People v. Bragg CA4/3

CourtListener 10804499Calctapp05.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 3/5/26 P. v. Bragg CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065405

v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CF1316)

DAVID GIRARD BRAGG, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Reed Webb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant David Girard Bragg was convicted by a jury of one
count of attempted robbery. On appeal, his appointed attorney filed a brief
pursuant to the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. While not arguing against his
client, counsel represented he found no arguable issues to advance on appeal
and asked us to review the appellate record, which we have done. We also
advised Bragg of his right to file a written argument on his own behalf, but
he has not done so. Finding no arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of May 18, 2024, J.M. was working the walk-up
window at a donut shop in Orange when Bragg came up to the window and
said, “Give me all the money in the register.” At first, J.M. thought Bragg
was joking because he spoke in a calm manner. But when Bragg dropped one
hand below the window counter and repeated the demand several times in a
louder voice, J.M. got scared and told him, “I can’t do that. I’m sorry.”
Bragg then left the window and began walking toward the back
of the shop. A few minutes later, though, he returned to the window and
began demanding money from J.M. again, saying, “I need the money in the
register.” Bragg was agitated and shouting this time around, but J.M. did not
give him any money. J.M.’s coworker called the police, and Bragg was
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arrested at the scene.
In closing argument, defense counsel argued Bragg lacked the
intent to commit robbery and compared him to a panhandler who was just
asking for money, not aggressively demanding it. However, the jury convicted

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At trial, surveillance video of the encounters between Bragg and
J.M. were played to the jury during the prosecution’s case.

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Bragg of attempted robbery, and he was placed on probation after the trial
court suspended his two-year prison sentence.
DISCUSSION
As we mentioned at the outset, appellate counsel was unable to
find any arguable issues to raise on Bragg’s behalf. He did, however, identify
two unbriefed issues to assist us in our review of the record: (1) Whether the
trial court erred in sustaining a hearsay objection to a statement regarding
Bragg’s physical condition; and (2) whether the court erred in limiting
defense counsel’s closing argument. Appellate counsel also suggests we
consider whether the prosecutor should have charged Bragg with
misdemeanor disorderly conduct, rather than felony attempted robbery.
The hearsay issue arose during the testimony of Jacob Reyes, one
of the arresting officers. On cross-examination, Reyes testified that after
Bragg was transported to the police station, he was taken to the hospital by
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the fire department. During this line of questioning, defense counsel asked
Reyes if Bragg “indicated to you he was having trouble breathing?” However,
the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objection before Reyes
answered the question, and defense counsel moved on to another topic.
As appellate counsel admits, the trial court’s hearsay ruling was
correct to the extent defense counsel was asking Reyes what Bragg personally
said to him. But even if the ruling was incorrect, it is not cause for reversal.
Appellate counsel suggests Bragg’s physical condition could have been used
to show he lacked the intent to rob at the donut shop, but there was no
evidence Bragg was in physical distress at the shop. Nor is there anything to

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The record does not disclose why Bragg was brought to the
hospital.

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suggest his breathing problems had any bearing on his mental condition. It is
not reasonably likely Bragg would have obtained a more favorable result had
the trial court overruled the prosecutor’s hearsay objection to the question
about his breathing. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
We reach the same conclusion with respect to whether the trial
court erred by precluding defense counsel from arguing in closing that
Bragg’s actions at the donut shop were attributable to mental health issues
he was experiencing. Appellate counsel suggests the argument was fair game
because J.M. had testified Bragg appeared worried, distressed, and not “in
the proper mental state” when he demanded the register money.
But there was no evidence at trial that Bragg suffered from
mental health issues. And even if there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for
defense counsel to make the argument, the jury would not have been required
to accept it. After all, J.M. testified Bragg was calm when he initially
approached him at the window, and he did not become agitated and start
shouting until J.M. refused to surrender the register money. Under these
circumstances, the jury could reasonably conclude Bragg’s agitated mental
state was due to his inability to secure the loot, as opposed to a mental health
issue. We do not believe Bragg would have fared better at trial had the trial
court permitted his attorney to argue this issue.
Lastly, as to whether Bragg should have been charged with a
misdemeanor rather than a felony, the law is clear that prosecutors have
broad discretion in deciding what charges to bring. (County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 35, 61.) Just because Bragg’s conduct may
have also constituted a misdemeanor does not mean he was improperly
charged with a felony. (See Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 82
[“the fact that the prosecutor may have had discretion to charge the

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defendant with a misdemeanor rather than a felony does not give such a
defendant the constitutional right to be treated as if he had been charged
with the lesser offense”].)
Having reviewed the entire record for any other arguable issues,
we are convinced none exist. We thus affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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