People v. Washington CA2/2

CourtListener 10797811Calctapp23.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 2/23/26 P. v. Washington CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B343173

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA051163)

TRACY BERNARD
WASHINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Modified and affirmed
with directions.
Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and
Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Noah P. Hill
and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_________________________________________
Tracy Bernard Washington (appellant) appeals from a
resentencing order, asserting that the trial court improperly
proceeded in his absence. We reject his contention and affirm,
but direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to
show that two one-year enhancements were stricken rather than
stayed.
BACKGROUND
In 2002, appellant was convicted of criminal threats (Pen.
Code, § 422).1 He was sentenced to 45 years to life in prison,
which included 25 years to life, plus four five-year enhancements
for prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)). Two one-year
enhancements for prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) were
imposed but stayed.
In 2024, his case was set for resentencing under sections
1172.7, subdivision (a) and 1172.75, subdivision (a). On July 15,
2024, counsel appeared for appellant’s resentencing, and the trial
court continued the hearing, ordering appellant to appear at the
next hearing date.
On October 22, 2024, the trial court called the matter for
resentencing and noted that appellant “has not been removed
from” prison. The court “re-ordered [him] out” for the next
hearing date.
On December 10, 2024, the trial court convened the
resentencing hearing, and appellant was again “not present
before the court.” Counsel had filed a “waiver of personal
appearance” dated March 14, 2023, which stated that appellant
had “been advised of his . . . right to be present at all stages of the
proceedings,” and “hereby waives the right to be present at the
hearing of any motion or other proceeding in this cause including

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
but not limited to re-sentencing.” Appellant’s counsel explained
that he sent appellant a letter in November 2024 asking whether
he wanted to attend the hearing, and appellant did not respond.
The court noted that it had issued an inmate transport
order and received a note from the state prison that appellant
could not be transported because he requires a wheelchair, which
the transporters were not advised of beforehand. The court had
also sent “an order for a Webex hearing [that] morning to see if
[appellant] wanted to be here via Webex,” and appellant refused
to attend via Webex.
The court therefore proceeded in appellant’s absence,
reduced his sentence by 10 years (by striking two five-year
enhancements), struck two one-year enhancements that had been
imposed but stayed, and reduced a restitution fine from $10,000
to $300. The abstract of judgment erroneously states that the
two one-year enhancements were stayed rather than stricken.
DISCUSSION
A defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is
guaranteed under the federal Constitution by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments and under the California Constitution
(art. I, § 15), and by sections 977 and 1043 of the Penal Code.
(People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81 (Concepcion).)
This right extends to “ ‘all critical stages of the criminal
prosecution, i.e., “all stages of the trial where his absence might
frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” ’ ” (People v. Cutting
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347.) The right to be personally
present may be waived, however, and waiver may be express or
implied. (Concepcion, at p. 82; People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29
Cal.4th 1196, 1206 (Gutierrez) [a defendant’s waiver “ ‘may be
implicit and turn, at least in part, on the actions of the

3
defendant’ ”].) We review a trial court’s finding that appellant
was voluntarily absent for substantial evidence, based on the
totality of the facts. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 14 Cal.5th 176,
181; People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 74; Gutierrez, supra,
at p. 1205.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
appellant waived his right to be physically present at his
resentencing hearing. Appellant was ordered to appear
physically at the hearing and failed to do so twice. The record
does not disclose why he did not appear on the October hearing
date. At the next hearing in December, appellant again failed to
appear, apparently because he required a wheelchair. But the
trial court also ordered him to appear via Webex, which he
refused to do. His refusal to appear via Webex, if only to state his
desire to be physically present at his resentencing, supports the
trial court’s finding that he was voluntarily absent from the
proceedings. This finding is further supported by an earlier
waiver he had signed under section 977, subdivision (b) to show
that he waived his right to be present at any proceeding,
including resentencing. Although appellant is correct that
section 977, subdivision (b) does not contemplate waiver by a
felony defendant of his presence at sentencing, the trial court
properly considered the signed document in concluding that
appellant’s absence was voluntary. (Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 1205 [voluntary absence is to be determined based on the
totality of facts].) Appellant also failed to respond to his
attorney’s letter about whether he wanted to attend his hearing.
Allowing appellant to come forth now and assert his right to be
personally present at the resentencing hearing “would only serve
to further a defendant’s dilatory tactics” and “ ‘frustrat[e] the

4
orderly processes’ of court proceedings.” (Gutierrez, at p. 1205;
see also Concepcion, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 82 [“ ‘ “Neither in
criminal [proceedings] nor in civil cases will the law allow a
person to take advantage of his own wrong” ’ ”].)
We similarly reject appellant’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s decision to
proceed in his absence. Such a claim requires a showing that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, and that he suffered
prejudice as a result. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)
Appellant’s claim fails at the outset because his counsel’s
performance was not deficient. (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77,
88 [we need not address both elements if one is not satisfied].)
Under all of the circumstances mentioned above, including that
appellant ignored a letter from his counsel asking whether he
wanted to attend, we conclude that counsel’s decision not to
object to proceeding in appellant’s absence was a reasonable
tactical decision. (Mickel, at p. 198 [“we begin with the
presumption that counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of
reasonableness, and afford ‘great deference to counsel’s tactical
decisions’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed, and the trial court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect that the two

5
one-year enhancements were stricken and to forward a certified
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

6

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.