People v. Holt CA2/5

CourtListener 10807964Calctapp12.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/12/26 P. v. Holt CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B338324 c/w B341086

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA065756)

CALVIN DEWAYNE HOLT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.

Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
A jury convicted defendant of first degree residential
robbery in 2016. He requested mental health diversion in 2023
(because his conviction was not yet final when the diversion
statutes took effect) and, at a resentencing hearing in 2024,
requested that the trial court strike a five-year sentencing
enhancement. The trial court denied both requests. We
consolidate the separate appeals from these two orders, and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
A. The underlying crime
In April 2015, defendant and Lemont Everett Townsend
went to the home of Calvin Ousley looking for defendant’s
girlfriend. When Ousley opened the security door to let the
girlfriend leave, defendant and Townsend pushed their way into
the residence. As the girlfriend fled, defendant punched Ousley
in the face. While Townsend held Ousley at gunpoint and told
him to “Sit [his] ass down,” defendant disconnected the wires
connecting Ousley’s 60-inch flat-screen TV, took the time to
locate the TV’s remote, and walked out of the residence with the
TV and remote. Defendant later sold the stolen TV and pocketed
the cash.
Thereafter, defendant urged his girlfriend to lie to law

1 We draw these facts from our prior, unpublished appellate
opinion affirming defendant’s conviction. (People v. Townsend et
al. (Jan. 12, 2018, B270929).)

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enforcement by reporting that Ousley had raped her, so that
defendant’s actions could thus be somehow excused as a “crime of
passion.” Defendant himself prevaricated, alternatively
admitting and denying to law enforcement that he had urged his
girlfriend to lie on his behalf.
B. Prosecution, conviction, appeal and
resentencing on remand
The People charged defendant with first degree residential
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)2 and alleged that, in committing this
crime, a principal had been armed with a handgun (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)). The People further alleged that defendant’s 1983
and 1986 convictions for robbery constituted “strikes” within the
meaning of our “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d),
667, subds. (b)-(j)) as well as prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd.
(a)), and alleged that defendant had served five prior prison
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The matter proceeded to a bifurcated trial in February
2016. The jury found defendant guilty of the robbery, found true
the firearm enhancement, and in the bifurcated portion of the
trial, found true the allegations regarding defendant’s prior
convictions.
In March 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to
prison for 35 years to life. The sentence was comprised of a base
sentence of 25 years to life for the robbery (as a “third strike”
sentence under our State’s Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds.
(a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(j))), plus one year for the firearm

2 The People also charged defendant with two counts of false
personation (§ 529, subd. (a)(3)), but later dismissed those counts.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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enhancement, plus five years for one of the prior serious felony
enhancements (namely, the 1986 robbery conviction), plus four
years for four of the prior prison term enhancements.3
On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s
conviction. Defendant argued that the trial court had erred in
not suspending the proceedings and ordering a psychiatric
examination into his competence to stand trial because defendant
had repeatedly disrupted the preliminary hearing proceedings to
an extent he had to be removed from the courtroom and he
thereafter refused to be transported to court for a pretrial
hearing. This court rejected defendant’s argument, finding that
defendant’s “course of conduct” and the trial court’s observation
of defendant in court “supported the trial court’s view that
[defendant] was malingering.” This court nevertheless struck the
one-year prior prison term enhancement based on defendant’s
2013 conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
In June 2018, the trial court on remand resentenced
defendant to a prison term of 34 years.
II. Pertinent Post-conviction Proceedings
A. Mental health diversion
On December 27, 2023, defendant filed a “Psychological
Evaluation Pursuant to PC 1001.36 Performed by Dr. Joel Peel
Leifer” in support of a request for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36.

3 The court did not impose a five-year prior serious felony
enhancement for the 1983 robbery allegation (which was a
juvenile adjudication) and did not impose a one-year prior prison
term enhancement for the 1986 robbery (to avoid the double-
counting prohibited by People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142,
1153).

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On May 22, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on
whether defendant was eligible for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. The trial court denied defendant’s request for
mental health diversion, finding that he was neither eligible nor
suitable for such diversion.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
B. Resentencing
After the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) notified the trial court that the recently enacted Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) entitled defendant to have his
three prior prison term enhancements struck at a full
resentencing hearing (§ 1172.75), defendant asked the trial court
to exercise its recently conferred discretion in section 1385,
subdivision (c) to strike his five-year prior serious felony
enhancement. After a hearing on August 29, 2024, the trial court
declined to exercise its discretion.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
C. Consolidation of appeals
At the People’s request and without objection from
defendant, we consolidated the two appeals for argument and
disposition.
DISCUSSION
I. Mental Health Diversion
In 2018, our Legislature enacted section 1001.36, which
authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants
suffering from qualifying mental health disorders. (See Stats.
2018, ch. 34, § 24; Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 391, 399-400 (Lacour).) Although defendant was
convicted by the time of section 1001.36’s enactment, his
conviction was not yet final, so he is entitled to post-trial

5
consideration of his entitlement to mental health diversion.
(People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 632-633.) Defendant
argues that the trial court erred in denying him mental health
diversion.
A. Pertinent facts
In support of his petition for mental health diversion,
defendant submitted Dr. Leifer’s evaluation, which was based on
a Zoom interview Dr. Leifer conducted with defendant in October
2023; Dr. Leifer did not evaluate any of the transcripts or court
filings in the record of conviction for this case.4 Dr. Leifer opined
that defendant was eligible for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36 because (1) defendant had a documented history
of two mental illnesses (namely, (a) substance use disorder, due
to his history of using PCP and cocaine, and (b) bipolar disorder),
and (2) these mental illnesses “played a contributory role in” the
2015 robbery in light of defendant’s self-reporting to Dr. Leifer
that, at the time of the robbery, he was “under the influence of
mind-altering substances” and not taking medications for his
“chronic thought disorder,” which meant that he was
“experiencing paranoid/disordered thought processes and
hallucinations” at the time of the robbery. Dr. Leifer further
opined that defendant was suitable for mental health diversion
because he would not pose a danger if released into the
community for treatment.
The People opposed defendant’s request, but did not submit
a competing expert opinion.

4 Defendant submitted this evaluation after this court, in
December 2021, issued an order to show cause requiring the trial
court to conduct a hearing on defendant’s eligibility for mental
health diversion.

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The trial court held an eligibility hearing on May 22, 2024.
The court ruled that defendant was not eligible for mental health
diversion. Specifically, the court found that although defendant
had been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder, no such
disorder “play[ed] a significant role . . . in the commission of this
offense.” The court explained that defendant’s conduct during
the offense, including his “attempts to have the girlfriend falsely
accuse [Ousley] of rape in order to specifically set up a heat of
passion defense,” showed that defendant was “engaged in some
manipulative behavior” that was “very planned and calculated”
and demonstrated “very clear thinking,” which affirmatively
refuted Dr. Leifer’s opinion that defendant had a “disordered
thought process” and suffered from hallucinations at that time.
The court rejected Dr. Leifer’s opinion because its factual basis
rested solely on defendant’s self-reporting rather than “objective
facts or witness statements or statements of the defendant at the
time” of the 2015 robbery. The court also ruled that defendant
was not suitable for mental health diversion because he “pose[s]
a[] reasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community.”
B. Analysis
Under section 1001.36, a person charged with a felony or
misdemeanor may obtain mental health diversion if he is found
to be (1) eligible and (2) suitable for such diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subds. (a)-(c).) A defendant is “eligible” for mental health
diversion if (1) he has “been diagnosed with a mental disorder as
identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,” and (2) “[t]he
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(1) & (2).)

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Section 1001.36 erects a presumption that a qualifying mental
disorder was a significant factor “unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that [the disorder] was not a motivating
factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) In
assessing whether this presumption of causation has been
rebutted, a court may consider “any relevant and credible
evidence.” (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s ruling on whether a
defendant is eligible for mental health diversion for an abuse of
discretion, and review any subsidiary factual findings for
substantive evidence. (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.)
In evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings, we “must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to
how the [trial court] may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996.) When evaluating whether
substantial evidence supports a finding that must be made by
clear and convincing evidence, we ask “whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Id. at p. 1011.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was not eligible for mental health diversion. Although
defendant established that he suffered from a qualifying mental
disorder (thereby satisfying the first requirement of eligibility
and triggering the statutory presumption of causation),
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that it is
not highly probable that defendant’s substance abuse and bipolar

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disorders were a motivating factor, casual factor, or contributing
factor to his involvement in the 2015 robbery. That is because
the hallmarks of those disorders are, in Dr. Leifer’s words,
“paranoid/disordered thought processes and hallucinations,” yet
the record of conviction affirmatively shows that defendant
exhibited “very clear thinking” during the robbery as he
disconnected the TV, asked about and then secured the remote,
and formulated a “crime of passion” defense. (Accord, People v.
Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 122-124 [clarity of
defendant’s thinking at the time of the crime relevant to the
court’s refusal to find a causal link between mental disorder and
crime].) Because these objective facts affirmatively demonstrate
clear thinking and thereby affirmatively refute the disorganized
and hallucination-driven thinking that would be present if
defendant’s mental disorders had contributed to the charged
offense, the trial court did not commit the sin of disregarding an
expert opinion based solely on the “absence of evidence” showing
that a defendant was laboring under a mental health disorder at
the time of the offense. (See Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p.
404; People v. Gomez (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688-689.)
Defendant resists this conclusion with what boils down to
three arguments.
First, he argues that it is possible to suffer from mental
disorders causing “disorganized and psychosis-driven” behavior
and be really good at planning, but the portion of Dr. Leiter’s
report that he cites does not support that proposition. More to
the point, it is not merely the advanced planning but the in-the-
moment thinking that affirmatively refutes the causal link
between defendant’s mental disorders and the commission of the
2015 robbery. Defendant relatedly urges that his crime was not

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particularly sophisticated, but the fact that his crime was not
well-conceived does not negate the evidence that defendant’s
conduct during that crime evinced “very clear thinking”
inconsistent with the mental illnesses from which he suffers.
Given this contrary evidence, the court was within its power to
reject as unfounded the contrary expert opinion that rested on
defendant’s self-serving statements about the crime that he made
in 2023 rather than the evidence contemporaneous with the
crime itself.
Second, defendant urges that the trial court wrongly
conflated the jury’s rejection of his “crime of passion” defense at
trial with the absence of a causal link. This is not accurate, as
the trial court cited defendant’s fabrication of the “crime of
passion” to show that he was capable of organized, clear and
quick thinking during and immediately after the crime at issue.
Third, defendant notes that the People did not offer a
contrary expert opinion. This is true. And had the trial court
merely rejected Dr. Leifer’s opinion on causation as unpersuasive,
without more, we would be left with no expert opinion on
causation; in that situation, the statutory presumption of
causation would have been unrebutted (and a finding of
causation compelled). But the trial court in this case accepted
and relied upon Dr. Leifer’s analytical framework for assessing
whether defendant’s mental illnesses contributed to the charged
offenses—namely, that those illnesses caused defendant to
“experienc[e] paranoid/disordered thought processes and
hallucinations” at the time of those offenses—but went on to find
that defendant’s conduct at that time, as reflected in the record of
conviction demonstrated clear and organized thinking. Thus, the
court’s finding in this case not only undermined the factual basis

10
for Dr. Leifer’s opinion, but also affirmatively refuted the causal
connection between defendant’s mental illnesses and the charged
offenses. The absence of a contrary expert opinion on these facts
is accordingly not a basis for reversal.
In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding defendant ineligible for mental health
diversion, we have no occasion to determine whether the court
erred in finding him unsuitable for such diversion.
II. Resentencing
In 2021, our Legislature enacted a statute—now codified at
section 1172.75—declaring “legally invalid” most prior prison
term enhancements and entitling defendants whose sentences
have such enhancements to a “full resentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subds. (a), (b) & (d)(1)-(2); People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
365, 373.) By the time of defendant’s full resentencing in 2024,
our Legislature had enacted section 1385, subdivision (c), which
empowers trial courts to dismiss sentencing enhancements.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss
the prior serious felony enhancement.
A. Pertinent facts
During the August 29, 2024 resentencing, the trial court
struck all three remaining prior prison term enhancements but
declined defendant’s request to strike the five-year prior serious
felony enhancement arising from his 1986 robbery conviction. In
so doing, the court acknowledged that it had “discretion” to strike
the prior serious felony enhancement but elected not to exercise
that discretion because “it would [not] be in the interest of
justice” to strike that enhancement due to defendant’s “conduct in
this case,” his “criminal history” prior to the 2015 conviction, and
“his behavior since being incarcerated” in this case. Defendant’s

11
pre-2015 criminal history includes convictions for robbery with a
firearm, domestic violence with injury, evading a peace officer,
resisting arrest, and multiple drug offenses. Defendant also
committed 13 rule violations while in custody on the 2015
conviction.
B. Analysis
As in effect in 2024, section 1385 granted trial courts “the
authority” and a simultaneous duty “to strike or dismiss [a
sentencing] enhancement” (or, if they prefer, the “additional
punishment for th[e] enhancement”) if doing so is “in the
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subds. (b) & (c)(1).) Although
this provision makes clear that whether the dismissal of an
enhancement is “in the furtherance of justice” is a
“discretion[ary]” call for the trial court to make (id., subd. (c)(1)-
(3)), the provision also directs that the existence of any of nine
numerated “mitigating circumstances” “weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that [the]
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, our
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance erects a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement that can be
rebutted only by a showing that dismissal would endanger public
safety. (Walker, at pp. 1028-1029.) Instead, Walker held that,
even when a court determines that dismissing an enhancement
will not endanger public safety, the court retains discretion not to
dismiss or strike that enhancement. In exercising that
discretion, the court is to “assign[] significant value” to any
mitigating circumstance(s), which “strongly favor[s]” and “will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement”—except

12
when the “court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in [the] furtherance of justice.’” (Id. at
pp. 1029, 1036.) We review the exercise of discretion under
section 1385, subdivision (c) for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
strike the five-year prior serious felony enhancement. To be sure,
it is undisputed that one of section 1385’s “mitigating
circumstances” is present here—namely, that the “enhancement
is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H)) because the robbery conviction supporting the
enhancement at issue was sustained in 1986. Although this
mitigating circumstance “weighs greatly in favor of dismiss[al]” of
the enhancement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to dismiss the enhancement here because the court
explicitly found that it would not be in the “interest of justice” to
dismiss the enhancement given the nature of the current offense,
defendant’s extensive criminal history, and his demonstrated and
persistent inability to conform his conduct to the rules while in
custody. The trial court’s citation to these reasons arguably
constitutes an implicit finding that releasing defendant sooner
would endanger public safety. But even if it does not, it was not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that
dismissal of the enhancement was not warranted in the interest
of justice given defendant’s targeted use of violence to steal
underlying this case, his varied and sometimes violent criminal
history, and his continued rule-breaking while in custody despite
the fact that he could seek a lesser sentence.

13
Defendant resists this conclusion with three arguments.
First, defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling was
procedurally deficient because the court did not explicitly state
that it was giving “great weight” to the existence of an
enumerated mitigating factor and did explicitly find that
dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety. We
reject these arguments. To begin, they ignore the baseline
presumption that courts have “considered all of the relevant
factors” and correctly applied the law “in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) The record contains nothing that would
rebut that baseline presumption. What is more, even if we do not
consider the trial court’s reasons for not dismissing the
enhancement as constituting an implied finding that doing so
would endanger public safety, the trial court retains the
discretion to dismiss even in the absence of a finding that public
safety is endangered.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court was required
to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancement because it is
more than five years old and hence constitutes a “mitigating
factor.” While true, that is just the first step of the analysis in
section 1385; it is not the last. Because, as explained above, the
court went on to find that dismissal of this enhancement was not
in the interest of justice (which is called for as a subsequent step
in the section 1385 analysis), the court did not abuse its
discretion in not stopping at the first step.
Third and lastly, defendant argues that the trial court
erred in citing his 13 prison disciplinary violations because they
do not involve violence or criminal activity. The trial court never
said they did. More to the point, regardless of their factual basis,

14
they constitute evidence of defendant’s inability or unwillingness
to conform his conduct to the rules—and this remains pertinent
in deciding whether shortening his sentence and allowing him to
be released into the community would be in the interest of
justice.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

I concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

15
The People v. Calvin Holt
B338324

BAKER, J., Concurring

The opinion for the court holds the trial court did not err in
finding defendant and appellant Calvin Holt’s (defendant’s)
mental illness did not contribute to his commission of the robbery
in question—notwithstanding our Legislature’s considered
amendment of the diversion statute to require courts to presume
contribution and find otherwise only on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Assem.
Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), as amended June 23, 2022, pp. 4, 6-7 [proposing
amendment to require a court to presume a qualifying mental
illness contributed to the offense after the Committee on the
Revision of the Penal Code found “mental health diversion has
been substantially underutilized”].) That, in my view, is a
mistake. But I nevertheless agree the trial court’s diversion
ruling should be affirmed because defendant conceded at oral
argument that the trial court made an alternative unsuitability
finding (Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)), because that finding
need not be made under the higher clear and convincing evidence
standard, and because sufficient evidence supports that finding.
I join the opinion for the court’s rationale for rejecting
defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in declining to
dismiss his prior serious felony conviction enhancement.

BAKER, J.

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