CourtListener 10808655•G.D. v. J.D. CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 3/13/26 G.D. v. J.D. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
G.D., B333973
(Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20STFL08338)
v.
J.D.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Armando Duron, Commissioner. Affirmed.
The Law Offices of Anthony Ukran and Anthony Ukran for
Appellant.
Leichter Leichter-Maroko and Ariel Leichter-Maroko for
Respondent.
__________________________
J.D. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) protecting her ex-husband, G.D., issued under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et
seq.).1 She argues that substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s findings that she harassed G.D. and disturbed his
peace. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. G.D.’s Request for a Restraining Order
In March 2023 G.D. requested a domestic violence
restraining order against J.D. based on her “repeatedly volatile,
harassing, and threatening behavior.” He alleged J.D. had
emotionally and mentally abused him, made false accusations
about him and his family, and yelled at and intimidated him in
front of their then-13-year-old daughter, C.D. The court issued a
temporary restraining order and set a hearing date.
B. The Hearing and the Restraining Order
The court held a three-day hearing in May and June 2023.
G.D. testified and also called his sister J.S. as a witness in
support of the restraining order. In defense J.D. testified and
also called an employee of the family’s temple to testify.
1. The restaurant incident in June 2022
G.D. testified that in June 2022 J.D. confronted him and
1 Statutory references are to the Family Code. We refer to
the adult protected party by his initials. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(1) [names of “protected persons in domestic violence-
prevention proceedings” may be abbreviated to protect their
privacy interests].) We also refer to J.D. and the parties’ family
members by their initials for the privacy of the protected party.
2
his girlfriend at a restaurant. J.D. asked whether G.D. would be
sitting with “that man,” referring to his girlfriend. He felt upset
after J.D. made that comment. She later reentered the
restaurant and took photos of G.D. and his girlfriend without
permission, then told G.D. he should be embarrassed and
ashamed of himself.
In her testimony, J.D. denied asking G.D. if he was dining
with a man. She testified that she took a photo of G.D. and his
girlfriend for two reasons: to show C.D. there was nothing to be
afraid of and to identify whether the woman was the same person
who had been calling and frightening C.D. via video calls. She
claimed G.D. then escorted her to the door and shoved her out.
2. Repeated phone calls
G.D. stated that between June 2020 and November 2022
J.D. repeatedly called G.D. without his consent and harassed
him. He testified the calls varied in frequency—sometimes a few
per day, other times several per month. G.D. asked J.D. to stop
“calling, yelling at me, harassing me, calling me bad names, and
causing stress and anxiety in me.” He said he felt “very
uncomfortable and stressed” when J.D. would yell at him on the
phone, and it made it difficult for him to focus on his work as an
obstetrician/gynecologist.
G.D. testified that on one particular day in November 2022
J.D. called his workplace more than five times over several
minutes. She wanted to discuss G.D. paying for their daughter’s
bat mitzvah scheduled seven months later. During the call, J.D.
told G.D. “after C.D.’s ba[t] mitzvah you can marry the
transgender that you are with”—a comment that bothered G.D.,
as his girlfriend was not transgender. She also threatened to
disclose to G.D.’s family that he had a daughter from a previous
3
relationship. G.D. said J.D.’s threat made him “very
uncomfortable,” and he blocked J.D.’s number afterward. He
repeatedly requested J.D. contact him only through a co-
parenting internet application, OurFamilyWizard.
G.D. indicated that in February 2023 J.D. called him from
an unknown number. J.D. yelled at G.D. and threatened to take
away his custody of C.D. G.D. had the call on speakerphone, and
C.D. heard the threat. J.D. also accused G.D. of hiding money
with J.S. and claimed J.S. had stolen from J.D. C.D. was visibly
upset.
In J.D.’s testimony, she described instances of seemingly
peaceful and consensual communication post-separation. She
said that between June 2020 and November 2022 G.D. initiated
phone calls and texts, and he invited her to events, including
C.D.’s birthday party. J.D. estimated both parties had called
each other 10 to 15 times during the relevant period, and she
denied yelling, insulting, or being abusive during those calls.
Emails G.D. had sent her in late 2022 were introduced into
evidence. J.D. denied ever referring to G.D.’s girlfriend as
transgender or a man or threatening to reveal G.D.’s other child
to his family. She also denied that G.D. had ever asked her to
use only OurFamilyWizard for communication.
With respect to her February 2023 call from another phone
number, J.D. testified that she called G.D. because C.D. was
supposed to be home half an hour earlier and J.D. was worried.
She said G.D. did not answer her call from her regular number,
and because he often failed to check OurFamilyWizard messages
promptly, she called from another number. She denied
threatening to take away his custody of C.D. or accusing G.D. of
hiding money.
4
3. Incidents at temple in February and March 2023
J.S. testified that she and her husband attended C.D.’s bat
mitzvah practice in February and March 2023 along with G.D.
because G.D. did not want to be alone with J.D. G.D. and J.S.
both testified that during the February practice, J.D. approached
G.D. and J.S. and directed offensive Persian curses at them,
stating “I spit on your honor” and “Death on your head,” as
translated from Farsi.
J.S. testified that before the March 2023 practice, J.D.
again threatened her, saying, “I will pull the money out of your
throat.” J.D. also approached J.S. with temple security and
falsely claimed J.S. had pushed her. G.D. testified that after the
meeting that day, J.D. started to approach him, and G.D. went
into a room where others were playing chess so he would not be
alone with her. He waited in the restroom to avoid further
interaction. He then asked a security guard to escort him to his
car, explaining he feared “that she may come close to [him] and
accuse [him] of hitting her or hurting her or making false
accusations.”2 When G.D. got to the parking garage, J.D. was
standing next to her car, which was parked a few cars away from
G.D.’s. G.D. subsequently hired a bodyguard to accompany him
to C.D.’s bat mitzvah because he feared J.D. might approach him
there.
J.D. denied making insulting comments to G.D. or his
family at temple in February or March 2023. She claimed that
on the March 2023 date J.S. and her husband were aggressive
toward her and J.S.’s husband had pushed J.D.’s arm, which
2 G.D. testified that in 2019, after C.D. stepped on J.D.’s foot
and a doctor found “she had a crack in her foot,” J.D. falsely
accused G.D. of breaking her foot.
5
made her frightened. She denied seeing G.D. in the hallway or
near her car that day. A temple employee called by J.D. testified
that on that day J.D. approached him for help, claiming she was
being harassed. He witnessed J.D. arguing with a man
(presumably J.S.’s husband), who “kept kind of coming toward
her.” The employee described the man as argumentative and
aggressive, and said J.D. appeared scared. The employee did not
know G.D.
4. Impact of J.D.’s behavior on G.D.
G.D. testified he was seeking a restraining order because
he was “worried that [J.D.] may falsely accuse [him] of doing
things that [he had] not done,” harass him, “cause a stress in”
him, and “continue to ruin [his] career and [his] life.” The stress
from the unwanted communication with J.D. affected his ability
to work and caused ongoing anxiety. He felt especially
uncomfortable when J.D. yelled at him in front of their daughter.
Messages between the parties showed G.D. asking J.D. to stop
“falsely accusing me” and stating: “I don’t want to receive your
abusive phone calls, and that is why I blocked your number.”
G.D. had not returned to retrieve personal belongings from their
former shared home since moving out in June 2020 because he
feared prompting J.D. to falsely accuse him of abuse.
5. The court’s ruling
On June 21, 2023 the court issued a two-year DVRO
protecting G.D. The order barred J.D. from contacting G.D.,
except for peaceful exchanges of C.D. and through
OurFamilyWizard. The court found that although each
individual incident might not, on its own, meet the definition of
domestic abuse, “in the aggregate . . . the cumulative effect of
these incidents . . . does constitute domestic violence of the
6
nature of disturbing the peace and harassing of” G.D. The court
found G.D.’s testimony credible “with respect to . . . almost all the
issues,” including his claim that J.D. “falsely accused him of
having run her over.” The court also concluded the fact “that
there is evidence of peaceful contact on other occasions does not
mean that all exchanges were civil and not abusive.” The court
found not credible J.D.’s explanation for photographing G.D. and
his girlfriend at the restaurant and her claim that she feared
G.D. during that interaction.
J.D. timely appealed the restraining order.
DISCUSSION
A. J.D.’s Appeal Is Not Moot Despite the Expiration of the
Restraining Order
The DVRO expired in June 2025, and G.D. did not seek a
renewal. G.D. argues the appeal is moot because the restraining
order was not renewed.
“ ‘A case becomes moot when events “ ‘render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.R. (2025)
18 Cal.5th 1042; see In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1124.) “ ‘It is well settled that an
appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a
live appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the
notice of appeal was filed.’ ” (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v.
City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866.) “ ‘If
relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief
granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by
the adverse party is moot.’ ” (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079.)
7
However, an appeal from an expired restraining order “is
not moot . . . if it ‘could have consequences for [a party] in . . .
future court proceedings,’ ” including custody proceedings.
(Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 148; see San Diego
Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564 [“An
appeal from an expired restraining order is not moot if it could
have collateral consequences in future proceedings.”].) Here, the
DVRO could have implications for J.D. in future family court
proceedings relating to child custody and spousal support. Under
section 3044, a finding of domestic violence by a parent triggers a
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody of a child to
that parent—a presumption that lasts five years regardless of a
restraining order’s expiration. (§ 3044, subd. (a); Cardona, at
p. 148.) “ ‘ “Because a DVPA restraining order must be based on
a finding that the party being restrained committed one or more
acts of domestic abuse, a finding of domestic abuse sufficient to
support a DVPA restraining order necessarily triggers the
presumption in section 3044.” ’ ” (Cardona, at p. 148.) The
issuance of the DVRO would therefore have the potential to affect
J.D.’s custody rights even after the DVRO has expired. (See ibid.
[appeal from DVRO not moot because section 3044 presumption
would endure even after the DVRO expired].) In addition, when
ordering spousal support, the family court must consider whether
the court has “[i]ssu[ed] a protective order after a hearing
pursuant to Section 6340.” (§ 4320, subd. (i)(1)(4).) Thus,
although the restraining order is expired, this appeal is not moot.
B. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The DVPA authorizes the trial court to issue a protective
order “to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
8
recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of
separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300.) “The DVPA’s definition of
abuse includes, among other things, ‘[t]o engage in any behavior
that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.’
(§ 6203, subd. (a)(4)), and specifies that the definition of abuse ‘is
not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.’
(§ 6203, subd. (b).) Behavior that may be enjoined pursuant to
section 6320 includes ‘stalking, threatening . . . , harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, mareking annoying
telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code,
destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified
distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.’ ” (Sabato
v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715, 723, citing § 6320,
subd. (a).) “Disturbing the peace” is “conduct that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly
or indirectly, . . . and by any method or through any means
including, but not limited to, telephone, online accounts, text
messages, internet-connected devices, or other electronic
technologies.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
A restraining order may issue upon proof of past abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226; Cooper v. Bettinger (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90, fn. 14.) The court must evaluate “the
totality of the circumstances” in determining whether to grant or
deny a domestic violence restraining order. (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
We review the trial court’s decision to grant a DVRO for
abuse of discretion. (R.R. v. C.R. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1262,
9
1272.) We review factual findings for substantial evidence,
considering the record in the light most favorable to the judgment
and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment. (Ibid.; Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 360, 373-374.) “[C]redibility determinations . . .
are subject to ‘extremely deferential review’ [citation], and ‘ “[a]
trier of fact is free to disbelieve a witness . . . if there is any
rational ground for doing so.” ’ ” (Vinson v. Kinsey (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1176.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Determination
that J.D. Harassed G.D. and Disturbed His Peace
J.D.’s core argument is that her actions were too minor or
sporadic to constitute abuse. These arguments are unavailing.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that she
harassed G.D. and disturbed his peace.
The evidence of J.D.’s repeated, unwanted phone calls
supported the court’s findings. G.D. testified that between June
2020 and November 2022 he repeatedly asked J.D. to stop calling
his cell phone because she would insult and yell at him, causing
him stress and anxiety. But J.D. continued calling, including in
November 2022, when she called G.D. at work more than five
times within a few minutes, even after he told her he could not
talk. During that call, J.D. insulted and threatened G.D., falsely
referred to his girlfriend as a transgender woman, and
threatened to reveal to G.D.’s family that he had a child from
another relationship. On another occasion, after G.D. blocked
her number and asked her to contact him only through
OurFamilyWizard, J.D. called him from another line and
threatened to take custody of C.D. The court was entitled to, and
10
did, credit G.D.’s testimony. (See In re Marriage of Evilsizor &
Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1426-1427 [“the trial court
was in the best position to evaluate credibility and to resolve
factual disputes, and our review of the record reveals sufficient
evidence to conclude that the court’s order was not an abuse of
discretion”].) Substantial evidence thus supports the trial court’s
determination that J.D.’s repeated and aggressive phone calls
constituted harassment and disturbed his peace. (See N.T. v.
H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 [substantial evidence of
harassment through repeated unwanted contact]; Burquet v.
Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144 [affirming a
finding of disturbance of the peace through persistent
communication despite repeated requests to stop]; Nevarez v.
Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783-784 [rejecting argument
that repeated contact was “mere badgering”].) J.D.’s threats to
reveal G.D.’s child born out of wedlock and to take away his
custody of C.D. provided additional justification for issuing the
DVRO. (See In re Marriage of Reichental (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
396 [upholding restraining order where the wife threatened to
reveal negative information about husband to destroy his
reputation]; In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
1483, 1498 (Nadkarni) [finding substantial evidence of abuse
based on former husband disclosing confidential emails to third
parties and using the emails to “control, harass, and abuse” ex-
wife].)
J.D. claims there was no substantial evidence of
harassment based on the phone calls because she called G.D. only
10 to 15 times—a number she says was uncontroverted. But the
trial court was not required to accept J.D.’s version of events.
(See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582
11
[“The trial judge may believe or disbelieve uncontradicted
witnesses if there is any rational ground for doing so.”].) In any
event, there is no minimum number of unwanted
communications in order to find harassment or disturbance of the
peace.
J.D. also defends the episode of repeated workplace calls
and the later call from another number by arguing she needed to
communicate about their daughter. J.D. asserts the trial court
committed error when it stated during the hearing that “the
legitimacy of why [J.D.] was calling is not the point here,” and
“just because you are legitimately calling about something
doesn’t mean you get to do it and it doesn’t mean you get to do it
in the way you want to do it, which is what he’s complaining
about.” J.D. argues the trial court ignored the principle that
“simply doing something in a way that the other person does not
like, is not domestic violence.” But the import of the court’s
ruling was that no matter what the intended purpose of J.D.’s
call was, the manner of the call was harassing to G.D. Although
the “DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes between
former couples,” and a restraining order need not “issue based on
any act that upsets the petitioning party” (Curcio v. Pels (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1, 13), the trial court found the calls were
harassing and disturbed G.D.’s peace. (See Parris J. v.
Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121 [“disturbing the
peace” under section 6320 is measured not by a reasonable
person standard, but by a subjective standard]; K.L. v. R.H.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965, 981 [“What disturbs the peace of a
person differs in each case.”].)
Other incidents also support the court’s finding that J.D.
harassed G.D. and disturbed his peace. The court credited G.D.’s
12
testimony that J.D. publicly harassed him at a restaurant by
taking unauthorized photographs of him and his girlfriend,
misgendering his girlfriend, and telling G.D. to feel “ashamed”
and “embarrassed” of himself. J.D. also made false and
inflammatory accusations, including that G.D. broke her foot3
and hid money with J.S. At temple, J.D. directed offensive Farsi
insults at G.D. and J.S. She also appeared to wait for G.D. in a
parking garage and left only when she saw he was accompanied
by a security guard.
Substantial evidence showed these actions disturbed G.D.’s
peace by destroying his mental and emotional calm. (§ 6320,
subd. (c).) He testified that J.D.’s behavior left him “very
uncomfortable and stressed,” interfered with his ability to care
for patients, and caused him ongoing anxiety. G.D.’s distress was
evident not just through his testimony, but also through his
actions. He took protective steps (including hiring a bodyguard
for C.D.’s bat mitzvah) and had not retrieved his personal
belongings from the former family home to avoid false allegations
of abuse. As G.D. explained, he sought a restraining order
because he was “worried that she may falsely accuse [him] of
doing things that [he had] not done,” harass him, “cause a stress
in” him, and “continue to ruin [his] career and [his] life.” This
evidence supports the court’s finding that J.D.’s conduct met the
statutory definition of disturbing the peace. (§ 6320, subd. (c);
see Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499 [substantial
3 J.D. argues the court erred by stating she falsely accused
G.D. of “having run her over,” when the allegation was that she
accused him of breaking her foot. This was a minor
misstatement with no bearing on the soundness of the court’s
reasoning.
13
evidence supported finding where conduct caused “ ‘shock’ and
‘embarrassment,’ ” and fear for safety and professional
relationships].)
J.D. also attempts to isolate each alleged incident,
asserting that she only called G.D. multiple times on one day,
made insulting remarks years earlier, took photos only once, and
allegedly made a false accusation only once. She argues that
because these events each occurred only once, they do not
constitute a pattern of harassment. But the law does not support
analyzing a party’s conduct in this piecemeal way. The question
is whether the cumulative effect of a pattern of harassing
behavior—regardless of whether it took different forms—
destroyed G.D.’s peace of mind. (See McCord v. Smith (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 358, 366 [“Whether one single act . . . would have
been sufficient to justify the issuance of the [domestic violence
restraining order] is not the question—the trial court considers
whether the totality of the circumstances supports the issuance of
the [restraining order].”].) As discussed, it was reasonable for the
court to conclude J.D. repeatedly harassed and disturbed the
peace of G.D. through a variety of different types of conduct and
communication channels.
J.D. also compares her actions to more extreme behavior in
other cases, arguing that her conduct was less egregious. But the
standard is not whether J.D.’s behavior was worse than that in
other cases, but whether the court abused its discretion in finding
that her conduct met the statutory definition of abuse. The court
did not. Nor is J.D. correct that abuse must fall into one of two
categories: where “one of the parties refuses to accept the break-
up of the relationship,” or where “the offending party engages in
a clear pattern of behavior attempting to control the other party
14
against their will.” The DVPA defines abuse broadly, and the
court properly found that definition was met based on the
particular circumstances here. (See Nadkarni, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 [“the Legislature intended that the
DVPA be broadly construed in order to accomplish the purpose of
the DVPA,” and trial courts are “ ‘entrusted with authority to
issue necessary orders suited to individual circumstances”].)4
Finally, J.D. contends that even if abuse occurred, it was
unlikely to recur. But a domestic violence restraining order does
not require proof of likely future abuse. (See R.R. v. C.R., supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275 [petitioner was not required “to
establish a probability of future abuse, as section 6300 permits
the court to issue a DVRO upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse’ ”]; Nevarez v. Tonna, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
p. 783 [“trial court was not required to find a probability that
Tonna would commit future abuse before issuing a restraining
order under section 6300”].)
///
///
4 J.D. also contends the court improperly excluded evidence
about whether G.D. was ever physically abusive during their
marriage and whether he had ever grabbed C.D. and dragged her
to her room. However, the court reasonably limited its focus to
J.D.’s conduct and whether it met the DVPA standard for abuse.
15
DISPOSITION
The restraining order is affirmed. G.D. shall recover his
costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
GIZA, J.*
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
16
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.