CourtListener 10786722•In re E.G. CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 2/10/26 In re E.G. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re E.G. et al., Persons Coming B347218
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 21CCJP04228D-G)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cristina G. Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, Giselle Marie Achecar, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mother appeals from the June 26, 2025 order terminating
parental rights to four of her children under section 366.26.1
Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court and
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) did not comply with their initial inquiry
obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (Cal-
ICWA) (§ 224 et seq.). The Department concedes that its ICWA
inquiry efforts were inadequate and asks us to conditionally
reverse and remand with directions to make an initial inquiry of
available extended maternal family members. However, based
on mother’s opening brief and our independent review of the
record, we conclude that (1) mother forfeited her contention of
ICWA error by failing to support her argument with citations to
the record, and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the
court’s determination that the minors here were not Indian
children. We therefore affirm the termination of parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother’s appeal concerns an order terminating parental
rights to four of mother’s children. The two oldest, E.G. and S.G.,
share the same father, M.G. The Department was unable to
locate P.H.’s father. E.B. is the father of V.B., mother’s youngest
child.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
2
In December 2021, E.G., S.G., and P.H. were declared
dependents in a prior dependency case. A year later, the court
terminated jurisdiction with an order granting mother and M.G.
joint physical and legal custody of the two older children, and
releasing P.H. to mother. The Department’s reports in the
current case reported that in the prior dependency case, the
juvenile court had found no reason to know minors were Indian
children under ICWA.
A second case was initiated in the fall of 2023, and the
court declared E.G., S.G., and P.H. dependents based domestic
violence between mother and E.B. (mother’s boyfriend), E.B.’s
physical abuse of the children, and mother’s failure to protect the
children, including a count that mother knew maternal uncle was
a methamphetamine user and allowed him to live in the family
home. During the initial investigation, the Department social
worker interviewed mother in the family home. Also present in
the home at the time of mother’s interview were mother’s
children; maternal grandmother; maternal grandmother’s minor
daughters; Beatriz, a parent advocate from Parenthood Partners
Family Services; and mother’s parent advocate through the
regional center. Beatriz reported she saw the family three times
a week for four to six hours per day, assisting mother with the
goal of becoming independent. Mother, maternal grandmother,
and Beatriz all denied the children had any Indian ancestry. The
investigating social worker interviewed another social worker
who worked with maternal grandmother on maternal
grandmother’s ongoing dependency case. Maternal
grandmother’s social worker denied any Indian ancestry for the
family. In a separate interview, maternal uncle also “denied
ICWA.” The social worker interviewed C.G., the paternal
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grandmother of E.G. and S.G., who also “denied ICWA.” Paternal
grandmother C.G. saw all three children regularly, and they
would stay with her for a week or two at a time.
After an extended visit with C.G. that started in
September, the children were placed with C.G. in November
2023.
V.B. was detained from mother’s custody shortly after she
was born, and in March 2024, she was declared a dependent
child. Mother and V.B.’s father, E.B., both denied any Indian
ancestry. The juvenile court in Riverside County found that V.B.
was not an Indian child. E.B. identified his siblings, paternal
uncle M.B., and paternal aunt J.B., as possible placement
options, but asked the investigating social worker not to contact
them until he (E.B.) consented. The social worker later contacted
paternal uncle M.B., who denied Indian ancestry. The social
worker was unable to contact paternal aunt J.B., and J.B.’s voice
mail was not set up.
In April 2024, as part of a concurrent planning assessment,
a Department social worker noted that paternal grandfather J.G.
needed to be added as a resource parent for adoption
consideration. At a six-month review hearing in May 2024, the
court terminated reunification services after finding that mother
and J.G.’s progress had been insubstantial, and ordered the
Department to initiate an adoptive home study.
Paternal grandfather J.G. was present during a visit
between mother and her children in July 2024, but there was no
indication in the Department’s report that J.G. spoke to the social
worker. A six-month status review report stated that C.G. and
J.G. were the caregivers for V.B., and that their home had been
given resource family approval in November 2023. At a
4
permanency planning hearing in November 2024, the court
continued to find that ICWA did not apply to the three older
minors. In fact, at the hearing under section 366.26, the juvenile
court noted the thoroughness of the Department’s inquiry efforts
before finding ICWA inapplicable.
The court terminated reunification services for mother and
E.B., with respect to minor V.B., at a 12-month review hearing in
March 2025. V.B.’s paternal grandmother M.F. denied any
Indian ancestry.
At a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 in
June 2025, the court terminated parental rights as to all four
minors. During the hearing, the court asked the Department
about the extent of its ICWA inquiry, and also asked all family
members present, including mother, father E.B., paternal
grandmother C.G., paternal grandfather J.G, and paternal uncle
J.G. whether any of them had Indian ancestry, and they all
denied any Indian ancestry. The minute orders also stated the
court continued to find that ICWA was not applicable as to each
minor.
DISCUSSION
According to mother, the Department failed to satisfy its
inquiry duties under ICWA and Cal-ICWA. Mother’s opening
brief makes the following argument: “There were living extended
family members known to Department by name that the
Department failed to inquire about their knowledge of the
family’s or the minors’ American Indian heritage.” Mother
identifies eight extended family members—five maternal and
three paternal relatives—and argues that the Department “did
5
not question these extended family members, who were known by
the Department, and named in the reports.” However, mother’s
brief lacks any record citations directing us to the portion of the
record where the relatives are identified. In fact, mother’s brief
lacks any information about the context or extent of the
Department’s contact, if any, with the named extended family
members, or any efforts made to contact them.
The portion of mother’s brief summarizing ICWA
proceedings does summarize information obtained from some of
the family members who were asked about possible Indian
ancestry, but the summary is woefully incomplete. If one were to
rely solely on the factual statement in mother’s brief, the only
extended family members questioned about possible Indian
ancestry, beyond mother and the two fathers (M.G. and E.B.),
were the two paternal grandmothers and V.B.’s paternal uncle.
As we explain below, the record reflects that Department’s
inquiry efforts were far more extensive than mother describes in
her brief.
Rather than filing a respondent’s brief, the Department
filed a letter brief conceding that its ICWA inquiry efforts were
inadequate as to maternal and paternal relatives.2 The letter
brief goes on to request that this court conditionally reverse the
termination of parental rights and remand with directions for the
Department to “make initial inquiry of available extended
maternal and family members, including making all reasonable
2 The letter only identifies the five maternal relatives by
name, followed by a string of record citations. The letter brief
also purports to cite to an FOB, which we understand to be a
reference to father’s opening brief, but to our knowledge, no
father has filed an appeal in the present case.
6
efforts to attempt to interview” just four identified maternal
relatives, without explaining why a fifth maternal relative and
all three paternal relatives identified by mother were left off the
Department’s list.
Despite the Department’s concession, we conclude mother
has forfeited her argument by failing to present a complete and
accurate summary of the record evidence of ICWA inquiry efforts.
In addition, we reject the argument that there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s “no ICWA” finding on the facts
before us.
A. Mother’s Claim of ICWA Error is Forfeited by
Inadequate Record Citations and an Inaccurate
Summary of the Department’s ICWA Inquiry Efforts
It is a well-established principle of appellate law that all
factual statements must be supported by specific citations to the
appellate record, regardless of where in the brief the facts are
discussed. (California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);
Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 580, 595–596 [appellate courts may disregard
arguments relying on factual statements unsupported by record
citations]; WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [court may decide an “appellant
has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by
accurate citations to the record”]; City of Hesperia v. Lake
Arrowhead Community Services Dist. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 734,
740, fn. 1 [courts may “disregard[] factual statements in the
parties’ briefs that are not accompanied by accurate references”
to the record]; Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32
7
Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5, [same]; County of Riverside v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 119, 124
[courts may ignore factual statements in appellate briefs that do
not contain record references]; Professional Collection
Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970 [statements
must be supported by record cites “no matter where in the brief
the reference to the record occurs”].)
In addition, every appellant has a duty to present both
favorable and unfavorable facts in an even-handed manner.
(L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620–621.) “[A]n
attack on the evidence without a fair statement of the evidence is
entitled to no consideration when it is apparent that a
substantial amount of evidence was received on behalf of the
respondent.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246,
see also E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 1267, 1286 [appellants failure to present both
favorable and unfavorable evidence “waives any claim that the
trial court’s . . . finding is not supported by substantial
evidence”]; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218, [appellant forfeited issue on
appeal by failing to “set forth, discuss, and analyze all [of] the
evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable” in
opening brief].)
Mother’s brief provides no record citations to support her
factual assertion that the eight identified extended family
members were known to the Department and that the
Department had the opportunity to ask those family members
about Indian ancestry and failed to do so. The opening brief is
not only lacking in relevant record citations, it also incorrectly
and misleadingly asserts that the Department did not meet its
8
inquiry obligations because it failed to ask maternal
grandmother, maternal uncle, paternal grandfather, and two
maternal aunts about possible Indian ancestry. Rather than
robustly opposing mother’s argument by identifying the evidence
in support of the Department’s ICWA inquiry efforts, as we do
below, the Department simply filed a letter brief conceding ICWA
error.
In fact, the record establishes the Department did ask
maternal grandmother and maternal uncle, and both denied that
ICWA was applicable. Paternal grandfather J.G., who along with
paternal grandmother C.G. was a prospective adoptive parent for
all four children, also denied any Indian ancestry. With respect
to mother’s contention that the Department failed to ask two
maternal aunts, ICWA does not impose an obligation to ask
relatives who are under the age of 18 about Indian ancestry, and
the record is clear that both maternal aunts were minors.
(§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
By failing to provide this court with an accurate summary
of the relevant facts and failing to identify evidence unfavorable
to her argument, mother has forfeited her contention that ICWA
inquiry was inadequate.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Determination that the Department Met its ICWA
Inquiry Obligations
Although mother’s mischaracterization of the record is a
sufficient ground for this court to reject her argument of ICWA
error, we also reject mother’s argument that the lack of any
inquiry efforts with respect to the three remaining family
9
members requires conditional reversal. Ignoring the five family
members discussed above, the following family members were not
asked about Indian ancestry: (1) maternal great uncle J.M., (2)
the two older children’s paternal great uncle A.S., and (3) V.B.’s
paternal aunt J.B. Mother’s argument that failure to ask these
family members about possible Indian ancestry constitutes
reversible error ignores the extent to which the juvenile court had
before it a well-developed record containing substantial evidence
that the Department’s inquiry efforts were proper, adequate, and
duly diligent. (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101–
1102; In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141.)
The duty of initial inquiry under Cal-ICWA “includes, but
is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b)(2).) Extended family members are persons over the age of 18
who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
And “on the first appearance upon a petition, ‘the court shall ask
each participant present in the hearing whether the participant
knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ ”
(In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1099, quoting § 224.2,
subd. (c).)
Our highest court has acknowledged, however, that the
duty of inquiry does not require interviewing “every” extended
family member. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at 1140 [holding
reversal is not required “in all cases in which every possible
extended family member has not been asked about the child’s
10
Indian ancestry”]; see also id. at 1153 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.)
[“Cal-ICWA does not, as some have assumed, require the juvenile
court to leave no stone unturned in an “ ‘ “open-ended universe of
stones,” ’ ” thereby creating ever-widening circles of mandatory
inquiry”]; id. at 1167 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.) [requiring inquiry of
“every member of a child’s extended family, including every first
and second cousin, every single niece and nephew, all aunts and
uncles, all siblings-in-law” would be “ ‘absurd at best and
impossible at worst’ ”].)
“ ‘[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is “a
quintessentially discretionary function” [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.’ (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1141, quoting Ezequiel G. [(2022)] 81 Cal.App.5th [984,] 1005
[(Ezequiel G.)].) ‘ “On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the
more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.” ’ (Kenneth D.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) Our high court thus has
held, ‘[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to
be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as
required by California law [citation], there is no error.’ (Dezi C.,
at p. 1141.)” (In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 800–801.)
“We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding
that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2) [juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to
the proceedings is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence’]; see also [Ezequiel G., supra,] 81 Cal.App.5th [at
11
pp.] 1004–1005 [reviewing juvenile court’s finding that it had no
reason to know a child is an Indian child for substantial evidence
but reviewing decision that ICWA inquiry was adequate for
abuse of discretion], disapproved on another ground in Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18; Dezi C., at p. 1134 [declining
to decide applicable standard of review].)” (In re C.R., supra, 112
Cal.App.5th at pp. 799–800.)
There was already ample evidence that there was no Indian
ancestry through mother, as there was evidence a prior court had
found ICWA inapplicable to those children, and the Department
had already received negative responses from maternal and
paternal relatives, as well as numerous service providers.
Substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that there was
no reason to believe they were Indian children. Maternal great
uncle J.M. resided in the same home as maternal grandmother
and mother, but there is no evidence in the record that any
relative had indicated he might have knowledge of any Indian
ancestry, or that he ever communicated with anyone at the
Department.
A.S., paternal great-uncle to E.G. and S.G., was residing in
the home of paternal grandparents, and the Department reported
in September 2023 that an attempt to obtain A.S.’s phone
number from paternal grandmother had not yet yielded a
response. The investigating social worker interviewed the social
worker handling maternal grandmother’s dependency case, who
reported that there was no Indian ancestry. The case worker for
mother’s prior dependency case also reported that the family had
no Indian ancestry. Multiple service providers were asked and
denied that they had any reason to believe the family had any
Indian ancestry.
12
The only paternal relative of mother’s youngest child, V.B.,
who was not questioned about possible Indian ancestry was
paternal aunt J.B. However, the investigation into V.B.’s safety
was initiated in Riverside County, and the social worker there
reported that father initially requested that paternal aunt and
uncle not be contacted until he had a chance to talk to them, and
that when the social worker tried calling paternal aunt, there
was no answer and no way to leave a voicemail. In addition,
V.B.’s father and her paternal uncle both denied any Indian
ancestry.
From these facts, the juvenile court could infer that the
Department’s ICWA inquiry efforts were adequate, proper, and
duly diligent.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s June 26, 2025 order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J.
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