CourtListener 10795700•People v. Turner CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/18/26 P. v. Turner CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336360
(Super. Ct. No. 23F-03778)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
BRANDI ELAINE TURNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Brandi Elaine Turner appeals a judgment following her
conviction of voluntary manslaughter and several drug offenses
for causing the overdose death of a man to whom she sold
fentanyl. (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351, 11377, subd. (a).) Turner was
sentenced to seven years in state prison.
Turner contends the trial court erred in imposing a
midterm sentence for her voluntary manslaughter conviction
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
because it misconstrued section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Because
she endured childhood trauma and sexual and domestic abuse,
Turner contends she is entitled to remand so that the trial court
can consider a low term sentence. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2022, Quinn Hall sent a message to Turner
stating that he had $100 to purchase drugs. On many prior
occasions, Hall purchased drugs from Turner; text messages
between them reflected sales of fentanyl and methamphetamine
from August through October 2022.
In April 2022, Turner and her husband overdosed on drugs
containing fentanyl. Fire department personnel found the
husband dead at the scene; Turner was admitted to a hospital,
treated, and survived. Several times Turner warned Hall that
her husband had died from a fentanyl overdose.
On October 26, 2022, Turner and Hall arranged to meet
behind an animal shelter where Turner sold Hall baggies of
fentanyl and methamphetamine. Hall ingested the drugs and
soon died from a fentanyl overdose. When found by a sheriff’s
deputy, he was lying on the ground behind the animal shelter,
clutching narcotics paraphernalia in his hand.
Turner had previously worked as a correctional officer with
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for seven
years. As part of her law enforcement training, Turner took a
drug identification and training course that included information
regarding the dangers of fentanyl.
Turner was charged with murder based on her providing
Hall with drugs that caused his death (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
several controlled substance offenses. The jury convicted Turner
of the sale of fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for sale, and
2
possession of methamphetamine for personal use. (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351, 11377, subd. (a).) The jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge, and the court
declared a mistrial as to that count. The information was then
amended to add count 5, voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd.
(a)), and Turner pleaded nolo contendere to that charge. The
court found true aggravating circumstances that the crime
disclosed a high degree of callousness, and the defendant engaged
in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1).) The court found true the
mitigating circumstance that Turner had no prior record. (Id.,
rule 4.423(b)(1).)
At sentencing, Turner asserted that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) applied and warranted a lower term
sentence. She pointed out that she was a drug addict, had been
raised by drug-addicted parents, was sexually abused as a child,
and suffered domestic violence from her drug-addicted husband.
Following her husband’s overdose death in 2022, Turner lived
with a drug dealer and sold drugs on his behalf.
The trial court rejected Turner’s argument. The court
acknowledged that she suffered sexual abuse and domestic
violence and concluded that it contributed to her addiction, but it
did not “contribute[] to the selling of drugs.” The court also noted
that Turner, as a previous law enforcement officer, received
training regarding the dangers of illegal drugs and knew the
dangers of fentanyl: “She was trained. And she knew how
dangerous it was.”
The trial court sentenced Turner to a midterm sentence of
six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction (count 5) and
imposed a consecutive one-year term for the possession of
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fentanyl for sale conviction (count 3). It imposed but stayed a
four-year sentence for furnishing fentanyl (count 2) and stayed
the sentence for misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine
(count 4).
DISCUSSION
Turner asserts that the trial court erred in imposing a
midterm sentence for voluntary manslaughter because it
misunderstood the meaning of “a contributing factor” when
considering the import of her childhood trauma and sexual and
domestic abuse. She contends the trial court erroneously
concluded the connection must be substantial or significant, and
more than slight. Turner relies upon principles set forth in
People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241 (“contributing
factor” is less than a significant factor) and Couzens et al.,
Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2025) § 12:7.
For this reason, Turner contends a remand is required for
resentencing. We are not persuaded.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) establishes a presumption
that the sentencing court should impose a lower term sentence if
certain mitigating circumstances were contributing factors in the
commission of the crime. It provides: “[U]nless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence. [¶] . . . [¶] (C) Prior to the instant offense . . .
the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence . . . .”
4
“[T]he trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives.” (People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.) We review a determination under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) for abuse of discretion.
(Fredrickson, at pp. 988–989.) We review subsidiary “factfinding”
determinations for substantial evidence. (People v. Oneal (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 581, 589 [determination whether mental disorder
was significant factor in commission of offense for mental health
diversion].)
Here, the trial court correctly construed section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) and (C) when it expressly found that
Turner’s previous trauma was a contributing factor to her drug
addiction but not to the commission of the voluntary
manslaughter offense. The trial judge stated: “If contributing
factor really means as Retired Judge Couzens opines, however
slight, I don’t see how you can argue that what she suffered,
which clearly she did, contributed to the selling of drugs.” The
court did not base its ruling on whether the prior trauma was a
substantial contributing factor, but found instead it did not
contribute at all.
We conclude the trial court reasonably concluded there was
an insufficient connection between Turner’s trauma and abuse
and her commission of voluntary manslaughter. The court
recognized that Turner’s trauma and abuse contributed to her
addiction but did not contribute to “this offense.”
Voluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill or
conscious disregard for life. (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th
959, 968.) The trial court here acknowledged that Turner did not
intend to kill Hall. But the court found that Turner knew it was
dangerous to ingest fentanyl because her husband had recently
5
overdosed on fentanyl, and she had received training on fentanyl
as a corrections officer. Substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that Turner’s trauma and abuse was not a
contributing factor in her reckless act of selling fentanyl when
she knew it was dangerous to ingest it, causing Hall’s death. As
the trial court aptly stated, Turner “knew that it was dangerous
to human life and she deliberately acted with conscious disregard
to human life. That was the basis of the plea, the basis of the
conviction.” The court did not abuse its discretion in reaching
that conclusion.
The trial court also found that the aggravating
circumstances of Turner’s crime outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 429
[lower term presumption of § 1170, subd. (b)(6) “can . . . be
departed from if ‘the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice’ ”].) The court
acknowledged the aggravating factors did not “far” outweigh the
mitigating factors, but section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) only
requires that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances so that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice. (People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 771 [citing § 1170, subd. (b)(6)].) Here, the
trial court reasonably concluded it was not in the interest of
justice to impose the low term given the aggravating
circumstances of Turner’s act of selling fentanyl to Hall
notwithstanding her knowledge of the lethal danger of ingesting
it. Reversal is not warranted.
6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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