CourtListener 10793863•People v. Zarakowski CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/13/26 P. v. Zarakowski CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336022
(Super. Ct. No. PA099512)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
MARK ANDREW
ZARAKOWSKI,
Defendant and Appellant.
Mark Andrew Zarakowski appeals the judgment after a
jury convicted him of assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1),
misdemeanor theft (§ 484, subd. (a); count 2), two counts of illegal
use of tear gas (§ 22810, subd. (g)(1); counts 3 and 4), and assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5). He was
sentenced to three years in state prison.
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
As to count 5, Zarakowski contends the trial court erred in
refusing to give a self-defense instruction, there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction, and the court erred in
refusing to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple
assault. He also contends, and the Attorney General concedes,
error in the abstract of judgment. We correct the error in the
abstract of judgment but otherwise affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
September 20, 2022, incident (counts 1, 2, 32)
Corrie and Andrew3 are the ex-wife and son of Zarakowski.
Andrew’s friends, Yasmeen Davis and her boyfriend, Jayden
Fador, were staying at Corrie and Andrew’s home. Zarakowski
showed up at the house, and asked Davis who she was and what
she was doing there. At the time, Davis was alone in the house.
She explained to Zarakowski why she was at the house, but he
did not believe she had permission to be there. Zarakowski left
the home but sat in his car in the driveway.
Davis called Fador to come to the house. When Fador
arrived, he went upstairs to grab some belongings and put them
in a backpack and another bag. Zarakowski returned to the
house, “got mad,” and told Davis that she lied to him about no
one else being inside the house. He accused Fador and Davis of
stealing and told them to leave the house.
2 Zarakowski was charged with another count of assault
with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6), but the jury
found him not guilty.
3 Because they share the same last name, we use first
names for the sake of clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2
Fador and Davis left the house and stood outside. Fador
called Corrie, who said Zarakowski was not allowed to be inside
the house. Zarakowski then left the house, got into his car, and
began to pull away when Fador read Zarakowski’s license plate
numbers out loud. Zarakowski got out of the car and approached
Fador. Fador dropped his bags and assumed a “fighting stance.”
Zarakowski and Fador began to fight, during which Zarakowski
headbutted Fador several times. A surveillance camera filmed
the altercation.
Before Zarakowski drove away, he grabbed Jayden’s bags
and put them in his car. Davis was recording the interaction on
her phone. Zarakowski made a U-turn in his car, rolled down his
passenger window, and pepper sprayed Davis in the face.
November 4, 2022, incident (counts 4 & 5)
Andrew, Fador, and Davis drove to Andrew’s house in his
car. Two other friends, Christopher Hernandez and Kayla
Sullivan, drove in a separate car. When Andrew arrived at his
house, Zarakowski was sitting in his car parked in front of the
house. Andrew walked towards Zarakowski and began yelling
and cussing at him. When the friends got out of the car,
Zarakowski said, “Oh, you guys came to jump me?” Andrew and
Hernandez approached Zarakowski while the other friends
stayed back. A home surveillance camera recorded the
interaction, and Sullivan recorded with her phone from about 15
feet away.
Zarakowski told Andrew to “[g]et out of my fucking house.”
Zarakowski yelled, “Did you pay for it . . . did you pay for it” in
reference to the house, and he pepper sprayed Andrew. Andrew
retreated slightly each time he was sprayed but then stood his
ground. Zarakowski said, “You want to fuck around [with] me,
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asshole!” and “Yeah, I[‘m] going to circumcise you.” Hernandez
saw Zarakowski pull out a knife from his back pocket. Fador also
saw the knife. They both saw Zarakowski “swing” the knife at
Andrew. Corrie came out of the house and jumped between
Andrew and Zarakowski to end the altercation.
DISCUSSION
Self-defense instruction
Zarakowski contends the trial court prejudicially erred by
not instructing the jury on self-defense as to count 5 (assault with
a deadly weapon (knife)). We disagree.
“A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a
request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” [Citation.] In addition, “a defendant
has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the
defense. . . .” ’ [Citation.] The court may, however, ‘properly
refuse an instruction offered by the defendant . . . if it is not
supported by substantial evidence [citation].’ ” (People v. Burney
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246.) “Substantial evidence supporting
sua sponte instruction on a particular defense is evidence that is
‘sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., ‘evidence
from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could have
concluded’ ” ’ that the particular facts underlying the instruction
did exist.” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 75; People v.
Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8 [“evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive”].) Nevertheless,
“ ‘[s]peculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient
. . . .’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 385.) “Although
a trial court should not measure the substantiality of the
evidence by undertaking to weigh the credibility of the witnesses,
4
the court need not give the requested instruction where the
supporting evidence is minimal and insubstantial.” (People v.
Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145, fn. omitted.)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 919.) And when a defendant’s
request for a jury instruction has been refused, we review the
record de novo to determine whether there was substantial
evidence that required giving the instruction. (People v. Simon
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132–133.)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense on
count 4 (use of tear gas against Andrew) but not on count 5
(assault with a deadly weapon against Andrew). The trial court
found the evidence was insufficient to support a self-defense
instruction on count 5.
We conclude the trial court did not err in finding the
evidence insufficient to support a self-defense theory.
Self-defense is an affirmative defense if the defendant (1)
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of suffering
bodily injury or being touched unlawfully; (2) reasonably believed
that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against
that danger; and (3) used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend himself against that danger. (People v. Clark
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 235, 250; CALCRIM No. 3470.)
Here, the evidence does not support that Zarakowski
reasonably believed he was in imminent danger or that he
reasonably believed immediate use of force was necessary to
defend against danger. During the point in the altercation when
the knife was used, Zarakowski had already pepper sprayed
Andrew multiple times, which made Andrew withdraw each time
he was sprayed. After pepper spraying Andrew, Zarakowski said,
5
“You want to fuck around [with] me, asshole!” and “Yeah, I[‘m]
going to circumcise you.” These statements refute Zarakowski’s
claim that he was acting in self-defense. At this point in the
altercation, Zarakowski became the aggressor. Nor was there
evidence that a knife was reasonably necessary for Zarakowski to
defend himself at that point during the altercation. Andrew was
unarmed and had been pepper sprayed multiple times when
Zarakowski swung his knife at Andrew.
But even if the trial court should have given a self-defense
instruction on count 5, the error would have been harmless under
either the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) or
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 standards. The
jury was instructed on self-defense on count 4, but it nonetheless
rejected the self-defense theory and found him guilty of count 4.
Under these circumstances, including Zarakowski wielding his
knife at Andrew after pepper spraying him and the jury
convicting him of count 4, any error in refusing to give the
self-defense instruction on count 5 is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Sufficiency of evidence
Zarakowski contends the evidence was insufficient to
support the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon because
he did not use the knife in a manner capable of producing and
likely to produce death or great bodily injury. We conclude
otherwise.
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, “we review the
whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record
must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e.,
6
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.
[Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to
justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine
the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve
neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) makes punishable “[a]ny
person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a
deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm.” A “ ‘deadly
weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to
produce, death or great bodily injury. [Citation.]’ ” (People v.
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029.) “Analysis of
whether the defendant’s manner of using the object was likely to
produce death or great bodily injury necessarily calls for an
assessment of potential harm in light of the evidence. As noted, a
mere possibility of serious injury is not enough. But the evidence
may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to
pass.” (In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 535.)
7
Here, substantial evidence supports that Zarakowski used
his knife in a manner capable of producing and likely to produce
great bodily injury. Fador and Hernandez testified they saw
Zarakowski “swing” his knife at Andrew. The video evidence
further corroborates this testimony. The video shows Zarakowski
threatening to “circumcise” Andrew, pulling something from his
pocket, and making an arm motion towards Andrew. The jury
could reasonably find from this video that Zarakowski used the
knife in a manner that was capable and likely to produce great
bodily injury. A knife was also recovered from Zarakowski’s car,
and the jury could further assess from a photograph of this knife
whether it was an object capable of producing great bodily injury.
The evidence together is sufficient to support that Zarakowski
assaulted Andrew with a deadly weapon.
Lesser included offense
Zarakowski contends the trial court erred by not
instructing on the lesser included offense of simple assault on
count 5. We conclude there was no prejudicial error.
A simple assault is “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another.” (§ 240.) The only difference between simple assault
and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) is that the
latter requires proof of the additional element that in committing
the assault, the defendant used a deadly weapon or instrument
other than a firearm. (People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th
736, 748.) Because an assault with a deadly weapon cannot be
committed without necessarily committing a simple assault,
simple assault is a lesser included offense of assault with a
deadly weapon. (Id. at pp. 747–748; People v. Lopez (1998) 19
Cal.4th 282, 288.)
8
“ ‘ “[A] trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses,
even in the absence of a request, whenever there is substantial
evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of
the charged offense are present.” [Citation.] Conversely, even on
request, a trial judge has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense
unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.] The question, then, is whether there was
substantial evidence that defendant committed assault but not
assault with a deadly weapon.” (People v. Page (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 1466, 1474.) We review de novo the question of
whether a trial court erroneously failed to instruct on a lesser
included offense. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 463.) If
error is found, the reviewing court must determine if there is a
reasonable probability that the omission affected the jury’s
verdict. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177–178;
Watson, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
“ ‘ “[I]n some circumstances it is possible to determine that
although an instruction on a lesser included offense was
erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted
instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant
under other, properly given instructions. In such cases the issue
should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s
consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and
there can be no prejudice to the defendant since the evidence that
would support a finding that only the lesser offense was
committed has been rejected by the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Elliot
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 475.)
In our view, there was no reasonable probability that the
failure to instruct on simple assault affected the jury’s verdict.
The evidence as to count 5 included two witness testimonies that
9
Zarakowski swung at Andrew with a knife, videos of the
confrontation, and Zarakowski’s statements that he was going to
“circumcise” Andrew. In his defense, Zarakowski disputed he
had a knife and also argued that if he had a knife, he used it in a
nondeadly way as a “buffer” or “to maintain a safety distance
between him and Andrew.” Because the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 875, it necessarily found that Zarakowski used a
knife in a manner capable and likely to produce great bodily
injury to Andrew. Because Zarakowski used his knife in a
manner likely to result in the application of force (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1)), there is no reasonable probability that omission of a
simple assault instruction would have affected the jury’s verdict.
(Watson, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Abstract of judgment
Zarakowski contends, and the Attorney General concedes,
the abstract of judgment must be amended to correct a clerical
error and to reflect that he was sentenced to concurrent, and not
consecutive, terms for counts 1, 3, and 4. We agree.
A trial court has the inherent power to correct clerical
errors at any time and a reviewing court may order correction of
an abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral
pronouncement of judgment. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185.)
Here, the trial court sentenced Zarakowski to three years
in state prison on count 5. It sentenced him to a concurrent
three-year term for count 1, concurrent two-year terms each for
counts 3 and 4, and a concurrent one-year term for count 2.
However, on the second amended abstract of judgment, a box
indicating that he was to serve one-third of his sentence
consecutively for counts 1, 3, and 4 was checked, as well as a box
10
indicating that those same sentences are to be served
concurrently. This was clerical error. We therefore order the
abstract of judgment to be corrected so that the only box checked
is the one that reflects the sentences for counts 1, 3, and 4 are to
be served concurrently.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall modify the
abstract of judgment to reflect that concurrent terms were
imposed for counts 1, 3, and 4. The court shall forward a copy of
the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
11
Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Megan D. Baca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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