People v. Lopez CA2/6

CourtListener 10795704Calctapp18.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 2/18/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338093
(Super. Ct. No. PA097455)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

KATHIA COREAS LOPEZ
and ANTONIO ORELLANA,

Defendants and Appellants.

Kathia Coreas Lopez and Antonio Orellana appeal
their convictions, by jury, of the first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a))1 and second degree robbery of Bryan Cojon.
(§ 211.) The jury further found that each appellant personally
used a deadly weapon, a knife, during the commission of each
offense. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced each
appellant to state prison for a total term of 26 years to life.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1

otherwise stated.
Appellants contend the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence statements Lopez made to an undercover officer
who was posing as a fellow inmate while Lopez was being
detained in a holding cell. They further contend references made
by the prosecutor to appellants’ El Salvadoran national origin
violated the California Racial Justice Act (“RJA”) (§ 745), and
that the trial court erred when it denied them a hearing on that
claim. Finally, appellants contend the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the distinction between first and second
degree murder because its instructions inadequately defined the
term “premeditation.” We affirm.
Facts
Lopez immigrated with her parents to the United
States from El Salvador. Her parents made her leave the family
home after she became involved with Mara Salvatrucha or M.S.
13, a criminal street gang with ties to El Salvador. After leaving
her parents’ home, Lopez lived in Pacoima with several other
Salvadorans, including appellant Orellana and J.S., a juvenile.
Lopez had a job at a fast-food restaurant and was also a sex
worker who solicited customers on Instagram. After exchanging
Instagram and text messages with him, Lopez arranged to meet
20-year-old Bryan Cojon at a gas station for paid sex. Lopez,
Orellana and J.S. planned to rob Cojon instead.
Cojon borrowed his uncle’s minivan and met Lopez at
the gas station. Surveillance video shows Lopez getting into the
van. The van left the gas station and parked around the corner.
Surveillance video shows Orellana and J.S. arrive and approach
the area where the van was parked. Two days later, Cojon’s body
was found in a ravine off La Tuna Canyon Road, in an area
known for illegal dumping. The minivan was found that same

2
day, abandoned just over one mile from the house where Lopez,
Orellana and J.S. were living.
Searching the van, criminalists found a bloody print
on the back door, a pool of blood matching Cojon’s DNA, an
opened but unused condom and an area where some of the van’s
carpeting had been cut away. Fingerprints lifted from the
exterior of the van belonged to Orellana and J.S.
Cojon had two serious stab wounds to his left thigh.
The fatal wound was four inches deep and severed the femoral
artery, resulting in massive blood loss. The second wound was
also on Cojon’s left thigh, closer to the knee, and was about two
inches deep. That wound did not strike any major blood vessel.
The medical examiner estimated Cojon could have survived for 45
minutes to three hours after the stabbing. Had he received
medical treatment, it would have been possible for Cojon to
survive these wounds. There was a third, more superficial cut on
Cojon’s shin.
Cojon’s father reported him missing when he did not
come home or show up for work the next day. When detectives
came to his house, Cojon’s father gave them the victim’s Apple
Watch and passcode. This allowed detectives to find text
messages connecting Cojon to Lopez and setting the time and
location for their meeting. Location history from the device
Lopez used to communicate with Cojon showed that, around the
time of Cojon’s death, Lopez’s device was near the gas station
where she had instructed Cojon to meet her. The device then
moved around the corner for several minutes. It then moved very
fast away from the gas station and on to the freeway, stopping at
the area where Cojon’s body was found. After some time, the
device moved back to the area near the gas station.

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About one week after the murder, Lopez, Orellana
and J.S. were arrested. Detectives seized Orellana’s cell phone
which contained evidence linking him to M.S 13. It also
contained text messages between Lopez and Orellana’s girlfriend
in which they discussed how to use Cojon’s stolen credit cards.
While in custody, Orellana made recorded phone calls to his
girlfriend. In one call, the girlfriend asked Orellana why he had
been arrested. Orellana replied that he was accused of murder.
She asked what evidence the police had against him and
Orellana replied, “They have everything, evidence, everything,
everything, my hands, everything.” Orellana also confirmed that
his nickname was Chaparro. He also told his girlfriend, “I
already confessed that I had done it.”
After her arrest, Lopez was placed in a holding cell
with an undercover police officer who was posing as an inmate.
Their lengthy conversation was recorded and transcribed. When
the agent first asked Lopez why she had been arrested, Lopez
expressed uncertainty and suggested it must have something to
do with her “brothers,” appellant Orellana and J.S. Lopez
described herself as a low ranking member of M.S. 13 and her
“brothers” as full-fledged members of the same gang. She
believed the gang would kill her if they knew she was talking
about what happened.
When the agent asked again why Lopez had been
arrested, she smiled and whispered that she was involved in a
killing. Lopez explained that one of her “brothers,” didn’t “like”
the victim because he was a member of a rival gang. They ended
up stabbing the victim in the leg. Lopez said that she also
stabbed the victim and that she tried to strangle him with the
seatbelt because he was moving around too much. Then, the

4
group threw Cojon’s body in a ravine. After the stabbing,
Orellana licked the victim’s blood. Lopez later described
Orellana as “a fucking psycho” who “licked the fucking blood.”
Lopez told the agent that she and her accomplices
wore gloves during the murder because they were inside the
victim’s van. They tried to avoid being identified by using alcohol
to clean the van, cutting out the bloodstained carpet and
disposing of some other evidence like the victim’s iPhone.
During the conversation, a detective entered the
holding cell and handed Lopez a flyer describing the murder. The
flyer included photos of Lopez, Orellana and J.S. and described
them as suspects in a murder and members of M.S 13.
Reviewing the flyer, Lopez identified Orellana with the
nickname, “Chaparro.” She told her cellmate that the murder
occurred during an attempted robbery, that Orellana did the
stabbing and J.S. drove the van.
Lopez also explained that she and her “brothers,”
Orellana and J.S. had committed other, similar robberies. She
would arrange to have victims meet her at a gas station or street
corner for paid sex. When the victim arrived, she would let the
victim get high while she stayed sober, then have them move to a
more isolated location where Orellana and J.S. would rob them.
In her trial testimony, Lopez denied stabbing Cojon.
The medical examiner found no indication that anyone had tried
to strangle Cojon with a seatbelt or other instrument. Lopez
testified that she had exaggerated her role in the killing to her
cell mate because she was scared and wanted to make the agent
afraid of her. Lopez claimed she lied about her role in the
stabbing during her interview with detectives because they
suggested that talking might help her avoid a life sentence.

5
Discussion
1. Appellant Lopez’s Statements to the Undercover
Agent. Lopez contends the statements she made to the
undercover agent should have been suppressed because she did
not receive Miranda2 warnings and because police coercion and
deception made her statements involuntary. Orellana contends
the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting
Lopez’s statements against him because her statements were
coerced and unreliable. These contentions lack merit.
First, Miranda warnings were not required in these
circumstances. Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins)
established that, “Miranda warnings are not required when the
suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement
officer and gives a voluntary statement.” (Id. at p. 294, italics
added.) As the Court explained, “Conversations between
suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a ‘police-
dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are not present when an
incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes
to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the
perspective of the suspect. [Citations.] When a suspect considers
himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive
atmosphere is lacking.” (Id. at p. 296.)
California courts have agreed. As the court explained
in People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, the aim of Miranda “is to
ensure that the suspect’s will to remain silent is not overborne by
the coercive atmosphere of police questioning in custody. Both
‘custody’ and ‘police questioning’ are necessary to invoke
Miranda, and both concepts are viewed from the suspect’s

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

6
perspective. [Citation.] Even when the suspect is in the process
of a custodial interrogation, voluntary statements to someone the
suspect does not believe is a police officer or agent, in a
conversation the suspect assumes is private, simply does not
involve one of these two critical concerns.” (Id. at p. 686; see also
People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 165-166 [incriminating
statements made to cellmate working as a government agent did
not require Miranda warnings and were not involuntary where
the cellmate’s “questions or tactics were [unlikely] to procure an
untrue statement or were otherwise improper”]; People v.
Gonzales & Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 284 [Miranda warnings
not required before conversation with fellow inmate because
incriminating statements “were voluntary and free of
compulsion”].)
Second, we are not persuaded that appellant Lopez’s
statements were coerced or otherwise involuntary. Whether
Lopez’s statements were voluntary, depends on “the totality of
the circumstances. We accept a trial court’s factual findings,
provided they are supported by substantial evidence, but we
independently review the ultimate legal question.” (People v.
Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 480 (Scott); see also People v. Guerra
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1092-1093, disapproved on other grounds
in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
As the Court noted in Perkins, “Miranda forbids
coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a
suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow
prisoner.” (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 297.) A statement is
involuntary if it is “‘“extracted by threats or violence, obtained by
direct or implied promises, or secured by the exertion of improper
influence. . . .”’” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176,

7
quoting People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661; People v.
McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347.)
Here, although it is undisputed that law enforcement
used deception to obtain Lopez’s statements, there is no
substantial evidence that this deception was “of a type reasonably
likely to produce an untrue statement.” (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 481.) For example, the undercover officer did not threaten
Lopez or offer her any benefit in exchange for continuing their
conversation. She didn’t try to intimidate Lopez or pretend to
offer Lopez any advice. The transcript of their conversation
discloses that, in addition to describing the crime and identifying
her accomplices, Lopez volunteered extensive information about
her family, her gang membership, her sex life and her living
arrangements. On many occasions, Lopez laughed as she spoke
to the officer. There is nothing to suggest her will was overborne
by coercion. The trial court did not err in admitting Lopez’s
statements to the undercover agent.
2. Racial Justice Act. Appellants contend the
prosecuting attorney violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA) by
referring to their El Salvadoran ethnicity during her cross-
examination of Lopez and in her closing argument. The trial
court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that
appellants had not made the requisite prima facie showing.
There was no error.
Section 745 provides that the state “shall not seek or
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence
on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is
established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence” that an attorney in the case “exhibited bias or animus
towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity

8
or national origin,” or used “racially discriminatory language
about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin . . . ,
whether or not purposeful.” (Id., subd. (a)(1), (a)(2).) The use of
discriminatory language does not violate the statute if “the
person speaking is relating language used by another that is
relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially
neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(2).) Racially discriminatory language includes language
that, “to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to
racial bias, including, but not limited to, . . . language that
references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture,
ethnicity, or national origin.” (Id., subd. (h)(4).)
If a defendant makes a motion during trial, “and the
defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of
subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing.” (§ 745, subd.
(c).) In this context, the term “prima facie showing” means “the
defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a
substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred.
For purposes of this section, a ‘substantial likelihood’ requires
more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more
likely than not.” (Id., subd. (h)(2).)
Here, appellants contended in the trial court that the
prosecuting attorney violated the RJA during her cross-
examination of Lopez and during her closing argument by
focusing on Lopez’s national origin, on her membership in a gang
that originated in El Salvador, and on the references Lopez made
to witchcraft in her conversation with the undercover agent. She
contends the prosecutor implied that witchcraft and violence
were attributable to Lopez’s national origin.

9
For example, Lopez told the undercover agent that
Orellana stabbed the victim because the victim was from a rival
gang, 18th Street. The prosecutor asked Lopez whether she
knew, “that one of the main rivals that M.S. 13 has is 18th
Street. Correct?” Lopez answered, “Yes.” She also knew that
there were members of 18th Street in El Salvador. Lopez agreed
that 18th Street and M.S. 13 were rivals “even in [Lopez’s] home
country.” The prosecutor also referred to Lopez’s claim that
Orellana licked the victim’s blood. She asked, “And is that
because of some type of, as you called it, ‘Brujeria’? The
witchcraft?” Lopez answered, “No.” She also denied that licking
blood is “part of what M.S. 13 does when they kill someone[.]”
In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “And
she [Lopez] laughs about Antonio [Orellana] licking the victim’s
blood after the murder. I mean, how wrong is that? You kill
someone in cold blood, and you lick their blood. To what? To
taste your victory? [¶] That is who these people are over there.”
Appellants contend these comments make a prima
facie showing of an RJA violation. In their view, the prosecutor
inferred that people from El Salvador are more violent, callous
and willing to harm others because they come from a country
that practices witchcraft, where killers lick the blood of their
victims, and where the violent gang, M.S. 13, originated. They
further contend the phrase, “That is who they are over there,”
referred to Salvadorans and was intended to separate
Salvadorans into a “despicable” group and to dehumanize them.
In opposing appellants’ RJA motions, the prosecutor
explained that the questions regarding witchcraft and licking the
victim’s blood were references to the behavior of M.S. 13
members, not to persons from El Salvador. Similarly, the

10
statement in closing argument referred to appellants’ conduct in
this case, not their national origin. The prosecutor described
Lopez’s callous attitude toward the killing, noting that she
laughed while describing the dress she wore during the killing
and Orellana licking the victim’s blood. In the next sentence, the
prosecutor stated, “That is who these people are over there.” This
was a reference to appellants’ behavior and to the activities of
M.S. 13, not to the people of El Salvador.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding
appellants had not made a prima facie showing of an RJA
violation and were not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. It found that the prosecutor “was referencing some of the
acts that the [appellants] committed and referenced and kind of
linked that into them being members of Mara Salvatrucha.”
We agree with the trial court. Appellants did not
make a prima facie showing that the prosecuting attorney
violated the RJA. First, the prosecutor questioned Lopez about
statements Lopez made to the undercover agent regarding her
birthplace in El Salvador and appellants’ association with M.S.
13, witchcraft and blood licking. These questions were based on
Lopez’s own statements and related directly to her description of
each person’s actions during the robbery and murder.
Statements do not violate the RJA if “the person speaking is
relating language used by another that is relevant to the
case . . . .” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, the questions do not
invite an objective observer to infer that people from El Salvador
are violent gang members who engage in or believe in witchcraft.
Instead, they remind the observer that Lopez described herself
and her co-defendant in those terms. Consequently, these
questions do not establish a “substantial likelihood that a

11
violation of subdivision (a) occurred,” and therefore do not make a
prima facie showing that the RJA has been violated. (Id., subd.
(h)(4).)
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the
prosecutor’s closing argument. The statement, “That is who
these people are over there,” does not refer expressly to
appellants’ national origin, ethnicity or immigration status. In
fact, at no point in her closing argument did the prosecutor refer
appellants’ race, ethnicity, national origin or immigration status.
Read in context, the prosecutor was arguing that Lopez behaved
callously after the crime, bragging and laughing about her role in
it and the “psycho” things her co-defendant did. An objective
observer would not understand the phrase, “[t]hat is who these
people are over there,” to refer to all Salvadorans or even to
appellants’ national origin. The more straight forward
understanding of the phrase is that it refers to the callousness
and cruelty of the people on trial – that the appellants are people
who engage in the cruel behavior shown by the evidence at trial,
not that they are cruel or violent because of their national origin
or ethnicity.
Appellants contend this analysis goes beyond the
court’s proper role in determining whether appellants made a
prima facie showing of an RJA violation. At the prima facie
stage, the court “should accept the truth of the defendant’s
allegations . . . unless the allegations are conclusory, unsupported
by the evidence presented in support of the claim, or
demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own records.” (Finley v.
Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23.) Ultimately, the
question is whether “the motion and its supporting evidence state
facts that, ‘if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood

12
that a violation’ occurred . . . .” (Id. at pp. 23-24, quoting § 745,
subd. (h)(2).) The court “should not weigh the evidence or make
credibility determinations, except in the rare case where the
record ‘irrefutably establishes’ that a defendant’s allegations are
false.” (Id. at p. 24.)
But accepting appellants’ factual allegations as true
does not require us, or the trial court, to accept appellants’
conclusions as true. Here, the facts are the prosecutor’s
questions and argument, as well as the context provided by the
evidence at trial. Appellants’ contentions that the prosecutor’s
comments “othered” them, were references to their national
origin or exhibited bias are conclusions derived from those facts
and need not be accepted as true. (See, e.g., People v. Quintero
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1076-1078 [rejecting appellants’
characterization of “‘predator’” and “‘monster’” as “dehumanizing”
and violative of the RJA].) The record here demonstrates that
the trial court accepted appellants’ factual claims as true but
disagreed with their conclusion, as do we. There was no error.
3. Instructional Error. Appellants contend the trial
court erred in instructing the jury on the distinction between first
and second degree murder. Appellants contend that CALCRIM
No. 521 and CALCRIM No. 526 provide the jury with an incorrect
definition of “premeditation,” because the pattern instructions do
not inform the jury that premeditation requires “substantially
more reflection” than the intent required for second degree
murder.
“‘“A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury ‘sua
sponte on general principles which are closely and openly
connected with the facts before the court.’”’” (People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 677, quoting People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45

13
Cal.4th 789, 824.) However, the court has no duty to “revise or
improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request
from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an
otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal . . . .” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638
(Lee).)
We review the claim of instructional error de novo,
considering the challenged instructions in the context of the
instructions and the record as a whole “‘to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in
an impermissible manner.’” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th
306, 326; People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) If the
instructions are reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that
supports the judgment rather than defeats it, we will adopt that
interpretation. (People v. Spaccia (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1278,
1287.)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury in terms of
the pattern instructions CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 526, regarding
premeditation and implied malice. Appellants contend the trial
court erred because these instructions do not adequately
distinguish between the mental states required for first and
second degree murder. This contention has been forfeited
because appellants did not object to the instructions or request
that they be modified. (Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 638; People v.
Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001.)
Had the contention not been forfeited, we would
reject it because CALCRIM No. 521 correctly defines
premeditation.3 As our Supreme Court has explained, “In the

3The instruction states, “[A] defendant is guilty of first
degree murder if the People have proved that he or she acted

14
context of first degree murder, ‘“premeditated” means “considered
beforehand,” and “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The process of premeditation and
deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The
true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of
the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly . . . .” [Citations.]’” (Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 636; see
also People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 (Houston).)
CALCRIM No. 521 is consistent with these principles
because it informs the jury, “The defendant acted with
premeditation if he or she decided to kill before completing the

willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant
acted willfully if he or she intended to kill. The defendant acted
deliberately if he or she carefully weighed the considerations for
and against his or her choice and, knowing the consequences,
decided to kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if he or
she decided to kill before completing the act that caused death.
[¶] The length of time the person spends considering whether to
kill does not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate
and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation
and premeditation may vary from person to person and according
to the circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively,
or without careful consideration is not deliberate and
premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to
kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the
reflection, not the length of time.” “The People have the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first
degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first
degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.”

15
act that caused death.” It further informs the jury that, “The
length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does
not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and
premeditated. . . . A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or
without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated.
On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be
reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the
length of time.” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court has also consistently held that
premeditation and deliberation can occur “‘“in a brief
interval. . . .”’” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1069
(Mendoza).) The test “‘“‘is not time, but reflection. “Thoughts
may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly.”’”’” (People v. Solomon
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812.)
Appellants argue that reliance on “the extent of
reflection” rather than the “duration of time,” collapses any
meaningful distinction between a premeditated killing and one
that occurs intentionally, but rashly or impulsively. The jury
should, they contend, have been instructed that premeditation
requires “‘substantially more reflection than may be involved in
the mere formation a specific intent to kill.’” (People v. Boatman
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264, quoting People v. Thomas
(1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900.) We are not persuaded. As our
Supreme Court has often noted, thoughts may follow each other
rapidly and a person can, instantaneously, make a calculated
judgment to kill another. (Ibid; see also People v. Potts (2019) 6
Cal.5th 1012, 1027; Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1216-1217;
Mendoza, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1069.)

16
For the same reason, we reject appellants’ contention
that the prosecutor committed error or misconduct in closing
argument when she argued premeditation “can be made in an
instant.” Even if this contention had not been forfeited based on
appellants’ failure to raise it in the trial court, we would find no
error because the prosecutor did not misstate the law. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 893-894; People v. Thornton
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 454.)
Here, there was substantial evidence from which the
jury could infer that appellants killed with premeditation and
deliberation. First, as Lopez admitted, the robbery of Cojon was
planned in advance. Appellants lured Cojon to the gas station
with the promise of sex, and agreed ahead of time to rob him
after he arrived. Orellana armed himself before going to the van.
Lopez described Orellana stabbing Cojon because he was moving
around too much during the robbery and because Orellana
believed Cojon was a member of a rival gang. Cojon was stabbed
in the thigh, severing his femoral artery, and then dumped in a
ravine to bleed to death. The jury could infer that appellants’
decisions to stab Cojon to stop him from moving and to retaliate
against him for supposedly belonging to a rival gang, were the
product of substantial reflection and calculation. (See, e.g.,
People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471 [numerous stab
wounds show “preconceived design to kill”]; People v. Koontz
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1082 [targeting vital area of body shows
premeditation].) Withholding medical treatment from Cojon and
then abandoning him to bleed to death is also evidence that
appellants acted with premeditation. (See, e.g., People v. Raley
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 888 [premeditation where defendant
stabbed and abandoned victims to bleed to death in isolated

17
area]; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1023-1024
[premeditation where defendant shot victim and allowed her to
bleed to death during lengthy car ride], disapproved on another
ground, People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, fn.13.)
4. Cumulative Prejudice. Orellana contends the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his federal and
state constitutional rights to due process and fair trial. Because
we have found no error, there is no error to cumulate. (People v.
Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 836; People v. Camacho (2022)
14 Cal.5th 77, 148.)
Conclusion
The judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

18
Hayden A. Zacky, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Lopez.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Orellana.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

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