People v. Gonzalez CA5

CourtListener 10807370Calctapp11.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/11/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088497
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F16906864)
v.

JASON LASHON GONZALEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Francine
Zepeda, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and
Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
A jury found defendant Jason Lashon Gonzalez guilty of five counts of sodomy
against a child under the age of 10 in violation of Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision
(a)1 and one count of committing a lewd act against a child in violation of section 288,
subdivision (a). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 100 years to life. On appeal,
defendant argues: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by permitting expert testimony
regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS); (2) the court
prejudicially erred by giving CALCRIM No. 1193 (CSAAS testimony) and CALCRIM
No. 332 (expert testimony) and by failing to give CALCRIM No. 303 (evidence for a
limited purpose); (3) defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for his treatment of
CSAAS issues; (4) substantial evidence does not support the count 1 conviction for
sodomy against a child under 10 years old; and (5) he is entitled to additional custody and
conduct credits. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence but conclude that
defendant is entitled to additional custody credits.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 9, 2023, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an amended
information that charged defendant with five counts (counts 1 through 5) of sodomy of a
child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)), and one count (count 6) of committing
a lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). All counts were alleged to have occurred “[o]n or
about August 1, 2007 through June 30, 2012.” Counts 2 through 5 were all alleged to
have occurred in Parlier. Count 1, however, was described as the “first time in the city of
Reedley when victim was 4 or 5 years old.” All counts involved conduct against a single
victim, E.
On June 4, 2024, a jury trial began. Trial concluded on June 10, 2024. A jury
found defendant guilty on all six counts.
On August 13, 2024, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 100 years to life.
The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for each of the five counts of sodomy,
with count 4 running concurrently with count 3, and counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 running

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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consecutively. The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of six years on count 6
but stayed that term pursuant to section 654. Defendant was awarded credit for 1,402
days of actual custody and 210 days of conduct credit under section 2933.1.
Appellant timely appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
E. was born in January 2003. E. has one younger brother and one older sister, and
her mother is R.L. Defendant was born in February 1986. Defendant came into E.’s life
when she was around four or five years old. Defendant first lived in R.L.’s garage in
2007, but it was not long before he moved into the home and began having a relationship
with her. Defendant and R.L. had a son together in May 2009, when E. was six years old.
After moving from Reedley, to Parlier, and to Orange Cove, it appears defendant and
R.L.’s relationship ended, and defendant moved away from E. and her family. R.L. and
defendant’s relationship lasted for about seven years. Defendant’s relationship with R.L.
was tumultuous and marked with abuse and drug use. However, during R.L. and
defendant’s relationship, E. viewed defendant as her stepdad and like a father figure. The
last time E. saw defendant was when she was in the sixth grade.
On September 28, 2015, when she was in the seventh grade, E. went to a school
counselor, Antonio Valdez. R.L. arranged for E. to see Valdez because E. was engaged
in non-suicidal self-injury. E. eventually broke down in tears and told Valdez that she
had experienced sexual abuse, but she did not go into specific details. Valdez contacted
Child Protective Services (CPS) and R.L. The CPS worker told R.L. that they could not
coerce E. into going to the police and that they had to wait until E. was ready to go
herself.
In December 2015, E. was ready to speak to the police. The Reedley Police
Department arranged for E. to have a multidisciplinary interview center (MDIC)

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interview.2 On December 22, 2015, a professional interviewer conducted a video-
recorded MDIC interview with E. A Reedley police officer was watching and listening
to the interview as it was happening. The video of E.’s MDIC interview was played to
the jury and a transcript was prepared.
In part, E. told the interviewer that defendant had sexually abused her more than
10 times. E. said that the first time she remembered being abused was when she was four
or five years old. E. believed she was still going to preschool because her mother was
working, and her older sister was going to school. E., her sister, her mother, and
defendant were living together in a house in Reedley on Hemlock Street. E. thought that
her little brother had been born but was still just a baby. E. told the interviewer that she
was lying on her back in her mother’s bed in the afternoon when defendant walked into
the bedroom. R.L. was working and E.’s sister was in school. Defendant told E. to pull
her pants down, and E. complied. E. wrote on a piece of paper that defendant did things
to her that were inappropriate. E. then told the interviewer that defendant pulled down
her shorts and underwear and had her lay on her stomach. E. explained that defendant
pulled down his pants, put his private parts inside of her “butt,” and moved up and down.
E. testified that what defendant was doing felt “weird” and hurt her “butt.” When E. tried
to get up, defendant pushed her back down, so she stayed lying down. After defendant
stopped, he told E. not to tell anyone what had happened. E. said that she did not tell
anyone about this initial abuse because she was scared. E. continued to describe similar
acts of sodomy occurring when she was older and living in Parlier. E. also wrote out
instances when defendant touched her breasts while rubbing her back when she was
seven or eight years old. E. told the interviewer that she did not tell her mom about any
sexual abuse in part because she was scared that her mom would be mad at her for not

2 The MDIC is a “facility specially designed and staffed for interviewing children
suspected of being victims of abuse.” (People v. Sisavath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1396,
1400.)

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telling sooner. E. also described an instance in which her aunt asked about inappropriate
touching, but E. told her aunt that nothing was happening because she was afraid her aunt
would be mad. E. also described an instance in which CPS was in their home on a
domestic violence matter. CPS asked E. and her older sister if there was any
inappropriate touching going on, and both answered no. E. explained that she was afraid
she would be taken away from her mom if she answered yes. Finally, E. told the
interviewer that there were other things that defendant had done but she was not ready to
discuss them.
Apparently after additional investigation, a felony complaint was filed against
defendant on November 21, 2016, for sexual abuse against E.
Trial Testimony of E.
At trial, E. (who was then 21 years old) testified in part that she saw and heard
defendant physically and verbally abuse R.L. E. testified that she did not like what
defendant was doing to her mom, but she still loved and cared about him. E. also saw
that defendant was strong, and his strength and his abuse of her mom made E. scared that
defendant would ultimately kill R.L. or do something to the family.
With respect to disclosing defendant’s sexual abuse, E. testified she saw her
seventh grade school counselor, Valdez, because her mother had found out that she was
cutting herself. During her conversation with Valdez, he asked E. if anyone was hurting
her. E. told him yes, but that it was not happening at that time and had only happened in
the past. E. told Valdez that it had happened when she was younger, that it was
somebody she knew and was close to, and that it was her younger brother’s dad. E. told
Valdez that defendant had raped her, which she understood to mean that he touched and
penetrated her inappropriately and without her consent. Valdez asked E. if she had told
her mom, and when she answered no, he said that he would have to tell her mom and
CPS. E. felt scared about telling her mom and, although she did not want to tell Valdez,
it was easier to tell him because he had asked her first. E. was scared and was unable to

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tell her mom, so Valdez did so. After Valdez told R.L. about what E. had disclosed, R.L.
told E. that they would go to the police whenever she (E.) was ready. Eventually E. felt
ready to see the police, and in the interim, she told her immediate family, grandparents,
and aunts and uncles about some of the abuse. When E. went to the police, she was
uncomfortable about telling them what happened, so she did not disclose everything.
However, when she spoke to the MDIC interviewer, she disclosed more details about
defendant’s abuse. E. testified that to this day, she has still not told her sister or mother
all the details of the abuse.
With respect to the sexual abuse by defendant, E. testified she was abused by
defendant frequently, perhaps once a day and almost anytime that R.L. was not home.
However, the abuse stopped after defendant and R.L. broke up. E. explained that there
were certain things that she remembered, but she believed that there were lots of things
she had blocked out because they were so traumatic. E. estimated that defendant had
sodomized her probably “well over 20 times.”
In the course of her testimony, E. described several acts of sodomy by defendant.
E.’s trial testimony and description of the abuse and sodomy perpetrated by defendant
were generally consistent with her MDIC interview. In general, E. and defendant would
be in a room and R.L. would not be present. E. would be on her stomach, and defendant
would remove E.’s pants and sodomize her. Only one time did defendant tell E. not to
tell her mom. At other times, E. testified that she did not say anything about the abuse
because she did not know it was wrong, she was close to defendant, and she looked at
him as a kind of father figure.
The first act of sodomy/abuse that E. testified she recalled was when she was
seven or eight years old and living in Parlier. However, E. testified that she did not recall
telling police officers or the MDIC interviewer about any abuse in Reedley when she was
four or five years old. The prosecutor showed E. a paper that she had written during the
MDIC interview, but although E. recognized the handwriting as her own, the writing did

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not help E. to remember “what happened in Reedley.” E. then read an officer’s statement
in an effort to refresh her recollection, but she was still unable to remember what abuse
occurred in Reedley or what she told officers or the interviewer about Reedley.
Trial Testimony of Jason Christopherson
Jason Christopherson, Ph.D, testified as an expert in CSAAS, which attempts to
explain the behavior of children who are the victims of sexual abuse. Dr. Christopherson
testified that he had not been provided with any reports in this case and did not know
anything about the case. Dr. Christopherson explained that CSAAS is not a diagnostic
tool or a tool used to prove something, rather it is a way of understanding the
psychological and developmental issues that children go through and how that
development affects a child’s response to being a sexual abuse victim.
Dr. Christopherson testified that CSAAS recognizes five major behaviors that
victimized children commonly manifest: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment
accommodation, unconvincing disclosure, and recanted disclosure. Dr. Christopherson
testified that the list is not intended to be a checklist or understood to mean that all
victims will exhibit each behavior; a child may exhibit some or all five of the behaviors.
Dr. Christopherson described each of the five CSAAS behaviors. With respect to
secrecy, Dr. Christopherson testified that children may keep secrets for months, years, or
decades because of a special or family relationship with the abuser, they are afraid of
getting in trouble, they may be responding to threats by the abuser, or they are naturally
uncomfortable talking about sexual abuse. With respect to helplessness, children may
feel “stuck” because they fear “bad things happening, getting in trouble, or losing a
special relationship, or they feel conflicted because there may be an element of pleasure
from the abuse that creates a mixed experience. With respect to entrapment
accommodation, because children may feel stuck and afraid that they or the abuser could
get in trouble, children sometimes seek out the abuser, have interactions with the abuser,
attempt to protect their relationship with the abuser, or do not disclose the abuse. As a

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method of accommodation, children may also engage in disassociation, in which the child
essentially blocks out or does not remember traumatic experiences like sexual abuse.
With respect to unconvincing disclosures, Dr. Christopherson explained that
disassociation may cause a child victim to forget details, mix up details, or combine
multiple events into a single event. Some children may also engage in incremental
disclosure by disclosing little details over time or to different people, while other children
may disclose all of the abuse to a single person all at once. With respect to recanting
disclosures, sometimes children see their lives being entirely changed and, in an effort to
return to how things used to be, recant or retract their disclosures. On cross-examination,
Dr. Christopherson testified in part that non-sexual traumas, such as being neglected due
to parental substance abuse, may cause a child to exhibit any of the five CSAAS
behaviors.
DISCUSSION
I. PROPRIETY OF CSAAS EXPERT EVIDENCE
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously admitted Dr. Christopherson’s
CSAAS evidence for several reasons. First, defendant argues that the “myths” that
CSAAS seeks to dispel are now readily understood by the public in light of recent sex
abuse scandals. Second, defendant argues that other jurisdictions recognize that CSAAS
evidence is inadmissible and unreliable. Third, defendant argues that CSAAS is rebuttal
evidence and that there was nothing to rebut from E.’s testimony because she testified to
the elements of the charges and defense counsel never questioned or attacked E.’s
credibility. Finally, defendant argues that Dr. Christopherson’s testimony was too
contradictory and confusing to be considered relevant evidence. Defendant argues that
admission of the irrelevant CSAAS evidence violated his due process rights and was
prejudicial under any standard. Defendant also argues that the issue has not been

8.
forfeited because defense counsel objected to Dr. Christopherson’s testimony in
opposition to the prosecutor’s motion in limine.
The People contend in part that Dr. Christopherson’s CSAAS testimony was
relevant and properly admitted. The People argue that defendant’s arguments regarding
the public’s understanding of a child’s reaction to sexual abuse, as well as his reliance on
out of state authority, are foreclosed by recent California authority. The People also
argue that the CSAAS evidence was relevant and admissible because E.’s testimony
implicated multiple myths/behaviors that are addressed by CSAAS.
B. Additional Background
As part of her motions in limine, the prosecutor moved to admit expert testimony
regarding misconceptions about the five CSAAS behaviors of children. Defense counsel
objected that until E. testified, it was unclear whether CSAAS evidence would have any
relevance. Defense counsel explained:

“If there is evidence that the complaining witness comes up and
states this never happened or I lied or any of those things which would not
go to or which would go against the veracity of her claim, then a CSAAS
expert may become appropriate. But if she comes and testifies and
basically lists off the elements of these charges, putting up a CSAAS
expert, all that does is vouch for her and vouch for the jury and say not only
did she say this happened, but, look, we have an expert who says this
happened. It doesn’t add anything if there isn’t inconsistencies or anything
of that nature.

“So at this moment it is irrelevant in that we don’t know. If there is
major changes or major issues with her testimony, then obviously my
argument would be extremely different a day from now.”
The trial court took the CSAAS motion in limine under advisement until after E. testified.
After E. and R.L. testified, the trial court returned to the issue of CSAAS
testimony. The court simply stated that it was “going to allow the CSAAS.” Defense
counsel made no objections to the court’s ruling and did not object during Dr.
Christopherson’s testimony.

9.
C. Legal Standards
1. Expert Testimony Generally
An expert witness may express opinions on any “subject that is sufficiently
beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.”
(Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 831.) Further,
because it is part of an expert’s specialized knowledge, experts may inform the jury about
background information generally accepted and reasonably relied on in their field.
(People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 821, fn. 20.) Trial courts have broad discretion
in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, and their admissibility
decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th
36, 60; see People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 484.) A trial court may abuse its
discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner that results in a
miscarriage of justice (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587) or when its ruling is
outside the bounds of reason under the circumstances (People v. Johnson (2022) 12
Cal.5th 544, 605). “ ‘A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of
discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
2. CSAAS Expert Testimony
Expert CSAAS testimony is generally admitted to “ ‘disabuse jurors of commonly
held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents
of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch); see
People v. Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438, 455–456 (Flores).)3 Therefore, “[w]hen a

3 Defendant’s citation to out of state authority for the proposition that CSAAS
evidence is unreliable or an improper way to bolster the testimony of a child witness is
unpersuasive. As demonstrated by these citations, our Supreme Court and numerous
California appellate courts have held that CSAAS testimony is admissible. Accordingly,
we follow McAlpin and its progeny and will not reexamine the issue.

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victim’s credibility is placed at issue due to ‘paradoxical behavior, including a delay in
reporting,’ CSAAS testimony is admissible to disabuse a jury of misconceptions about
how a child reacts to molestation.” (Flores, supra, at p. 456; see People v. Page (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1027, fn. 2 (Page); People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737,
1744–1745 (Patino).) Stated differently, expert CSAAS evidence may be introduced “if
the issue of a specific misconception is suggested by the evidence.” (Patino, supra, at p.
1745.) However, expert testimony regarding CSAAS may not be admitted to prove that a
complaining witness has been sexually abused, nor may a CSAAS expert witness opine
about the veracity of a complaining witness. (See McAlpin, supra, at p. 1300; Munch,
supra, at p. 468.) Thus, “[w]hile CSAAS evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged
sexual abuse occurred, it is well established [that] CSAAS evidence is relevant for the
limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.”
(People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias).) Reviewing courts
routinely hold that the admission of CSAAS evidence in compliance with the rules of
evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights. (See id. at p. 174; Patino, at
p. 1747.)
D. Analysis
1. Forfeiture
In some circumstances, an appellant’s objection as part of a motion in limine and a
court’s ruling thereon may be sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal without further
objections during trial. (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1108–1109; People
v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 (Morris), disapproved on another ground in People
v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) However, for an issue to be preserved
based only on in limine proceedings, there must be, among other things, an express ruling
from the trial court (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1171), and the ruling must
have been made at a time when the trial judge was able to determine the evidentiary
question in its appropriate context. (Morris, supra, at p. 190.)

11.
Here, the trial court did not make any express rulings with respect to Dr.
Christopherson during the motions in limine hearing. Defense counsel objected to the
admission of Dr. Christopherson’s testimony on relevancy grounds because it was
unknown precisely what E.’s testimony would be. The trial court agreed with defense
counsel because it took the matter under advisement until after E. testified. Thus, no
ruling was made at the motions in limine hearing because the trial court was not in a
position to assess the relevancy of Dr. Christopherson’s testimony without first hearing
E.’s testimony. Under such circumstances, defense counsel’s in limine objection did not
preserve errors with respect to Dr. Christopherson. (People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th
at p. 1171; Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 190.)
In order for defendant to have preserved issues relating to Dr. Christopherson, he
was obligated to object and explain why Dr. Christopherson’s testimony was irrelevant in
light of E.’s actual trial testimony and too vague. (Evid. Code, § 353; Morris, supra, 53
Cal.3d at p. 190; see People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 729.) Defendant made no
such objections. Therefore, defendant has forfeited his vagueness and relevancy
objections to Dr. Christopherson’s testimony. (Evid. Code, § 353; Danielson, supra, at p.
729; Morris, supra, at p. 190.)
2. Relevancy of Dr. Christopherson’s Testimony
Alternatively, even if defendant did not forfeit his relevancy objection, Dr.
Christopherson’s testimony was relevant and admissible because the evidence
demonstrated that E. exhibited four of the five CSAAS behaviors.4 (Page, supra, 114

4 Similarly, even if defendant did not forfeit his vagueness objection, the objection
is without merit. Dr. Christopherson’s testimony was clear and typical CSAAS expert
testimony. (E.g. People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 214–215; Lapenias,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 467; Patino, supra,
26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1742.)

12.
Cal.App.5th at p. 1027, fn. 2; Flores, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 456; Patino, supra, 26
Cal.App.4th at p. 1745.)
First, with respect to secrecy, Dr. Christopherson testified in part that children may
keep the secret of sexual abuse for months, years, or decades because of a special
relationship with the abuser, a fear of getting into trouble, and natural discomfort over
speaking about sexual abuse. Consistent with this testimony, E. did not disclose for years
any abuse and did not disclose the abuse until months after it had ended. When she
finally did disclose to Valdez, she did not go into detail and was too afraid to tell her
mom; Valdez had to disclose to R.L. E. also testified that she did not tell the police in
December 2015 everything that defendant had done to her and, as of trial, she still had
not told her family everything that defendant did. E. also testified that she was afraid of
what defendant could do to her mother and to herself if she disclosed and yet at times she
still loved and cared for defendant and viewed him as a father figure. Further, E.
explained to the MDIC interviewer that she told her aunt and a CPS officer that she was
not being abused by defendant, even though she was directly asked about inappropriate
touching, because she did not want her aunt to be mad and did not want CPS to take her
away from her mom. Finally, E. said during her MDIC interview that she was tired of
talking about the abuse and that there were other things that defendant had done to her
that she was unwilling to discuss.
Second, with respect to helplessness, Dr. Christopherson testified in part that
children may feel stuck in an abusive situation in part because they fear getting into
trouble, losing a special relationship, or are afraid of bad things happening. Consistent
with this explanation, again, E. testified she was afraid of defendant doing bad things to
her family and told the MDIC interviewer that she was afraid of getting in trouble or
losing her relationship with her mother if she disclosed the abuse.
Third, Dr. Christopherson testified in part about the disassociation aspect of
entrapment accommodation. Dr. Christopherson explained that as a method of

13.
accommodation, children may utilize disassociation and block out or forget the traumatic
experiences of sexual abuse. Consistent with this explanation, E. testified that she could
not remember all of the episodes of sexual abuse, even though they were very common,
and expressly stated that she had blocked out the memories of abuse because they were
so traumatic. Further, E. testified that she had no recollection of any abuse occurring in
Reedley, despite two attempts to refresh her recollection and even though E. had told the
MDIC interviewer in December 2015 that the first act of abuse occurred in Reedley when
she was four or five years old.
Fourth, and finally, Dr. Christopherson testified in part about the disassociation
and incremental disclosure aspects of unconvincing disclosures. Dr. Christopherson
testified that disassociation may cause some children to forget or “mix up” details, while
incremental disclosure may cause some children to disclose some details over a period of
time and to different people. The evidence and E.’s testimony are consistent with both of
these aspects of unconvincing disclosure. E. testified to forgetting details about the
episodes of abuse, blocking out many of the episodes, and entirely forgetting the first
disclosed act of sexual abuse against her. Further, the evidence demonstrated that E.
revealed some of the abuse to Valdez, then some to her family, then some to the police,
and then more to the MDIC interviewer, but she had not fully disclosed all that defendant
had done to her.
We recognize that defense counsel’s cross-examination of E. was relatively brief
and, although counsel asked E. about a timeline of disclosures, she did not confront E.
with any express inconsistencies in her testimony. Nevertheless, CSAAS evidence may
become relevant and admissible when the admitted evidence demonstrates paradoxical
behavior by the victim that may be explained by CSAAS. (Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1027, fn. 2; Flores, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 456; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1745; see also Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172.) As recounted above, E.’s
testimony and other evidence revealed behavior by E. that could be explained by four

14.
CSAAS behaviors. In fact, during closing argument, defense counsel acknowledged that
“[E.]’s actions as a 12-year-old were consistent with CSAAS.” Because E.’s testimony
and other evidence clearly implicated four of the five CSAAS behaviors, Dr.
Christopherson’s testimony was admissible to disabuse the jury of any misconceptions
that they may have harbored regarding how children react to sexual molestation. (Page,
supra, at p. 1027, fn. 2; Flores, supra, at p. 456; Patino, supra, at p. 1745; see Lapenias,
supra, at p. 172.) Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr.
Christopherson’s testimony (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 605; People v.
Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 60; People v. Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 587), and
defendant’s due process rights were not violated. (Lapenias, supra, at p. 174; Patino,
supra, at p. 1747.)
II. INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO CSAAS
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that there is cumulative prejudicial instructional error because
the trial court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 332 (expert witnesses)
and CALCRIM No. 1193 (CSAAS evidence) but without instructing with CALCRIM
No. 303 (limited purpose evidence). With respect to CALCRIM No. 303, defendant
argues that CALCRIM No. 1193 does not sufficiently inform the jury that CSAAS
evidence is limited purpose evidence and the bench notes for CALCRIM No. 1193 direct
the court to give CALCRIM No. 303. Second, Defendant contends that CALCRIM No.
332 and CALCRIM No. 1193 together are confusing and permit a jury to consider
hypothetical questions that are too close to the facts of the case. Defendant also argues
that CALCRIM No. 332 tells the jury they must consider an expert’s opinion, but
CALCRIM No. 1193 does not use the word opinion. Further, defendant argues that
CALCRIM No. 332 requires the jury to consider assumed facts within an opinion without
giving the jury a basis to consider the truth of CSAAS. Third, and finally, defendant
argues that CALCRIM No. 1193 is contrary to law because it tells the jury to consider

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whether a victim’s testimony “was consistent” with CSAAS, as opposed to “not
inconsistent,” with being molested and it fails to tell the jury that CSAAS evidence may
not be used to determine whether a victim’s molestation claim is true.
The People argue defendant has forfeited his instructional errors because he did
not object at trial. Alternatively, the People argue there was no prejudicial instructional
error. First, the failure to give CALCRIM No. 303 was harmless because CALCRIM No.
1193 contains its own limiting language. Second, as recognized by other courts of
appeal, CALCRIM No. 1193 is an appropriate instruction that does not tell jurors to
consider CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt. Third, CALCRIM No. 332 is not
confusing when combined with CALCRIM No. 1193 because in part CALCRIM Nos.
332 and 1193 merely give the jury guidance on how to evaluate CSAAS evidence.
B. Additional Background
The trial court and the parties conferred regarding jury instructions. Prior to
conferring, the prosecutor requested the court give CALCRIM Nos. 332 and 1193, while
defendant requested the court give CALCRIM Nos. 303 and 332. The court decided to
give CALCRIM Nos. 332 and 1193, but after commenting that there was no limited
evidence introduced, it declined to give CALCRIM No. 303. After identifying the
instructions to be given, both the prosecutor and defense counsel stated that they agreed
with those instructions, and no objections were made.
CALCRIM No. 332 (Instruction 332) as given to the jury in relevant part read:

“A witness was allowed to testify as an expert and to give opinion.
You must consider the opinion, but you are not required to accept it as true
or correct. The meaning and importance of any opinion are for you to
decide. In evaluating the believability of an expert witness, follow the
instructions about the believability of witnesses generally. In addition,
consider the expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education,
the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on
which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether
information on which the expert relied was true and accurate.

16.
“You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable,
unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.

“An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question. A
hypothetical question asks the witness to assume certain facts are true and
to give an opinion based on the assumed facts. It is up to you to decide
whether an assumed fact has been proved. If you conclude that an assumed
fact is not true, consider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact in
evaluating the expert’s opinion.”
CALCRIM No. 1193 (Instruction 1193) as given to the jury read:

“You have heard testimony from Dr. Christopherson regarding
[CSAAS].

“[CSAAS] relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in
child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is
offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual
abuse.

“Dr. Christopherson’s testimony about [CSAAS] is not evidence that
the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him or any
conduct or crimes with which he was not charged.

“You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
E.’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been
molested, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.”
C. Legal Standard
Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. (People v. Lewis (2023) 14
Cal.5th 876, 900 (Lewis); People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382 (Thomas).)
Thus, an “ ‘appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses
whether the instruction accurately states the law.’ ” (Lewis, supra, at p. 900; People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) If a defendant contends that an instruction misstates
the law, the reviewing court must view the challenged instruction “ ‘ “in the context of
the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” ’ ” (Lewis,
supra, at p. 900; Mitchell, supra, at p. 579.) “ ‘Jurors are presumed able to understand
and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court’s

17.
instructions.’ ” (Thomas, supra, at p. 382.) If reasonably possible to do so, reviewing
courts interpret an instruction in a manner that supports the judgment, as opposed to
defeating it. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 377; People v. Quinonez (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 457, 465.) Depending on the nature of the error, harm from an
instructional error will be assessed under either the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, or the probability of a more favorable
outcome standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Hendrix (2022)
13 Cal. 5th 933, 942.)
D. Analysis
1. Instruction 1193
Initially, because defendant contends that Instruction 1193 is an incorrect
statement of law, he has not forfeited his claim of error. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1002, 1012.) Nevertheless, defendant’s challenges to Instruction 1193 have been
made to other Courts of Appeal and been consistently rejected. We agree with our sister
courts and are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments.
First, we cannot agree that Instruction 1193 impermissibly allowed the jurors to
consider CSAAS testimony as evidence of guilt by addressing a victim’s credibility.
Courts have recognized that a reasonable jury would understand that Instruction 1193
does two distinct things: it allows the jury to view CSAAS testimony to conclude that a
victim’s behavior does not mean the victim lied about being abused, and it prohibits the
jury from using CSAAS testimony to conclude that the victim was in fact molested. (See
Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
504.) Because these two aspects of Instruction 1193 “simply neutralize[] the victim’s
apparently self-impeaching behavior,” “a juror who believes [the CSAAS expert’s]
testimony will find both that [the victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not
affect her believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence does not show
[the victim] had been molested.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 504; see Page, supra, at p.

18.
1030.) Therefore, Instruction 1193 did not impermissibly permit the jury to consider
CSAAS testimony as evidence of defendant’s guilt. (Page, supra, at p. 1030; People v.
Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 219–220; People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
768, 815–816; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176; Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474.)
Second, although prior authority (e.g. People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th
947, 959), as well as prior versions of Instruction 1193, provided that CSAAS evidence
may demonstrate that a victim’s reactions were “not inconsistent with having been
molested,” we cannot conclude that Instruction 1193’s use of the phrase “consistent with”
(instead of “not inconsistent with”) is of any import. “[C]onsistent with” and “not
inconsistent with” mean the same thing. “[C]onsistent with” merely eliminates a
grammatical double negative. (Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.)
Third, contrary to defendant’s arguments, Instruction 1193 did not permit the jury
to conclude that E. must have been abused simply because her behavior was consistent
with CSAAS. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal has recently explained:

“ ‘[T]he last sentence of [Instruction 1193] contains a direction with
specific and general aspects. Specifically, the jury is to use the expert
testimony to help ground its analysis of the consistency of the complaining
witness’s conduct (by using a more informed reference point). The jury is
then to use this “consistency” analysis in its general evaluation of the
believability of the complaining witness’s testimony. … Reasonable jurors
would not understand the instruction to mean that if they find the
characteristics of [CSAAS] to be satisfied, this indicates that the [victim]
was necessarily telling the truth.’ ” (Page, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p.
1032.)
As a result, Instruction 1193 appropriately limits the use of CSAAS evidence without:
(a) improperly allowing an alleged minor victim of sexual abuse to corroborate her own
testimony; (b) violating due process; or (c) misapplying the burden of proof. (Page,
supra, at pp. 1032–1033; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)

19.
For these reasons, defendant has not demonstrated that Instruction 1193 was an
inaccurate statement of law or an otherwise improper or prejudicial instruction.
2. Giving Instruction 332 and Instruction 1193 Together
a. Forfeiture
Instruction 332 correctly states the law with respect to assessing the testimony of
an expert witness. (§ 1227b [requiring that a jury be instructed regarding how to assess
expert testimony]; People v. Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 859–860.) Further, as
explained above, Instruction 1193 correctly states the law with respect to CSAAS
testimony. Because Instructions 332 and 1193 are both correct statements of the law, it
was incumbent upon defendant to seek a clarification or modification of these
instructions to address any perceived confusion. (People v. Geier (2006) 41 Cal.4th 555,
579; People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 503.) Because defendant made no
objections and sought no clarifications or modifications regarding Instructions 332 and
1193, defendant has forfeited any error from giving the two instructions together. (Geier,
supra, at p. 579; Kimble, supra, at p. 503.)
b. No Confusion
Alternatively, even if the defendant did not forfeit his challenges to giving
Instructions 332 and 1193, we are not persuaded that the two instructions created any
confusion.5
i. Hypothetical Questions
Defendant contends that Instruction 332 discusses hypothetical questions and
directs the jury to determine whether the assumed facts or basis for a hypothetical
question was true. We agree that Instruction 332 so informs the jury. Nevertheless, that
portion of Instruction 332 was essentially surplusage because Dr. Christopherson was not

5 We note that the directions for Instruction 1193 state that Instruction 332 is to be
used when Instruction 1193 is given. The Instruction 1193 directions do not state that
Instruction 332 should be modified in any way.

20.
asked any hypothetical questions. Indeed, defendant identifies no hypothetical questions
(or questions tied to the specific facts of this case, for that matter) that were posed to Dr.
Christopherson. Instead, Dr. Christopherson was generally asked about CSAAS and the
five behaviors recognized by CSAAS. This is the proper scope of CSAAS testimony.
(Cf. People v. Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 821, fn. 20 [noting that expert may testify
as to generally accepted principles within a profession]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at pp. 214–215 [noting the limited nature of the CSAAS expert’s testimony
and the possible reactions of child sex abuse victims]; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 171 [expert CSAAS testimony admitted when evidence suggested that four of the five
CSAAS behaviors or myths would be implicated]; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p.
467 [CSAAS expert had no information about the facts of the case but testified as to
characteristics of children who had been sexually abused]; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1742 [expert testified regarding five behaviors of CSAAS].) Defendant theorizes
that if the jury concluded hypothetical questions were asked, those questions would
necessarily assume facts that are close to the facts of this case. However, since no
hypothetical questions were asked, there is no basis to conclude the jury would think that
hypothetical questions were asked or that the jury would examine assumed bases for any
theoretical hypothetical questions. (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 382.) In the absence
of any hypothetical questions actually being asked of Dr. Christopherson, the jury would
not apply Instruction 332’s language regarding hypothetical questions. (Ibid.; see also
Lewis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 900.)
ii. Absence of “Opinion” from Instruction 1193
Defendant is correct that Instruction 332 uses the term “opinion,” but Instruction
1193 does not. However, simply because Instruction 1193 does not use the term
“opinion” does not mean that there is confusion or a fatal inconsistency between
Instruction 332 and Instruction 1193 or that the jury would not understand how to
evaluate Dr. Christopherson’s testimony. To the contrary, we believe that a reasonable

21.
jury would understand that Instructions 332 and 1193 complement each other.
Specifically, Instruction 1193 informs the jury that CSAAS testimony is a specialized
form of expert testimony that can only be considered for limited purposes, while
Instruction 332 informs the jury that Dr. Christopherson’s entire expert testimony is
subject to specific considerations as part of the jury’s process for determining how much
weight to give his testimony and whether to accept or reject his testimony in whole or in
part. We detect nothing about the failure of Instruction 1193 to mention the term
“opinion” that would confuse the jury or prejudice the defendant.6 Therefore, defendant
has not shown that the jury would be confused by Instruction 1193 or apply it in a
prejudicial manner. (Lewis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 900.)
iii. Basis for CSAAS Testimony
Defendant argues that Instruction 332 required the jury to decide whether the
information upon which Dr. Christopherson relied was true and accurate, but Dr.
Christopherson did not offer any evidence by which the jury could conclude whether the
factual basis of CSAAS had been proven. We are not convinced.
Expert testimony regarding CSAAS is not admitted for the purpose of proving
CSAAS or explaining how CSAAS has been proven in the relevant field, rather it is
admitted to help juries assess the credibility of child sexual abuse victims in light of
CSAAS. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172.) As such, Dr. Christopherson
was not required to “prove” CSAAS, rather, it was sufficient for him to explain CSAAS
in general and the five behaviors of CSAAS in particular. Such testimony has been
repeatedly held to be admissible. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214–

6 We note the trial court gave the jury CALCRIM Nos. 103 and 220, which properly
informed the jury to consider all of the evidence received during trial. Because all of Dr.
Christopherson’s testimony, including his opinions, was received as “evidence,” the jury
would consider all of Dr. Christopherson’s testimony irrespective of Instruction 332 or its
use of the term “opinion.” (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 382.)

22.
215; Lapenias, supra, at p. 171; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 467; Patino, supra,
26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1742). This is in part because expert witnesses may inform the jury
about background information that is generally accepted and reasonably relied on in their
field. (People v. Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 821, fn. 20.) It is the general nature of a
CSAAS expert’s testimony that permits the jury to understand and assess the credibility
of an alleged child sexual abuse victim by dispelling common myths and misconceptions.
(People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301; Munch, supra, at p. 468.)
Here, through Instruction 332, the jury was directed to consider whether Dr.
Christopherson had adequately explained the basis of CSAAS sufficiently for them to
consider and apply it to this case. To the extent the jury was unsatisfied with Dr.
Christopherson’s explanations, including with respect to the origins or acceptance of
CSAAS, Instruction 332 permitted the jury to reject some or all of his testimony. Given
the nature of CSAAS testimony and the language of Instruction 332, defendant has not
shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied Instruction 332 in a prejudicial
way (Lewis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 900), and we cannot conclude that a jury would be
confused by not knowing how CSAAS had been “proven.”
3. CALCRIM No. 303
CALCRIM No. 303 reads: “During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.”
The trial court did not give CALCRIM No. 303 apparently because it concluded that no
evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. Defendant had requested CALCRIM No.
303 be given, but did not explain to the court that Dr. Christopherson’s CSAAS
testimony was admitted for a limited purpose (Flores, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 455–
456 [noting the limited purpose of CSAAS evidence]) or object when the court stated that
it would not give CALCRIM No. 303.
Assuming without deciding that defendant did not forfeit this issue, the court’s
failure to give CALCRIM No. 303 was harmless. It is true that the bench notes for

23.
Instruction 1193 state that if the instruction is given, CALCRIM No. 303 should also be
given. However, Instruction 1193 already informed the jury that there was a limitation
on how to consider the CSAAS evidence. Instruction 1193 instructed the jury to consider
CSAAS evidence “only in deciding whether or not [E.]’s conduct was consistent with the
conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of [the
victim.]” The word “only” is a term of limitation and exclusivity. (Machado v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 347, 357–358; Johnson v. Ocean
Shore Railroad Co. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 429, 434; Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p.
1089, col. 1 [definition of “only”].) By directing the jury to “only” consider CSAAS for
two purposes (believability and conduct consistent with CSAAS), Instruction 1193 of
necessity informed the jury that they could consider CSAAS for no other purposes. We
presume that the jury understood the meaning of Instruction 1193, the import of the word
“only,” and that they followed Instruction 1193 by only considering CSAAS evidence for
the limited purposes described. (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 382.) There is nothing
before us to rebut these presumptions. Therefore, because we presume that the jury
correctly followed the limitations in Instruction 1193, and because the express limitation
within Instruction 1193 has the same limiting effect as CALCRIM No. 303, the failure to
give CALCRIM No. 303 was harmless under any standard.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that his trial counsel’s conduct with respect to the CSAAS
testimony and the CSAAS related jury instructions were prejudicially ineffective.
In order for defense counsel’s conduct to be deemed constitutionally ineffective,
the defendant must show both a deficient performance and prejudice. (People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 706.) Defendant cannot meet these requirements. First, as
explained above, we have determined that Dr. Christopherson’s testimony was relevant
and properly admitted and that the trial court properly gave Instructions 332 and 1193.
Therefore, defense counsel had no bases for objections and was not deficient with respect

24.
to these alleged errors. Second, we have determined that the failure to give CALCRIM
No. 303 was harmless. Therefore, defendant could not have been prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to request CALCRIM No. 303. For these reasons, defendant has failed
to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT COUNT 1
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues there is no evidence that the count 1 offense occurred during the
time period charged. Defendant argues that E. had no recollection of the count 1 offense,
and the MDIC did not establish a definite time when the abuse occurred because E. said
she thought the abuse began between ages four or five, likely when she was in preschool,
and after her brother had been born. Defendant points out that E. was six when her
brother was born, and that the prosecutor amended the information to specifically allege
that the abuse in count 1 occurred between August 1, 2007, and June 30, 2012. However,
based on the MDIC interview, the abuse could have occurred in January 2007, when E.
turned four, and the seven-month gap between January 2007 and August 2007 is
materially outside of the time range alleged in count 1. Defendant argues it is absolute
speculation that E. was abused on or after August 1, 2007.
The People contend that the MDIC interview constitutes substantial evidence and
supports the count 1 conviction. The People also argue that the date that count 1
occurred need not be proved with exactness and that there were no material discrepancies
between any relevant dates.
B. Legal Standard
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, reviewing
courts “ ‘ “ ‘ “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable,
credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820.)

25.
“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) Appellate courts
presume in support of the judgment every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. (Oyler, supra, at p. 820.) Appellate courts do not resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724,
749.) “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon
no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s
verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.) A judgment will not be
reversed for insufficiency of the evidence merely because the circumstances may also be
reasonably reconciled with a conclusion contrary to the judgment. (Oyler, supra, at p.
820.)
C. Additional Background
Pertinent to count 1, the trial court gave the jury CALCRIM Nos. 207 and 1127.
CALCRIM No. 207 informed the jury as follows: “It is alleged that the crimes
occurred on or about August 1, 2007 through June 30, 2012. The People are not required
to prove that the crimes to place exactly on those days but only that they happened
reasonably close to those days.”
CALCRIM No. 1127 identified the elements of a section 288.7, subdivision (a)
offense. Apart from the elements of the offense, this instruction informed the jury that
the “defendant is charged in Count One with engaging in sodomy with a child 10 years of
age or younger in violation of Penal Code section 288.7(a). (First time in the city of
Reedley, when the victim was four or five years old).”
D. Analysis
As noted above, the count 1 offense is based on the first act of sodomy that was
performed against E. by defendant. Count 1 was alleged to have occurred in Reedley
when E. was either four or five years old. There is no doubt that E.’s trial testimony was

26.
insufficient to support a conviction on count 1 because she had absolutely no recollection
of any abuse occurring in Reedley.
Notwithstanding E.’s trial testimony, the jury also viewed E.’s MDIC interview.
In the MDIC interview, E. told the interviewer that defendant pulled her pants down,
placed his penis in her “butt,” and moved up and down without letting her get up. E. also
told the interviewer that this act of sodomy occurred in Reedley when she was either four
or five years old and she thought she was in preschool and thought that her brother had
been born but he was still a baby. E.’s statements in the MDIC interview are direct
evidence that establishes each element of the section 288.7, subdivision (a) violation
charged in count 1, including that she was four or five years old (and thus, under 10 years
old), and the abuse occurred in Reedley. Therefore, E.’s MDIC interview by itself
constitutes substantial evidence that supports the count 1 conviction. (People v. Ghobrial
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 281; see People v. Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 820.)
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to show that E. was abused in
Reedley between August 1, 2007, and June 30, 2012. However, the general rule is that
the prosecution “need not plead the exact time of commission of an alleged offense.”
(People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1027; see § 955.) If the prosecution opts to
allege specific dates or time periods, it has long been established that the prosecution
does not need to actually prove the alleged date(s) with exactness so long as the
prosecution shows the offense took place before the filing of the information and within
the limitations period, unless time is somehow a material element in the case or the
defendant was misled in his defense. (See People v. Lees (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 363,
369; People v. Krupnick (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 755, 764; People v. Roebling (1936) 14
Cal.App.2d 586, 589.) Here, defendant has not shown that time itself was a material
element of the offense, he did not pursue an alibi defense, he has not argued or shown
that the alleged conduct in Reedley occurred outside of any limitations period, he has not
demonstrated how a distinction between January 2007 (the month and year of E.’s fourth

27.
birthday) and August 1, 2007 is material, and he has not argued or demonstrated that he
was in any way misled in making his defense based on the timeframes alleged in the
information. (Lees, supra, at p. 369; Krupnick, supra, at p. 764.) Therefore, the failure
of the prosecutor to prove an exact date within the timeframe alleged in the information
for count 1 is of no consequence. (Lees, supra, at p. 369; Krupnick, supra, at p. 764.)
In sum, sufficient evidence supports defendant’s conviction on count 1.
V. CUSTODY AND CONDUCT CREDITS
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that there was a miscalculation as to his custody and conduct
credits. Defendant contends that he is entitled to three additional days of custody credits
and one additional day of section 2933.1 conduct credit.
The People agree there was a miscalculation and that defendant is entitled to three
additional days of custody credit. However, because conduct credits under section
2933.1 are subject to a 15 percent limitation, the People argue that defendant is not
entitled to any additional conduct credits.
B. Analysis
We agree with the parties that, based on an arrest date of October 9, 2020, and a
sentencing date of August 13, 2024, defendant is entitled to 1,405 days of custody credit.
Because defendant was awarded 1,402 days of custody credit, he is entitled to an
additional three days of custody credit.
With respect to conduct credits, section 2933.1, subdivision (c) limits the amount
of presentence credits to 15 percent of the actual period of presentence confinement for
those who are convicted of a violent felony, as defined by section 667.5, subdivision (c).
(§ 2933.1, subd. (c); People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 794; People v. Jones (2009)
47 Cal.4th 566, 576.) Defendant’s convictions under section 288.7, subdivision (a) are
violent felonies under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(7) (convictions for offenses punished
by death or life imprisonment), and defendant’s conviction under section 288,

28.
subdivision (a) is a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(6) (convictions
under § 288, subds. (a) and (b)). Therefore, all of defendant’s convictions are for violent
felonies, and the amount of presentence conduct credits that defendant may be awarded is
capped by section 2933.1, subdivision (c) to 15 percent of 1,405 days. Fifteen percent of
1,405 days is 210.75 days. Because 211 days of conduct credit would exceed 15 percent,
and because defendant may not be awarded partial days, the trial court correctly awarded
defendant 210 days of conduct credit. (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140,
1184; People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815–816.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. This matter is remanded back to the trial court in order
to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that awards defendant 1,405 days of custody
credits.

FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

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