Hakim-Baba v. Desai CA6

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Filed 3/4/26 Hakim-Baba v. Desai CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

YAGHOOB HAKIM-BABA, H050787
(Monterey County
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Super. Ct. No. 20CV001292)
Appellant,

v.

HITESH DESAI et al.,

Defendants, Cross-complainants
and Respondents.

Persuaded by defendants Hitesh Desai, Jayesh Desai, and Mohammad Rezai,
plaintiff Yaghoob Hakim-Baba signed an agreement to purchase an interest in defendant
I & P Brothers, LLC (I & P). Hakim-Baba came to regret the purchase, but not before
paying much of the purchase price. When the parties were unable to agree on when and
how to refund Hakim-Baba the sum he had paid toward the purchase, Hakim-Baba sued.
Defendants cross-complained for breach of contract. The parties settled, with
Hakim-Baba electing to rescind the agreement rather than pursue his claims for tort
damages and defendants abandoning their cross-claim. Implementing the rescission
remedy, defendants refunded Hakim-Baba all the money he had paid, with half the
prejudgment interest he sued for; Hakim-Baba returned his interest in I & P.
Hakim-Baba recovered none of the damages he had claimed as the costs incurred in
raising the capital to fund the now-rescinded purchase. When Hakim-Baba sought
contractual attorney fees, contending that he was the prevailing party, the trial court
denied his request, finding that neither party obtained a greater recovery. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Pleadings
Hakim-Baba sued defendants in April 2020. Hakim-Baba alleged he paid
defendants $3.9 million in connection with an agreement that would provide him a
membership interest in I & P (the “I & P Purchase Agreement”) and defendants had used
about $2 million of Hakim-Baba’s payment to buy a property on Carmel Valley Road.
But one of the individual defendants took title to the Carmel Valley property.
Hakim-Baba alleged three causes of action. First, Hakim-Baba sought title to the Carmel
Valley property through a quiet title claim. Second, Hakim-Baba sought damages,
including statutory double damages and punitive damages, through a financial elder
abuse claim.1 Third, Hakim-Baba sought rescission, including a return of his $3.9
million and the economic costs he incurred to procure those funds. Hakim-Baba sought
interest on all “damages and/or restitution awarded.” Hakim-Baba alleged his contractual
entitlement to attorney fees in connection with his financial elder abuse and rescission
claims.
In his operative fourth amended complaint, filed about a year later, Hakim-Baba
included more detail in his factual allegations and more causes of action. Hakim-Baba
added that defendants used a spreadsheet to induce him to enter the I & P Purchase
Agreement when his capacity was diminished. The spreadsheet was the basis for
Hakim-Baba’s agreement to pay $4,661,113 for a 25 percent membership interest, but the
spreadsheet overvalued I & P’s property holdings and undervalued its debt. In addition
to his original causes of action, Hakim-Baba asserted causes of action for intentional
misrepresentation, concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty claiming the same $3.9

1
Hakim-Baba included in his prayer for relief a request for treble damages.

2
million he paid in connection with the contract as damages. Hakim-Baba alleged that
defendants had promised to refund his money if he canceled the deal but failed to do so.
Under the rescission cause of action, Hakim-Baba included within his damages “the cost
of funds and interest at the legal rate from the date [his] funds were delivered to”
defendants.
In their answer, defendants admitted that Hakim-Baba paid $3.9 million towards
the purchase of an interest in I & P, that Hakim-Baba had asked for his money back, and
that they had offered him his money back. In a cross-complaint, defendants alleged that
Hakim-Baba had breached the I & P Purchase Agreement by failing to pay the full
purchase price and sought damages including the balance of his purchase price, lost
profits, opportunity costs, and increased financing expenses.
B. Settlement
Before Hakim-Baba filed suit, defendants made three settlement offers.
First, defendants proposed converting Hakim-Baba’s “invest[ment]” into a loan to
I & P secured by a second deed of trust against two residential properties. The loan
would accrue interest at an annual rate of 7 percent, paid monthly, and I & P would pay
the principal within about a year.
Second, having waited a few weeks without receiving a response, I & P asserted
its position that Hakim-Baba was a member of I & P under a binding agreement but
modified its settlement offer. Again, the framework of the deal was to treat
Hakim-Baba’s money as a loan to I & P, but this time as a first position loan on the
Carmel Valley property and a second position loan on another with repayment forecast in
about seven months. To facilitate part of the repayment, the Carmel Valley property
would immediately be listed for sale.
Hakim-Baba made a partial counteroffer, proposing that the Carmel Valley
property be transferred to him in exchange for a credit. His proposal would have left the

3
parties to reserve their rights concerning the difference between the settlement value of
the Carmel Valley property and the amount he had already paid.
Third, defendants responded with their “final” offer. Defendants proposed two
alternatives for partial satisfaction of the refund due: (1) grant Hakim-Baba title to the
Carmel Valley property for a $2.3 million credit; (2) sell the Carmel Valley property,
paying Hakim-Baba $2 million from the proceeds. In either scenario, the balance still
owed to Hakim-Baba would constitute a second-position loan on another property, to be
satisfied from the proceeds of the anticipated sale of that property in about six months.
Hakim-Baba did not accept this final offer and sued. About two years after
Hakim-Baba filed his complaint, defendants accepted Hakim-Baba’s pretrial Code of
Civil Procedure section 998 offer.
Pursuant to the settlement, the trial court entered judgment in Hakim-Baba’s favor
and against defendants on the operative complaint and cross-complaint. The judgment
rescinded the I & P Purchase Agreement, extinguishing Hakim-Baba’s interest in I & P
and awarding Hakim-Baba $3.89 million in restitution, for which defendants were jointly
and severally liable.2 And the judgment awarded Hakim-Baba $357,720.14 in
prejudgment interest, calculated as simple interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per annum
through the acceptance of the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer. The trial court
reserved jurisdiction to address prevailing party costs and attorney fees. The parties
agreed to dismiss their respective complaints with prejudice after the judgment was
satisfied.
C. The Prevailing Party Determination and Appeal
Hakim-Baba sought over $800,000 in attorney fees, relying on the fee provision in
the I & P operating agreement. The operating agreement provides: “In the event that any

2
Hakim-Baba withdrew $10,000 from I & P’s bank account while the litigation
was pending. The settlement amount accounted for this withdrawal.

4
dispute between or among the Company, the Manager and/or the Members with respect
to the Company or this Agreement should result in litigation or arbitration, the prevailing
party in the dispute shall be entitled to recover from the other party all reasonable fees,
costs and expenses of enforcing any right of the prevailing party, including without
limitation reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses.”
The trial court denied the request, reasoning that “the compromise settlement did
not result in [Hakim-Baba] completely prevailing on all contract claims” and “neither
party obtained a ‘greater recovery,’ even though both recovered something under the
restitution obtained.” Hakim-Baba timely appealed from the denial of his postjudgment
fee request.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Attorney fees are not normally recoverable as costs” absent “ ‘a legal basis . . .
grounded in an agreement, statute, or other law.’ ” (Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality
Aggregates (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 269, 275, italics omitted.) Unless attorney fees are
“specifically provided by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys
and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.)
“[A] contractual provision may provide that the party that prevails in litigation
over noncontractual claims shall recover its attorney fees.” (Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc.
(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 990 (Maynard).) “If the attorney fee provision does
encompass noncontractual claims, the prevailing party entitled to recover fees normally
will be the party whose net recovery is greater, in the sense of most accomplishing its
litigation objectives, whether or not that party prevailed on a contract cause of action.”
(Id. at p. 992.)
“If the contractual [fee] provision limits an award of attorney fees to the party
who has prevailed on the contract, fees may be awarded only to that party, and Civil

5
Code section 1717 is invoked.”3 (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 990, italics
added; see also Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City of Long Beach (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 955, 965–966 (Waterwood).) Under section 1717, subdivision (b)(1),
subject to exceptions not applicable here, “the party prevailing on the contract shall be
the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also
determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.”
Where a contract is written broadly enough to encompass both tort and contract
claims in issue, courts apply ordinary rules of contract interpretation to determine what
the parties intended by their reference to a prevailing party. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
17 Cal.4th 599, 608 (Santisas).) In the absence of a contractual definition or extrinsic
evidence, courts may resort to the ordinary or popular meaning of “ ‘prevailing party.’ ”
(Id. at p. 609.) To do so, “a court may base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic
definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether
by judgment, settlement, or otherwise.” (Id. at p. 622.)
For fee provisions subject to section 1717, when the trial court “renders a simple,
unqualified decision in favor of [one party] on the only contract claim in the action” that
party “is unquestionably the sole victor” and “the prevailing party on the contract as a
matter of law.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 865–866 (Hsu).) A simple,
unqualified decision is one in which “the results of the litigation on the contract claims
are not mixed” but rather “purely good news for one party and bad news for the other”; in
such a case, “a trial court has no discretion to deny attorney fees to the successful
litigant.” (Id. at pp. 875–876, italics omitted.) But absent a complete and one-sided
victory on all contract claims, “ ‘it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine
which party prevailed on the contract or whether, on balance, neither party prevailed
sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.’ ” (In re Tobacco Cases I (2013)

3
Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

6
216 Cal.App.4th 570, 577 (Tobacco Cases I).) In exercising that discretion, “ ‘the trial
court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract . . . claims with the parties’
demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the
pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources’ ” and “ ‘ “the extent to
which each party [had] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form,
and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.” For example, a party
who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if
it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The trial court’s determination of the prevailing party for purposes of awarding
attorney fees is an exercise of discretion which should not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.” (Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit Plan v. The
Churchill Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103, 126; see also Tobacco Cases
I, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 578.)
B. Whether Hakim-Baba Won a Simple, Unqualified Victory
Hakim-Baba claims a “ ‘simple, unqualified victory’ ” on the contract despite
failing to secure all the monetary relief he requested in connection with his rescission
claim. Even if the contractual fee provision, despite the breadth of its plain language,
were limited by section 1717, the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that
the judgment was not a simple, unqualified victory.4
Leaving aside Hakim-Baba’s tort and financial elder abuse claims, Hakim-Baba
sought (1) rescission of the I & P Purchase Agreement—defendants’ return of his

4
The fee provision is bilateral, so the fee request does not depend on the language
in section 1717, subdivision (a) making unilateral fee provisions bilateral. While
section 1717 authorizes fee awards to “the party prevailing on the contract,” the fee
provision before us is not limited to contractual claims. (See Maynard, supra,
216 Cal.App.4th at p. 990–995.)

7
outstanding principal totaling almost $3.9 million in exchange for his return of his stake
in I & P; (2) his cost of procuring the principal he paid toward the purchase price; and
(3) seven percent interest on his principal and damages. Defendants, in contrast, asserted
a cross-claim seeking to (1) hold Hakim-Baba to the contract; (2) require Hakim-Baba to
pay the balance of the purchase price; and (3) require Hakim-Baba to pay damages
incurred because of his failure to timely pay the full purchase price.
Through settlement, Hakim-Baba achieved some, but not all, of his contract-based
objectives: (1) Hakim-Baba rescinded the contract for full restitution (avoiding any
contractual cross-claims); and (2) obtained 3.5 percent simple interest on his principal.
Hakim-Baba did not achieve all his objectives: (1) He recovered none of the costs of
procuring principal, which he had claimed as damages;5 and (2) he did not obtain the
other 3.5 percent interest, valued at over $350,000, on his refunded payment.
This is a mixed result.
Hakim-Baba’s reliance on Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005)
135 Cal.App.4th 21, 59 is misplaced. In Ajaxo, this court affirmed the trial court’s
determination that the plaintiff prevailed on the contract, despite a nonsuit on damages
for misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets: Plaintiff “won a simple, unqualified
verdict on the breach of contract claim” by “recover[ing] greater relief in the action on

5
The amount of Hakim-Baba’s claimed rescission damages is not clearly
evidenced in the record. At the motion hearing, defense counsel represented that these
damages constituted $50,000 Hakim-Baba paid to borrow the sum he paid to
defendants—plus associated but unquantified legal fees. In his appellate brief,
Hakim-Baba dismisses the $50,000 as a “trifle”—citing as support only counsel’s
argument at the motion hearing. We decline to accept counsel’s argument in support of
the fee request as evidence. (Cf. City of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
458, 465.) Even if we accepted counsel’s argument as evidence, the amount would still
exceed $50,000 by an undisclosed sum. And while Hakim-Baba suggests that difficulty
valuing his compensatory damages or punitive damages claims redounds to his benefit, it
is of course Hakim-Baba who bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his fee request.

8
the contract” than any defendant. (Ajaxo, at p. 59.) Hakim-Baba invokes the
$19.2 million in damages that Ajaxo had been denied in the trial court, analogizing
Hakim-Baba’s abortive pursuit of rescission damages. But nowhere in his briefing does
Hakim-Baba acknowledge that Ajaxo’s claim for $19.2 million was not for breach of
contract but for misappropriation of his trade secrets. Ajaxo does nothing to make
Hakim-Baba’s mixed result a simple and unqualified one.
Nor does Pacific Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1254 compel a result in Hakim-Baba’s favor. There, in litigation initiated
by a third party, Pacific Custom Pools, Inc. (PCP) sued Turner for $2 million, but Turner
won summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 1258–1259.) Turner later voluntarily dismissed its
own $20,000 indemnification claim against PCP, given the time and expense necessary to
pursuing it. (Id. at pp. 1270–1273.) The trial court denied Turner attorney fees, ruling
that the fee provision in the contract between Turner and PCP applied only to actions
against PCP. (Id. at pp. 1268–1269.) The appellate court reversed that determination (id.
at p. 1270) and ruled that Turner should have been awarded fees as the prevailing party
(Id. at p. 1273). On the latter point, Turner’s election to dismiss its $20,000
indemnification claim did not detract from its “ ‘ “simple, unqualified win” ’ ” on
summary judgment of PCP’s $2 million claim. (Id. at p. 1272.) Here, in contrast,
Hakim-Baba’s litigation goals—even limited to the parties’ contract claims—were
unambiguously to recover both the $3.9 million he had paid toward the purchase of his
interest in I & P and damages for rescission, and his success in achieving his goals was
mixed. Hakim-Baba did not voluntarily dismiss any claim independent of the judgment
on the settlement. Nor is there any evidence that his reason for relinquishing his claim
for unquantified rescission damages was merely that the anticipated litigation expense
outweighed the value of the claim.
Hakim-Baba’s contentions that he won unqualified victories on discrete
contractual issues do not help. The statute requires an analysis of which party, if any,

9
recovered greater relief in the contract action. (See Tobacco Cases I, supra,
216 Cal.App.4th at p. 577.)
C. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Concluding that Neither Party
Recovered Greater Relief
Alternatively, Hakim-Baba contends that he won such a lopsided result on the
contract claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that neither party
recovered greater relief. At bottom, the parties dispute which of them most desired
rescission as a resolution to this case. Rejecting Hakim-Baba’s contention that we must
disregard how his tort claims shaped the parties’ approach to the contract litigation, we
conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion.
1. Consideration of Hakim-Baba’s Tort Claims
The parties dispute whether Hakim-Baba’s tort claims may be considered in
assessing whether Hakim-Baba prevailed. We conclude that they may.
First, Hakim-Baba contends that the trial court did not consider the tort claims.
We disagree.
Nowhere did the trial court say it was disregarding Hakim-Baba’s tort claims.6
Rather, to support its conclusion that plaintiff did not win a substantive victory, the trial
court invoked “the unique circumstances of this litigation,” the defensive nature of
defendants’ cross-claim, and the fact that rescission provided benefits to both parties. We
understand the trial court’s reference to the defensive purpose of defendants’ contractual
cross-claim to recognize defendants’ success in defending against Hakim-Baba’s tort
claims. Indeed, Hakim-Baba’s own argument at the hearing on the fee motion
emphasized this connection: “[T]his is important, if we did not elect rescission and we
got damages under the tort claims, we would have then been liable for a million dollars

6
The trial court declined to consider Hakim-Baba’s quiet title claim because he
voluntarily dismissed it.

10
and change on the cross[-]complaint for a breach of contract, and there’s no indication we
would have gotten anywhere near 3.9 million dollars” in tort damages.7 Moreover, in
finding that the defensive cross-complaint supported a determination that neither party
had prevailed, the trial court focused on Hakim-Baba’s recovery of only “part of the
relief sought on the complaint,” without limiting its consideration to any subset of his
claims.
The trial court was required to assess the parties’ litigation objectives in assessing
whether they prevailed on their contract claims. (See Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 877;
Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 622.) Our Supreme Court has said that a defendant can
be deemed a prevailing party where both parties assert contract claims, neither recovers
anything, and the defendant’s contract claim is “essentially defensive in nature.” (Hsu, at
p. 875, fn. 10.) The equitable assessment of a party’s objectives, defensive or otherwise,
is not limited to cases where no relief was awarded—even a party that is denied direct
relief on a claim may be the prevailing party if it otherwise achieved its main litigation
objective. (See Tobacco Cases I, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 577.)
The trial court could reasonably conclude that the practical purpose of defendants’
contractual cross-claim was to defend against Hakim-Baba’s tort claims by deterring him
from pursuing them, thereby encouraging him to settle for rescission. We recognize that
defendants’ contractual cross-claim is facially offensive—defendants alleged that
Hakim-Baba breached a contract and was required to pay them damages. But defendants
filed the cross-claim in a case where the prospect of contractual damages did, according
to Hakim-Baba’s own argument, influence his decision to abandon his tort claims. So we
interpret the trial court’s order as reflecting a determination that defendants brought their

7
The trial court’s finding that the cross-complaint was defensive necessarily
means that its purpose was to defeat some or all of the claims in Hakim-Baba’s
complaint. Hakim-Baba has not argued that the purpose of the cross-complaint was to
defend against his rescission claim, to the exclusion of defending against his tort claims.

11
contract claim to deter Hakim-Baba from pursuing tort claims and to incentivize a
rescission settlement—a middle ground acceptable to both parties.
Second, as Hakim-Baba recognizes, the “broad” fee provision in the operating
agreement authorizes fees arising from “ ‘any dispute’ ” between members with respect
to the company. All Hakim-Baba’s claims emanate from the agreement by which he
purchased a membership in the company, so all his claims are within the scope of the fee
provision in the operating agreement.
“[I]f the attorney fee provision encompasses fees incurred in connection with any
dispute arising out of the contract, in order to determine the prevailing party the contract
cause of action should not be viewed in isolation from other related claims that were
litigated. . . . While prevailing on the contract is alone significant if the attorney fee
provision limits fee entitlement to the party prevailing on the contract claim, it is not
controlling if the provision authorizes fees to the party prevailing in the resolution of the
entire controversy.” (Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 993.)
Third, even if section 1717 trumps the breadth of the parties’ fee provision and
limits our consideration to Hakim-Baba’s rescission claim and defendants’ breach of
contract claim, both parties’ objectives in asserting those claims were intertwined with
Hakim-Baba’s tort claims.8 As we explained, the trial court reasonably concluded that
defendants’ cross-claim was defensive. And, in context, the claims defendants were
defending by asserting a claim on the contract were Hakim-Baba’s tort claims, which

8
In Santisas, our Supreme Court held that section 1717 permitted a successful
defendant to recover—as an element of costs—attorney fees incurred in defending
against tort claims included in an action on a contract. (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at
pp. 615, 622.) But the court held that section 1717 barred the defendant from recovering
attorney fees incurred in defending the breach of contract claim in the same action,
because the breach of contract claim was voluntarily dismissed. (Id. at pp. 622–623.)
Three justices dissented on the latter issue, arguing that section 1717 should have no
impact on the effect of the bilateral fee provision at issue. (Id. at pp. 624, 631 (conc. &
dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).)

12
required him to affirm the contract. So we assume that the bare fact of Hakim-Baba’s
failure on his tort claims is not itself relevant. But to the extent his tort claims spurred
defendants’ assertion of their contract claim, and defendants’ contract claim in turn
spurred Hakim-Baba to settle for rescission and only partial associated monetary relief,
we will not require a trial court to ignore the interrelationship between all claims. The
trial court was bound to consider defendants’ litigation objectives in pursuing their
contract claim, and in doing so was free to determine these objectives were to deter
Hakim-Baba from pursuing his tort claims.
In this context, we do not read Hsu to preclude consideration of defendants’
success in fending off Hakim-Baba’s tort claims by asserting a contractual cross-claim.
In Hsu, the court reasoned that the “evident[]” purpose for a legislative amendment
replacing “ ‘prevailing party’ ” with “ ‘party prevailing on the contract’ ” was to
“emphasize that the determination of prevailing party for purposes of contractual attorney
fees [is] to be made without reference to the success or failure of noncontract claims.”
(Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 873–874; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 357–358.)9 But Hsu was straightforward: The only claim
was plaintiffs’ claim for specific performance. (Hsu, at pp. 867–868.) The defendants
defeated the claim, so the defendants prevailed. (Id. at p. 868.) Here, in contrast,
crediting the trial court’s determination that the breach of contract cross-claim was
asserted for defensive purposes, we cannot measure the success of defendants’ claim
without considering whether they achieved their defensive purpose by defeating
Hakim-Baba’s tort claims. Indeed, Hsu directs courts to “respect substance rather than

9
The parties dispute both whether (1) the tort claims were directly subject to the
trial court’s consideration as claims on a contract; and (2) Hakim-Baba’s quiet title claim,
which the trial court disregarded based on his voluntary dismissal, should have been
considered. Even if Hakim-Baba is correct on both issues, they do not assist him. There
was a proper basis to consider the results of the tort claims and the trial court did not
consider the quiet title claim.

13
form,” to the point that a party “denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found
to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main
litigation objective.” (Id. at p. 877.) And given the fee provision here, we cannot
determine which party prevailed without considering the functional relationship among
the claims between members of the company. (See Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 990–992.)
So Hakim-Baba’s success, or lack thereof, in obtaining the litigation objectives
reflected by his pursuit of tort claims is, in this case, a proper factor that the trial court
considered in deciding that he was not the prevailing party for the purpose of his request
for contractual attorney fees.
2. Whether Hakim-Baba Won a Lopsided Result
Hakim-Baba argues that even if he did not win an unqualified victory on the
contract claims, their result was still so lopsided in his favor that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that there was no clear winner. But we discern no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s determination that in “the unique circumstances of this
litigation” neither side obtained greater recovery, whether on the contract or in the
litigation overall.
While the parties dispute which of them desired rescission, the record permits the
trial court’s reasonable inference that both were amenable.
On the pleadings, it was agreed that defendants had offered to refund Hakim-Baba
the $3.9 million he had paid.10 And in sworn declarations the individual defendants

10
In MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, the
court evaluated whether MacQuiddy was entitled to fees under a statute that did not
define prevailing party. In that context, as here, “ ‘ “ ‘a court may base its attorney fees
decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its
litigation objectives.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1048.) The defendant admitted liability under the
“ ‘ “lemon law” ’ ” in its answer and the proper amount of its $68,000 payment to
repurchase the car was never litigated. (Id. at pp. 1043, 1048.) The only issue the parties
litigated was whether the defendant was also liable for a civil penalty, and the defendant

14
confirmed their desire to withdraw from their business relationship with Hakim-Baba.11
The only apparent means for defendants to end the relationship were to rescind the
contract (requiring at least a refund of the $3.9 million) or to negotiate a new deal to buy
out Hakim-Baba’s interest. In their answer to Hakim-Baba’s rescission claim, defendants
framed their dispute with Hakim-Baba as a disagreement about repayment terms.12 At
the same time, Hakim-Baba was prosecuting tort claims by which he sought a multiplier
on his compensatory damages and punitive damages, a result that could have left him
with both a monetary recovery and a share of the business. In their declarations, the
individual defendants represented that Hakim-Baba was (improperly, in their view)
seeking substantially more than rescission. The trial court could reasonably conclude that
defendants’ objective in this litigation was, at least to the same extent it was

prevailed on the issue. (Id. at p. 1048.) The reviewing court held that the trial court was
permitted to conclude that MacQuiddy was not a prevailing party because he did not
achieve his main litigation objective, obtaining a civil penalty. (Ibid.) Here, too, there
was no dispute about the amount defendants would have to refund Hakim-Baba. While
the parties’ pre-suit settlement negotiations, if considered, might cast doubt on how
quickly defendants could make that payment, one could still reasonably infer that
Hakim-Baba chose to pursue litigation to secure more ambitious relief than rescission.
11
The declarations, filed in opposition to separate motions by Hakim-Baba for a
preliminary injunction and for summary adjudication, were resubmitted in opposition to
Hakim-Baba’s fee motion.
12
Defendants attached to their answer correspondence sent during the parties’
prelitigation settlement negotiations. The parties dispute whether we may properly
consider their prelitigation settlement negotiations, which the trial court did not mention
in its analysis. (See Waterwood, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 967–968 [ruling that
settlement communications are irrelevant to the prevailing party analysis].) Even if
considered, the negotiations do not materially tilt the scales in either direction. Simply,
they suggest that defendants were prepared to settle by making a securitized promise to
refund Hakim-Baba’s payment, but that Hakim-Baba for reasons articulated in a
declaration from his counsel believed the offer did not provide adequate security to
ensure the refund would be paid. And Hakim-Baba never made an offer for a complete
settlement of his claims. So neither party proposed that the case be resolved on terms
equivalent to those on which the matter eventually settled.

15
Hakim-Baba’s, to secure rescission—refunding Hakim-Baba’s payment to avoid a tort
recovery and exclude him from their business enterprise.
To be sure, the record could have supported a different conclusion by a reasonable
trier of fact. It was Hakim-Baba alone who pleaded a claim for rescission, whereas
defendants’ contractual claim was for breach. But Hakim-Baba, like defendants, pleaded
claims (his tort claims) that were irreconcilable with rescission. (See, e.g., Wong v. Stoler
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1384 [describing necessary election between
“disaffirm[ing] the contract, treating it as rescinded, and recover[ing] damages resulting
from the rescission” or “affirm[ing] the contract, treating it as repudiated, and
recover[ing] damages for breach . . . or fraud”].)13 Those tort claims were Hakim-Baba’s
vehicle for seeking punitive damages. As Hakim-Baba acknowledged in the trial court,
the contract damages potentially available to defendants on their cross-claim for breach
of contract influenced his decision to settle for rescission without rescission damages or
half of the prejudgment interest he claimed.
We also recognize that when Hakim-Baba sought summary adjudication of his
rescission claim based on defendants’ alleged failures of consideration, defendants
successfully opposed the motion.14 But the trial court had defendants’ explanation for
their opposition—Hitesh Desai’s declaration that defendants were prepared to cancel the
deal and refund Hakim-Baba’s payments—despite their view of the contract’s
legitimacy—but that Hakim-Baba attempted to extract unreasonable contract cancelation
terms.15 And defendants distinguish between consensual rescission—which they say they
13
We need not decide whether Hakim-Baba is correct that every one of his tort
theories is irreconcilable with rescission.
14
In conjunction with the summary adjudication motion, Hakim-Baba also sought
writs of attachment under the rescission claims. Earlier in the litigation, Hakim-Baba had
unsuccessfully sought writs of attachment under one of his tort claims.
15
Hitesh Desai described as “extortionist” Hakim-Baba’s claim for seven percent
interest and the cost of borrowing as rescission damages, among other forms of relief.

16
wanted all along and achieved without an adjudication or admission of fault—and the
rescission for cause Hakim-Baba sought through litigation—which they contend
Hakim-Baba was not entitled to and “could result in unjust, harmful findings.”
Hakim-Baba’s allegations having implicated defendants’ business practices and the
potential for claims for damages defendants opposed, we do not view defendants’
resistance in litigation to Hakim-Baba’s rescission claims as foreclosing the trial court’s
broader assessment of the parties’ litigation objectives. Through the settlement,
Hakim-Baba recovered only half the interest he sought and no other damages.
D. Whether the Trial Court Misapplied Legal Standards
Hakim-Baba contends that the trial court misapplied legal standards when it
(1) treated defendants’ cross-complaint as defensive; (2) characterized rescission as a
mixed result because both parties obtained a benefit and a detriment from being returned
to the status quo; and (3) stated that no damages were awarded even though prejudgment
interest is a measure of damages. None of these arguments supplies an independent basis
for reversal.
First, Hakim-Baba argues that a trial court may only consider a defendant’s
defensive objective in filing a cross-complaint when considering whether to award a
defendant prevailing party fees. But he supplies no authority for his preferred limitation:
Irrespective of which party is seeking the fee award, the trial court’s ultimate charge is to
evaluate which if any party prevailed, considering their litigation objectives and relative
success. (See Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 622; Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 877.)
Second, Hakim-Baba asserts that the trial court was not permitted to consider the
practical effects of rescission. But, notwithstanding Hakim-Baba’s preferred framing,
this is not a simple case where one party desired rescission and the other resisted. There
is room in this record for a reasonable inference that defendants viewed rescission at least
as favorably as Hakim-Baba did. On a motion for fees as the “prevailing party” on the

17
“dispute,” we will not require the trial court to willfully blind itself to the result achieved
as compared to the claims in play.
Third, Hakim-Baba contends that the trial court chose the wrong word when it
wrote that Hakim-Baba recovered “no damages and less than the legal rate of interest,”
even though Hakim-Baba’s claimed “damages” included “ ‘economic costs and expenses
incurred’ and ‘costs of funds’ and ‘interest at the legal rate.’ ” Semantics aside, the trial
court understood that Hakim-Baba failed to recover any economic costs or expenses
associated with his payment of $3.9 million to defendants and only half the prejudgment
interest that he sought. Choosing a different word to express that understanding in its
order would not have changed the outcome of its analysis.
III. DISPOSITION
The December 2, 2022 order denying Hakim-Baba’s request for attorney fees is
affirmed.

18
_____________________________________
LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

_____________________________________
WILSON, J.

Hakim-Baba v. Desai et al.
H050787

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