protective order for abuse of discretion, and the factual
findings necessary to support the protective order are reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citations.] ‘We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, the
prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of
upholding the trial court’s findings.’ ” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219,
1226, disapproved of on other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) However, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual
findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.” (People v. Cluff (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.) Review on direct appeal “is limited to facts in the appellate
record.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1372.)

9.
Here, the record shows the court based its denial of defendant’s request for
peaceful contact on the circumstances of the case, including his dissuasion of Jane from
testifying as well as the facts of the underlying incident, rather than solely on the belief
that there was already a CPO in place when he called her. While the trial court
incorrectly stated that defendant had violated a CPO when he made the call, it correctly
noted that defendant called Jane to dissuade her from testifying. As the court stated,
“[Defendant] goes on to say [to Jane], [‘L]ook, they can’t force you to go to court. They
can’t force you to do nothing. Don’t let them tell you to do anything.[’] He goes [on to]
continue to tell her not to come to court, to say it was all an accident, and even when he
gives a statement, he doesn’t know why this is in the jail. This is all the victim and [the]
victim’s fault.” The court also noted that it relied on the facts of the case, including
surveillance video that showed defendant leaving the hotel room after a gunshot, before
Jane stumbled out of the room, and witness testimony that a single gunshot had been fired
before Jane left the motel room, screaming for help and saying, “I got shot,” because, as
the court explained, “based on the information I have regarding the current facts of the
case, and the intimidation in that phone call, I’m denying that request.” Accordingly,
regardless of defendant’s forfeiture of the issue by failing to object below, there is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s denial of his October 22, 2024 request for a
CPO allowing peaceful contact with Jane.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

10.

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